

## Factsheet

### The integration of groups with a migration background in 2018

#### Introduction

This factsheet outlines the current situation and main developments regarding integration of the largest population groups of non-Western origin in the Netherlands. The main source of information used is the set of tables compiled annually by Statistics Netherlands at the request of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment's Society and Integration Department: the *Integration Key Indicators*. The latest figures largely confirm the trends reported last year: for most aspects, the majority of the groups are still in a less favourable position than the reference group without a migration background (ethnically Dutch people, i.e. those of whom both parents were born in the Netherlands), which means that the ultimate goal of integration policy – i.e. equality – has not yet been achieved. Nevertheless, there are positive signs of progress towards this policy objective: the differences between groups with and without a migration background are gradually narrowing.

The current statistics show that, in 2017, groups with a migration background clearly benefited from the economic recovery. While the 2016 policy review concluded that improved levels of education had not yet translated into jobs, we can see from the latest data that the employment-to-population ratio among groups with a migration background is once again rising and unemployment is falling. Particularly as regards the latter, there have been spectacular improvements in specific categories: among second-generation Moroccans, for example, the unemployment rate has fallen by almost 6 percentage points in a single year. Nonetheless, there is still a long way to go; unemployment among groups with a migration background is still roughly two (first generation) to three (second generation) times higher than among groups without a migration background.

Moreover, simply having a job naturally says little about a person's labour market status; the quality of the work is also relevant. According to new figures, the proportion of people who start their employment career with a part-time job working fewer than 20 hours a week is higher among most groups with a migration background than among those without. This is not just an indication of weaker labour market status; having lower earnings also affects the position of these groups in various other social fields.

The main points are as follows:

- The proportion of the Dutch population with a migration background is slowly but surely moving towards a quarter.
- Educational achievement gaps are narrowing, but there is still a difference.
- The labour market situation of groups with a migration background has improved rapidly over the past couple of years, but here too sometimes considerable disadvantages persist and migrants continue to be vulnerable.
- This is reflected in higher welfare dependency and, on average, a lower income.
- Migrant over-representation in crime statistics is falling fast, but there are still sometimes significant negative differences.
- Even in intangible areas such as social capital and health, the position of groups with a migration background – especially those of non-Western origin – is less


favourable than that of ethnically Dutch people.

Another important point is that, although the above conclusions are valid for the overall categories, the reality is more complex, with large differences even within groups:

- Across the generations, we see a general improvement: in most areas, the second generation is in a better – or even much better – position than the first generation and is considerably less at a disadvantage in relation to ethnically Dutch people; and
- there are considerable differences between (and within) groups of origin:
  - whereas the position of second-generation Antilleans sometimes scarcely differs from that of ethnically Dutch people, the first generation is still in a very disadvantaged position; and
  - among second-generation Moroccans, remarkable progress has been made in several areas.

## Demographics

Population by origin, as at 1 January 2018		
	Number	Proportion
<b>Total population</b>	17,181,084	100
<b>Ethnically Dutch</b>	13,209,225	76.9
<b>Total with migration background</b>	3,971,859	23.1
<b>Total with Western background (excluding ethnically Dutch)</b>		
- German	354,136	2.1
- Polish	173,050	1.0
- Belgian	118,725	0.7
<b>Total with non-Western background</b>		
- Turkish	404,459	2.4
- Moroccan	396,539	2.3
- Surinamese	351,681	2.0
- Antillean	157,114	0.9
- Other non-Western	933,050	5.4
Of which: sub-Saharan African (as at 1/1/2017)	207,844	
<b>Note: an individual has a migration background if at least one of his or her parents was born abroad. The 'with migration background' category therefore includes both the first and the second generation, even where the latter was born in the Netherlands.</b>		
<b>Source: Statistics Netherlands</b>		




As at 1 January 2018, almost a quarter (23.1%) of the Dutch population had a migration background. Locally, the proportion with a migration background is sometimes substantially higher due to concentration effects: this category already makes up more than half of the population in Amsterdam, The Hague and Rotterdam. Within individual districts and neighbourhoods, these effects are even more pronounced. In some areas (e.g. Transvaal and Schilderswijk in The Hague), more than 90% of the inhabitants have a migration background.

The Dutch population has increased by 99,577 since 1 January 2017, and that growth has occurred entirely in the category with a migration background: the number of ethnically Dutch people has decreased not only in relative terms (from 77.4% to 76.9%), but also in

absolute terms (by 9,529). Although all categories with a migration background grew in size, the 'other non-Western' category saw the largest increase, by 54,229 people. This group largely comprises asylum seekers with residence permits.


### Population with a migration background, broken down by generation, as at 1 January 2017

Currently at least half of the traditional non-Western groups from Morocco, Turkey and Suriname were born in the Netherlands and are therefore second generation. The equivalent figure for groups with an Antillean or other non-Western background is still less than half, i.e. most are first generation.



### The third generation is still small in number and young

The third generation of non-Western migrants in the Netherlands is still small in number. In 2016 Statistics Netherlands estimated that 120,000 people in the population aged up to 50<sup>1</sup> were third generation: both parents were born in the Netherlands and at least one has a migration background.



This category is largest in the group with a Surinamese background, with approximately


<sup>1</sup> Due to technical data collection limitations, the maximum age of 50 was used.

44,000 people (roughly one-eighth) classified as third generation. The people in this category are young and most are still of school age.


## Education

### Early leaving is falling and education levels are rising

The trends in education are favourable: the reduction in early leaving is more significant, and education levels are rising slightly faster among pupils with a migration background than among those without. This improvement in attainment can be seen in almost all types of education: both in pre-vocational secondary education (VMBO), where a larger proportion take the more advanced programmes, and in senior general secondary education (HAVO)/pre-university education (VWO). In the case of the latter indicators, the trend discerned in the groups with a Moroccan or Surinamese background is particularly positive.



Educational disadvantage is therefore gradually narrowing and this has a knock-on effect on the educational attainment of the non-school population: the proportion of school-leavers with a basic qualification – regarded as the minimum level required to enter the labour market – has been rising for years and is currently about the same among groups with a migration background<sup>2</sup> as among people with an ethnically Dutch background.




However, there are still differences between the individual origin categories. For

<sup>2</sup> These figures relate to the second generation. Since first-generation migrants were educated in their country of origin, this analysis is not possible in their case.

example, in the past 10 years, the group with a Turkish background has had the greatest educational disadvantage (albeit narrowing) in relation to ethnically Dutch people, while the proportion of people with a basic qualification is higher in some other second-generation groups (e.g. Antilleans) than among ethnically Dutch people.

People with a migration background also tend to accumulate courses more often than their ethnically Dutch counterparts, with the result that they are now successfully completing higher education in increasing numbers, albeit by a longer route. This is also reflected in the highest educational attainment of these population groups: the proportion of highly qualified people is gradually rising and the proportion of poorly educated people is falling. In all categories, fewer than half fell into the lowest two levels of education in 2018 (second quarter).




## Work


The latest labour market data available reveal a spectacular development: in recent years the economic recession hit groups with a migration background especially hard – unemployment ‘exploded’ in this population category – but now that the economy is booming again, the labour market status of these groups is recovering strongly. Particularly in the case of groups with a Turkish and – even more so – a Moroccan background, the improvement has been remarkable.


### Employment-to-population ratio continues to improve

This is reflected in the proportion of the population with a job: after reaching a low point in 2014, net employment has once again been on an upward trend in the past two years for groups with a non-Western or Western migration background and for those without a migration background. Nevertheless, the non-Western group in particular still has a lot of ground to make up (11.1 percentage points). Moreover, the gap is only slowly closing, as employment among the group with a Dutch background is also on the rise again.




A closer look reveals that the employment rate is mainly increasing among the relatively well-educated second generation. Compared with the previous year (2016), employment among the second generation with a Surinamese or Turkish background rose sharply in 2017, by 2.9 percentage points. In the case of second-generation Moroccans, there had already been a remarkably large increase in employment a year earlier (by more than 7 percentage points), which was maintained into 2017 and even improved on slightly. Furthermore, the employment rate among second-generation Surinamese is coming close to that of the ethnically Dutch group, though the difference between them is still more than 2.5 percentage points, compared with more than 5 percentage points in the case of second-generation Antilleans. The gap still exceeds 8 percentage points for the Turkish and Moroccan groups. When we look at the first-generation statistics, the difference in the employment rate compared with ethnically Dutch people is much larger, especially among the groups with an Antillean or Moroccan background (more than 17 percentage points).






### Unemployment once again falling sharply

Unemployment follows the economic cycle much more closely than the employment-to-population ratio does and is therefore a better indicator of short-term trends. The gap between the group with a non-Western background and the category without a migration background was 5.4 percentage points in 2008 (5.1 and 6.1 for the first and second generation, respectively), almost doubling to 10.7 percentage points by 2013. The peak has been reached and unemployment among groups with a migration background is now falling sharply in absolute terms, and also faster than among ethnically Dutch people, with the result that the gap is narrowing. The difference for the non-Western category was 10.4 percentage points in 2014, 9.6 in 2015 and 8.3 in 2016, falling further to 7.2 in 2017.



Here, too, the second generation – which was hit hardest during the recession – has seen the most spectacular recovery. Last year we established that there had been a dramatic drop for second-generation Moroccans in particular, by 5.7 percentage points. This downturn levelled off between 2016 and 2017, but at 3.5 percentage points it is still substantial. Over the same period unemployment among second-generation Turks and Antilleans also fell sharply, by 4.3 and 4.6 percentage points, respectively, compared with a decrease of just 1 percentage point among ethnically Dutch people.

Although a great deal of ground has been made up, especially by the second generation, glaring differences remain: in 2017 unemployment among groups with a migration background was still two to three times higher than among the group without a migration background. With the exception of the Antillean group, the second generation recorded a higher unemployment rate than the first generation. In the case of the Antillean group, the familiar pattern of a well-integrated second generation and a problematic first generation is once again evident: the second generation has the lowest unemployment of all non-Western categories (7.8%), while the first generation has the highest (17.4%), with the rate even rising slightly between 2016 and 2017.




## **Workers with a migration background more likely to start in part-time jobs**

Whether a person is employed or not makes a huge difference in terms of social status. Having a job is of great significance, as income is the key to, for example, living in a nice home in an attractive neighbourhood. It is also connected with actual and perceived health, contributes to self-esteem, etc. However, simply knowing whether a person does or does not have a job is not enough in itself to indicate his or her labour market status. If someone is in employment, aspects like the number of hours they are employed for are also relevant. Starting this year, therefore, the key indicators will also provide information about the proportion of the population working more or fewer than 20 hours a week in their first job. A part-time job of fewer than 20 hours a week (and therefore paying no more than half a wage) could be described as 'marginal' employment.

According to the figures compiled by Statistics Netherlands, during the period 2003-2017 the proportion of employees with a migration background working more than 20 hours a week in their first job was smaller than among ethnically Dutch people. In the case of the Western groups, the difference is very small; for non-Western employees, however, the situation is quite different. There are also considerable differences between and within groups. For example, in 2017 the proportion among the groups with a Turkish or Moroccan background was 7% and 11% lower, respectively, with the second generation well below the first.





While there is no real difference between the Surinamese group and ethnically Dutch people, the proportion among the Antillean group is a good 5 percentage points lower. Interestingly, however, compared with the ethnically Dutch reference group, a considerably larger proportion of first-generation Surinamese – but a significantly smaller proportion of the second generation – had a job of 20 hours a week or more 15 years ago. Since then the groups have tended to converge: among the first generation, the proportion has fallen to approximately the ethnically Dutch level while among the second generation, it has increased to this level.

The final point here is that in the case of Central and Eastern Europeans, the first generation has a first job of more than 20 hours a week more often than ethnically Dutch people, but the converse is true for the second generation.

### Pattern

While it is welcome news that the increase in employment rates among the categories with a migration background is continuing, unemployment is still falling and the gap in relation to the population without a migration background is shrinking, this does not mean that the tide has turned for the better once and for all. The recent trend is consistent with the established pattern where people with a migration background are the first to suffer job losses in a recession and are often the last to benefit when the economy picks up again. The fact that groups with a migration background are more likely than ethnically Dutch people to have a first job with a relatively small number of hours (less than 20 a week) is another indication that these groups still occupy a vulnerable position in the labour market.


### Income

#### Large income gap

The lower labour market status of groups with a migration background is of course reflected in their income. The *standardised income* in 2016 was €30,200 for ethnically Dutch people, the highest compared with all other groups. The income of the groups with a migration background is consistently lower, by an average of €9,500 in the period 2011-2016.

At about €20,000, the income of the groups with a Moroccan or Turkish background was almost one-third lower in the period 2011-2016. In the case of those with a Surinamese or Antillean background, the gap is smaller, averaging €5,600 and €8,000, respectively, over the same period. This gap is relatively stable: since 2013 the income of all groups has gradually increased, though slightly more strongly among the groups with a migration background. The result is that the gap has narrowed, but only to a limited extent (a few hundred euros annually). Consequently, there is still a considerable income gap.

Here, too, there is a difference between generations: the income of the second generation is higher than that of the first generation in all groups with a migration background, particularly so in the case of the Antillean and other non-Western groups (approximately €5,000 higher). For both of these groups, the difference compared with ethnically Dutch people is about half the size of the first-generation gap.




These and all other figures provide a factual, descriptive picture of the position of the various groups, but do not explain the differences. Regarding these income statistics, it is relevant, for example, that groups with a migration background – and this is certainly true for the second generation – are on average younger than those without, which partly explains the income gap (see also the final section of this factsheet).

## Social assistance

### Over-representation in social assistance


Vulnerable labour market status is also reflected in the degree of welfare dependency: groups with a migration background are heavily over-represented in social assistance and although there was a decline in dependency at the beginning of the millennium, the trend reversed when the economic crisis hit in 2008. It then continued to rise and was much greater among groups with a migration background than among those without.

Welfare dependency reached a peak in 2014 and has been falling in all groups for the past three years. Among groups with a migration background, the downward trend is much steeper, with the result that over-representation is gradually decreasing. They are still lagging well behind ethnically Dutch people, however.



Large differences between and within the different groups are also evident in the area of welfare dependency. For instance, in the group with a Central and Eastern European (CEE)

background, it is only fractionally higher than that of ethnically Dutch people, with no difference between the first and second generation. It is a different story with the other categories: there the proportion of people dependent on social assistance is two to three times higher among the first generation than among the second. The difference is extremely large in the category with a sub-Saharan African background:<sup>3</sup> almost one-third of the first generation is dependent on social assistance, while the proportion of the second generation is only 1 percentage point higher than the figure for ethnic Dutch people.




## Crime

### Over-representation is declining



The crime rate – measured on the basis of the number of suspects per 1,000 inhabitants aged 12 and over – is considerably higher on average among non-Western migrants than among ethnically Dutch people. This over-representation is extensive and systematic. The figures compiled by Statistics Netherlands show a positive trend, however: whereas the number of suspects among non-Western migrants was 37 per mille points<sup>4</sup> higher than among ethnically Dutch people in 2005 and 2006, this over-representation has clearly diminished since 2007.

<sup>3</sup> This category has recently been added to the key indicators under agreements undertaken in the context of the International Decade of People of African Descent, and includes the following countries: Mauritania, Senegal, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Mali, Liberia, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, The Gambia, Togo, Benin, Niger, Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, Central African Republic, Gabon, Republic of the Congo (Congo-Brazzaville), South Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, Zambia, Angola, Namibia, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, South Africa, Madagascar, Malawi, Cabo Verde, Mauritius, Equatorial Guinea and Guinea-Bissau.

<sup>4</sup> Statistics Netherlands measures the number of suspects per 1,000 persons.





The latest Statistics Netherlands data indicate that this downward trend is continuing and has even speeded up in recent years. According to preliminary figures for 2017, over-representation has decreased to 18.5 per mille points, falling by a larger margin in the past year than in previous years. This trend is evident in all categories. Nevertheless, there are still significant differences between the groups, though the decrease in all groups is substantial.



For instance, the proportion of suspects among the group with an Antillean background was highest during the entire period (2005-2017), but also dropped the most, from 82 per 1,000 in 2005 to 44 per 1,000 in 2017. There was also a large downturn among migrants of Moroccan origin, from 74 per 1,000 in 2005 to 37 per 1,000 in 2017. In the Surinamese, Turkish and other groups, the proportions were always lower (though still substantially higher than those in the ethnically Dutch group); the number of suspects per 1,000 dropped sharply in these groups too, however, for example from 53 to 28 and from 45 to 20 in the Surinamese and Turkish groups, respectively.

If we take a closer look, we can see that both the first and the second generation are following the downward trend, which is particularly steep among first-generation Antilleans and second-generation Moroccans, both groups which used to have a very high proportion of suspects.






Although there have been encouraging developments in this area (with the number of suspects falling in absolute terms and the difference between groups with and without a migration background narrowing), groups with a migration background were still over-represented in the crime statistics in 2017.

### Perceived health

Epidemiological research consistently shows that lagging behind in education, employment and income has an impact on people's health. Given the disadvantages and gaps in the areas discussed, groups with a non-Western migration background may be expected to have poorer perceived health than ethnically Dutch people. The National Health Survey conducted by Statistics Netherlands bears this out: 8 in 10 ethnically Dutch people perceive their own health as good or very good, compared with roughly three-quarters of the group with an Antillean background, about two-thirds of those with a Surinamese or Turkish background, and 6 in 10 of those with a Moroccan background. Moreover, this proportion fell slightly among most groups during the period 2013-2017 and the difference compared with ethnically Dutch people increased.


Among all groups for which there are sufficient observational data to be able to draw conclusions, it can be seen that, compared with the ethnically Dutch age group, the younger group reports a better health perception than the older cohorts. Older Moroccans and Turks have by far the worst results.



### Inter-ethnic marriages


A traditional indicator of social and cultural integration is the extent to which migrants and their descendants marry someone from a different background.

For many years the key indicators have revealed a relatively stable picture: the proportion of the groups with a Surinamese or Antillean background that marry outside their own ethnic group of origin is considerably higher than for the groups with a Turkish or Moroccan background. In the Moroccan group the proportion is roughly one-fifth, with hardly any difference between first and second generation, whereas in the group with a Turkish background we see the remarkable trend that the second generation is less likely than the first to marry someone from a different background. Among other groups, the proportion of the second generation is higher than that of the first. In the case of the Surinamese and Antillean groups, the proportion is much higher: more than half and almost three-quarters, respectively. In these groups the proportion among the second generation (56% and 91%, respectively) is much higher than among the first generation.



## Social capital

A new indicator was introduced this year to assess social and cultural integration:




using what is known as the yardstick for social capital, a total index is presented that helps clarify the extent to which there is a difference in social capital between different groups. The index value does not, therefore, shed light on the increase or decrease in social capital over time, but is an excellent tool for determining how different groups relate to each other in individual years.


The figures show that, during the period 2012-2017, the difference between groups increased as regards the amount of social capital available to them, with the non-Western category having least, the Western category taking up a middle position and the ethnically Dutch group scoring highest. Unfortunately, it is not possible to calculate these figures for individual groups of origin.

The overall score includes two underlying aspects: *participation* and *trust*. 'Participation' concerns the extent to which people have contact with family, friends and fellow citizens and have informal help (social participation), the extent to which they participate in employment, voluntary work and associations (civic participation) and participate politically (voting and political action). The second aspect, 'trust', is also broad and covers general social trust, political trust (in the House of Representatives) and civic trust (in the armed forces, the police, the courts, civil servants, the press and large companies).

In both these aspects, the categories with a migration background score lower than those without, with the non-Western and ethnically Dutch groups being furthest apart and the Western group coming between the two. The difference in participation is the largest and remains relatively stable over time. The difference in trust is quite small, but especially among the non-Western group trust seems to decline after 2014.




A closer look reveals that the first generation has significantly less social capital than the second. For the second generation, the difference in participation compared with ethnically Dutch people is small, but there has been a marked decline in trust since 2014.



## Describing and explaining are two different things

The Statistics Netherlands figures presented in this factsheet *describe* the position of groups with a migration background, both in absolute terms and in comparison with the category without a migration background, but explicitly *do not explain* the differences between groups. Explanations do exist, of course. For instance, analysis reveals that the lower average educational attainment of pupils with a migration background can mainly be attributed to their parents' low or lower level of education.



Gap in reading comprehension (left diagram) and arithmetic (right diagram) between final-year primary school pupils with a non-Western migration background and those without a migration background, broken down by background, actual and corrected, 2013/2014 (in test scores; source: Netherlands Institute for Social Research (SCP), *Integratie in zicht?*)

If we correct the analysis for differences in this factor, we find that pupils with a migration background in, for example, primary education perform as well as or better than comparable pupils without a migration background: in the diagrams, the educational disadvantage of pupils with a Moroccan background (the red bar) has turned into an advantage (the green bar).

A similar effect can also be seen in the percentages of suspects: for example, the non-Western population has a low average age (younger than the ethnically Dutch population) and is therefore over-represented in the age group that oversteps the law more often (mainly comprising adolescent boys), which partly explains the over-representation.

The relevance of the descriptive analysis is that the actual differences between groups of origin are the starting point for integration policy, *and* are directly related to the ultimate goal: equality (i.e. no differences) between groups. They thus provide crucial information for *monitoring* integration policy.

The explanatory insights elicited from the *in-depth studies* of the Netherlands Institute for Social Research (SCP), for example, fulfil a different role in the policy-making process by offering guidelines for developing policy and devising policy instruments.

This factsheet is based on Statistics Netherlands data, mainly the *Integration Key Indicators*

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