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INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON climate change

# Climate Change 2022

## Mitigation of Climate Change

Summary for Policymakers



Working Group III contribution to the  
Sixth Assessment Report of the  
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change



**WORKING GROUP III CONTRIBUTION  
TO THE IPCC SIXTH ASSESSMENT REPORT (AR6)**

**Summary for Policymakers**

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## A. Introduction and framing

The Working Group III (WG III) contribution to the IPCC's Sixth Assessment Report (AR6) assesses literature on the scientific, technological, environmental, economic and social aspects of mitigation of climate change. [FOOTNOTE 1] Levels of confidence [FOOTNOTE 2] are given in () brackets. Numerical ranges are presented in square [] brackets. References to Chapters, Sections, Figures and Boxes in the underlying report and Technical Summary (TS) are given in {} brackets.

**FOOTNOTE 1:** The Report covers literature accepted for publication by 11 October 2021.

**FOOTNOTE 2:** Each finding is grounded in an evaluation of underlying evidence and agreement. A level of confidence is expressed using five qualifiers, typeset in italics: *very low*, *low*, *medium*, *high* and *very high*. The assessed likelihood of an outcome or a result is described as: virtually certain 99–100% probability, very likely 90–100%, likely 66–100%, more likely than not 50–100%, about as likely as not 33–66%, unlikely 0–33%, very unlikely 0–10%, exceptionally unlikely 0–1%. Additional terms may also be used when appropriate, consistent with the IPCC uncertainty guidance: <https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/05/uncertainty-guidance-note.pdf>.

The report reflects new findings in the relevant literature and builds on previous IPCC reports, including the WG III contribution to the IPCC's Fifth Assessment Report (AR5), the WG I and WG II contributions to AR6 and the three Special Reports in the Sixth Assessment cycle, [FOOTNOTE 3] as well as other UN assessments. Some of the main developments relevant for this report include {TS.1, TS.2}:

**FOOTNOTE 3:** The three Special Reports are: Global Warming of 1.5°C: an IPCC Special Report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways, in the context of strengthening the global response to the threat of climate change, sustainable development, and efforts to eradicate poverty (2018); Climate Change and Land: an IPCC Special Report on climate change, desertification, land degradation, sustainable land management, food security, and greenhouse gas fluxes in terrestrial ecosystems (2019); IPCC Special Report on the Ocean and Cryosphere in a Changing Climate (2019).

- **An evolving international landscape.** The literature reflects, among other factors: developments in the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) process, including the outcomes of the Kyoto Protocol and the adoption of the Paris Agreement {13, 14, 15, 16}; the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development including the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) {1, 3, 4, 17}; and the evolving roles of international cooperation {14}, finance {15} and innovation {16}.
- **Increasing diversity of actors and approaches to mitigation.** Recent literature highlights the growing role of non-state and sub-national actors including cities, businesses, Indigenous Peoples, citizens including local communities and youth, transnational initiatives, and public-private entities in the global effort to address climate change {5, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17}. Literature documents the global spread of climate policies and cost declines of existing and emerging low emission technologies, along with varied types and levels of mitigation efforts, and sustained reductions in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in some countries {2, 5, 6, 8, 12, 13, 16}, and the impacts of, and some lessons from, the COVID-19 pandemic. {1, 2, 3, 5, 13, 15, Box TS.1, Cross-Chapter Box 1 in Chapter 1}

- **Close linkages between climate change mitigation, adaptation and development pathways.** The development pathways taken by countries at all stages of economic development impact GHG emissions and hence shape mitigation challenges and opportunities, which vary across countries and regions. Literature explores how development choices and the establishment of enabling conditions for action and support influence the feasibility and the cost of limiting emissions {1, 3, 4, 5, 13, 15, 16}. Literature highlights that climate change mitigation action designed and conducted in the context of sustainable development, equity, and poverty eradication, and rooted in the development aspirations of the societies within which they take place, will be more acceptable, durable and effective {1, 3, 4, 5}. This report covers mitigation from both targeted measures, and from policies and governance with other primary objectives.
- **New approaches in the assessment.** In addition to the sectoral and systems chapters {3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12}, the report includes, for the first time in a WG III report, chapters dedicated to demand for services, and social aspects of mitigation {5, Box TS.11}, and to innovation, technology development and transfer {16}. The assessment of future pathways in this report covers near term (to 2030), medium term (up to 2050), and long term (to 2100) timescales, combining assessment of existing pledges and actions {4, 5}, with an assessment of emissions reductions, and their implications, associated with long-term temperature outcomes up to the year 2100 {3}. [FOOTNOTE 4] The assessment of modelled global pathways addresses ways of shifting development pathways towards sustainability. Strengthened collaboration between IPCC Working Groups is reflected in Cross-Working Group boxes that integrate physical science, climate risks and adaptation, and the mitigation of climate change. [FOOTNOTE 5]

**FOOTNOTE 4:** The term ‘temperature’ is used in reference to “global surface temperatures” throughout this SPM as defined in footnote 8 of WG I SPM. See FOOTNOTE 14 of Table SPM.1. Emission pathways and associated temperature changes are calculated using various forms of models, as summarised in Box SPM.1 and Chapter 3 and discussed in Annex III.

**FOOTNOTE 5:** Namely: Economic Benefits from Avoided Climate Impacts along Long-Term Mitigation Pathways {Cross-Working Group Box 1 in Chapter 3}; Urban: Cities and Climate Change {Cross-Working Group Box 2 in Chapter 8}; and Mitigation and Adaptation via the Bioeconomy {Cross-Working Group Box 3 in Chapter 12}.

- **Increasing diversity of analytic frameworks from multiple disciplines including social sciences.** This report identifies multiple analytic frameworks to assess the drivers of, barriers to and options for, mitigation action. These include: economic efficiency including the benefits of avoided impacts; ethics and equity; interlinked technological and social transition processes; and socio-political frameworks, including institutions and governance {1, 3, 13, Cross-Chapter Box 12 in Chapter 16}. These help to identify risks and opportunities for action including co-benefits and just and equitable transitions at local, national and global scales. {1, 3, 4, 5, 13, 14, 16, 17}

Section B of this Summary for Policymakers (SPM) assesses *Recent developments and current trends*, including data uncertainties and gaps. Section C, *System transformations to limit global warming*, identifies emission pathways and alternative mitigation portfolios consistent with limiting global warming to different levels, and assesses specific mitigation options at the sectoral and system level. Section D addresses *Linkages between mitigation, adaptation, and sustainable development*. Section E, *Strengthening the response*, assesses knowledge of how enabling conditions of institutional design, policy, finance, innovation and governance arrangements can contribute to climate change mitigation in the context of sustainable development.

## B. Recent developments and current trends

**B.1 Total net anthropogenic GHG emissions [FOOTNOTE 6] have continued to rise during the period 2010–2019, as have cumulative net CO<sub>2</sub> emissions since 1850. Average annual GHG emissions during 2010–2019 were higher than in any previous decade, but the rate of growth between 2010 and 2019 was lower than that between 2000 and 2009. (*high confidence*) (Figure SPM.1) {Figure 2.2, Figure 2.5, Table 2.1, 2.2, Figure TS.2}**

**FOOTNOTE 6:** Net GHG emissions in this report refer to releases of greenhouse gases from anthropogenic sources minus removals by anthropogenic sinks, for those species of gases that are reported under the common reporting format of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC): CO<sub>2</sub> from fossil fuel combustion and industrial processes (CO<sub>2</sub>-FFI); net CO<sub>2</sub> emissions from land use, land use change and forestry (CO<sub>2</sub>-LULUCF); methane (CH<sub>4</sub>); nitrous oxide (N<sub>2</sub>O); and fluorinated gases (F-gases) comprising hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), sulphur hexafluoride (SF<sub>6</sub>) as well as nitrogen trifluoride (NF<sub>3</sub>). Different datasets for GHG emissions exist, with varying time horizons and coverage of sectors and gases, including some that go back to 1850. In this report, GHG emissions are assessed from 1990, and CO<sub>2</sub> sometimes also from 1850. Reasons for this include data availability and robustness, scope of the assessed literature, and the differing warming impacts of non-CO<sub>2</sub> gases over time.

**B.1.1** Global net anthropogenic GHG emissions were 59±6.6 GtCO<sub>2</sub>-eq [FOOTNOTE 7, 8] in 2019, about 12% (6.5 GtCO<sub>2</sub>-eq) higher than in 2010 and 54% (21 GtCO<sub>2</sub>-eq) higher than in 1990. The annual average during the decade 2010–2019 was 56±6.0 GtCO<sub>2</sub>-eq, 9.1 GtCO<sub>2</sub>-eq yr<sup>-1</sup> higher than in 2000–2009. This is the highest increase in average decadal emissions on record. The average annual rate of growth slowed from 2.1% yr<sup>-1</sup> between 2000 and 2009 to 1.3% yr<sup>-1</sup> between 2010 and 2019. (*high confidence*) (Figure SPM.1) {Figure 2.2, Figure 2.5, Table 2.1, 2.2, Figure TS.2}

**FOOTNOTE 7:** GHG emission metrics are used to express emissions of different greenhouse gases in a common unit. Aggregated GHG emissions in this report are stated in CO<sub>2</sub>-equivalent (CO<sub>2</sub>-eq) using the Global Warming Potential with a time horizon of 100 years (GWP100) with values based on the contribution of Working Group I to the AR6. The choice of metric depends on the purpose of the analysis and all GHG emission metrics have limitations and uncertainties, given that they simplify the complexity of the physical climate system and its response to past and future GHG emissions. {Chapter 2 SM 2.3, Cross-Chapter Box 2 in Chapter 2, Box TS.2, WG I Chapter 7 Supplementary Material}

**FOOTNOTE 8:** In this SPM, uncertainty in historic GHG emissions is reported using 90 % uncertainty intervals unless stated otherwise. GHG emission levels are rounded to two significant digits; as a consequence, small differences in sums due to rounding may occur.

**B.1.2** Growth in anthropogenic emissions has persisted across all major groups of GHGs since 1990, albeit at different rates. By 2019, the largest growth in absolute emissions occurred in CO<sub>2</sub> from fossil fuels and industry followed by CH<sub>4</sub>, whereas the highest relative growth occurred in fluorinated gases, starting from low levels in 1990 (*high confidence*). Net anthropogenic CO<sub>2</sub> emissions from land use, land-use change and forestry (CO<sub>2</sub>-LULUCF) are subject to large uncertainties and high annual variability, with *low confidence* even in the direction of the long-term trend [FOOTNOTE 9]. (Figure SPM.1) {Figure 2.2, Figure 2.5, 2.2, Figure TS.2}

**FOOTNOTE 9:** Global databases make different choices about which emissions and removals occurring on land are considered anthropogenic. Currently, net CO<sub>2</sub> fluxes from land reported by global book-keeping models used here are estimated to be about ~5.5 GtCO<sub>2</sub> yr<sup>-1</sup> higher than the aggregate

global net emissions based on national GHG inventories. This difference, which has been considered in the literature, mainly reflects differences in how anthropogenic forest sinks and areas of managed land are defined. Other reasons for this difference, which are more difficult to quantify, can arise from the limited representation of land management in global models and varying levels of accuracy and completeness of estimated LULUCF fluxes in national GHG inventories. Neither method is inherently preferable. Even when the same methodological approach is applied, the large uncertainty of CO<sub>2</sub>-LULUCF emissions can lead to substantial revisions to estimated emissions. {Cross-Chapter Box 3 in Chapter 3, 7.2, SRCCL SPM A.3.3}

**B.1.3** Historical cumulative net CO<sub>2</sub> emissions from 1850 to 2019 were 2400±240 GtCO<sub>2</sub> (*high confidence*). Of these, more than half (58%) occurred between 1850 and 1989 [1400±195 GtCO<sub>2</sub>], and about 42% between 1990 and 2019 [1000±90 GtCO<sub>2</sub>]. About 17% of historical cumulative net CO<sub>2</sub> emissions since 1850 occurred between 2010 and 2019 [410±30 GtCO<sub>2</sub>]. [FOOTNOTE 10] By comparison, the current central estimate of the remaining carbon budget from 2020 onwards for limiting warming to 1.5°C with a probability of 50% has been assessed as 500 Gt CO<sub>2</sub>, and as 1150 Gt CO<sub>2</sub> for a probability of 67% for limiting warming to 2°C. Remaining carbon budgets depend on the amount of non-CO<sub>2</sub> mitigation (±220 Gt CO<sub>2</sub>) and are further subject to geophysical uncertainties. Based on central estimates only, cumulative net CO<sub>2</sub> emissions between 2010-2019 compare to about four fifths of the size of the remaining carbon budget from 2020 onwards for a 50% probability of limiting global warming to 1.5°C, and about one third of the remaining carbon budget for a 67% probability to limit global warming to 2°C. Even when taking uncertainties into account, historical emissions between 1850 and 2019 constitute a large share of total carbon budgets for these global warming levels [FOOTNOTE 11, 12]. Based on central estimates only, historical cumulative net CO<sub>2</sub> emissions between 1850-2019 amount to about four fifths [FOOTNOTE 12] of the total carbon budget for a 50% probability of limiting global warming to 1.5°C (central estimate about 2900 GtCO<sub>2</sub>), and to about two thirds [FOOTNOTE 12] of the total carbon budget for a 67% probability to limit global warming to 2°C (central estimate about 3550 GtCO<sub>2</sub>). {Figure 2.7, 2.2, Figure TS.3, WG I Table SPM.2}


**FOOTNOTE 10:** For consistency with WGI, historical cumulative CO<sub>2</sub> emissions from 1850-2019 are reported using 68% confidence intervals.

**FOOTNOTE 11:** The carbon budget is the maximum amount of cumulative net global anthropogenic CO<sub>2</sub> emissions that would result in limiting global warming to a given level with a given likelihood, taking into account the effect of other anthropogenic climate forcers. This is referred to as the total carbon budget when expressed starting from the pre-industrial period, and as the remaining carbon budget when expressed from a recent specified date. The total carbon budgets reported here are the sum of historical emissions from 1850 to 2019 and the remaining carbon budgets from 2020 onwards, which extend until global net zero CO<sub>2</sub> emissions are reached. {Annex I: Glossary; WG I SPM}

**FOOTNOTE 12:** Uncertainties for total carbon budgets have not been assessed and could affect the specific calculated fractions.

**B.1.4** Emissions of CO<sub>2</sub>-FFI dropped temporarily in the first half of 2020 due to responses to the COVID-19 pandemic (*high confidence*), but rebounded by the end of the year (*medium confidence*). The annual average CO<sub>2</sub>-FFI emissions reduction in 2020 relative to 2019 was about 5.8% [5.1-6.3%], or 2.2 [1.9-2.4] GtCO<sub>2</sub> (*high confidence*). The full GHG emissions impact of the COVID-19 pandemic could not be assessed due to a lack of data regarding non-CO<sub>2</sub> GHG emissions in 2020. {Cross-Chapter Box 1 in Chapter 1, Figure 2.6, 2.2, Box TS.1, Box TS.1 Figure 1}

**Global net anthropogenic emissions have continued to rise across all major groups of greenhouse gases.**



**Figure SPM.1: Global net anthropogenic GHG emissions (GtCO<sub>2</sub>-eq yr<sup>-1</sup>) 1990–2019**

Global net anthropogenic GHG emissions include CO<sub>2</sub> from fossil fuel combustion and industrial processes (CO<sub>2</sub>-FFI); net CO<sub>2</sub> from land use, land use change and forestry (CO<sub>2</sub>-LULUCF) [FOOTNOTE 9]; methane (CH<sub>4</sub>); nitrous oxide (N<sub>2</sub>O); fluorinated gases (HFCs; PFCs, SF<sub>6</sub>, NF<sub>3</sub>). [FOOTNOTE 6]

Panel a shows aggregate annual global net anthropogenic GHG emissions by groups of gases from 1990 to 2019 reported in GtCO<sub>2</sub>-eq converted based on global warming potentials with a 100-year time horizon (GWP100-AR6) from the IPCC Sixth Assessment Report Working Group I (Chapter 7). The fraction of global emissions for each gas is shown 1990, 2000, 2010, 2019; as well as the aggregate average annual growth rate between these decades. At the right side of Panel a, GHG emissions in 2019 are broken down into individual components with the associated uncertainties [90% confidence interval] indicated by the error bars: CO<sub>2</sub> FFI ±8%, CO<sub>2</sub>-LULUCF ±70%, CH<sub>4</sub> ±30%, N<sub>2</sub>O ±60%, F-gases ±30%, GHG ±11%. Uncertainties in GHG emissions are assessed in the Supplementary Material to Chapter 2. The single year peak of emissions in 1997 was due to higher CO<sub>2</sub>-LULUCF emissions from a forest and peat fire event in South East Asia.

Panel b shows global anthropogenic CO<sub>2</sub>-FFI, net CO<sub>2</sub>-LULUCF, CH<sub>4</sub>, N<sub>2</sub>O and fluorinated gas emissions individually for the period 1990–2019, normalised relative to 100 in 1990. Note the different scale for the included fluorinated gas emissions compared to other gases, highlighting its rapid growth from a low base. Shaded areas indicate the uncertainty range. Uncertainty ranges as shown here are specific for individual groups of greenhouse gases and cannot be compared. The table shows the central estimate for: absolute emissions in 2019, the absolute change in emissions between 1990 and 2019, and emissions in 2019 expressed as a percentage of 1990 emissions. {2.2, Figure 2.5, Figure TS.2, Chapter 2 SM}

**FOOTNOTE 9:** Global databases make different choices about which emissions and removals occurring on land are considered anthropogenic. Currently, net CO<sub>2</sub> fluxes from land reported by global book-keeping models used here are estimated to be about ~5.5 GtCO<sub>2</sub> yr<sup>-1</sup> higher than the aggregate global net emissions based on national GHG inventories. This difference, which has been considered in the literature, mainly reflects differences in how anthropogenic forest sinks and areas of managed land are defined. Other reasons for this difference, which are more difficult to quantify, can arise from the limited representation of land management in global models and varying levels of accuracy and completeness of estimated LULUCF fluxes in national GHG inventories. Neither method is inherently preferable. Even when the same methodological approach is applied, the large uncertainty of CO<sub>2</sub>-LULUCF emissions can lead to substantial revisions to estimated emissions. {Cross-Chapter Box 3 in Chapter 3, 7.2, SRCCL SPM A.3.3}

**FOOTNOTE 6:** Net GHG emissions in this report refer to releases of greenhouse gases from anthropogenic sources minus removals by anthropogenic sinks, for those species of gases that are reported under the common reporting format of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC): CO<sub>2</sub> from fossil fuel combustion and industrial processes (CO<sub>2</sub>-FFI); net CO<sub>2</sub> emissions from land use, land use change and forestry (CO<sub>2</sub>-LULUCF); methane (CH<sub>4</sub>); nitrous oxide (N<sub>2</sub>O); and fluorinated gases (F-gases) comprising hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), sulphur hexafluoride (SF<sub>6</sub>) as well as nitrogen trifluoride (NF<sub>3</sub>). Different datasets for GHG emissions exist, with varying time horizons and coverage of sectors and gases, including some that go back to 1850. In this report, GHG emissions are assessed from 1990, and CO<sub>2</sub> sometimes also from 1850. Reasons for this include data availability and robustness, scope of the assessed literature, and the differing warming impacts of non-CO<sub>2</sub> gases over time.

**B.2 Net anthropogenic GHG emissions have increased since 2010 across all major sectors globally. An increasing share of emissions can be attributed to urban areas. Emissions reductions in CO<sub>2</sub> from fossil fuels and industrial processes, due to improvements in energy intensity of GDP and carbon intensity of energy, have been less than emissions increases from rising global activity levels in industry, energy supply, transport, agriculture and buildings. (*high confidence*) {2.2, 2.4, 6.3, 7.2, 8.3, 9.3, 10.1, 11.2}**

**B.2.1** In 2019, approximately 34% [20 GtCO<sub>2</sub>-eq] of total net anthropogenic GHG emissions came from the energy supply sector, 24% [14 GtCO<sub>2</sub>-eq] from industry, 22% [13 GtCO<sub>2</sub>-eq] from agriculture, forestry and other land use (AFOLU), 15% [8.7 GtCO<sub>2</sub>-eq] from transport and 6% [3.3 GtCO<sub>2</sub>-eq] from buildings.<sup>13</sup> If emissions from electricity and heat production are attributed to the sectors that use the final energy, 90% of these indirect emissions are allocated to the industry and buildings sectors, increasing their relative GHG emissions shares from 24% to 34%, and from 6% to 16%, respectively. After reallocating emissions from electricity and heat production, the energy supply sector accounts for 12% of global net anthropogenic GHG emissions. (*high confidence*) {Figure 2.12, 2.2, 6.3, 7.2, 9.3, 10.1, 11.2, Figure TS.6}

**FOOTNOTE 13:** Sector definitions can be found in Annex II 9.1.

**B.2.2** Average annual GHG emissions growth between 2010 and 2019 slowed compared to the previous decade in energy supply [from 2.3% to 1.0%] and industry [from 3.4% to 1.4%], but remained roughly constant at about 2% per year in the transport sector (*high confidence*). Emissions growth in AFOLU, comprising emissions from agriculture (mainly CH<sub>4</sub> and N<sub>2</sub>O) and forestry and other land use (mainly CO<sub>2</sub>) is more uncertain than in other sectors due to the high share and uncertainty of CO<sub>2</sub>-LULUCF emissions (*medium confidence*). About half of total net AFOLU emissions are from CO<sub>2</sub>-LULUCF, predominantly from deforestation. [FOOTNOTE 14] (*medium confidence*). {Figure 2.13, 2.2, 6.3, 7.2, Figure 7.3, 9.3, 10.1, 11.2, TS.3}



**FOOTNOTE 14:** Land overall constituted a net sink of  $-6.6 (\pm 4.6)$  GtCO<sub>2</sub> yr<sup>-1</sup> for the period 2010–2019, comprising a gross sink of  $-12.5 (\pm 3.2)$  GtCO<sub>2</sub> yr<sup>-1</sup> resulting from responses of all land to both anthropogenic environmental change and natural climate variability, and net anthropogenic CO<sub>2</sub>-LULUCF emissions  $+5.9 (\pm 4.1)$  GtCO<sub>2</sub> yr<sup>-1</sup> based on book-keeping models. {2.2, 7.2, Table 7.1}

**B.2.3** The global share of emissions that can be attributed to urban areas is increasing. In 2015, urban emissions were estimated to be 25 GtCO<sub>2</sub>-eq (about 62% of the global share) and in 2020, 29 GtCO<sub>2</sub>-eq (67–72% of the global share).<sup>15</sup> The drivers of urban GHG emission are complex and include population size, income, state of urbanisation and urban form. (*high confidence*) {8.1, 8.3}

**FOOTNOTE 15:** This estimate is based on consumption-based accounting, including both direct emissions from within urban areas, and indirect emissions from outside urban areas related to the production of electricity, goods and services consumed in cities. These estimates include all CO<sub>2</sub> and CH<sub>4</sub> emission categories except for aviation and marine bunker fuels, land-use change, forestry and agriculture. {8.1, Annex I: Glossary}

**B.2.4** Global energy intensity (total primary energy per unit GDP) decreased by 2% yr<sup>-1</sup> between 2010 and 2019. Carbon intensity (CO<sub>2</sub> from fossil fuel combustion and industrial processes (CO<sub>2</sub> FFI) per unit primary energy) decreased by 0.3% yr<sup>-1</sup>, with large regional variations, over the same period mainly due to fuel switching from coal to gas, reduced expansion of coal capacity, and increased use of renewables. This reversed the trend observed for 2000–2009. For comparison, the carbon intensity of primary energy is projected to decrease globally by about 3.5% yr<sup>-1</sup> between 2020 and 2050 in modelled scenarios that limit warming to 2°C (>67%), and by about 7.7% yr<sup>-1</sup> globally in scenarios that limit warming to 1.5°C (>50%) with no or limited overshoot.<sup>16</sup> (*high confidence*) {Figure 2.16, 2.2, 2.4, Table 3.4, 3.4, 6.3}

**FOOTNOTE 16:** See Box SPM.1 for the categorisation of modelled long-term emission scenarios based on projected temperature outcomes and associated probabilities adopted in this report.

**B.3 Regional contributions [FOOTNOTE 17] to global GHG emissions continue to differ widely. Variations in regional, and national per capita emissions partly reflect different development stages, but they also vary widely at similar income levels. The 10% of households with the highest per capita emissions contribute a disproportionately large share of global household GHG emissions. At least 18 countries have sustained GHG emission reductions for longer than 10 years. (*high confidence*) (Figure SPM.2) {Figure 1.1, Figure 2.9, Figure 2.10, Figure 2.25, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, 2.6, Figure TS.4, Figure TS.5}**

**FOOTNOTE 17:** See Working Group III Annex II, Part 1 for regional groupings adopted in this report.

**B.3.1** GHG emissions trends over 1990–2019 vary widely across regions and over time, and across different stages of development as shown in Figure SPM.2. Average global per capita net anthropogenic GHG emissions increased from 7.7 to 7.8 tCO<sub>2</sub>-eq, ranging from 2.6 tCO<sub>2</sub>-eq to 19 tCO<sub>2</sub>-eq across regions. Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and Small Island Developing States (SIDS) have much lower per capita emissions (1.7 tCO<sub>2</sub>-eq, 4.6 tCO<sub>2</sub>-eq, respectively) than the global average (6.9 tCO<sub>2</sub>-eq), excluding CO<sub>2</sub>-LULUCF [FOOTNOTE 18]. (*high confidence*) (Figure SPM.2) {Figure 1.2, Figure 2.9, Figure 2.10, 2.2, Figure TS.4}

**FOOTNOTE 18:** In 2019, LDCs are estimated to have emitted 3.3% of global GHG emissions, and SIDS are estimated to have emitted 0.60% of global GHG emissions, excluding CO<sub>2</sub>-LULUCF. These

country groupings cut across geographic regions and are not depicted separately in Fig SPM2. {Figure 2.10}

**B.3.2** Historical contributions to cumulative net anthropogenic CO<sub>2</sub> emissions between 1850 and 2019 vary substantially across regions in terms of total magnitude, but also in terms of contributions to CO<sub>2</sub>-FFI (1650 +/- 73 GtCO<sub>2</sub>-eq) and net CO<sub>2</sub>-LULUCF (760 +/- 220 GtCO<sub>2</sub>-eq) emissions.[FOOTNOTE 19] Globally, the major share of cumulative CO<sub>2</sub>-FFI emissions is concentrated in a few regions, while cumulative CO<sub>2</sub>-LULUCF [FOOTNOTE 9] emissions are concentrated in other regions. LDCs contributed less than 0.4% of historical cumulative CO<sub>2</sub>-FFI emissions between 1850 and 2019, while SIDS contributed 0.5%. (*high confidence*) (Figure SPM.2) {Figure 2.10, 2.2, TS.3, Figure 2.7}

**FOOTNOTE 9:** Global databases make different choices about which emissions and removals occurring on land are considered anthropogenic. Currently, net CO<sub>2</sub> fluxes from land reported by global book-keeping models used here are estimated to be about ~5.5 GtCO<sub>2</sub> yr<sup>-1</sup> higher than the aggregate global net emissions based on national GHG inventories. This difference, which has been considered in the literature, mainly reflects differences in how anthropogenic forest sinks and areas of managed land are defined. Other reasons for this difference, which are more difficult to quantify, can arise from the limited representation of land management in global models and varying levels of accuracy and completeness of estimated LULUCF fluxes in national GHG inventories. Neither method is inherently preferable. Even when the same methodological approach is applied, the large uncertainty of CO<sub>2</sub>-LULUCF emissions can lead to substantial revisions to estimated emissions. {Cross-Chapter Box 3 in Chapter 3, 7.2, SRCCL SPM A.3.3}

**FOOTNOTE 19:** For consistency with WGI, historical cumulative CO<sub>2</sub> emissions from 1850-2019 are reported using 68% confidence intervals.

**B.3.3** In 2019, around 48% of the global population lives in countries emitting on average more than 6t CO<sub>2</sub>-eq per capita, excluding CO<sub>2</sub>-LULUCF. 35% live in countries emitting more than 9 tCO<sub>2</sub>-eq per capita. Another 41% live in countries emitting less than 3 tCO<sub>2</sub>-eq per capita. A substantial share of the population in these low emitting countries lack access to modern energy services (FOOTNOTE 20). Eradicating extreme poverty, energy poverty, and providing decent living standards (FOOTNOTE 21) to all in these regions in the context of achieving sustainable development objectives, in the near-term, can be achieved without significant global emissions growth. (*high confidence*) (Figure SPM.2) {Figure 1.2, 2.2, 2.4, 2.6, 3.7, 4.2, 6.7, Figure TS.4, Figure TS.5}

**FOOTNOTE 20:** In this report, access to modern energy services is defined as access to clean, reliable and affordable energy services for cooking and heating, lighting, communications, and productive uses (See Annex I: Glossary)

**FOOTNOTE 21:** In this report, decent living standards are defined as a set of minimum material requirements essential for achieving basic human well-being, including nutrition, shelter, basic living conditions, clothing, health care, education, and mobility. (See 5.1)

**B.3.4** Globally, the 10% of households with the highest per capita emissions contribute 34-45% of global consumption-based household GHG emissions [FOOTNOTE 22], while the middle 40% contribute 40-53%, and the bottom 50% contribute 13-15%. (*high confidence*) {2.6, Figure 2.25}


**FOOTNOTE 22:** Consumption-based emissions refer to emissions released to the atmosphere to generate the goods and services consumed by a certain entity (e.g., a person, firm, country, or region).

The bottom 50% of emitters spend less than USD3PPP per capita per day. The top 10% of emitters (an open-ended category) spend more than USD23PPP per capita per day. The wide range of estimates for the contribution of the top 10% result from the wide range of spending in this category and differing methods in the assessed literature. {Annex I: Glossary; 2.6}


**B.3.5** At least 18 countries have sustained production-based GHG and consumption-based CO<sub>2</sub> emission reductions for longer than 10 years. Reductions were linked to energy supply decarbonisation, energy efficiency gains, and energy demand reduction, which resulted from both policies and changes in economic structure. Some countries have reduced production-based GHG emissions by a third or more since peaking, and some have achieved several years of consecutive reduction rates of around 4 %/yr, comparable to global reductions in scenarios limiting warming to 2°C (>67%) or lower. These reductions have only partly offset global emissions growth. (*high confidence*) (Figure SPM.2) {Figure TS.4, 2.2, 1.3.2}

**Emissions have grown in most regions but are distributed unevenly, both in the present day and cumulatively since 1850.**


**a. Global net anthropogenic GHG emissions by region (1990–2019)**



**b. Historical cumulative net anthropogenic CO<sub>2</sub> emissions per region (1850–2019)**



**c. Net anthropogenic GHG emissions per capita and for total population, per region (2019)**



**d. Regional indicators (2019) and regional production vs consumption accounting (2018)**

	Africa	Australia, Japan, New Zealand	Eastern Asia	Eastern Europe, West-Central Asia	Europe	Latin America and Caribbean	Middle East	North America	South-East Asia and Pacific	Southern Asia
Population (million persons, 2019)	1292	157	1471	291	620	646	252	366	674	1836
GDP per capita (USD1000 <sub>ppp</sub> 2017 per person) <sup>1</sup>	5.0	43	17	20	43	15	20	61	12	6.2
<b>Net GHG 2019<sup>2</sup> (production basis)</b>										
% GHG contributions	9%	3%	27%	6%	8%	10%	5%	12%	9%	8%
GHG emissions intensity (tCO <sub>2</sub> -eq / USD1000 <sub>ppp</sub> 2017)	0.78	0.30	0.62	0.64	0.18	0.61	0.64	0.31	0.65	0.42
GHG per capita (tCO <sub>2</sub> -eq per person)	3.9	13	11	13	7.8	9.2	13	19	7.9	2.6
<b>CO<sub>2</sub>FFI, 2018, per person</b>										
Production-based emissions (tCO <sub>2</sub> FFI per person, based on 2018 data)	1.2	10	8.4	9.2	6.5	2.8	8.7	16	2.6	1.6
Consumption-based emissions (tCO <sub>2</sub> FFI per person, based on 2018 data)	0.84	11	6.7	6.2	7.8	2.8	7.6	17	2.5	1.5

<sup>1</sup> GDP per capita in 2019 in USD2017 currency purchasing power basis.

<sup>2</sup> Includes CO<sub>2</sub>FFI, CO<sub>2</sub>LULUCF and Other GHGs, excluding international aviation and shipping.

The regional groupings used in this figure are for statistical purposes only and are described in Annex II, Part I.

**Figure SPM.2: Regional GHG emissions, and the regional proportion of total cumulative production-based CO<sub>2</sub> emissions from 1850–2019**

Panel a shows global net anthropogenic GHG emissions by region (in GtCO<sub>2</sub>-eq yr<sup>-1</sup> (GWP100 AR6)) for the time period 1990–2019 [FOOTNOTE 6]. Percentage values refer to the contribution of each region to total GHG emissions in each respective time period. The single year peak of emissions in 1997 was due to higher CO<sub>2</sub>-LULUCF emissions from a forest and peat fire event in South East Asia. Regions are as grouped in Annex II.

Panel b shows the share of historical cumulative net anthropogenic CO<sub>2</sub> emissions per region from 1850 to 2019 in GtCO<sub>2</sub>. This includes CO<sub>2</sub> from fossil fuel combustion and industrial processes (CO<sub>2</sub>-FFI) and net CO<sub>2</sub> Land use, land use change, forestry (CO<sub>2</sub>-LULUCF). Other GHG emissions are not included [FOOTNOTE 6]. CO<sub>2</sub>-LULUCF emissions are subject to high uncertainties, reflected by a global uncertainty estimate of ± 70% (90% confidence interval).

Panel c shows the distribution of regional GHG emissions in tonnes CO<sub>2</sub>-eq per capita by region in 2019. GHG emissions are categorised into: CO<sub>2</sub>-FFI, net CO<sub>2</sub>-LULUCF and other GHG emissions (methane, nitrous oxide, fluorinated gases, expressed in CO<sub>2</sub>-eq using GWP100-AR6). The height of each rectangle shows per-capita emissions, the width shows the population of the region, so that the area of the rectangles refers to the total emissions for each region. Emissions from international aviation and shipping are not included. In the case of two regions, the area for CO<sub>2</sub>-LULUCF is below the axis, indicating net CO<sub>2</sub> removals rather than emissions. CO<sub>2</sub>-LULUCF emissions are subject to high uncertainties, reflected by a global uncertainty estimate of ± 70% (90% confidence interval).

Panel d shows population, GDP per person, emission indicators by region in 2019 for percentage GHG contributions, total GHG per person, and total GHG emissions intensity, together with production-based and consumption-based CO<sub>2</sub>-FFI data, which is assessed in this report up to 2018. Consumption-based emissions are emissions released to the atmosphere in order to generate the goods and services consumed by a certain entity (e.g., region). Emissions from international aviation and shipping are not included. {1.3, Figure 1.2, 2.2, Figure 2.9, Figure 2.10, Figure 2.11, Annex II}

**B.4 The unit costs of several low-emission technologies have fallen continuously since 2010. Innovation policy packages have enabled these cost reductions and supported global adoption. Both tailored policies and comprehensive policies addressing innovation systems have helped overcome the distributional, environmental and social impacts potentially associated with global diffusion of low-emission technologies. Innovation has lagged in developing countries due to weaker enabling conditions. Digitalisation can enable emission reductions, but can have adverse side-effects unless appropriately governed. (*high confidence*) (Figure SPM.3) {2.2, 6.3, 6.4, 7.2, 12.2, 16.2, 16.4, 16.5, Cross-Chapter Box 11 in Chapter 16}**


**B.4.1** From 2010–2019, there have been sustained decreases in the unit costs of solar energy (85%), wind energy (55%), and lithium-ion batteries (85%), and large increases in their deployment, e.g., >10x for solar and >100x for electric vehicles (EVs), varying widely across regions (Figure SPM.3). The mix of policy instruments which reduced costs and stimulated adoption includes public R&D, funding for demonstration and pilot projects, and demand pull instruments such as deployment subsidies to attain scale. In comparison to modular small-unit size technologies, the empirical record shows that multiple large-scale mitigation technologies, with fewer opportunities for learning, have seen minimal cost reductions and their adoption has grown slowly. (*high confidence*) {1.3, 1.5, Figure 2.5, 2.5, 6.3, 6.4, 7.2, 11.3, 12.2, 12.3, 12.6, 13.6, 16.3, 16.4, 16.6}

**B.4.2** Policy packages tailored to national contexts and technological characteristics have been effective in supporting low-emission innovation and technology diffusion. Appropriately designed policies and governance have helped address distributional impacts and rebound effects. Innovation has provided opportunities to lower emissions and reduce emission growth and created social and environmental co-benefits. (*high confidence*) Adoption of low-emission technologies lags in most

developing countries, particularly least developed ones, due in part to weaker enabling conditions, including limited finance, technology development and transfer, and capacity. In many countries, especially those with limited institutional capacities, several adverse side-effects have been observed as a result of diffusion of low-emission technology, e.g., low-value employment, and dependency on foreign knowledge and suppliers. Low-emission innovation along with strengthened enabling conditions can reinforce development benefits, which can, in turn, create feedbacks towards greater public support for policy. (*medium confidence*) {9.9, 13.6, 13.7, 16.3, 16.4, 16.5, 16.6, Cross-Chapter Box 12 in Chapter 16, TS.3}

**B.4.3** Digital technologies can contribute to mitigation of climate change and the achievement of several SDGs (*high confidence*). For example, sensors, Internet of Things, robotics, and artificial intelligence can improve energy management in all sectors, increase energy efficiency, and promote the adoption of many low-emission technologies, including decentralised renewable energy, while creating economic opportunities (*high confidence*). However, some of these climate change mitigation gains can be reduced or counterbalanced by growth in demand for goods and services due to the use of digital devices (*high confidence*). Digitalisation can involve trade-offs across several SDGs, e.g., increasing electronic waste, negative impacts on labour markets, and exacerbating the existing digital divide. Digital technology supports decarbonisation only if appropriately governed (*high confidence*). {5.3, 10, 12.6, 16.2, Cross-Chapter Box 11 in Chapter 16, TS.5, Box TS.14}

**The unit costs of some forms of renewable energy and of batteries for passenger EVs have fallen, and their use continues to rise.**



### Figure SPM.3: Unit cost reductions and use in some rapidly changing mitigation technologies

The top panel shows global costs per unit of energy (USD/MWh) for some rapidly changing mitigation technologies. Solid blue lines indicate average unit cost in each year. Light blue shaded areas show the range between the 5<sup>th</sup> and 95<sup>th</sup> percentiles in each year. Grey shading indicates the range of unit costs for new fossil fuel (coal and gas) power in 2020 (corresponding to USD55–148 per MWh). In 2020, the levelised costs of energy (LCOE) of the four renewable energy technologies could compete with fossil fuels in many places. For batteries, costs shown are for 1 kWh of battery storage capacity; for the others, costs are LCOE, which includes installation, capital, operations, and maintenance costs per MWh of electricity produced. The literature uses LCOE because it allows consistent comparisons of cost trends across a diverse set of energy technologies to be made. However, it does not include the costs of grid integration or climate impacts. Further, LCOE does not take into account other environmental and social externalities that may modify the overall (monetary and non-monetary) costs of technologies and alter their deployment.

The bottom panel shows cumulative global adoption for each technology, in GW of installed capacity for renewable energy and in millions of vehicles for battery-electric vehicles. A vertical dashed line is placed in 2010 to indicate the change since AR5. Shares of electricity produced and share of passenger vehicle fleet are indicated in text for 2020 based on provisional data, i.e., percentage of total electricity production (for PV, onshore wind, offshore wind, CSP) and of total stock of passenger vehicles (for electric vehicles). The electricity production share reflects different capacity factors; e.g., for the same amount of installed capacity, wind produces about twice as much electricity as solar PV. {2.5, 6.4}

Renewable energy and battery technologies were selected as illustrative examples because they have recently shown rapid changes in costs and adoption, and because consistent data are available. Other mitigation options assessed in the report are not included as they do not meet these criteria.

**B.5 There has been a consistent expansion of policies and laws addressing mitigation since AR5. This has led to the avoidance of emissions that would otherwise have occurred and increased investment in low-GHG technologies and infrastructure. Policy coverage of emissions is uneven across sectors. Progress on the alignment of financial flows towards the goals of the Paris Agreement remains slow and tracked climate finance flows are distributed unevenly across regions and sectors. (*high confidence*) {5.6, 13.2, 13.4, 13.5, 13.6, 13.9, 14.3, 14.4, 14.5, Cross-Chapter Box 10 in Chapter 14, 15.3, 15.5}**

**B.5.1** The Kyoto Protocol led to reduced emissions in some countries and was instrumental in building national and international capacity for GHG reporting, accounting and emissions markets (*high confidence*). At least 18 countries that had Kyoto targets for the first commitment period have had sustained absolute emission reductions for at least a decade from 2005, of which two were countries with economies in transition (*very high confidence*). The Paris Agreement, with near universal participation, has led to policy development and target-setting at national and sub-national levels, in particular in relation to mitigation, as well as enhanced transparency of climate action and support (*medium confidence*). {14.3, 14.6}

**B.5.2** The application of diverse policy instruments for mitigation at the national and sub-national levels has grown consistently across a range of sectors (*high confidence*). By 2020, over 20% of global GHG emissions were covered by carbon taxes or emissions trading systems, although coverage and prices have been insufficient to achieve deep reductions (*medium confidence*). By 2020, there were ‘direct’ climate laws focused primarily on GHG reductions in 56 countries covering 53% of global emissions (*medium confidence*). Policy coverage remains limited for emissions from agriculture and

the production of industrial materials and feedstocks (*high confidence*). {5.6, 7.6, 11.5, 11.6, 13.2, 13.6}

**B.5.3** In many countries, policies have enhanced energy efficiency, reduced rates of deforestation and accelerated technology deployment, leading to avoided and in some cases reduced or removed emissions (*high confidence*). Multiple lines of evidence suggest that mitigation policies have led to avoided global emissions of several Gt CO<sub>2</sub>.eq yr<sup>-1</sup> (*medium confidence*). At least 1.8 Gt CO<sub>2</sub>.eq yr<sup>-1</sup> can be accounted for by aggregating separate estimates for the effects of economic and regulatory instruments. Growing numbers of laws and executive orders have impacted global emissions and were estimated to result in 5.9 Gt CO<sub>2</sub>.eq yr<sup>-1</sup> less in 2016 than they otherwise would have been. (*medium confidence*) (Figure SPM.3) {2.2, 2.8, 6.7, 7.6, 9.9, 10.8, 13.6, Cross-chapter Box 10 in Chapter 14}

**B.5.4** Annual tracked total financial flows for climate mitigation and adaptation increased by up to 60% between 2013/14 and 2019/20 (in USD2015), but average growth has slowed since 2018<sup>23</sup> (*medium confidence*). These financial flows remained heavily focused on mitigation, are uneven, and have developed heterogeneously across regions and sectors (*high confidence*). In 2018, public and publicly mobilised private climate finance flows from developed to developing countries were below the collective goal under the UNFCCC and Paris Agreement to mobilize USD 100 billion per year by 2020 in the context of meaningful mitigation action and transparency on implementation (*medium confidence*). Public and private finance flows for fossil fuels are still greater than those for climate adaptation and mitigation (*high confidence*). Markets for green bonds, ESG (environmental, social and governance) and sustainable finance products have expanded significantly since AR5. Challenges remain, in particular around integrity and additionality, as well as the limited applicability of these markets to many developing countries. (*high confidence*) {Box 15.4, 15.3, 15.5, 15.6, Box 15.7}

**FOOTNOTE 23:** Estimates of financial flows (comprising both private and public, domestic and international flows) are based on a single report which assembles data from multiple sources and which has applied various changes to their methodology over the past years. Such data can suggest broad trends but is subject to uncertainties.

**B.6** Global GHG emissions in 2030 associated with the implementation of nationally determined contributions (NDCs) announced prior to COP26 [FOOTNOTE 24] would make it *likely* that warming will exceed 1.5°C during the 21st century.[FOOTNOTE 25] *Likely* limiting warming to below 2°C would then rely on a rapid acceleration of mitigation efforts after 2030. Policies implemented by the end of 2020 [FOOTNOTE 26] are projected to result in higher global GHG emissions than those implied by NDCs. (*high confidence*) (Figure SPM.4) {3.3, 3.5, 4.2, Cross-Chapter Box 4 in Chapter 4}

**FOOTNOTE 24:** NDCs announced prior to COP26 refer to the most recent nationally determined contributions submitted to the UNFCCC up to the literature cut-off date of this report, 11 October 2021, and revised NDCs announced by China, Japan and the Republic of Korea prior to October 2021 but only submitted thereafter. 25 NDC updates were submitted between 12 October 2021 and prior to the start of COP26.

**FOOTNOTE 25:** This implies that mitigation after 2030 can no longer establish a pathway with less than 67% probability to exceed 1.5°C during the 21st century, a defining feature of the class of pathways that limit warming to 1.5°C (>50%) with no or limited overshoot assessed in this report (Category C1 in Table SPM.1). These pathways limit warming to 1.6°C or lower throughout the 21st century with a 50% likelihood.



**FOOTNOTE 26:** The policy cut-off date in studies used to project GHG emissions of “policies implemented by the end of 2020” varies between July 2019 and November 2020. {Table 4.2}

**B.6.1** Policies implemented by the end of 2020 are projected to result in higher global GHG emissions than those implied by NDCs, indicating an implementation gap. A gap remains between global GHG emissions in 2030 associated with the implementation of NDCs announced prior to COP26 and those associated with modelled mitigation pathways assuming immediate action (for quantification see Table SPM.X). [FOOTNOTE 27] The magnitude of the emission gap depends on the global warming level considered and whether only unconditional or also conditional elements of NDCs [FOOTNOTE 28] are considered.[FOOTNOTE 29] (*high confidence*) {3.5, 4.2, Cross-Chapter Box 4 in Chapter 4}

**Table SPM.X:** Projected global emissions in 2030 associated with policies implemented by the end of 2020 and NDCs announced prior to COP26, and associated emission gaps. \*Emissions projections for 2030 and absolute differences in emissions are based on emissions of 52-56 GtCO<sub>2</sub>-eq yr<sup>-1</sup> in 2019 as assumed in underlying model studies. (*medium confidence*) {4.2, Table 4.3, Cross-Chapter Box 4 in Chapter 4}

GtCO <sub>2</sub> -eq yr <sup>-1</sup>	Implied by policies implemented by the end of 2020	Implied by NDCs announced prior to COP26	
		Unconditional elements	Inc. conditional elements
Median (Min–Max)*	57 (52–60)	53 (50–57)	50 (47–55)
Implementation gap between implemented policies and NDCs (Median)		4	7
Emission gap between NDCs and pathways that limit warming to 2°C (>67%) with immediate action		10–16	6–14
Emissions gap between NDCs and pathways that limit warming to 1.5°C (>50%) with no or limited overshoot with immediate action		19–26	16–23

**FOOTNOTE 27:** Immediate action in modelled global pathways refers to the adoption between 2020 and at latest before 2025 of climate policies intended to limit global warming to a given level. Modelled

pathways that limit warming to 2°C (>67%) based on immediate action are summarised in Category C3a in Table SPM.1. All assessed modelled global pathways that limit warming to 1.5°C (>50%) with no or limited overshoot assume immediate action as defined here (Category C1 in Table SPM.1).

**FOOTNOTE 28:** In this report, “unconditional” elements of NDCs refer to mitigation efforts put forward without any conditions. “Conditional” elements refer to mitigation efforts that are contingent on international cooperation, for example bilateral and multilateral agreements, financing or monetary and/or technological transfers. This terminology is used in the literature and the UNFCCC’s NDC Synthesis Reports, not by the Paris Agreement. {4.2.1, 14.3.2}

**FOOTNOTE 29:** Two types of gaps are assessed: The implementation gap is calculated as the difference between the median of global emissions in 2030 implied by policies implemented by the end of 2020 and those implied by NDCs announced prior to COP26. The emissions gap is calculated as the difference between GHG emissions implied by the NDCs (minimum/maximum emissions in 2030) and the median of global GHG emissions in modelled pathways limiting warming to specific levels based on immediate action and with stated likelihoods as indicated (Table SPM.1).

**B.6.2** Global emissions in 2030 associated with the implementation of NDCs announced prior to COP26 are lower than the emissions implied by the original NDCs [FOOTNOTE 30] (*high confidence*). The original emission gap has fallen by about 20% to one third relative to pathways that limit warming to 2°C (>67%) with immediate action (Category C3a in Table SPM.1), and by about 15-20% relative to pathways limiting warming to 1.5°C (>50%) with no or limited overshoot (Category C1 in Table SPM.1) (*medium confidence*). (Figure SPM.4) {3.5, 4.2, Cross-Chapter Box 4 in Chapter 4}

**FOOTNOTE 30:** Original NDCs refer to those submitted to the UNFCCC in 2015 and 2016. Unconditional elements of NDCs announced prior to COP26 imply global GHG emissions in 2030 that are 3.8 [3.0–5.3] GtCO<sub>2</sub>-eq yr<sup>-1</sup> lower than those from the original NDCs, and 4.5 [2.7–6.3] GtCO<sub>2</sub>-eq yr<sup>-1</sup> lower when conditional elements of NDCs are included. NDC updates at or after COP26 could further change the implied emissions.


**B.6.3** Modelled global emission pathways consistent with NDCs announced prior to COP26 that limit warming to 2°C (>67%) (Category C3b in Table SPM.1) imply annual average global GHG emissions reduction rates of 0–0.7 GtCO<sub>2</sub>-eq per year during the decade 2020-2030, with an unprecedented acceleration to 1.4–2.0 GtCO<sub>2</sub>-eq per year during 2030-2050 (*medium confidence*). Continued investments in unabated high emitting infrastructure and limited development and deployment of low emitting alternatives prior to 2030 would act as barriers to this acceleration and increase feasibility risks (*high confidence*). {3.3, 3.5, 3.8, Cross-Chapter Box 5 in Chapter 4}

**B.6.4** Modelled global emission pathways consistent with NDCs announced prior to COP26 will *likely* exceed 1.5°C during the 21st century. Those pathways that then return warming to 1.5°C by 2100 with a likelihood of 50% or greater imply a temperature overshoot of 0.15-0.3°C (42 pathways in category C2 in Table SPM.1). In such pathways, global cumulative net-negative CO<sub>2</sub> emissions are -380 [-860 to -200] GtCO<sub>2</sub> [FOOTNOTE 31] in the second half of the century, and there is a rapid acceleration of other mitigation efforts across all sectors after 2030. Such overshoot pathways imply increased climate-related risk, and are subject to increased feasibility concerns[FOOTNOTE 32], and greater social and environmental risks, compared to pathways that limit warming to 1.5°C (>50%) with no or limited overshoot. (*high confidence*) (Figure SPM.4, Table SPM.1) {3.3, 3.5, 3.8, 12.3; WG II SPM.B.6}

**FOOTNOTE 31:** Median and very likely range [5th to 95th percentile].

**FOOTNOTE 32:** Returning to below 1.5°C in 2100 from GHG emissions levels in 2030 associated with the implementation of NDCs is infeasible for some models due to model-specific constraints on the deployment of mitigation technologies and the availability of net negative CO<sub>2</sub> emissions.

**Projected global GHG emissions from NDCs announced prior to COP26 would make it likely that warming will exceed 1.5°C and also make it harder after 2030 to limit warming to below 2°C.**



**Figure SPM.4: Global GHG emissions of modelled pathways (funnels in Panel a. and associated bars in Panels b, c, d) and projected emission outcomes from near-term policy assessments for 2030 (Panel b).**

Panel a shows global GHG emissions over 2015-2050 for four types of assessed modelled global pathways:

- Trend from implemented policies: Pathways with projected near-term GHG emissions in line with policies implemented until the end of 2020 and extended with comparable ambition levels beyond 2030 (29 scenarios across categories C5-C7, Table SPM.1)
- Limit to 2°C (>67%) or return warming to 1.5°C (>50%) after a high overshoot, NDCs until 2030: Pathways with GHG emissions until 2030 associated with the implementation of NDCs announced prior to COP26, followed by accelerated emissions reductions *likely* to limit warming to 2°C (C3b, Table SPM.1) or to return warming to 1.5°C with a probability of 50% or greater after high overshoot (subset of 42 scenarios from C2, Table SPM.1).

- Limit to 2°C (>67%) with immediate action: Pathways that limit warming to 2°C (>67%) with immediate action after 2020<sup>27</sup> (C3a, Table SPM.1).
- Limit to 1.5°C (>50%) with no or limited overshoot: Pathways limiting warming to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot (C1, Table SPM.1 C1). All these pathways assume immediate action after 2020.

Past GHG emissions for 2010-2015 used to project global warming outcomes of the modelled pathways are shown by a black line [FOOTNOTE 33] and past global GHG emissions in 2015 and 2019 as assessed in Chapter 2 are shown by whiskers.

**FOOTNOTE 33:** See the Box SPM.1 for a description of the approach to project global warming outcomes of modelled pathways and its consistency between the climate assessment in AR6 WG I.

Panels b, c and d show snapshots of the GHG emission ranges of the modelled pathways in 2030, 2050, and 2100, respectively. Panel b also shows projected emissions outcomes from near-term policy assessments in 2030 from Chapter 4.2 (Tables 4.2 and 4.3; median and full range). GHG emissions are in CO<sub>2</sub>-equivalent using GWP100 from AR6 WG I. {3.5, 4.2, Tables 4.2 and 4.3, Cross-Chapter Box 4 in Chapter 4}

**B.7 Projected cumulative future CO<sub>2</sub> emissions over the lifetime of existing and currently planned fossil fuel infrastructure without additional abatement exceed the total cumulative net CO<sub>2</sub> emissions in pathways that limit warming to 1.5°C (>50%) with no or limited overshoot. They are approximately equal to total cumulative net CO<sub>2</sub> emissions in pathways that limit warming to 2°C (>67%). (*high confidence*) {2.7, 3.3}**

**B.7.1** If historical operating patterns are maintained, [FOOTNOTE 34] and without additional abatement [FOOTNOTE 35], estimated cumulative future CO<sub>2</sub> emissions from existing fossil fuel infrastructure, the majority of which is in the power sector, would, from 2018 until the end of its lifetime, amount to 660 [460–890] GtCO<sub>2</sub>. They would amount to 850 [600–1100] GtCO<sub>2</sub> when unabated emissions from currently planned infrastructure in the power sector is included. These estimates compare with cumulative global net CO<sub>2</sub> emissions from all sectors of 510 [330–710] GtCO<sub>2</sub> until the time of reaching net zero CO<sub>2</sub> emissions [FOOTNOTE 36] in pathways that limit warming to 1.5°C (>50%) with no or limited overshoot, and 890 [640–1160] GtCO<sub>2</sub> in pathways that limit warming to 2°C (>67%). (Table SPM.1) (*high confidence*) {2.7, Figure 2.26, Figure TS.8}

**FOOTNOTE 34:** Historical operating patterns are described by load factors and lifetimes of fossil fuel installations as observed in the past (average and range).

**FOOTNOTE 35:** Abatement here refers to human interventions that reduce the amount of greenhouse gases that are released from fossil fuel infrastructure to the atmosphere.

**FOOTNOTE 36:** Total cumulative CO<sub>2</sub> emissions up to the time of global net zero CO<sub>2</sub> emissions are similar but not identical to the remaining carbon budget for a given temperature limit assessed by Working Group I. This is because the modelled emission scenarios assessed by Working Group III cover a range of temperature levels up to a specific limit, and exhibit a variety of reductions in non-CO<sub>2</sub> emissions that also contribute to overall warming. {Box 3.4}

**B.7.2** In modelled global pathways that limit warming to 2°C (>67%) or lower, most remaining fossil fuel CO<sub>2</sub> emissions until the time of global net zero CO<sub>2</sub> emissions are projected to occur outside the power sector, mainly in industry and transport. Decommissioning and reduced utilisation of existing

fossil fuel based power sector infrastructure, retrofitting existing installations with CCS [FOOTNOTE 37] switches to low carbon fuels, and cancellation of new coal installations without CCS are major options that can contribute to aligning future CO<sub>2</sub> emissions from the power sector with emissions in the assessed global modelled least-cost pathways. The most appropriate strategies will depend on national and regional circumstances, including enabling conditions and technology availability. (*high confidence*) {Table 2.7, 2.7, 3.4, 6.3, 6.5, 6.7, Box SPM.1}

**FOOTNOTE 37:** In this context, capture rates of new installations with CCS are assumed to be 90-95% + {11.3.5}. Capture rates for retrofit installations can be comparable, if plants are specifically designed for CCS retrofits {11.3.6}.

## C. System transformations to limit global warming

**C.1 Global GHG emissions are projected to peak between 2020 and at the latest before 2025 in global modelled pathways that limit warming to 1.5°C (>50%) with no or limited overshoot and in those that limit warming to 2°C (>67%) and assume immediate action.** [ Table SPM footnote [#9], FOOTNOTE 38] **In both types of modelled pathways, rapid and deep GHG emissions reductions follow throughout 2030, 2040 and 2050 (*high confidence*). Without a strengthening of policies beyond those that are implemented by the end of 2020, GHG emissions are projected to rise beyond 2025, leading to a median global warming of 3.2 [2.2 to 3.5] °C by 2100 [FOOTNOTE 39, 40] (*medium confidence*). (Table SPM.1, Figure SPM.4, Figure SPM.5) {3.3, 3.4}**

**FOOTNOTE 38:** All reported warming levels are relative to the period 1850–1900. If not otherwise specified, ‘pathways’ always refer to pathways computed with a model. Immediate action in the pathways refers to the adoption of climate policies between 2020 and at latest 2025 intended to limit global warming at a given level.

**FOOTNOTE 39:** Long-term warming is calculated from all modelled pathways assuming mitigation efforts consistent with national policies that were implemented by the end of 2020 (scenarios that fall into policy category P1b of Chapter 3) and that pass through the 2030 GHG emissions ranges of such pathways assessed in Chapter 4 (See FOOTNOTE 25) {3.2, Table 4.2}

**FOOTNOTE 40:** Warming estimates refer to the 50th and [5th–95th] percentile across the modelled pathways and the median temperature change estimate of the probabilistic WG I climate model emulators[Footnote 1<sup>1</sup> (Table SPM1).

**C.1.1** Net global GHG emissions are projected to fall from 2019 levels by 27% [13–45%] by 2030 and 63% [52–76%] [FOOTNOTE 41] by 2050 in global modelled pathways that limit warming to 2°C (>67%) and assuming immediate action (category C3a, Table SPM.1). This compares with reductions of 43% [34–60%] by 2030 and 84% [73–98%] by 2050 in pathways that limit warming to 1.5°C (>50%) with no or limited overshoot (C1, Table SPM.1) (*high confidence*). [ FOOTNOTE 42] In modelled pathways that return warming to 1.5°C (>50%) after a high overshoot [FOOTNOTE 43], GHG emissions are reduced by 23 [0–44%] in 2030 and by 75 [62–91%] in 2050 (C2, Table SPM.1) (*high confidence*). Modelled pathways that are consistent with NDCs announced prior to COP26 until 2030 and assume no increase in ambition thereafter have higher emissions, leading to a median global warming of 2.8°C [2.1–3.4°C] by 2100 (*medium confidence*). [FOOTNOTE 24] (Figure SPM .4). {3.3}

**FOOTNOTE 41:** In this report, emissions reductions are reported relative to 2019 modelled emission levels, while in SR1.5 emissions reductions were calculated relative to 2010. Between 2010 and 2019 global GHG and global CO<sub>2</sub> emissions have grown by 12% (6.5 GtCO<sub>2</sub>eq) and 13% (5.0 Gt CO<sub>2</sub>) respectively. In global modelled pathways assessed in this report that limit warming to 1.5°C (>50%) with no or limited overshoot, GHG emissions are projected to be reduced by 37% [28–57%] in 2030 relative to 2010. In the same type of pathways assessed in SR1.5, GHG emissions are reduced by 45% (40–60% interquartile range) relative to 2010. In absolute terms, the 2030 GHG emissions levels of pathways that limit warming to 1.5°C (>50%) with no or limited overshoot are higher in AR6 (31 [21–36] GtCO<sub>2</sub>eq) than in SR1.5 (28 (26–31 interquartile range) GtCO<sub>2</sub>eq). (Figure SPM. 1, Table SPM.1) {3.3, SR1.5}

**FOOTNOTE 42:** Scenarios in this category limit peak warming to 2°C throughout the 21st century with close to, or more than, 90% likelihood.

**FOOTNOTE 43:** This category contains 91 scenarios with immediate action and 42 scenarios that are consistent with the NDCs until 2030.

**C.1.2** In modelled pathways that limit warming to 2°C (>67%) assuming immediate action, global net CO<sub>2</sub> emissions are reduced compared to modelled 2019 emissions by 27% [11–46%] in 2030 and by 52% [36–70%] in 2040; and global CH<sub>4</sub> emissions are reduced by 24% [9–53%] in 2030 and by 37% [20–60%] in 2040. In pathways that limit warming to 1.5°C (>50%) with no or limited overshoot global net CO<sub>2</sub> emissions are reduced compared to modelled 2019 emissions by 48% [36–69%] in 2030 and by 80% [61–109%] in 2040; and global CH<sub>4</sub> emissions are reduced by 34% [21–57%] in 2030 and 44% [31–63%] in 2040. There are similar reductions of non-CO<sub>2</sub> emissions by 2050 in both types of pathways: CH<sub>4</sub> is reduced by 45% [25–70%]; N<sub>2</sub>O is reduced by 20% [-5 – 55%]; and F-Gases are reduced by 85% [20–90%]. [FOOTNOTE 44] Across most modelled pathways, this is the maximum technical potential for anthropogenic CH<sub>4</sub> reductions in the underlying models (*high confidence*). Further emissions reductions, as illustrated by the IMP-SP pathway, may be achieved through changes in activity levels and/or technological innovations beyond those represented in the majority of the pathways (*medium confidence*). Higher emissions reductions of CH<sub>4</sub> could further reduce peak warming. (*high confidence*) (Figure SPM.5) {3.3}

**FOOTNOTE 44:** These numbers for CH<sub>4</sub>, N<sub>2</sub>O, and F-gases are rounded to the nearest 5% except numbers below 5%.

**C.1.3** In modelled pathways consistent with the continuation of policies implemented by the end of 2020, GHG emissions continue to rise, leading to global warming of 3.2 [2.2–3.5]°C by 2100 (within C5-C7, Table SPM.1) (*medium confidence*). Pathways that exceed warming of >4°C (≥50%) (C8, SSP5-8.5, Table SPM.1) would imply a reversal of current technology and/or mitigation policy trends (*medium confidence*). Such warming could occur in emission pathways consistent with policies implemented by the end of 2020 if climate sensitivity is higher than central estimates (*high confidence*). (Table SPM.1, Figure SPM.4) {3.3, Box 3.3}

**C.1.4** Global modelled pathways falling into the lowest temperature category of the assessed literature (C1, Table SPM.1) are on average associated with a higher median peak warming in AR6 compared to pathways in the same category in SR1.5. In the modelled pathways in AR6, the likelihood of limiting warming to 1.5°C has on average declined compared to SR1.5. This is because GHG emissions have risen since 2017, and many recent pathways have higher projected emissions by 2030, higher cumulative net CO<sub>2</sub> emissions and slightly later dates for reaching net zero CO<sub>2</sub> or net zero GHG emissions. High mitigation challenges, for example, due to assumptions of slow technological change, high levels of global population growth, and high fragmentation as in the Shared Socioeconomic Pathway SSP3, may render modelled pathways that limit warming to 2°C (> 67%) or lower infeasible. (*medium confidence*) (Table SPM.1, Box SPM.1) {3.3, 3.8, Annex III Figure II.1, Annex III Figure II.3}

**Table SPM.1 | Key characteristics of the modelled global emissions pathways:** Summary of projected CO<sub>2</sub> and GHG emissions, projected net zero timings and the resulting global warming outcomes. Pathways are categorised (rows), according to their likelihood of limiting warming to different peak warming levels (if peak temperature occurs before 2100) and 2100 warming levels.

Values shown are for the median [p50] and 5th-95th percentiles [p5-p95], noting that not all pathways achieve net zero CO<sub>2</sub> or GHGs.



p50 [p2-p95] <sup>(1)</sup>		GHG emissions Gt CO <sub>2</sub> -eq/yr <sup>(2)</sup>			GHG emissions reductions from 2019 % <sup>(3)</sup>			Emissions milestones <sup>(4),(8)</sup>				Cumulative CO <sub>2</sub> emissions Gt CO <sub>2</sub> <sup>(13)</sup>		Cumulative net-negative CO <sub>2</sub> emissions Gt CO <sub>2</sub>	Global mean temperature change 50% probability <sup>(16)</sup> °C		Likelihood of peak global warming staying below (%) <sup>(15)</sup>		
Category <sup>(5)</sup> [Category / subset label]	WG I SSP & WG III IP2/TMP2 alignment <sup>(6)</sup>	2030	2040	2050	2030	2040	2050	Peak CO <sub>2</sub> emissions (% peak before 2100)	Peak GHG emissions (% peak before 2100)	Net-zero CO <sub>2</sub> (% net-zero pathways)	Net-zero GHGs <sup>(11)</sup> (% net-zero pathways)	2020 to net-zero CO <sub>2</sub>	2020-2100	Year of net-zero CO <sub>2</sub> to 2100	at peak warming	2100	-1.5°C	-2.0°C	-3.0°C
		<p><i>Modelled global emissions pathways categorised by projected global warming levels (GWL). Detailed likelihood definitions are provided in SPM Box 1. The five illustrative scenarios (SSPx-y) considered by AR6 WGI and the Illustrative Mitigation Pathways assessed in WGIII are aligned with the temperature categories and are indicated in a separate column. Global emission pathways contain regionally differentiated information. This assessment focuses on their global characteristics.</i></p> <p><i>Projected median annual GHG emissions in the year across the scenarios, with the 5th-95th percentile in brackets. Modelled GHG emissions in 2019: 55 [53-58] Gt CO<sub>2</sub>-eq</i></p> <p><i>Projected median GHG emissions reductions of pathways in the year across the scenarios compared to modelled 2019, with the 5th-95th percentile in brackets. Negative numbers indicate increase in emissions compared to 2019</i></p> <p><i>Median 5-year intervals at which projected CO<sub>2</sub> &amp; GHG emissions peak with the 5th-95th percentile interval in square brackets. Percentage of peaking pathways is denoted in round brackets. Three dots (...) denotes emissions peak in 2100 or beyond for that percentile.</i></p> <p><i>Median 5-year intervals at which projected CO<sub>2</sub> &amp; GHG emissions of pathways in this category reach net-zero, with the 5th-95th percentile interval in square brackets. Percentage of net zero pathways is denoted in round brackets. Three dots (...) denotes net zero not reached for that percentile.</i></p> <p><i>Median cumulative net CO<sub>2</sub> emissions across the projected scenarios in this category until reaching net-zero or until 2100, with the 5th-95th percentile interval in square brackets.</i></p> <p><i>Median cumulative net-negative CO<sub>2</sub> emissions between the year of net-zero CO<sub>2</sub> and 2100. More net-negative results in greater temperature declines after peak</i></p> <p><i>Projected temperature change of pathways in this category (50% probability across the range of climate uncertainties) relative to 1850-1900, at peak warming and in 2100, for the median value across the scenarios and the 5th-95th percentile interval in square brackets.</i></p> <p><i>Median likelihood that the projected pathways in this category stay below a given global warming level, with the 5th-95th percentile interval in square brackets.</i></p>																	
C1 [97]	limit warming to 1.5°C (>50%) with no or limited overshoot	31 [21-36]	17 [6-23]	9 [1-15]	43 [34-60]	69 [58-90]	84 [73-98]			2095-2100 (52%) [2050-...]	510 [330-710]	320 [-210-570]	-220 [-660-20]	1.6 [1.4-1.6]	1.3 [1.1-1.5]	38 [33-58]	90 [86-97]	100 [99-100]	
C1a [50]	... with net-zero GHGs	33 [22-37]	18 [6-24]	8 [0-15]	41 [31-59]	66 [58-89]	85 [72-100]	2020-2025 (100%) [2020-2025]	2050-2055 (100%) [2035-2070]	2070-2075 (100%) [2050-2090]	550 [340-760]	160 [-220-620]	-360 [-680-140]	1.6 [1.4-1.6]	1.2 [1.1-1.4]	38 [34-60]	90 [85-98]	100 [99-100]	
C1b [47]	... without net-zero GHGs	29 [21-36]	16 [7-21]	9 [4-13]	48 [35-61]	70 [62-87]	84 [76-93]			... (0%) [...-...]	460 [320-590]	360 [10-540]	-60 [-440-0]	1.6 [1.5-1.6]	1.4 [1.3-1.5]	37 [33-56]	89 [87-96]	100 [99-100]	
C2 [133]	return warming to 1.5°C (>50%) after a high overshoot	42 [31-55]	25 [17-34]	14 [5-21]	23 [0-44]	55 [40-71]	75 [62-91]	2020-2025 (100%) [2020-2030]	2020-2025 (100%) [2020-2025]	2055-2060 (100%) [2045-2070]	720 [530-930]	400 [-90-620]	-360 [-680-60]	1.7 [1.5-1.8]	1.4 [1.2-1.5]	24 [15-42]	82 [71-93]	100 [99-100]	
C3 [311]	limit warming to 2°C (>67%)	44 [32-55]	29 [20-36]	20 [13-26]	21 [1-42]	46 [34-63]	64 [53-77]	2020-2025 (100%) [2020-2030]	2020-2025 (100%) [2020-2025]	2070-2075 (93%) [2055-...]	890 [640-1160]	800 [510-1140]	-40 [-290-0]	1.7 [1.6-1.8]	1.5 [1.5-1.8]	20 [13-41]	76 [68-91]	99 [98-100]	
C3a [204]	... with action starting in 2020	40 [30-49]	29 [21-36]	20 [14-27]	27 [13-45]	47 [35-63]	63 [52-76]	2020-2025 (100%) [2020-2025]	2020-2025 (100%) [2020-2025]	2070-2075 (91%) [2055-...]	860 [640-1180]	790 [480-1150]	-30 [-280-0]	1.7 [1.6-1.8]	1.6 [1.5-1.8]	21 [14-42]	78 [69-91]	100 [98-100]	
C3b [97]	... NDCs until 2030	52 [47-56]	29 [20-36]	18 [10-25]	5 [0-14]	46 [34-63]	68 [56-82]			2065-2070 (97%) [2055-2090]	910 [720-1150]	800 [560-1050]	-60 [-300-0]	1.8 [1.6-1.8]	1.6 [1.5-1.7]	17 [12-35]	73 [67-87]	99 [98-99]	
C4 [159]	limit warming to 2°C (>50%)	50 [41-56]	38 [28-44]	28 [19-35]	10 [0-27]	31 [20-50]	49 [35-65]	2020-2025 (100%) [2020-2030]	2020-2025 (100%) [2020-2030]	2080-2085 (86%) [2065-...]	1210 [970-1490]	1160 [700-1490]	-30 [-390-0]	1.9 [1.7-2.0]	1.8 [1.5-2.0]	11 [7-22]	59 [50-77]	98 [95-99]	
C5 [212]	limit warming to 2.5°C (>50%)	52 [46-56]	45 [37-53]	39 [30-49]	6 [1-18]	18 [4-33]	29 [11-48]			... (41%) [2080-...]	1780 [1400-2360]	1780 [1260-2360]	0 [-160-0]	2.2 [1.9-2.5]	2.1 [1.9-2.5]	4 [0-10]	37 [18-59]	91 [83-98]	
C6 [97]	limit warming to 3°C (>50%)	54 [50-62]	53 [48-61]	52 [45-57]	2 [-10-11]	3 [-14-14]	5 [-2-18]	2030-2035 (96%) [2020-2090]	2020-2025 (97%) [2020-2090]		2790 [2440-3520]				2.7 [2.4-2.9]	0 [0-0]	8 [2-18]	71 [53-88]	
C7 [164]	limit warming to 4°C (>50%)	62 [53-69]	67 [56-78]	70 [58-83]	-11 [-18-3]	-19 [-31-1]	-24 [-41-2]	2085-2090 (57%) [2040-...]	2090-2095 (56%) [2040-...]	no net-zero	no net-zero	4220 [3160-5000]		no net-zero	temperature does not peak by 2100	3.5 [2.8-3.9]	0 [0-0]	22 [7-60]	
C8 [29]	exceed warming of 4°C (>>50%)	71 [69-81]	80 [78-96]	88 [82-112]	-20 [-34-17]	-35 [-66-29]	-46 [-92-36]	2080-2085 (90%) [2070-...]			5600 [4910-7450]				4.2 [3.7-5.0]	0 [0-0]	0 [0-0]	4 [0-11]	

**1** Values in the table refer to the 50th and [5th–95th] percentile values across the pathways falling within a given category as defined in Box SPM.1. For emissions-related columns these values relate to the distribution of all the pathways in that category. Harmonized emissions values are given for consistency with projected global warming outcomes using climate emulators. Based on the assessment of climate emulators in AR6 WG I (Chapter 7, Box 7.1), two climate emulators are used for the probabilistic assessment of the resulting warming of the pathways. For the ‘Temperature Change’ and ‘Likelihood’ columns, the single upper row values represent the 50th percentile across the pathways in that category and the median [50th percentile] across the warming estimates of the probabilistic MAGICC climate model emulator. For the bracketed ranges, the median warming for every pathway in that category is calculated for each of the two climate model emulators (MAGICC and FaIR). Subsequently, the 5th and 95th percentile values across all pathways for each emulator are calculated. The coolest and warmest outcomes (i.e. the lowest p5 of two emulators, and the highest p95, respectively) are shown in square brackets. These ranges therefore cover both the uncertainty of the emissions pathways as well as the climate emulators’ uncertainty.

**2** For a description of pathways categories see Box SPM.1.

**3** All global warming levels are relative to 1850–1900. See Table SPM 1 Footnote 13 below and SPM Scenarios Box FOOTNOTE 46 for more details.

**4** C3 pathways are sub-categorised according to the timing of policy action to match the emissions pathways in Figure SPM.4. Two pathways derived from a cost-benefit analysis have been added to C3a, whilst 10 pathways with specifically designed near-term action until 2030, whose emissions fall below those implied by NDCs announced prior to COP26, are not included in either of the two subsets.

**5** Alignment with the categories of the illustrative SSP scenarios considered in AR6 WG I, and the Illustrative (Mitigation) Pathways (IPs/IMPs) of WG III. The IMPs have common features such as deep and rapid emissions reductions, but also different combinations of sectoral mitigation strategies. See SPM Box 1 for an introduction of the IPs and IMPs and Chapter 3 for full descriptions. {3.2, 3.3, Annex III.II.4}

**6** The Illustrative Mitigation Pathway ‘Neg’ has extensive use of carbon dioxide removal (CDR) in the AFOLU, energy and the industry sectors to achieve net negative emissions. Warming peaks around 2060 and declines to below 1.5°C (50% likelihood) shortly after 2100. Whilst technically classified as C3, it strongly exhibits the characteristics of C2 high overshoot pathways, hence it has been placed in the C2 category. See SPM C3.1 for an introduction of the IPs and IMPs.

**7** The 2019 range of harmonized GHG emissions across the pathways [53–58 GtCO<sub>2</sub>eq] is within the uncertainty ranges of 2019 emissions assessed in Chapter 2 [53–66 GtCO<sub>2</sub>-eq]. {Fig SPM 1, Fig SPM 2, Box SPM1 FOOTNOTE 50}

**8** Rates of global emission reduction in mitigation pathways are reported on a pathway-by-pathway basis relative to harmonized modelled global emissions in 2019 rather than the global emissions reported in SPM Section B and Chapter 2; this ensures internal consistency in assumptions about emission sources and activities, as well as consistency with temperature projections based on the physical climate science assessment by WG I. {Annex III.II.2.5, FOOTNOTE 50} Negative values (e.g., in C7, C8) represent an increase in emissions.

**9** Emissions milestones are provided for 5-year intervals in order to be consistent with the underlying 5-year time-step data of the modelled pathways. Peak emissions (CO<sub>2</sub> and GHGs) are assessed for 5 year reporting intervals starting in 2020. The interval 2020–2025 signifies that projected emissions peak as soon as possible between 2020 and at latest before 2025. The upper 5-year interval refers to the median interval within which the emissions peak or reach net zero. Ranges in square brackets underneath refer to the range across the pathways, comprising the lower bound of the 5th percentile 5-year interval and the upper bound of the 95th percentile 5-year interval. Numbers in round brackets signify the fraction of pathways that reach specific milestones.

**10** Percentiles reported across all pathways in that category include those that do not reach net zero before 2100 (fraction of pathways reaching net zero is given in round brackets). If the fraction of pathways that reach net zero before 2100 is lower than the fraction of pathways covered by a percentile (e.g., 0.95 for the 95th percentile), the percentile is not defined and denoted with "...". The fraction of pathways reaching net zero includes all with reported non-harmonised, and / or harmonised emissions profiles that reach net zero. Pathways were counted when at least one of the two profiles fell below 100 MtCO<sub>2</sub> yr<sup>-1</sup> until 2100.

**11** The timing of net zero is further discussed in SPM C2.4 and the Cross-Chapter Box 3 in Chapter 3 on net zero CO<sub>2</sub> and net zero GHG emissions.

**12** For cases where models do not report all GHGs, missing GHG species are infilled and aggregated into a Kyoto basket of GHG emissions in CO<sub>2</sub>-eq defined by the 100 year global warming potential. For each pathway, reporting of CO<sub>2</sub>, CH<sub>4</sub>, and N<sub>2</sub>O emissions was the minimum required for the assessment of the climate

response and the assignment to a climate category. Emissions pathways without climate assessment are not included in the ranges presented here. See Annex III.II.5.

**13** Cumulative emissions are calculated from the start of 2020 to the time of net zero and 2100, respectively. They are based on harmonized net CO<sub>2</sub> emissions, ensuring consistency with the WG I assessment of the remaining carbon budget. {Box 3.4, FOOTNOTE 51 in SPM C.2}.

**14** Global mean temperature change for category (at peak, if peak temperature occurs before 2100, and in 2100) relative to 1850–1900, based on the median global warming for each pathway assessed using the probabilistic climate model emulators calibrated to the AR6 WG I assessment, see also SPM Scenarios Box. {SPM FOOTNOTE 12, WG I Cross Chapter Box 7.1, Annex III.II.2.5}.

**15** Probability of staying below the temperature thresholds for the pathways in each category, taking into consideration the range of uncertainty from the climate model emulators consistent with the AR6 WG I assessment. The probabilities refer to the probability at peak temperature. Note that in the case of temperature overshoot (e.g., category C2 and some pathways in C1), the probabilities of staying below at the end of the century are higher than the probabilities at peak temperature.

## &lt;START BOX SPM.1 HERE&gt;

**Box SPM.1: Assessment of modelled global emission scenarios**

A wide range of modelled global emission pathways and scenarios from the literature is assessed in this report, including pathways and scenarios with and without mitigation.[FOOTNOTE 45] Emissions pathways and scenarios project the evolution of GHG emissions based on a set of internally consistent assumptions about future socio-economic conditions and related mitigation measures.[FOOTNOTE 46] These are quantitative projections and are neither predictions nor forecasts. Around half of all modelled global emission scenarios assume cost-effective approaches that rely on least-cost emission abatement options globally. The other half looks at existing policies and regionally and sectorally differentiated actions. Most do not make explicit assumptions about global equity, environmental justice or intra-regional income distribution. Global emission pathways, including those based on cost effective approaches contain regionally differentiated assumptions and outcomes, and have to be assessed with the careful recognition of these assumptions. This assessment focuses on their global characteristics. The majority of the assessed scenarios (about 80%) have become available since the SR1.5, but some were assessed in that report. Scenarios with and without mitigation were categorised based on their projected global warming over the 21<sup>st</sup> century, following the same scheme as in the SR1.5 for warming up to and including 2°C. {1.5, 3.2, 3.3, Annex III.II.2, Annex III.II.3}

**FOOTNOTE 45:** In the literature, the terms pathways and scenarios are used interchangeably, with the former more frequently used in relation to climate goals. For this reason, this SPM uses mostly the term (emissions and mitigation) pathways. {Annex III.II.1.1}

**FOOTNOTE 46:** Key assumptions relate to technology development in agriculture and energy systems and socio-economic development, including demographic and economic projections. IPCC is neutral with regard to the assumptions underlying the scenarios in the literature assessed in this report, which do not cover all possible futures. Additional scenarios may be developed. The underlying population assumptions range from 8.5 to 9.7 billion in 2050 and 7.4 to 10.9 billion in 2100 (5-95th percentile) starting from 7.6 billion in 2019. The underlying assumptions on global GDP growth (ppp) range from 2.5 to 3.5% per year in the 2019-2050 period and 1.3 to 2.1% per year in the 2050-2100 (5-95th percentile). Many underlying assumptions are regionally differentiated. {1.5; 3.2; 3.3; Figure 3.9; Annex III.II.1.4; Annex III.II.3}

Scenario categories are defined by their likelihood of exceeding global warming levels (at peak and in 2100) and referred to in this report as follows [FOOTNOTE 47, 48]:

- Category C1 comprises modelled scenarios that limit warming to 1.5°C in 2100 with a likelihood of greater than 50%, and reach or exceed warming of 1.5°C during the 21st century with a likelihood of 67% or less. In this report, these scenarios are referred to as scenarios that limit warming to 1.5°C (>50%) with no or limited overshoot. Limited overshoot refers to exceeding 1.5°C global warming by up to about 0.1°C and for up to several decades. [FOOTNOTE 49]
- Category C2 comprises modelled scenarios that limit warming to 1.5°C in 2100 with a likelihood of greater than 50%, and exceed warming of 1.5°C during the 21st century with a likelihood of greater than 67%. In this report, these scenarios are also referred to as scenarios

that return warming to 1.5°C (>50%) after a high overshoot. High overshoot refers to temporarily exceeding 1.5°C global warming by 0.1-0.3°C for up to several decades.

- Category C3 comprises modelled scenarios that limit peak warming to 2°C throughout the 21st century with a likelihood of greater than 67%. In this report, these scenarios are also referred to as scenarios that limit warming to 2°C (>67%).
- Categories C4-C7 comprise modelled scenarios that limit warming to 2°C, 2.5°C, 3°C, 4°C, respectively, throughout the 21st century with a likelihood of greater than 50%. In some scenarios in C4 and many scenarios in C5-C7, warming continues beyond the 21<sup>st</sup> century.
- Category C8 comprises modelled scenarios that exceed warming of 4°C during the 21<sup>st</sup> century with a likelihood of 50% or greater. In these scenarios warming continues to rise beyond the 21<sup>st</sup> century.


Categories of modelled scenarios are distinct and do not overlap; they do not contain categories consistent with lower levels of global warming, e.g., the category of C3 scenarios that limit warming to 2°C (>67%) does not include the C1 and C2 scenarios that limit or return warming to 1.5°C (>50%). Where relevant, scenarios belonging to the group of categories C1-C3 are referred to in this report as scenarios that limit warming to 2°C (>67%) or lower.

**FOOTNOTE 47:** The future scenario projections presented here are consistent with the total observed increase in global surface temperature between 1850-1900 and 1995-2014 as well as to 2011-2020 (with best estimates of 0.85 and 1.09°C, respectively) assessed in WGI. The largest contributor to historical human-induced warming is CO<sub>2</sub>, with historical cumulative CO<sub>2</sub> emissions from 1850 to 2019 being 2400 ± 240 (GtCO<sub>2</sub>). {WGI SPM A.1.2, WGI Table SPM.2, WGI Table 5.1, Section B}

**FOOTNOTE 48:** In case no explicit likelihood is provided, the reported warming levels are associated with a likelihood of >50%.

**FOOTNOTE 49:** Scenarios in this category are found to have simultaneous likelihood to limit peak global warming to 2°C throughout the 21<sup>st</sup> century of close to and more than 90%.

## The range of assessed scenarios results in a range of 21st century projected global warming.



### Box SPM.1, Figure 1

Projected global mean warming of the ensemble of modelled scenarios included in the climate categories C1–C8 and IMPs (based on emulators calibrated to the WGI assessment), as well as five illustrative scenarios (SSPx-y) as considered by AR6 WG I. The left panel shows the p5–p95 range of projected median warming across global modelled pathways within a category, with the category medians (line). The right panel shows the peak and 2100 emulated temperature outcomes for the categories C1 to C8 and for IMPs, and the five illustrative scenarios (SSPx-y) as considered by AR6 WG I. The boxes show the p5–p95 range within each scenario category as in panel-a. The combined p5–p95 range across scenarios and the climate uncertainty for each category C1–C8 is also shown for 2100 warming (thin vertical lines). {Table SPM.1, Figure 3.11, WGI Figure SPM.8}

Methods to project global warming associated with the scenarios were updated to ensure consistency with the AR6 WG1 assessment of physical climate science [FOOTNOTE 50]: {3.2, Annex III.II.2.5, WG I Cross-chapter box 7.1}

**FOOTNOTE 50:** This involved improved methodologies to use climate emulators (MAGICC7 and FAIR v1.6), which were evaluated and calibrated to closely match the global warming response to emissions as assessed in AR6 WGI. It included harmonisation of global GHG emissions in 2015 in modelled scenarios (51–56 GtCO<sub>2</sub>-eq; 5th to 95th percentiles) with the corresponding emission value underlying the CMIP6 projected climate response assessed by WG I (54 GtCO<sub>2</sub>-eq), based on similar data sources of historical emissions that are updated over time. The assessment of past GHG emissions in Chapter 2 of the report is based on a more recent dataset providing emissions of 57 [±6.3] GtCO<sub>2</sub>-eq in 2015 (B.1). Differences are well within the assessed uncertainty range, and arise mainly from differences in estimated CO<sub>2</sub>-LULUCF emissions, which are subject to large uncertainties, high annual variability and revisions over time. Projected rates of global emission reduction in mitigation scenarios

are reported relative to modelled global emissions in 2019 rather than the global emissions reported in Chapter 2; this ensures internal consistency in assumptions about emission sources and activities, as well as consistency with temperature projections based on the physical climate science assessment by WG I. {Annex III.II.2.5}

These updated methods affect the categorisation of some scenarios. On average across scenarios, peak global warming is projected to be lower by up to about  $0.05[\pm 0.1]^{\circ}\text{C}$  than if the same scenarios were evaluated using the SR1.5 methodology, and global warming in 2100 is projected to be lower by about  $0.1[\pm 0.1]^{\circ}\text{C}$ . {Annex III.II.2.5.1, Annex III, Figure II.3}

Resulting changes to the emission characteristics of scenario categories described in Table SPM.1 interact with changes in the characteristics of the wider range of emission scenarios published since the SR1.5. Proportionally more scenarios assessed in AR6 are designed to limit temperature overshoot and more scenarios limit large-scale net negative CO<sub>2</sub> emissions than in SR1.5. As a result, AR6 scenarios in the lowest temperature category (C1) generally reach net zero GHG emissions later in the 21st century than scenarios in the same category assessed in SR1.5, and about half do not reach net zero GHG by 2100. The rate of decline of GHG emissions in the near term by 2030 in category C1 scenarios is very similar to the assessed rate in SR1.5, but absolute GHG emissions of category C1 scenarios in AR6 are slightly higher in 2030 than in SR1.5, since the reductions start from a higher emissions level in 2020. (Table SPM.1) {Annex III 2.5, 3.2, 3.3}

The large number of global emissions scenarios assessed, including 1202 scenarios with projected global warming outcomes using climate emulators, come from a wide range of modelling approaches. They include the five illustrative scenarios (Shared Socioeconomic Pathways; SSPs) assessed by WG I for their climate outcomes but cover a wider and more varied set in terms of assumptions and modelled outcomes. For this assessment, Illustrative Mitigation Pathways (IMPs) were selected from this larger set to illustrate a range of different mitigation strategies that would be consistent with different warming levels. The IMPs illustrate pathways that achieve deep and rapid emissions reductions through different combinations of mitigation strategies. The IMPs are not intended to be comprehensive and do not address all possible themes in the underlying report. They differ in terms of their focus, for example, placing greater emphasis on renewables (IMP-Ren), deployment of carbon dioxide removal that result in net negative global GHG emissions (IMP-Neg) and efficient resource use as well as shifts in consumption patterns globally, leading to low demand for resources, while ensuring a high level of services and satisfying basic needs (IMP-LD) (Figure SPM.5). Other IMPs illustrate the implications of a less rapid introduction of mitigation measures followed by a subsequent gradual strengthening (IMP-GS), and how shifting global pathways towards sustainable development, including by reducing inequality, can lead to mitigation (IMP-SP). The IMPs reach different climate goals as indicated in Table SPM.1 and Figure Box SPM.1. {1.5, 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.6, Figure 3.7, Figure 3.8, Box 3.4, Annex III.II.2.4}

<END BOX SPM.1 HERE>

**C.2 Global net zero CO<sub>2</sub> emissions are reached in the early 2050s in modelled pathways that limit warming to 1.5°C (>50%) with no or limited overshoot, and around the early 2070s in modelled pathways that limit warming to 2°C (>67%). Many of these pathways continue to net negative CO<sub>2</sub> emissions after the point of net zero. These pathways also include deep reductions in other GHG emissions. The level of peak warming depends on cumulative CO<sub>2</sub> emissions until the time of net zero CO<sub>2</sub> and the change in non-CO<sub>2</sub> climate forcings by the time of peaking. Deep**

**GHG emissions reductions by 2030 and 2040, particularly reductions of methane emissions, lower peak warming, reduce the likelihood of overshooting warming limits and lead to less reliance on net negative CO<sub>2</sub> emissions that reverse warming in the latter half of the century. Reaching and sustaining global net zero GHG emissions results in a gradual decline in warming. (*high confidence*) (Table SPM.1) {3.3, 3.5, Box 3.4, Cross-Chapter Box 3 in Chapter 3, AR6 WG I SPM D1.8}**

**C.2.1** Modelled global pathways limiting warming to 1.5°C (>50%) with no or limited overshoot are associated with projected cumulative net CO<sub>2</sub> emissions [FOOTNOTE 51] until the time of net zero CO<sub>2</sub> of 510 [330–710] GtCO<sub>2</sub>. Pathways limiting warming to 2°C (>67%) are associated with 890 [640–1160] GtCO<sub>2</sub> (Table SPM.1). (*high confidence*). {3.3, Box 3.4}

**FOOTNOTE 51:** Cumulative net CO<sub>2</sub> emissions from the beginning of the year 2020 until the time of net zero CO<sub>2</sub> in assessed pathways are consistent with the remaining carbon budgets assessed by WG I, taking account of the ranges in the WG III temperature categories and warming from non-CO<sub>2</sub> gases. {Box 3.4}

**C.2.2** Modelled global pathways that limit warming to 1.5°C (>50%) with no or limited overshoot involve more rapid and deeper near-term GHG emissions reductions through to 2030, and are projected to have less net negative CO<sub>2</sub> emissions and less carbon dioxide removal (CDR) in the longer term, than pathways that return warming to 1.5°C (>50%) after a high overshoot (C2 category). Modelled pathways that limit warming to 2°C (>67%) have on average lower net negative CO<sub>2</sub> emissions compared to pathways that limit warming to 1.5°C (>50%) with no or limited overshoot and pathways that return warming to 1.5°C (>50%) after a high overshoot (C1 and C2 categories respectively). Modelled pathways that return warming to 1.5°C (>50%) after a high overshoot (C2 category) show near-term GHG emissions reductions similar to pathways that limit warming to 2°C (>67%) (C3 category). For a given peak global warming level, greater and more rapid near-term GHG emissions reductions are associated with later net zero CO<sub>2</sub> dates. (*high confidence*) (Table SPM.1) {3.3, Table 3.5, Cross-Chapter Box 3 in Chapter 3, Annex I: Glossary}

**C.2.3** Future non-CO<sub>2</sub> warming depends on reductions in non-CO<sub>2</sub> GHG, aerosol and their precursor, and ozone precursor emissions. In modelled global low emission pathways, the projected reduction of cooling and warming aerosol emissions over time leads to net warming in the near- to mid-term. In these mitigation pathways, the projected reductions of cooling aerosols are mostly due to reduced fossil fuel combustion that was not equipped with effective air pollution controls. Non-CO<sub>2</sub> GHG emissions at the time of net zero CO<sub>2</sub> are projected to be of similar magnitude in modelled pathways that limit warming to 2°C (>67%) or lower. These non-CO<sub>2</sub> GHG emissions are about 8 [5–11] GtCO<sub>2</sub>-eq per year, with the largest fraction from CH<sub>4</sub> (60% [55–80%]), followed by N<sub>2</sub>O (30% [20–35%]) and F-gases (3% [2–20%]). [FOOTNOTE 52] Due to the short lifetime of CH<sub>4</sub> in the atmosphere, projected deep reduction of CH<sub>4</sub> emissions up until the time of net zero CO<sub>2</sub> in modelled mitigation pathways effectively reduces peak global warming. (*high confidence*) {3.3, AR6 WG I SPM D1.7}

**FOOTNOTE 52:** All numbers here rounded to the closest 5%, except values below 5% (for F-gases).

**C.2.4** At the time of global net zero GHG emissions, net negative CO<sub>2</sub> emissions counterbalance metric-weighted non-CO<sub>2</sub> GHG emissions. Typical emissions pathways that reach and sustain global net zero GHG emissions based on the 100 year global warming potential (GWP100) [FOOTNOTE 7] are projected to result in a gradual decline of global warming. About half of the assessed pathways that limit warming to 1.5°C (>50%) with no or limited overshoot (C1 category) reach net zero GHG emissions during the second half of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. These pathways show greater reduction in global warming after the peak to 1.2 [1.1–1.4]°C by 2100 than modelled pathways in the same category that



do not reach net zero GHG emissions before 2100 and that result in warming of 1.4 [1.3–1.5]°C by 2100. In modelled pathways that limit warming to 2°C (>67%) (C3 category), there is no significant difference in warming by 2100 between those pathways that reach net zero GHGs (around 30%) and those that do not (*high confidence*). In pathways that limit warming to 2°C (>67%) or lower and that do reach net zero GHG, net zero GHG occurs around 10–40 years later than net zero CO<sub>2</sub> emissions (*medium confidence*). {3.3, Cross-Chapter Box 3 in Chapter 3, Cross-Chapter Box 2 in Chapter 2; AR6 WG I SPM D1.8}

**C.3 All global modelled pathways that limit warming to 1.5°C (>50%) with no or limited overshoot, and those that limit warming to 2°C (>67%) involve rapid and deep and in most cases immediate GHG emission reductions in all sectors. Modelled mitigation strategies to achieve these reductions include transitioning from fossil fuels without CCS to very low- or zero-carbon energy sources, such as renewables or fossil fuels with CCS, demand side measures and improving efficiency, reducing non-CO<sub>2</sub> emissions, and deploying carbon dioxide removal (CDR) methods to counterbalance residual GHG emissions. Illustrative Mitigation Pathways (IMPs) show different combinations of sectoral mitigation strategies consistent with a given warming level. (*high confidence*) (Figure SPM.5) {3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 6.4, 6.6}**

**C.3.1** There is a variation in the contributions of different sectors in modelled mitigation pathways, as illustrated by the Illustrative Mitigation Pathways. However, modelled pathways that limit warming to 2°C (>67%) or lower share common characteristics, including rapid and deep GHG emission reductions. Doing less in one sector needs to be compensated by further reductions in other sectors if warming is to be limited. (*high confidence*) (Figure SPM.5) {3.2, 3.3, 3.4}

**C.3.2** In modelled pathways that limit warming to 1.5°C (>50%) with no or limited overshoot, the global use of coal, oil and gas in 2050 is projected to decline with median values of about 95%, 60% and 45% compared to 2019. The interquartile ranges are (80 to 100%), (40 to 75%) and (20 to 60%) and the p5-p95 ranges are [60 to 100%], [25 to 90%] and [-30 to 85%], respectively. In modelled pathways that limit warming to 2°C (>67%), these projected declines have a median value and interquartile range of 85% (65 to 95%), 30% (15 to 50%) and 15% (-10 to 40%) respectively by 2050. The use of coal, oil and gas without CCS in modelled pathways that limit warming to 1.5°C (>50%) with no or limited overshoot is projected to be reduced to a greater degree, with median values of about 100%, 60% and 70% in 2050 compared to 2019. The interquartile ranges are (95 to 100%), (45 to 75%) and (60 to 80%) and the p5-p95 range of about [85 to 100%], [25 to 90%], and [35 to 90%] for coal, oil and gas respectively. In these global modelled pathways, in 2050 almost all electricity is supplied from zero or low-carbon sources, such as renewables or fossil fuels with CCS, combined with increased electrification of energy demand. As indicated by the ranges, choices in one sector can be compensated for by choices in another while being consistent with assessed warming levels. [FOOTNOTE 53] (*high confidence*) {3.4, 3.5, Table 3.6, Figure 3.22, Figure 6.35}

**FOOTNOTE 53:** Most but not all models include the use of fossil fuels for feedstock with varying underlying standards.

**C.3.3** In modelled pathways that reach global net zero CO<sub>2</sub> emissions, at the point they reach net zero, 5-16 GtCO<sub>2</sub> of emissions from some sectors are compensated for by net negative CO<sub>2</sub> emissions in other sectors. In most global modelled pathways that limit warming to 2°C (>67%) or lower, the AFOLU sector, via reforestation and reduced deforestation, and the energy supply sector reach net zero CO<sub>2</sub> emissions earlier than the buildings, industry and transport sectors. (*high confidence*) (Figure SPM.5, panel e and f) {3.4}


**C.3.4** In modelled pathways that reach global net zero GHG emissions, at the point they reach net zero GHG, around 74% [54 to 90%] of global emissions reductions are achieved by CO<sub>2</sub> reductions in energy supply and demand, 13% [4 to 20%] by CO<sub>2</sub> mitigation options in the AFOLU sector, and 13% [10 to 18%] through the reduction of non-CO<sub>2</sub> emissions from land-use, energy and industry (*medium confidence*). (Figure SPM.5f) {3.3, 3.4}

**C.3.5** Methods and levels of CDR deployment in global modelled mitigation pathways vary depending on assumptions about costs, availability and constraints. [FOOTNOTE 54] In modelled pathways that report CDR and that limit warming to 1.5°C (>50%) with no or limited overshoot, global cumulative CDR during 2020–2100 from Bioenergy with Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage (BECCS) and Direct Air Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage (DACCS) is 30–780 GtCO<sub>2</sub> and 0–310 GtCO<sub>2</sub>, respectively. In these modelled pathways, the AFOLU sector contributes 20–400 GtCO<sub>2</sub> net negative emissions. Total cumulative net negative CO<sub>2</sub> emissions including CDR deployment across all options represented in these modelled pathways are 20–660 GtCO<sub>2</sub>. In modelled pathways that limit warming to 2°C (>67%), global cumulative CDR during 2020–2100 from BECCS and DACCS is 170–650 and 0–250 GtCO<sub>2</sub> respectively, the AFOLU sector contributes 10–250 GtCO<sub>2</sub> net negative emissions, and total cumulative net negative CO<sub>2</sub> emissions are around 40 [0–290] GtCO<sub>2</sub>. (Table SPM.1) (*high confidence*) {Table 3.2, 3.3, 3.4}


**FOOTNOTE 54:** Aggregate levels of CDR deployment are higher than total net negative CO<sub>2</sub> emissions given that some of the deployed CDR is used to counterbalance remaining gross emissions. Total net negative CO<sub>2</sub> emissions in modelled pathways might not match the aggregated net negative CO<sub>2</sub> emissions attributed to individual CDR methods. Ranges refer to the 5–95th percentile across modelled pathways that include the specific CDR method. Cumulative levels of CDR from AFOLU cannot be quantified precisely given that: a) some pathways assess CDR deployment relative to a baseline; and b) different models use different reporting methodologies that in some cases combine gross emissions and removals in AFOLU. Total CDR from AFOLU equals or exceeds the net negative emissions mentioned.

**C.3.6** All mitigation strategies face implementation challenges, including technology risks, scaling, and costs. Many challenges, such as dependence on CDR, pressure on land and biodiversity (e.g., bioenergy) and reliance on technologies with high upfront investments (e.g., nuclear), are significantly reduced in modelled pathways that assume using resources more efficiently (e.g., IMP-LD) or shift global development towards sustainability (e.g., IMP-SP). (*high confidence*) (Figure SPM 5) {3.2, 3.4, 3.7, 3.8, 4.3, 5.1}

**Modelled mitigation pathways that limit warming to 1.5°C, and 2°C, involve deep, rapid and sustained emissions reductions.**



Net zero CO<sub>2</sub> and net zero GHG emissions are possible through different modelled mitigation pathways.



**Figure SPM.5: Illustrative Mitigation Emissions Pathways (IMPs) and net zero CO<sub>2</sub> and GHG emissions strategies**

**Panel a and b** show the development of global GHG and CO<sub>2</sub> emissions in modelled global pathways (upper sub-panels) and the associated timing of when GHG and CO<sub>2</sub> emissions reach net zero (lower sub-panels). Panels c and d show the development of global CH<sub>4</sub> and N<sub>2</sub>O emissions, respectively. Coloured ranges denote the 5th to 95th percentile across pathways. The red ranges depict emissions pathways assuming policies that were implemented by the end of 2020 and pathways assuming implementation of NDCs (announced prior to COP26). Ranges of modelled pathways that limit warming to 1.5°C (>50%) with no or limited overshoot are shown in light blue (category C1) and pathways that limit warming to 2°C (>67%) are shown in light purple (category C3). The grey range comprises all assessed pathways (C1-C8) from the 5th percentile of the lowest warming category (C1) to the 95th percentile of the highest warming category (C8). The modelled pathway ranges are compared to the emissions from two pathways illustrative of high emissions (CurPol and ModAct) and five Illustrative Mitigation Pathways (IMPs): IMP-LD, IMP-Ren, IMP-SP, IMP-Neg and IMP-GS. Emissions are harmonised to the same 2015 base year. The vertical error bars in 2015 show the 5-95th percentile uncertainty range of the non-harmonised emissions across the pathways, and the uncertainty range, and median value, in emission estimates for 2015 and 2019. The vertical error bars in 2030 (panel a) depict the assessed range of the NDCs, as announced prior to COP26 (see Figure SPM.4, FOOTNOTE 24).

**Panel e** shows the sectoral contributions of CO<sub>2</sub> and non-CO<sub>2</sub> emissions sources and sinks at the time when net zero CO<sub>2</sub> emissions are reached in the IMPs. Positive and negative emissions for different IMPs are compared to the GHG emissions from the year 2019. Energy supply (neg.) includes BECCS and DACCS. DACCS features in only two of the five IMPs (IMP-REN, IMP-GS) and contributes <1 % and 64%, respectively, to the net negative emissions in Energy Supply (neg.).

**Panel f** shows the contribution of different sectors and sources to the emissions reductions from a 2019 baseline for reaching net zero GHG emissions. Bars denote the median emissions reductions for all pathways that reach net zero GHG emissions. The whiskers indicate the p5-p95 range. The contributions of the service sectors (transport, buildings, industry) are split into direct (demand-side) as well as indirect (supply-side) CO<sub>2</sub> emissions

reductions. Direct emissions represent demand-side emissions due to the fuel use in the respective demand sector. Indirect emissions represent upstream emissions due to industrial processes and energy conversion, transmission and distribution. In addition, the contributions from the LULUCF sector and reductions from non-CO<sub>2</sub> emissions sources (green and grey bars) are displayed.

{3.3, 3.4}

**C.4 Reducing GHG emissions across the full energy sector requires major transitions, including a substantial reduction in overall fossil fuel use, the deployment of low-emission energy sources, switching to alternative energy carriers, and energy efficiency and conservation. The continued installation of unabated fossil fuel [FOOTNOTE 55] infrastructure will ‘lock-in’ GHG emissions. (*high confidence*) {2.7, 6.6, 6.7, 16.4}**

**C.4.1** Net-zero CO<sub>2</sub> energy systems entail: a substantial reduction in overall fossil fuel use, minimal use of unabated fossil fuels, and use of CCS in the remaining fossil system [FOOTNOTE 55]; electricity systems that emit no net CO<sub>2</sub>; widespread electrification of the energy system including end uses; energy carriers such as sustainable biofuels, low-emissions hydrogen, and derivatives in applications less amenable to electrification; energy conservation and efficiency; and greater physical, institutional, and operational integration across the energy system. CDR will be needed to counter-balance residual emissions in the energy sector. The most appropriate strategies depend on national and regional circumstances, including enabling conditions and technology availability. (*high confidence*) {3.4, 6.6, 11.3, 16.4}

**FOOTNOTE 55:** In this context, ‘unabated fossil fuels’ refers to fossil fuels produced and used without interventions that substantially reduce the amount of GHG emitted throughout the life-cycle; for example, capturing 90% or more from power plants, or 50-80% of fugitive methane emissions from energy supply. {Box 6.5, 11.3}

**C.4.2** Unit cost reductions in key technologies, notably wind power, solar power, and storage, have increased the economic attractiveness of low-emission energy sector transitions through 2030. Maintaining emission-intensive systems may, in some regions and sectors, be more expensive than transitioning to low emission systems. Low-emission energy sector transitions will have multiple co-benefits, including improvements in air quality and health. The long-term economic attractiveness of deploying energy system mitigation options depends, *inter alia*, on policy design and implementation, technology availability and performance, institutional capacity, equity, access to finance, and public and political support. (*high confidence*) {Figure SPM3, 3.4, 6.4, 6.6, 6.7, 13.7}

**C.4.3** Electricity systems powered predominantly by renewables are becoming increasingly viable. Electricity systems in some countries and regions are already predominantly powered by renewables. It will be more challenging to supply the entire energy system with renewable energy. Even though operational, technological, economic, regulatory, and social challenges remain, a variety of systemic solutions to accommodate large shares of renewables in the energy system have emerged. A broad portfolio of options such as, integrating systems, coupling sectors, energy storage, smart grids, demand-side management, sustainable biofuels, electrolytic hydrogen and derivatives, and others will ultimately be needed to accommodate large shares of renewables in energy systems. (*high confidence*) {Box 6.8, 6.4, 6.6}

**C.4.4** Limiting global warming to 2°C or below will leave a substantial amount of fossil fuels unburned and could strand considerable fossil fuel infrastructure (*high confidence*). Depending on its availability, CCS could allow fossil fuels to be used longer, reducing stranded assets (*high confidence*). The combined global discounted value of the unburned fossil fuels and stranded fossil fuel infrastructure

has been projected to be around 1–4 trillion dollars from 2015 to 2050 to limit global warming to approximately 2°C, and it will be higher if global warming is limited to approximately 1.5°C (*medium confidence*). In this context, coal assets are projected to be at risk of being stranded before 2030, while oil and gas assets are projected to be more at risk of being stranded toward mid-century. A low-emission energy sector transition is projected to reduce international trade in fossil fuels. (*high confidence*) {6.7, Figure 6.35}

**C.4.5** Global methane emissions from energy supply, primarily fugitive emissions from production and transport of fossil fuels, accounted for about 18% [13%-23%] of global GHG emissions from energy supply, 32% [22%-42%] of global methane emissions, and 6% [4%-8%] of global GHG emissions in 2019 (*high confidence*). About 50–80% of CH<sub>4</sub> emissions from these fossil fuels could be avoided with currently available technologies at less than USD50 tCO<sub>2</sub>-eq<sup>-1</sup> (*medium confidence*). {6.3, 6.4.2, Box 6.5, 11.3, 2.2.2, Table 2.1, Figure 2.5; Annex1 Glossary}

**C.4.6** CCS is an option to reduce emissions from large-scale fossil-based energy and industry sources, provided geological storage is available. When CO<sub>2</sub> is captured directly from the atmosphere (DACCS), or from biomass (BECCS), CCS provides the storage component of these CDR methods. CO<sub>2</sub> capture and subsurface injection is a mature technology for gas processing and enhanced oil recovery. In contrast to the oil and gas sector, CCS is less mature in the power sector, as well as in cement and chemicals production, where it is a critical mitigation option. The technical geological CO<sub>2</sub> storage capacity is estimated to be on the order of 1000 gigatonnes of CO<sub>2</sub>, which is more than the CO<sub>2</sub> storage requirements through 2100 to limit global warming to 1.5°C, although the regional availability of geological storage could be a limiting factor. If the geological storage site is appropriately selected and managed, it is estimated that the CO<sub>2</sub> can be permanently isolated from the atmosphere. Implementation of CCS currently faces technological, economic, institutional, ecological-environmental and socio-cultural barriers. Currently, global rates of CCS deployment are far below those in modelled pathways limiting global warming to 1.5°C or 2°C. Enabling conditions such as policy instruments, greater public support and technological innovation could reduce these barriers. (*high confidence*) {2.5, 6.3, 6.4, 6.7, 11.3, 11.4, Cross-Chapter Box 8 in Chapter 12, Figure TS.31, SRCCS Chapter 5}

**C.5 Net-zero CO<sub>2</sub> emissions from the industrial sector are challenging but possible. Reducing industry emissions will entail coordinated action throughout value chains to promote all mitigation options, including demand management, energy and materials efficiency, circular material flows, as well as abatement technologies and transformational changes in production processes. Progressing towards net zero GHG emissions from industry will be enabled by the adoption of new production processes using low and zero GHG electricity, hydrogen, fuels, and carbon management. (*high confidence*) {11.2, 11.3, 11.4, Box TS.4}**

**C.5.1** The use of steel, cement, plastics, and other materials is increasing globally, and in most regions. There are many sustainable options for demand management, materials efficiency, and circular material flows that can contribute to reduced emissions, but how these can be applied will vary across regions and different materials. These options have a potential for being more used in industrial practice and would need more attention from industrial policy. These options, as well as new production technologies, are generally not considered in recent global scenarios nor in national economy-wide scenarios due to relative newness. As a consequence, the mitigation potential in some scenarios is underestimated compared to bottom-up industry-specific models. (*high confidence*) {3.4, 5.3, Figure 5.7, 11.2, Box 11.2, 11.3, 11.4, 11.5.2, 11.6}

**C.5.2** For almost all basic materials – primary metals [FOOTNOTE 56], building materials and chemicals – many low- to zero- GHG intensity production processes are at the *pilot to near-commercial* and in some cases *commercial* stage but not yet established industrial practice. Introducing new sustainable basic materials production processes could increase production costs but, given the small fraction of consumer cost based on materials, are expected to translate into minimal cost increases for final consumers. Hydrogen direct reduction for primary steelmaking is *near-commercial* in some regions. Until new chemistries are mastered, deep reduction of cement process emissions will rely on already commercialised cementitious material substitution and the availability of CCS. Reducing emissions from the production and use of chemicals would need to rely on a life cycle approach, including increased plastics recycling, fuel and feedstock switching, and carbon sourced through biogenic sources, and, depending on availability, CCU, direct air CO<sub>2</sub> capture, as well as CCS. Light industry, mining and manufacturing have the potential to be decarbonised through available abatement technologies (e.g., material efficiency, circularity), electrification (e.g., electrothermal heating, heat pumps) and low- or zero- GHG emitting fuels (e.g., hydrogen, ammonia, and bio-based & other synthetic fuels). (*high confidence*) {Table 11.4, Box 11.2, 11.3, 11.4}

**FOOTNOTE 56:** Primary metals refers to virgin metals produced from ore.

**C.5.3** Action to reduce industry sector emissions may change the location of GHG intensive industries and the organisation of value chains. Regions with abundant low GHG energy and feedstocks have the potential to become exporters of hydrogen-based chemicals and materials processed using low-carbon electricity and hydrogen. Such reallocation will have global distributional effects on employment and economic structure. (*medium confidence*) {Box 11.1}

**C.5.4** Emissions intensive and highly traded basic materials industries are exposed to international competition, and international cooperation and coordination may be particularly important in enabling change. For sustainable industrial transitions, broad and sequential national and sub-national policy strategies reflecting regional contexts will be required. These may combine policy packages including: transparent GHG accounting and standards; demand management; materials and energy efficiency policies; R&D and niche markets for commercialisation of low emission materials and products; economic and regulatory instruments to drive market uptake; high quality recycling, low-emissions energy and other abatement infrastructure (e.g., for CCS); and socially inclusive phase-out plans of emissions intensive facilities within the context of just transitions. The coverage of mitigation policies

could be expanded nationally and sub-nationally to include all industrial emission sources, and both available and emerging mitigation options. (*high confidence*) {11.6}

**C.6 Urban areas can create opportunities to increase resource efficiency and significantly reduce GHG emissions through the systemic transition of infrastructure and urban form through low-emission development pathways towards net-zero emissions. Ambitious mitigation efforts for established, rapidly growing and emerging cities will encompass 1) reducing or changing energy and material consumption, 2) electrification, and 3) enhancing carbon uptake and storage in the urban environment. Cities can achieve net-zero emissions, but only if emissions are reduced within and outside of their administrative boundaries through supply chains, which will have beneficial cascading effects across other sectors. (*very high confidence*) {8.2, 8.3, 8.4, 8.5, 8.6, Figure 8.21, 13.2}**

**C.6.1** In modelled scenarios, global consumption-based urban CO<sub>2</sub> and CH<sub>4</sub> emissions [FOOTNOTE 15] are projected to rise from 29 GtCO<sub>2</sub>-eq in 2020 to 34 GtCO<sub>2</sub>-eq in 2050 with moderate mitigation efforts (intermediate GHG emissions, SSP2-4.5), and up to 40 GtCO<sub>2</sub>-eq in 2050 with low mitigation efforts (high GHG emissions, SSP 3-7.0). With ambitious and immediate mitigation efforts, including high levels of electrification and improved energy and material efficiency, global consumption-based urban CO<sub>2</sub> and CH<sub>4</sub> emissions could be reduced to 3 GtCO<sub>2</sub>-eq in 2050 in the modelled scenario with very low GHG emissions (SSP1-1.9). [FOOTNOTE 57] (*medium confidence*) {8.3}

**FOOTNOTE 15:** This estimate is based on consumption-based accounting, including both direct emissions from within urban areas, and indirect emissions from outside urban areas related to the production of electricity, goods and services consumed in cities. These estimates include all CO<sub>2</sub> and CH<sub>4</sub> emission categories except for aviation and marine bunker fuels, land-use change, forestry and agriculture. {8.1, Annex I: Glossary}

**FOOTNOTE 57:** These scenarios have been assessed by WGI to correspond to intermediate, high and very low GHG emissions.

**C.6.2** The potential and sequencing of mitigation strategies to reduce GHG emissions will vary depending on a city's land use, spatial form, development level, and state of urbanisation (*high confidence*). Strategies for established cities to achieve large GHG emissions savings include efficiently improving, repurposing or retrofitting the building stock, targeted infilling, and supporting non-motorised (e.g., walking, bicycling) and public transport. Rapidly growing cities can avoid future emissions by co-locating jobs and housing to achieve compact urban form, and by leapfrogging or transitioning to low-emissions technologies. New and emerging cities will have significant infrastructure development needs to achieve high quality of life, which can be met through energy efficient infrastructures and services, and people-centred urban design. (*high confidence*). For cities, three broad mitigation strategies have been found to be effective when implemented concurrently: i) reducing or changing energy and material use towards more sustainable production and consumption; ii) electrification in combination with switching to low-emission energy sources; and iii) enhancing carbon uptake and storage in the urban environment, for example through bio-based building materials, permeable surfaces, green roofs, trees, green spaces, rivers, ponds and lakes [FOOTNOTE 58]. (*very high confidence*) {5.3, Figure 5.7, Table SM5.2, 8.2, 8.4, 8.6, Figure 8.21, 9.4, 9.6, 10.2}

**FOOTNOTE 58:** These examples are considered to be a subset of nature-based solutions or ecosystem-based approaches.



**C.6.3** The implementation of packages of multiple city-scale mitigation strategies can have cascading effects across sectors and reduce GHG emissions both within and outside a city's administrative boundaries. The capacity of cities to develop and implement mitigation strategies varies with the broader regulatory and institutional settings, as well as enabling conditions, including access to financial and technological resources, local governance capacity, engagement of civil society, and municipal budgetary powers. (*very high confidence*). {Figure 5.7, Table SM5.2, 8.4, 8.5, 8.6, 13.2, 13.3, 13.5, 13.7, Cross-Chapter Box 9}

**C.6.4** A growing number of cities are setting climate targets, including net-zero GHG targets. Given the regional and global reach of urban consumption patterns and supply chains, the full potential for reducing consumption-based urban emissions to net-zero GHG can be met only when emissions beyond cities' administrative boundaries are also addressed. The effectiveness of these strategies depends on cooperation and coordination with national and sub-national governments, industry, and civil society, and whether cities have adequate capacity to plan and implement mitigation strategies. Cities can play a positive role in reducing emissions across supply chains that extend beyond cities' administrative boundaries, for example through building codes and the choice of construction materials. (*very high confidence*) {8.4, Box 8.4, 8.5, 9.6, 9.9, 13.5, 13.9}

**C.7. In modelled global scenarios, existing buildings, if retrofitted, and buildings yet to be built, are projected to approach net zero GHG emissions in 2050 if policy packages, which combine ambitious sufficiency, efficiency, and renewable energy measures, are effectively implemented and barriers to decarbonisation are removed. Low ambitious policies increase the risk of lock-in buildings in carbon for decades while well-designed and effectively implemented mitigation interventions, in both new buildings and existing ones if retrofitted, have significant potential to contribute to achieving SDGs in all regions while adapting buildings to future climate. (*high confidence*) {9.1, 9.3, 9.4, 9.5, 9.6, 9.9}**

**C.7.1** In 2019, global direct and indirect GHG emissions from buildings and emissions from cement and steel use for building construction and renovation were 12 GtCO<sub>2</sub>-eq. These emissions include indirect emissions from offsite generation of electricity and heat, direct emissions produced onsite and emissions from cement and steel used for building construction and renovation. In 2019, global direct and indirect emissions from non-residential buildings increased by about 55% and those from residential buildings increased by about 50% compared to 1990. The latter increase, according to the decomposition analysis, was mainly driven by the increase of the floor area per capita, population growth and the increased use of emission-intensive electricity and heat while efficiency improvements have partly decreased emissions. There are great differences in the contribution of each of these drivers to regional emissions. (*high confidence*) {9.3}

**C.7.2** Integrated design approaches to the construction and retrofit of buildings have led to increasing examples of zero energy or zero carbon buildings in several regions. However, the low renovation rates and low ambition of retrofitted buildings have hindered the decrease of emissions. Mitigation interventions at the design stage include buildings typology, form, and multi-functionality to allow for adjusting the size of buildings to the evolving needs of their users and repurposing unused existing buildings to avoid using GHG-intensive materials and additional land. Mitigation interventions include: at the construction phase, low-emission construction materials, highly efficient building envelope and the integration of renewable energy solutions[FOOTNOTE 59]; at the use phase, highly efficient appliances/ equipment, the optimisation of the use of buildings and the supply with low-emission energy

sources; and at the disposal phase, recycling and re-using construction materials. (*high confidence*) {9.4, 9.5, 9.6, 9.7}

**FOOTNOTE 59:** Integration of renewable energy solutions refers to the integration of solutions such as solar photovoltaics, small wind turbines, solar thermal collectors, and biomass boilers.

**C.7.3** By 2050, bottom-up studies show that up to 61% (8.2 GtCO<sub>2</sub>) of global building emissions could be mitigated. Sufficiency policies [FOOTNOTE 60] that avoid the demand for energy and materials contribute 10% to this potential, energy efficiency policies contribute 42%, and renewable energy policies 9%. The largest share of the mitigation potential of new buildings is available in developing countries while in developed countries the highest mitigation potential is within the retrofit of existing buildings. The 2020-2030 decade is critical for accelerating the learning of know-how, building the technical and institutional capacity, setting the appropriate governance structures, ensuring the flow of finance, and in developing the skills needed to fully capture the mitigation potential of buildings. (*high confidence*) {9.3, 9.4, 9.5, 9.6, 9.7, 9.9}

**FOOTNOTE 60:** Sufficiency policies are a set of measures and daily practices that avoid demand for energy, materials, land and water while delivering human wellbeing for all within planetary boundaries.

**C.8 Demand-side options and low-GHG emissions technologies can reduce transport sector emissions in developed countries and limit emissions growth in developing countries (*high confidence*). Demand-focused interventions can reduce demand for all transport services and support the shift to more energy efficient transport modes (*medium confidence*). Electric vehicles powered by low emissions electricity offer the largest decarbonisation potential for land-based transport, on a life cycle basis (*high confidence*). Sustainable biofuels can offer additional mitigation benefits in land-based transport in the short and medium term (*medium confidence*). Sustainable biofuels, low emissions hydrogen, and derivatives (including synthetic fuels) can support mitigation of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions from shipping, aviation, and heavy-duty land transport but require production process improvements and cost reductions (*medium confidence*). Many mitigation strategies in the transport sector would have various co-benefits, including air quality improvements, health benefits, equitable access to transportation services, reduced congestion, and reduced material demand (*high confidence*). {10.2, 10.4, 10.5, 10.6, 10.7}**

**C.8.1** In scenarios that limit warming to 1.5°C (>50%) with no or limited overshoot, global transport-related CO<sub>2</sub> emissions fall by 59% [42–68% interquartile range] by 2050 relative to modelled 2020 emissions, but with regionally differentiated trends (*high confidence*). In global modelled scenarios that limit warming to 2°C (>67%), transport related CO<sub>2</sub> emissions are projected to decrease by 29% [14–44% interquartile range] by 2050 compared to modelled 2020 emissions. In both categories of scenarios, the transport sector *likely* does not reach zero CO<sub>2</sub> emissions by 2100 so negative emissions are *likely* needed to counterbalance residual CO<sub>2</sub> emissions from the sector (*high confidence*). {3.4, 10.7}

**C.8.2** Changes in urban form (e.g., density, land use mix, connectivity, and accessibility) in combination with programmes that encourage changes in consumer behaviour (e.g., transport pricing) could reduce transport related greenhouse gas emissions in developed countries and slow growth in emissions in developing countries (*high confidence*). Investments in public inter- and intra-city transport and active transport infrastructure (e.g., bike and pedestrian pathways) can further support the shift to less GHG-intensive transport modes (*high confidence*). Combinations of systemic changes including, teleworking, digitalisation, dematerialisation, supply chain management, and smart and

shared mobility may reduce demand for passenger and freight services across land, air, and sea (*high confidence*). Some of these changes could lead to induced demand for transport and energy services, which may decrease their GHG emissions reduction potential (*medium confidence*). {5.3, 10.2, 10.8}

**C.8.3** Electric vehicles powered by low-GHG emissions electricity have large potential to reduce land-based transport GHG emissions, on a life cycle basis (*high confidence*). Costs of electrified vehicles, including automobiles, two and three wheelers, and buses are decreasing and their adoption is accelerating, but they require continued investments in supporting infrastructure to increase scale of deployment (*high confidence*). Advances in battery technologies could facilitate the electrification of heavy-duty trucks and complement conventional electric rail systems (*medium confidence*). There are growing concerns about critical minerals needed for batteries. Material and supply diversification strategies, energy and material efficiency improvements, and circular material flows can reduce the environmental footprint and material supply risks for battery production (*medium confidence*). Sourced sustainably and with low-GHG emissions feedstocks, bio-based fuels, blended or unblended with fossil fuels, can provide mitigation benefits, particularly in the short- and medium-term (*medium confidence*). Low-GHG emissions hydrogen and hydrogen derivatives, including synthetic fuels, can offer mitigation potential in some contexts and land-based transport segments (*medium confidence*). {3.4, 6.3, 10.3, 10.4, 10.7, 10.8, Box 10.6}

**C.8.4** While efficiency improvements (e.g., optimised aircraft and vessel designs, mass reduction, and propulsion system improvements) can provide some mitigation potential, additional CO<sub>2</sub> emissions mitigation technologies for aviation and shipping will be required (*high confidence*). For aviation, such technologies include high energy density biofuels (*high confidence*), and low-emission hydrogen and synthetic fuels (*medium confidence*). Alternative fuels for shipping include low-emission hydrogen, ammonia, biofuels, and other synthetic fuels (*medium confidence*). Electrification could play a niche role for aviation and shipping for short trips (*medium confidence*) and can reduce emissions from port and airport operations (*high confidence*). Improvements to national and international governance structures would further enable the decarbonisation of shipping and aviation (*medium confidence*). Such improvements could include, for example, the implementation of stricter efficiency and carbon intensity standards for the sectors (*medium confidence*). {10.3, 10.5, 10.6, 10.7, 10.8, Box 10.5}

**C.8.5** Substantial potential for GHG reductions, both direct and indirect, for the transport sector largely depends on power sector decarbonisation, and low emissions feedstocks and production chains (*high confidence*). Integrated transport and energy infrastructure planning and operations can enable sectoral synergies and reduce the environmental, social, and economic impacts of decarbonising the transport and energy sectors (*high confidence*). Technology transfer and financing can support developing countries leapfrogging or transitioning to low emissions transport systems thereby providing multiple co-benefits (*high confidence*). {10.2, 10.3, 10.4, 10.5, 10.6, 10.7, 10.8}

**C.9** **AFOLU mitigation options, when sustainably implemented, can deliver large-scale GHG emission reductions and enhanced removals, but cannot fully compensate for delayed action in other sectors. In addition, sustainably sourced agricultural and forest products can be used instead of more GHG intensive products in other sectors. Barriers to implementation and trade-offs may result from the impacts of climate change, competing demands on land, conflicts with food security and livelihoods, the complexity of land ownership and management systems, and cultural aspects. There are many country-specific opportunities to provide co-benefits (such as biodiversity conservation, ecosystem services, and livelihoods) and avoid risks (for example, through adaptation to climate change). (*high confidence*)** {7.4, 7.6, 7.7, 12.5, 12.6}

**C.9.1** The projected economic mitigation potential of AFOLU options between 2020 and 2050, at costs below USD100 tCO<sub>2</sub>-eq<sup>-1</sup>, is 8-14 GtCO<sub>2</sub>-eq yr<sup>-1</sup> [FOOTNOTE 61] (*high confidence*). 30-50% of this potential is available at less than USD20/tCO<sub>2</sub>-eq and could be upscaled in the near term across most regions (*high confidence*). The largest share of this economic potential [4.2-7.4 GtCO<sub>2</sub>-eq yr<sup>-1</sup>] comes from the conservation, improved management, and restoration of forests and other ecosystems (coastal wetlands, peatlands, savannas and grasslands), with reduced deforestation in tropical regions having the highest total mitigation. Improved and sustainable crop and livestock management, and carbon sequestration in agriculture, the latter includes soil carbon management in croplands and grasslands, agroforestry and biochar, can contribute 1.8-4.1 GtCO<sub>2</sub>-eq yr<sup>-1</sup> reduction. Demand-side and material substitution measures, such as shifting to balanced, sustainable healthy diets [FOOTNOTE 62], reducing food loss and waste, and using bio-materials, can contribute 2.1 [1.1-3.6]GtCO<sub>2</sub>-eq yr<sup>-1</sup> reduction. In addition, demand-side measures together with the sustainable intensification of agriculture can reduce ecosystem conversion and CH<sub>4</sub> and N<sub>2</sub>O emissions, and free-up land for reforestation and restoration, and the producing of renewable energy. The improved and expanded use of wood products sourced from sustainably managed forests also has potential through the allocation of harvested wood to longer-lived products, increasing recycling or material substitution. AFOLU mitigation measures cannot compensate for delayed emission reductions in other sectors. Persistent and region-specific barriers continue to hamper the economic and political feasibility of deploying AFOLU mitigation options. Assisting countries to overcome barriers will help to achieve significant mitigation (*medium confidence*). (Figure SPM.6) {7.1, 7.4, 7.5, 7.6}

**FOOTNOTE 61:** The global top-down estimates and sectoral bottom-up estimates described here do not include the substitution of emissions from fossil fuels and GHG-intensive materials. 8-14 GtCO<sub>2</sub>-eq yr<sup>-1</sup> represents the mean of the AFOLU economic mitigation potential estimates from top-down estimates (lower bound of range) and global sectoral bottom-up estimates (upper bound of range). The full range from top-down estimates is 4.1-17.3 GtCO<sub>2</sub>-eq yr<sup>-1</sup> using a “no policy” baseline. The full range from global sectoral studies is 6.7-23.4 GtCO<sub>2</sub>-eq yr<sup>-1</sup> using a variety of baselines. (*high confidence*)

**FOOTNOTE 62:** ‘Sustainable healthy diets’ promote all dimensions of individuals’ health and wellbeing; have low environmental pressure and impact; are accessible, affordable, safe and equitable; and are culturally acceptable, as described in FAO and WHO. The related concept of balanced diets refers to diets that feature plant-based foods, such as those based on coarse grains, legumes, fruits and vegetables, nuts and seeds, and animal-sourced food produced in resilient, sustainable and low-GHG emission systems, as described in SRCCCL.

**C.9.2** AFOLU carbon sequestration and GHG emission reduction options have both co-benefits and risks in terms of biodiversity and ecosystem conservation, food and water security, wood supply, livelihoods and land tenure and land-use rights of Indigenous Peoples, local communities and small land owners. Many options have co-benefits but those that compete for land and land-based resources can pose risks. The scale of benefit or risk largely depends on the type of activity undertaken, deployment strategy (e.g., scale, method), and context (e.g., soil, biome, climate, food system, land ownership) that vary geographically and over time. Risks can be avoided when AFOLU mitigation is pursued in response to the needs and perspectives of multiple stakeholders to achieve outcomes that maximize co-benefits while limiting trade-offs. (*high confidence*) {7.4, 7.6, 12.3}

**C.9.3** Realising the AFOLU potential entails overcoming institutional, economic and policy constraints and managing potential trade-offs (*high confidence*). Land-use decisions are often spread across a wide range of landowners; demand-side measures depend on billions of consumers in diverse contexts. Barriers to the implementation of AFOLU mitigation include insufficient institutional and financial support, uncertainty over long-term additionality and trade-offs, weak governance, insecure land ownership, the low incomes and the lack of access to alternative sources of income, and the risk of reversal. Limited access to technology, data, and know-how is a barrier to implementation. Research and development are key for all measures. For example, measures for the mitigation of agricultural CH<sub>4</sub> and N<sub>2</sub>O emissions with emerging technologies show promising results. However the mitigation of agricultural CH<sub>4</sub> and N<sub>2</sub>O emissions is still constrained by cost, the diversity and complexity of agricultural systems, and by increasing demands to raise agricultural yields, and increasing demand for livestock products. (*high confidence*) {7.4, 7.6}

**C.9.4** Net costs of delivering 5-6 Gt CO<sub>2</sub> yr<sup>-1</sup> of forest related carbon sequestration and emission reduction as assessed with sectoral models are estimated to reach to ~USD400 billion yr<sup>-1</sup> by 2050. The costs of other AFOLU mitigation measures are highly context specific. Financing needs in AFOLU, and in particular in forestry, include both the direct effects of any changes in activities as well as the opportunity costs associated with land use change. Enhanced monitoring, reporting and verification capacity and the rule of law are crucial for land-based mitigation, in combination with policies also recognising interactions with wider ecosystem services, could enable engagement by a wider array of actors, including private businesses, NGOs, and Indigenous Peoples and local communities. (*medium confidence*) {7.6, 7.7}

**C.9.5** Context specific policies and measures have been effective in demonstrating the delivery of AFOLU carbon sequestration and GHG emission reduction options but the above-mentioned constraints hinder large scale implementation (*medium confidence*). Deploying land-based mitigation can draw on lessons from experience with regulations, policies, economic incentives, payments (e.g., for biofuels, control of nutrient pollution, water regulations, conservation and forest carbon, ecosystem services, and rural livelihoods), and from diverse forms of knowledge such as Indigenous knowledge, local knowledge and scientific knowledge. Indigenous Peoples, private forest owners, local farmers and communities manage a significant share of global forests and agricultural land and play a central role in land-based mitigation options. Scaling successful policies and measures relies on governance that emphasises integrated land use planning and management framed by SDGs, with support for implementation. (*high confidence*) {7.4, Box 7.2, 7.6}

**C.10 Demand-side mitigation encompasses changes in infrastructure use, end-use technology adoption, and socio-cultural and behavioural change. Demand-side measures and new ways of end-use service provision can reduce global GHG emissions in end use sectors by 40-70% by 2050 compared to baseline scenarios, while some regions and socioeconomic groups require additional energy and resources. Demand side mitigation response options are consistent with improving basic wellbeing for all. (*high confidence*) (Figure SPM.6) {5.3, 5.4, Figure 5.6, Figure 5.14, 8.2, 9.4, 10.2, 11.3, 11.4, 12.4, Figure TS.22}**

**C.10.1** Infrastructure design and access, and technology access and adoption, including information and communication technologies, influence patterns of demand and ways of providing services, such as mobility, shelter, water, sanitation, and nutrition. Illustrative global low demand scenarios, accounting for regional differences, indicate that more efficient end-use energy conversion can improve services while reducing the need for upstream energy by 45% by 2050 compared to 2020. Demand-side mitigation potential differs between and within regions, and some regions and populations require additional energy, capacity, and resources for human wellbeing. The lowest population quartile by

income worldwide faces shortfalls in shelter, mobility, and nutrition. (*high confidence*) {5.2, 5.3, 5.4, 5.5, Figure 5.6, Figure 5.10, Figure TS.20, Figure TS.22, Table 5.2}

**C.10.2** By 2050, comprehensive demand-side strategies across all sectors could reduce CO<sub>2</sub> and non-CO<sub>2</sub> GHG emissions globally by 40–70% compared to the 2050 emissions projection of two scenarios consistent with policies announced by national governments until 2020. With policy support, socio-cultural options, and behavioural change can reduce global GHG emissions of end-use sectors by at least 5% rapidly, with most of the potential in developed countries, and more until 2050, if combined with improved infrastructure design and access. Individuals with high socio-economic status contribute disproportionately to emissions and have the highest potential for emissions reductions, e.g., as citizens, investors, consumers, role models, and professionals. (*high confidence*) (Figure SPM.6){5.2, 5.3, 5.4, 5.5, 5.6, Table SM5.2, 8.4, 9.9, 13.2, 13.5, 13.8, Figure TS.20}


**C.10.3** A range of 5-30% of global annual GHG emissions from end-use sectors are avoidable by 2050, compared to 2050 emissions projection of two scenarios consistent with policies announced by national governments until 2020, through changes in the built environment, new and repurposed infrastructures and service provision through compact cities, co-location of jobs and housing, more efficient use of floor space and energy in buildings, and reallocation of street space for active mobility (*high confidence*). (Figure SPM.6) {5.3.1, 5.3.3, 5.4, Figure 5.7, Figure 5.13, Table 5.1, Table 5.5, Table SM5.2, 8.4, 9.5, 10.2, 11.3, 11.4, Table 11.6, Box TS.12}

**C.10.4** Choice architecture [FOOTNOTE 63] can help end-users adopt, as relevant to consumers, culture and country contexts, low GHG intensive options such as balanced, sustainable healthy diets[FOOTNOTE 62] acknowledging nutritional needs; food waste reduction; adaptive heating and cooling choices for thermal comfort; integrated building renewable energy; and electric light-duty vehicles, and shifts to walking, cycling, shared pooled and public transit; sustainable consumption by intensive use of longer-lived repairable products (*high confidence*). Addressing inequality and many forms of status consumption [FOOTNOTE 64] and focusing on wellbeing supports climate change mitigation efforts (*high confidence*). (Figure SPM.6) {2.4.3, 2.6.2, 4.2.5, 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, 5.4, Figure 5.4, Figure 5.10, Table 5.2, Table SM5.2, 7.4.5, 8.2, 8.4, 9.4, 10.2, 12.4, Figure TS.20}

**FOOTNOTE 63:** Choice architecture describes the presentation of choices to consumers, and the impact that presentation has on consumer decision-making.

**FOOTNOTE 64:** Status consumption refers to the consumption of goods and services which publicly demonstrates social prestige.

**Demand-side mitigation can be achieved through changes in socio-cultural factors, infrastructure design and use, and end-use technology adoption by 2050.**



**Figure SPM.6 Indicative potential of demand-side mitigation options by 2050**

Figure SPM.6 covers the indicative potential of demand-side options for the year 2050. Figure SPM.7 covers cost and potentials for the year 2030. Demand-side mitigation response options are categorised into three broad domains: ‘socio-cultural factors’, associated with individual choices, behaviour; and lifestyle changes, social norms and culture; ‘infrastructure use’, related to the design and use of supporting hard and soft infrastructure that enables changes in individual choices and behaviour; and ‘end-use technology adoption’, refers to the uptake of technologies by end-users. Demand side mitigation is a central element of the IMP-LD and IMP-SP scenarios (Figure SPM.5).

Panel (a) (Nutrition) demand-side potentials in 2050 assessment is based on bottom-up studies and estimated following the 2050 baseline for the food sector presented in peer-reviewed literature (more information in Supplementary Material 5.II, and 7.4.5). Panel (b) (Manufactured products, mobility, shelter) assessment of potentials for total emissions in 2050 are estimated based on approximately 500 bottom up studies representing all global regions (detailed list is in Table SM5.2). Baseline is provided by the sectoral mean GHG emissions in 2050 of the two scenarios consistent with policies announced by national governments until 2020. The heights of the coloured columns represent the potentials represented by the median value. These are based on a range of values available in the case studies from literature shown in Chapter 5 Supplementary Material II. The range is

shown by the dots connected by dotted lines representing the highest and the lowest potentials reported in the literature.

Panel (a) shows the demand side potential of socio-cultural factors and infrastructure use. The median value of direct emissions (mostly non-CO<sub>2</sub>) reduction through socio-cultural factors is 1.9 GtCO<sub>2</sub>-eq without considering land-use change through reforestation of freed up land. If changes in land use pattern enabled by this change in food demand are considered, the indicative potential could reach 7 GtCO<sub>2</sub>-eq. Panel (b) illustrates mitigation potential in industry, land transport and buildings end-use sectors through demand-side options. Key options are presented in the summary table below the figure and the details are in Table SM5.2.

Panel (c) visualizes how sectoral demand-side mitigation options (presented in Panel (b)) change demand on the electricity distribution system. Electricity accounts for an increasing proportion of final energy demand in 2050 (additional electricity bar) in line with multiple bottom-up studies (detailed list is in Table SM5.3), and Chapters 6 (6.6). These studies are used to compute the impact of end-use electrification which increases overall electricity demand. Some of the projected increase in electricity demand can be avoided through demand-side mitigation options in the domains of socio-cultural factors and infrastructure use in end-use electricity use in buildings, industry, and land transport found in literature based on bottom-up assessments. Dark grey columns show the emissions that cannot be avoided through demand-side mitigation options. {5.3, Figure 5.7, Supplementary Material 5.II}

**C.11 The deployment of CDR to counterbalance hard-to-abate residual emissions is unavoidable if net zero CO<sub>2</sub> or GHG emissions are to be achieved. The scale and timing of deployment will depend on the trajectories of gross emission reductions in different sectors. Upscaling the deployment of CDR depends on developing effective approaches to address feasibility and sustainability constraints especially at large scales. (*high confidence*) {3.4, 7.4, 12.3, Cross-Chapter Box 8 in Chapter 12}**

**C.11.1** CDR refers to anthropogenic activities that remove CO<sub>2</sub> from the atmosphere and store it durably in geological, terrestrial, or ocean reservoirs, or in products. CDR methods vary in terms of their maturity, removal process, timescale of carbon storage, storage medium, mitigation potential, cost, co-benefits, impacts and risks, and governance requirements (*high confidence*). Specifically, maturity ranges from lower maturity (e.g., ocean alkalisation) to higher maturity (e.g., reforestation); removal and storage potential ranges from lower potential (<1 Gt CO<sub>2</sub> yr<sup>-1</sup>, e.g., blue carbon management) to higher potential (>3 Gt CO<sub>2</sub> yr<sup>-1</sup>, e.g., agroforestry); costs range from lower cost (e.g., 45-100 USD/tCO<sub>2</sub> for soil carbon sequestration) to higher cost (e.g., 100-300 USD/tCO<sub>2</sub> for DACCS) (*medium confidence*). Estimated storage timescales vary from decades to centuries for methods that store carbon in vegetation and through soil carbon management, to ten thousand years or more for methods that store carbon in geological formations (*high confidence*). The processes by which CO<sub>2</sub> is removed from the atmosphere are categorised as biological, geochemical or chemical. Afforestation, reforestation, improved forest management, agroforestry and soil carbon sequestration are currently the only widely practiced CDR methods (*high confidence*). {7.4, 7.6, 12.3, Table 12.6, Table TS.7, Cross-Chapter Box 8 in Chapter 12, WG I 5.6}

**C.11.2** The impacts, risks and co-benefits of CDR deployment for ecosystems, biodiversity and people will be highly variable depending on the method, site-specific context, implementation and scale (*high confidence*). Reforestation, improved forest management, soil carbon sequestration, peatland restoration and blue carbon management are examples of methods that can enhance biodiversity and ecosystem functions, employment and local livelihoods, depending on context (*high confidence*). In contrast, afforestation or production of biomass crops for BECCS or biochar, when poorly implemented, can have adverse socio-economic and environmental impacts, including on biodiversity, food and water security, local livelihoods and on the rights of Indigenous Peoples, especially if implemented at large scales and where land tenure is insecure (*high confidence*). Ocean fertilisation, if implemented, could



lead to nutrient redistribution, restructuring of ecosystems, enhanced oxygen consumption and acidification in deeper waters (*medium confidence*). {7.4, 7.6, 12.3, 12.5}

**C.11.3** The removal and storage of CO<sub>2</sub> through vegetation and soil management can be reversed by human or natural disturbances; it is also prone to climate change impacts. In comparison, CO<sub>2</sub> stored in geological and ocean reservoirs (via BECCS, DACCS, ocean alkalisation) and as carbon in biochar is less prone to reversal. (*high confidence*) {6.4, 7.4, 12.3}

**C11.4** In addition to deep, rapid, and sustained emission reductions CDR can fulfil three different complementary roles globally or at country level: lowering net CO<sub>2</sub> or net GHG emissions in the near-term; counterbalancing ‘hard-to-abate’ residual emissions (e.g., emissions from agriculture, aviation, shipping, industrial processes) in order to help reach net zero CO<sub>2</sub> or net zero GHG emissions in the mid-term; achieving net negative CO<sub>2</sub> or GHG emissions in the long-term if deployed at levels exceeding annual residual emissions (*high confidence*) {3.3, 7.4, 11.3, 12.3, Cross-Chapter Box 8 in Chapter 12}

**C.11.5** Rapid emission reductions in all sectors interact with future scale of deployment of CDR methods, and their associated risks, impacts and co-benefits. Upscaling the deployment of CDR methods depends on developing effective approaches to address sustainability and feasibility constraints, potential impacts, co-benefits and risks. Enablers of CDR include accelerated research, development and demonstration, improved tools for risk assessment and management, targeted incentives and development of agreed methods for measurement, reporting and verification of carbon flows. (*high confidence*) {3.4, 7.6, 12.3}

**C.12 Mitigation options costing USD100 tCO<sub>2</sub>-eq<sup>-1</sup> or less could reduce global GHG emissions by at least half the 2019 level by 2030 (*high confidence*). Global GDP continues to grow in modelled pathways [FOOTNOTE 65] but, without accounting for the economic benefits of mitigation action from avoided damages from climate change nor from reduced adaptation costs, it is a few percent lower in 2050 compared to pathways without mitigation beyond current policies. The global economic benefit of limiting warming to 2°C is reported to exceed the cost of mitigation in most of the assessed literature. (*medium confidence*) (Figure SPM.7) {3.6, 3.8, Cross-Working Group Box 1 in Chapter 3, 12.2, Box TS.7}**

**FOOTNOTE 65:** In modelled pathways that limit warming to 2°C (>67%) or lower.

**C.12.1** Based on a detailed sectoral assessment of mitigation options, it is estimated that mitigation options costing USD100 tCO<sub>2</sub>-eq<sup>-1</sup> or less could reduce global GHG emissions by at least half of the 2019 level by 2030 (options costing less than USD20 tCO<sub>2</sub>-eq<sup>-1</sup> are estimated to make up more than half of this potential) [FOOTNOTE 66]. For a smaller part of the potential, deployment leads to net cost savings. Large contributions with costs less than USD20 tCO<sub>2</sub>-eq<sup>-1</sup> come from solar and wind energy, energy efficiency improvements, reduced conversion of natural ecosystems, and CH<sub>4</sub> emissions reductions (coal mining, oil and gas, waste). The mitigation potentials and mitigation costs of individual technologies in a specific context or region may differ greatly from the provided estimates. The assessment of the underlying literature suggests that the relative contribution of the various options could change beyond 2030. (*medium confidence*) (Figure SPM.7) {12.2}

**FOOTNOTE 66.** The methodology underlying the assessment is described in the caption to Figure SPM.7.

**C.12.2** The aggregate effects of climate change mitigation on global GDP are small compared to global projected GDP growth in assessed modelled global scenarios that quantify the macroeconomic implications of climate change mitigation, but that do not account for damages from climate change nor adaptation costs (*high confidence*). For example, compared to pathways that assume the continuation of policies implemented by the end of 2020, assessed global GDP reached in 2050 is reduced by 1.3–2.7% in modelled pathways assuming coordinated global action starting between now and 2025 at the latest to limit warming to 2°C (>67%). The corresponding average reduction in annual global GDP growth over 2020–2050 is 0.04–0.09 percentage points. In assessed modelled pathways, regardless of the level of mitigation action, global GDP is projected to at least double (increase by at least 100%) over 2020–2050. For modelled global pathways in other temperature categories, the reductions in global GDP in 2050 compared to pathways that assume the continuation of policies implemented by the end of 2020 are as follows: 2.6 - 4.2% (C1), 1.6 - 2.8% (C2), 0.8 - 2.1% (C4), 0.5 - 1.2% (C5). The corresponding reductions in average annual global GDP growth over 2020–2050, in percentage points, are as follows: 0.09 - 0.14 (C1), 0.05 - 0.09 (C2), 0.03 - 0.07 (C4), 0.02 - 0.04 (C5) [FOOTNOTE 67]. There are large variations in the modelled effects of mitigation on GDP across regions, depending notably on economic structure, regional emissions reductions, policy design and level of international cooperation [FOOTNOTE 68] (*high confidence*). Country level studies also show large variations in the effect of mitigation on GDP depending notably on the level of mitigation and on the way it is achieved (*high confidence*). Macroeconomic implications of mitigation co-benefits and trade-offs are not quantified comprehensively across the above scenarios and depend strongly on mitigation strategies (*high confidence*). {3.6, 4.2, Box TS.7, Annex III I.2, I.9, I.10 and II.3}


**FOOTNOTE 67:** These estimates are based on 311 pathways that report effects of mitigation on GDP and that could be classified in temperature categories, but that do not account for damages from climate change nor adaptation costs and that mostly do not reflect the economic impacts of mitigation co-benefits and trade-offs. The ranges given are interquartile ranges. The macroeconomic implications quantified vary largely depending on technology assumptions, climate/emissions target formulation, model structure and assumptions, and the extent to which pre-existing inefficiencies are considered. Models that produced the pathways classified in temperature categories do not represent the full diversity of existing modelling paradigms, and there are in the literature models that find higher mitigation costs, or conversely lower mitigation costs and even gains. {1.7, 3.2, 3.6, Annex III I.2 I.9 I.10 and II.3}

**FOOTNOTE 68:** In modelled cost-effective pathways with a globally uniform carbon price, without international financial transfers or complementary policies, carbon intensive and energy exporting countries are projected to bear relatively higher mitigation costs because of a deeper transformation of their economies and changes in international energy markets. {3.6}

**C.12.3** Estimates of aggregate economic benefits from avoiding damages from climate change, and from reduced adaptation costs, increase with the stringency of mitigation (*high confidence*). Models that incorporate the economic damages from climate change find that the global cost of limiting warming to 2°C over the 21st century is lower than the global economic benefits of reducing warming, unless: i) climate damages are towards the low end of the range; or, ii) future damages are discounted at high rates (*medium confidence*) [FOOTNOTE 69]. Modelled pathways with a peak in global emissions between now and 2025 at the latest, compared to modelled pathways with a later peak in global emissions, entail more rapid near-term transitions and higher up-front investments, but bring long-term gains for the economy, as well as earlier benefits of avoided climate change impacts (*high confidence*). The precise magnitude of these gains and benefits is difficult to quantify. {1.7, 3.6, Cross-Working Group Box 1 in Chapter 3 Box TS.7, WGII SPM B.4}

**FOOTNOTE 69:** The evidence is too limited to make a similar robust conclusion for limiting warming to 1.5°C.

**Many options available now in all sectors are estimated to offer substantial potential to reduce net emissions by 2030. Relative potentials and costs will vary across countries and in the longer term compared to 2030.**



**Figure SPM.7: Overview of mitigation options and their estimated ranges of costs and potentials in 2030.**

Costs shown are net lifetime costs of avoided greenhouse gas emissions. Costs are calculated relative to a reference technology. The assessments per sector were carried out using a common methodology, including definition of potentials, target year, reference scenarios, and cost definitions. The mitigation potential (shown in the horizontal axis) is the quantity of net greenhouse gas emission reductions that can be achieved by a given mitigation option relative to a specified emission baseline. Net greenhouse gas emission reductions are the sum of reduced emissions and/or enhanced sinks. The baseline used consists of current policy (~ 2019) reference scenarios from the AR6 scenarios database (25/75 percentile values). The assessment relies on approximately 175 underlying sources, that together give a fair representation of emission reduction potentials across all regions. The mitigation potentials are assessed independently for each option and are not necessarily additive. {12.2.1, 12.2.2}

The length of the solid bars represents the mitigation potential of an option. The error bars display the full ranges of the estimates for the total mitigation potentials. Sources of uncertainty for the cost estimates include assumptions on the rate of technological advancement, regional differences, and economies of scale, among others. Those uncertainties are not displayed in the figure.

Potentials are broken down into cost categories, indicated by different colours (see legend). Only discounted lifetime monetary costs are considered. Where a gradual colour transition is shown, the breakdown of the potential into cost categories is not well known or depends heavily on factors such as geographical location, resource availability, and regional circumstances, and the colours indicate the range of estimates. Costs were taken directly from the underlying studies (mostly in the period 2015-2020) or recent datasets. No correction for inflation was applied, given the wide cost ranges used. The cost of the reference technologies were also taken from the underlying studies and recent datasets. Cost reductions through technological learning are taken into account (FOOTNOTE 70).

When interpreting this figure, the following should be taken into account:

- The mitigation potential is uncertain, as it will depend on the reference technology (and emissions) being displaced, the rate of new technology adoption, and several other factors.
- Cost and mitigation potential estimates were extrapolated from available sectoral studies. Actual costs and potentials would vary by place, context and time.
- Beyond 2030, the relative importance of the assessed mitigation options is expected to change, in particular while pursuing long-term mitigation goals, recognising also that the emphasis for particular options will vary across regions (for specific mitigation options see sections C4.1, C5.2, C7.3, C8.3 and C9.1).
- Different options have different feasibilities beyond the cost aspects, which are not reflected in the figure (cf. section E.1).
- The potentials in the cost range 100 to 200 USD tCO<sub>2</sub>-eq<sup>-1</sup> may be underestimated for some options.
- Costs for accommodating the integration of variable renewable energy sources in electricity systems are expected to be modest until 2030, and are not included because of complexities in attributing such costs to individual technology options.
- Cost range categories are ordered from low to high. This order does not imply any sequence of implementation.
- Externalities are not taken into account.

{12.2, Table 12.3, 6.4, Table 7.3, Supplementary Material Table 9.2, Supplementary Material Table 9.3, 10.6, 11.4, Fig 11.13, Supplementary Material 12.A.2.3}

**FOOTNOTE 70:** For nuclear energy, modelled costs for long-term storage of radio-active waste are included.

## D. Linkages between mitigation, adaptation, and sustainable development

**D.1 Accelerated and equitable climate action in mitigating, and adapting to, climate change impacts is critical to sustainable development. Climate change actions can also result in some trade-offs. The trade-offs of individual options could be managed through policy design. The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) adopted under the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development can be used as a basis for evaluating climate action in the context of sustainable development. (*high confidence*) (Figure SPM.8) {1.6, 3.7, 17.3, Figure TS.29}**

**D.1.1** Human-induced climate change is a consequence of more than a century of net GHG emissions from unsustainable energy use, land-use and land use change, lifestyle and patterns of consumption and production. Without urgent, effective and equitable mitigation actions, climate change increasingly threatens the health and livelihoods of people around the globe, ecosystem health and biodiversity. There are both synergies and trade-offs between climate action and the pursuit of other SDGs. Accelerated and equitable climate action in mitigating, and adapting to, climate change impacts is critical to sustainable development. (*high confidence*) {1.6, Cross-Chapter Box 5 in Chapter 4, 7.2, 7.3, 17.3, WGI, WGII}

**D.1.2** Synergies and trade-offs depend on the development context including inequalities, with consideration of climate justice. They also depend on means of implementation, intra- and inter-sectoral interactions, cooperation between countries and regions, the sequencing, timing and stringency of mitigation actions, governance, and policy design. Maximising synergies and avoiding trade-offs pose particular challenges for developing countries, vulnerable populations, and Indigenous Peoples with limited institutional, technological and financial capacity, and with constrained social, human, and economic capital. Trade-offs can be evaluated and minimized by giving emphasis to capacity building, finance, governance, technology transfer, investments, and development and social equity considerations with meaningful participation of Indigenous Peoples and vulnerable populations. (*high confidence*) {1.6, 1.7, 3.7, 5.2, 5.6, 7.4, 7.6, 17.4}

**D.1.3** There are potential synergies between sustainable development and energy efficiency and renewable energy, urban planning with more green spaces, reduced air pollution, and demand side mitigation including shifts to balanced, sustainable healthy diets (*high confidence*). Electrification combined with low GHG energy, and shifts to public transport can enhance health, employment, and can elicit energy security and deliver equity (*high confidence*). In industry, electrification and circular material flows contribute to reduced environmental pressures and increased economic activity and employment. However, some industrial options could impose high costs (*medium confidence*). (Figure SPM.8) {5.2, 8.2, 11.3, 11.5, 17.3, Figure TS.29}

**D.1.4** Land-based options such as reforestation and forest conservation, avoided deforestation and restoration and conservation of natural ecosystems and biodiversity, improved sustainable forest management, agroforestry, soil carbon management and options that reduce CH<sub>4</sub> and N<sub>2</sub>O emissions in agriculture from livestock and soil, can have multiple synergies with the SDGs. These include enhancing sustainable agricultural productivity and resilience, food security, providing additional biomass for human use, and addressing land degradation. Maximising synergies and managing trade-offs depend on specific practices, scale of implementation, governance, capacity building, integration with existing land-use, and the involvement of local communities and Indigenous Peoples and through benefit sharing supported by frameworks such as Land Degradation Neutrality within the UNCCD. (*high confidence*) {3.7, 7.4, 12.5, 17.3}

**D.1.5** Trade-offs in terms of employment, water use, land use competition and biodiversity, as well as access to, and the affordability of, energy, food, and water can be avoided by well-implemented land-based mitigation options, especially those that do not threaten existing sustainable land uses and land rights, though more frameworks for integrated policy implementation are required. The sustainability of bioenergy and other biobased products is influenced by feedstock, land management practice, climatic region, the context of existing land management, and the timing, scale and speed of deployment. (*medium confidence*) {3.5, 3.7, 7.4, 12.4, 12.5, 17.1}

**D.1.6** CDR methods such as soil carbon sequestration and biochar [FOOTNOTE 71] can improve soil quality and food production capacity. Ecosystem restoration and reforestation sequester carbon in plants and soil, and can enhance biodiversity and provide additional biomass, but can displace food production and livelihoods, which calls for integrated approaches to land use planning, to meet multiple objectives including food security. However, due to limited application of some of the options today, there are some uncertainties about potential benefits (*high confidence*) {3.7, 7.4, 7.6, 12.5, 17.3, Table TS.7}

**FOOTNOTE 71:** Potential risks, knowledge gaps due to the relative immaturity of use of biochar as soil amendment and unknown impacts of widespread application, and co-benefits of biochar are reviewed in 7.4.3.2.

Mitigation options have synergies with many Sustainable Development Goals, but some options can also have trade-offs. The synergies and trade-offs vary dependent on context and scale.




Figure SPM.8 Synergies and trade-offs between sectoral and system mitigation options and the SDGs

The sectoral chapters (Chapters 6–11) include qualitative assessments of synergies and trade-offs between sectoral mitigation options and the SDGs. Figure SPM.8 presents a summary of the chapter-level assessment for selected mitigation options (see Supplementary Material Table 17.1 for the underlying assessment). The last column provides a line of sight to the sectoral chapters, which provide details on context specificity and dependence of interactions on the scale of implementation. Blank cells indicate that interactions have not been assessed due to limited literature. They do not indicate the absence of interactions between mitigation options and the SDGs. Confidence levels depend on the quality of evidence and level of agreement in the underlying literature assessed by the sectoral chapters. Where both synergies and trade-offs exist, the lower of the confidence levels for these interactions is used.

Some mitigation options may have applications in more than one sector or system. The interactions between mitigation options and the SDGs might differ depending on the sector or system, and also on the context and the scale of implementation. Scale of implementation particularly matters when there is competition for scarce resources.

{6.3, 6.4, 6.7, 7.3, 7.4, 7.5, 7.6, 8.2, 8.4, 8.6, Figure 8.4, Table SM8.1, Table SM8.2, 9.4, 9.5, 9.8, Table 9.5, 10.3, 10.4, 10.5, 10.6, 10.8, Table 10.3, 11.5, 12.5, 17.3, Figure 17.1, Table SM17.1, Annex II Part IV Section 12}

**D.2 There is a strong link between sustainable development, vulnerability and climate risks. Limited economic, social and institutional resources often result in high vulnerability and low adaptive capacity, especially in developing countries (*medium confidence*). Several response options deliver both mitigation and adaptation outcomes, especially in human settlements, land management, and in relation to ecosystems. However, land and aquatic ecosystems can be adversely affected by some mitigation actions, depending on their implementation (*medium confidence*). Coordinated cross-sectoral policies and planning can maximise synergies and avoid or reduce trade-offs between mitigation and adaptation (*high confidence*). {3.7, 4.4, 13.8, 17.3, WG II}**

**D.2.1** Sustainable urban planning and infrastructure design including green roofs and facades, networks of parks and open spaces, management of urban forests and wetlands, urban agriculture, and water-sensitive design can deliver both mitigation and adaptation benefits in settlements (*medium confidence*). These options can also reduce flood risks, pressure on urban sewer systems, urban heat island effects, and can deliver health benefits from reduced air pollution (*high confidence*). There could also be trade-offs. For example, increasing urban density to reduce travel demand, could imply high vulnerability to heat waves and flooding (*high confidence*). (Figure SPM.8) {3.7, 8.2, 8.4, 12.5, 13.8, 17.3}

**D.2.2** Land-related mitigation options with potential co-benefits for adaptation include agroforestry, cover crops, intercropping, and perennial plants, thus restoring natural vegetation and rehabilitating degraded land. These can enhance resilience by maintaining land productivity and protecting and diversifying livelihoods. Restoration of mangroves and coastal wetlands sequester carbon, while also reducing coastal erosion and protecting against storm surges, thus, reduce the risks from sea level rise and extreme weather. (*high confidence*) {4.4, 7.4, 7.6, 12.5, 13.8}

**D.2.3** Some mitigation options can increase competition for scarce resources including land, water and biomass. Consequently, these can also reduce adaptive capacity, especially if deployed at larger scale and with high expansion rates thus exacerbating existing risks in particular where land and water resources are very limited. Examples include the large-scale or poorly planned deployment of bioenergy, biochar, and afforestation of naturally unforested land. (*high confidence*) {12.5, 17.3}

**D.2.4** Coordinated policies, equitable partnerships and integration of adaptation and mitigation within and across sectors can maximise synergies and minimise trade-offs and thereby enhance the support for climate action (*medium confidence*). Even if extensive global mitigation efforts are implemented, there



will be a large need for financial, technical, and human resources for adaptation. Absence or limited resources in social and institutional systems can lead to poorly coordinated responses, thus reducing the potential for maximising mitigation and adaptation benefits, and increasing risk (*high confidence*). {12.6, 13.8, 17.1, 17.3}

**D.3 Enhanced mitigation and broader action to shift development pathways towards sustainability will have distributional consequences within and between countries. Attention to equity and broad and meaningful participation of all relevant actors in decision-making at all scales can build social trust, and deepen and widen support for transformative changes. (*high confidence*)** {3.6, 4.2, 4.5, 5.2, 13.2, 17.3, 17.4}

**D.3.1** Countries at all stages of economic development seek to improve the well-being of people, and their development priorities reflect different starting points and contexts. Different contexts include social, economic, environmental, cultural, or political conditions, resource endowment, capabilities, international environment, and history. The enabling conditions for shifting development pathways towards increased sustainability will therefore also differ, giving rise to different needs. (*high confidence*) (Figure SPM.2) {1.6, 1.7, 2.4, 2.6, Cross-Chapter Box 5 in Chapter 4, 4.3.2, 17.4}

**D.3.2** Ambitious mitigation pathways imply large and sometimes disruptive changes in economic structure, with significant distributional consequences, within and between countries. Equity remains a central element in the UN climate regime, notwithstanding shifts in differentiation between states over time and challenges in assessing fair shares. Distributional consequences within and between countries include shifting of income and employment during the transition from high to low emissions activities. While some jobs may be lost, low-emissions development can also open more opportunities to enhance skills and create more jobs that last, with differences across countries and sectors. Integrated policy packages can improve the ability to integrate considerations of equity, gender equality and justice. (*high confidence*). {1.4, 1.6, 3.6, 4.2, 5.2, Box 11.1, 14.3, 15.2, 15.5, 15.6}

**D.3.3** Inequalities in the distribution of emissions and in the impacts of mitigation policies within countries affect social cohesion and the acceptability of mitigation and other environmental policies. Equity and just transitions can enable deeper ambitions for accelerated mitigation. Applying just transition principles and implementing them through collective and participatory decision-making processes is an effective way of integrating equity principles into policies at all scales, in different ways depending on national circumstances. (*medium confidence*) This is already taking place in many countries and regions, as national just transition commissions or task forces, and related national policies, have been established in several countries. A multitude of actors, networks, and movements are engaged. (*high confidence*) {1.6, 1.7, 2.4, 2.6, 4.5, 13.2, 13.9, 14.3, 14.5}

**D.3.4** Broadening equitable access to domestic and international finance, technologies that facilitate mitigation, and capacity, while explicitly addressing needs can further integrate equity and justice into national and international policies and act as a catalyst for accelerating mitigation and shifting development pathways (*medium confidence*). The consideration of ethics and equity can help address the uneven distribution of adverse impacts associated with 1.5°C and higher levels of global warming, in all societies (*high confidence*). Consideration of climate justice can help to facilitate shifting development pathways towards sustainability, including through equitable sharing of benefits and burdens of mitigation, increasing resilience to the impacts of climate change, especially for vulnerable countries and communities, and equitably supporting those in need (*high confidence*). {1.4, 1.6, 1.7,

3.6, 4.2, 4.5, Box 5.10, 13.4, 13.8, 13.9, 14.3, 14.5, 15.2, 15.5, 15.6, 16.5, 17.3, 17.4, SR1.5 SPM, WGII CH18}

## E. Strengthening the response

**E.1** There are mitigation options which are feasible [FOOTNOTE 72] to deploy at scale in the near term. Feasibility differs across sectors and regions, and according to capacities and the speed and scale of implementation. Barriers to feasibility would need to be reduced or removed, and enabling conditions [FOOTNOTE 73] strengthened to deploy mitigation options at scale. These barriers and enablers include geophysical, environmental-ecological, technological, and economic factors, and especially institutional and socio-cultural factors. Strengthened near-term action beyond the NDCs (announced prior to UNFCCC COP26) can reduce and/or avoid long-term feasibility challenges of global modelled pathways that limit warming to 1.5 °C (>50%) with no or limited overshoot. (*high confidence*) {3.8, 6.4, 8.5, 9.9, 10.8, 12.3, Figure TS.31, Annex II Part IV Section 11}

FOOTNOTE 72: In this report, the term ‘feasibility’ refers to the potential for a mitigation or adaptation option to be implemented. Factors influencing feasibility are context-dependent and may change over time. Feasibility depends on geophysical, environmental-ecological, technological, economic, socio-cultural and institutional factors that enable or constrain the implementation of an option. The feasibility of options may change when different options are combined and increase when enabling conditions are strengthened.

FOOTNOTE 73: In this report, the term ‘enabling conditions’ refers to conditions that enhance the feasibility of adaptation and mitigation options. Enabling conditions include finance, technological innovation, strengthening policy instruments, institutional capacity, multi-level governance and changes in human behaviour and lifestyles.

**E.1.1** Several mitigation options, notably solar energy, wind energy, electrification of urban systems, urban green infrastructure, energy efficiency, demand side management, improved forest- and crop/grassland management, and reduced food waste and loss, are technically viable, are becoming increasingly cost effective, and are generally supported by the public. This enables deployment in many regions. (*high confidence*) While many mitigation options have environmental co-benefits, including improved air quality and reducing toxic waste, many also have adverse environmental impacts, such as reduced biodiversity, when applied at very large scale, for example very large scale bioenergy or large scale use of battery storage, that would have to be managed (*medium confidence*). Almost all mitigation options face institutional barriers that need to be addressed to enable their application at scale (*medium confidence*). {6.4, Figure 6.19, 7.4, 8.5, Figure 8.19, 9.9, Figure 9.20, 10.8, Figure 10.23, 12.3, Figure 12.4, Figure TS.31}

**E.1.2** The feasibility of mitigation options varies according to context and time. For example, the institutional capacity to support deployment varies across countries; the feasibility of options that involve large-scale land use changes varies across regions; spatial planning has a higher potential at early stages of urban development; the potential of geothermal is site specific; and capacities, cultural and local conditions can either inhibit or enable demand-side responses. The deployment of solar and wind energy has been assessed to become increasingly feasible over time. The feasibility of some options can increase when combined or integrated, such as using land for both agriculture and

centralised solar production. (*high confidence*) {6.4, 6.6, 7.4, 8.5, 9.9, 10.8, 12.3, Appendix 10.3, Table SM6, Table SM8.2, Table SM9.1, Table SM12.B}

**E.1.3** Feasibility depends on the scale and speed of implementation. Most options face barriers when they are implemented rapidly at a large scale, but the scale at which barriers manifest themselves varies. Strengthened and coordinated near-term actions in cost-effective modelled global pathways that limit warming to 2°C (>67%) or lower, reduce the overall risks to the feasibility of the system transitions, compared to modelled pathways with relatively delayed or uncoordinated action.[FOOTNOTE 74] (*high confidence*) {3.8, 6.4, 10.8, 12.3}

**FOOTNOTE 74:** The future feasibility challenges described in the modelled pathways may differ from the real-world feasibility experiences of the past.

**E.2** In all countries, mitigation efforts embedded within the wider development context can increase the pace, depth and breadth of emissions reductions (*medium confidence*). Policies that shift development pathways towards sustainability can broaden the portfolio of available mitigation responses, and enable the pursuit of synergies with development objectives (*medium confidence*). Actions can be taken now to shift development pathways and accelerate mitigation and transitions across systems (*high confidence*). {4.3, 4.4, Cross-Chapter Box 5 in Chapter 4, 5.2, 5.4, 13.9, 14.5, 15.6, 16.3, 16.4, 16.5}

**E.2.1** Current development pathways may create behavioural, spatial, economic and social barriers to accelerated mitigation at all scales (*high confidence*). Choices made by policymakers, citizens, the private sector and other stakeholders influence societies' development pathways (*high confidence*). Actions that steer, for example, energy and land systems transitions, economy-wide structural change, and behaviour change, can shift development pathways towards sustainability [FOOTNOTE 75] (*medium confidence*). {4.3, Cross-Chapter Box 5 in Chapter 4, 5.4, 13.9}

**FOOTNOTE 75:** Sustainability may be interpreted differently in various contexts as societies pursue a variety of sustainable development objectives.

**E.2.2** Combining mitigation with policies to shift development pathways, such as broader sectoral policies, policies that induce lifestyle or behaviour changes, financial regulation, or macroeconomic policies can overcome barriers and open up a broader range of mitigation options (*high confidence*). It can also facilitate the combination of mitigation and other development goals (*high confidence*). For example, measures promoting walkable urban areas combined with electrification and renewable energy can create health co-benefits from cleaner air and benefits from enhanced mobility (*high confidence*). Coordinated housing policies that broaden relocation options can make mitigation measures in transport more effective (*medium confidence*). {3.2, 4.3, 4.4, Cross-Chapter Box 5 in Chapter 4, 5.3, 8.2, 8.4}

**E.2.3** Institutional and regulatory capacity, innovation, finance, improved governance and collaboration across scales, and multi-objective policies enable enhanced mitigation and shifts in development pathways. Such interventions can be mutually reinforcing and establish positive feedback mechanisms, resulting in accelerated mitigation. (*high confidence*) {4.4, 5.4, Figure 5.14, 5.6, 9.9, 13.9, 14.5, 15.6, 16.3, 16.4, 16.5, Cross-Chapter Box 12 in Chapter 16}

**E.2.4** Enhanced action on all the above enabling conditions can be taken now (*high confidence*). In some situations, such as with innovation in technology at an early stage of development and some changes in behaviour towards low-emissions, because the enabling conditions may take time to be established, action in the near-term can yield accelerated mitigation in the mid-term (*medium*

*confidence*). In other situations, the enabling conditions can be put in place and yield results in a relatively short time frame, for example the provision of energy related information, advice and feedback to promote energy saving behaviour (*high confidence*). {4.4, 5.4, Figure 5.14, 5.6, 6.7, 9.9, 13.9, 14.5, 15.6, 16.3, 16.4, 16.5, Cross-Chapter Box 12 in Chapter 16}

**E.3 Climate governance, acting through laws, strategies and institutions, based on national circumstances, supports mitigation by providing frameworks through which diverse actors interact, and a basis for policy development and implementation (*medium confidence*). Climate governance is most effective when it integrates across multiple policy domains, helps realise synergies and minimize trade-offs, and connects national and sub-national policy-making levels (*high confidence*). Effective and equitable climate governance builds on engagement with civil society actors, political actors, businesses, youth, labour, media, Indigenous Peoples and local communities (*medium confidence*). {5.4, 5.6, 8.5, 9.9, 13.2, 13.7, 13.9}**

**E.3.1** Climate governance enables mitigation by providing an overall direction, setting targets, mainstreaming climate action across policy domains, enhancing regulatory certainty, creating specialised organisations and creating the context to mobilise finance (*medium confidence*). These functions can be promoted by climate-relevant laws, which are growing in number, or climate strategies, among others, based on national and sub-national context (*medium confidence*). Framework laws set an overarching legal basis, either operating through a target and implementation approach, or a sectoral mainstreaming approach, or both, depending on national circumstance (*medium confidence*). Direct national and sub-national laws that explicitly target mitigation and indirect laws that impact emissions through mitigation related policy domains have both been shown to be relevant to mitigation outcomes (*medium confidence*). {13.2}

**E.3.2** Effective national climate institutions address coordination across sectors, scales and actors, build consensus for action among diverse interests, and inform strategy setting (*medium confidence*). These functions are often accomplished through independent national expert bodies, and high-level coordinating bodies that transcend departmental mandates. Complementary sub-national institutions tailor mitigation actions to local context and enable experimentation but can be limited by inequities and resource and capacity constraints (*high confidence*). Effective governance requires adequate institutional capacity at all levels (*high confidence*). {4.4, 8.5, 9.9, 11.3, 11.5, 11.6, 13.2, 13.5, 13.7, 13.9}

**E.3.3** The extent to which civil society actors, political actors, businesses, youth, labour, media, Indigenous Peoples, and local communities are engaged influences political support for climate change mitigation and eventual policy outcomes. Structural factors of national circumstances and capabilities (e.g., economic and natural endowments, political systems and cultural factors and gender considerations) affect the breadth and depth of climate governance. Mitigation options that align with prevalent ideas, values and beliefs are more easily adopted and implemented. Climate-related litigation, for example by governments, private sector, civil society and individuals is growing, with a large number of cases in some developed countries, and with a much smaller number in some developing countries, and in some cases, has influenced the outcome and ambition of climate governance. (*medium confidence*) {5.2, 5.4, 5.5, 5.6, 9.9, 13.3, 13.4}

**E.4 Many regulatory and economic instruments have already been deployed successfully. Instrument design can help address equity and other objectives. These instruments could support deep emissions reductions and stimulate innovation if scaled up and applied more widely (*high confidence*). Policy packages that enable innovation and build capacity are better able to support**

**a shift towards equitable low-emission futures than are individual policies (*high confidence*). Economy-wide packages, consistent with national circumstances, can meet short-term economic goals while reducing emissions and shifting development pathways towards sustainability (*medium confidence*). {13.6, 13.7, 13.9, 16.3, 16.4, 16.6, Cross-Chapter Box 5 in Chapter 4}**

**E.4.1** A wide range of regulatory instruments at the sectoral level have proven effective in reducing emissions. These instruments, and broad-based approaches including relevant economic instruments[FOOTNOTE 76], are complementary. (*high confidence*) Regulatory instruments that are designed to be implemented with flexibility mechanisms can reduce costs (*medium confidence*). Scaling up and enhancing the use of regulatory instruments, consistent with national circumstances, could improve mitigation outcomes in sectoral applications, including but not limited to renewable energy, land-use and zoning, building codes, vehicle and energy efficiency, fuel standards, and low-emissions industrial processes and materials (*high confidence*). {6.7, 7.6, 8.4, 9.9, 10.4, 11.5, 11.6, 13.6}

**FOOTNOTE 76:** Economic instruments are structured to provide a financial incentive to reduce emissions and include, among others, market- and price-based instruments.

**E.4.2** Economic instruments have been effective in reducing emissions, complemented by regulatory instruments mainly at the national and also sub-national and regional level (*high confidence*). Where implemented, carbon pricing instruments have incentivized low-cost emissions reduction measures, but have been less effective, on their own and at prevailing prices during the assessment period, to promote higher-cost measures necessary for further reductions (*medium confidence*). Equity and distributional impacts of such carbon pricing instruments can be addressed by using revenue from carbon taxes or emissions trading to support low-income households, among other approaches (*high confidence*). Practical experience has informed instrument design and helped to improve predictability, environmental effectiveness, economic efficiency, distributional goals and social acceptance (*high confidence*). Removing fossil fuel subsidies would reduce emissions, improve public revenue and macroeconomic performance, and yield other environmental and sustainable development benefits; subsidy removal may have adverse distributional impacts especially on the most economically vulnerable groups which, in some cases can be mitigated by measures such as re-distributing revenue saved, all of which depend on national circumstances (*high confidence*); fossil fuel subsidy removal is projected by various studies to reduce global CO<sub>2</sub> emissions by 1-4%, and GHG emissions by up to 10% by 2030, varying across regions (*medium confidence*). {6.3, 13.6}

**E.4.3** Low-emission technological innovation is strengthened through the combination of dedicated technology-push policies and investments (e.g., for scientific training, R&D, demonstration), with tailored demand-pull policies (e.g., standards, feed-in tariffs, taxes), which create incentives and market opportunities. Developing countries' abilities to deploy low-emission technologies, seize socio-economic benefits and manage trade-offs would be enhanced with increased financial resources and capacity for innovation which are currently concentrated in developed countries, alongside technology transfer. (*high confidence*) {16.2, 16.3, 16.4, 16.5}

**E.4.4** Effective policy packages would be comprehensive in coverage, harnessed to a clear vision for change, balanced across objectives, aligned with specific technology and system needs, consistent in terms of design and tailored to national circumstances. They are better able to realise synergies and avoid trade-offs across climate and development objectives. Examples include: emissions reductions from buildings through a mix of efficiency targets, building codes, appliance performance standards, information provision, carbon pricing, finance and technical assistance; and industrial GHG emissions reductions through innovation support, market creation and capacity building. (*high confidence*) {4.4, 6.7, 9.9, 11.6, 13.7, 13.9, 16.3, 16.4}

**E.4.5** Economy-wide packages that support mitigation and avoid negative environmental outcomes include: long-term public spending commitments, pricing reform; and investment in education and training, natural capital, R&D and infrastructure (*high confidence*). They can meet short-term economic goals while reducing emissions and shifting development pathways towards sustainability (*medium confidence*). Infrastructure investments can be designed to promote low-emissions futures that meet development needs (*medium confidence*). {Cross Chapter Box 7 in Chapter 4, 5.4, 5.6, 8.5, 13.6, 13.9, 16.3, 16.5, 16.6}

**E.4.6** National policies to support technology development and diffusion, and participation in international markets for emission reduction, can bring positive spill-over effects for other countries (*medium confidence*), although reduced demand for fossil fuels could result in costs to exporting countries (*high confidence*). There is no consistent evidence that current emission trading systems have led to significant emissions leakage, which can be attributed to design features aimed at minimising competitiveness effects among other reasons (*medium confidence*). {13.6, 13.7, 13.8, 16.2, 16.3, 16.4}

**E.5** **Tracked financial flows fall short of the levels needed to achieve mitigation goals across all sectors and regions. The challenge of closing gaps is largest in developing countries as a whole. Scaling up mitigation financial flows can be supported by clear policy choices and signals from governments and the international community. (*high confidence*) Accelerated international financial cooperation is a critical enabler of low-GHG and just transitions, and can address inequities in access to finance and the costs of, and vulnerability to, the impacts of climate change (*high confidence*).** {15.2, 15.3, 15.4, 15.5, 15.6}

**E.5.1** Average annual modelled investment requirements for 2020 to 2030 in scenarios that limit warming to 2°C or 1.5°C are a factor of three to six greater than current levels, and total mitigation investments (public, private, domestic and international) would need to increase across all sectors and regions (*medium confidence*). Mitigation investment gaps are wide for all sectors, and widest for the AFOLU sector in relative terms and for developing countries [FOOTNOTE 77] (*high confidence*). Financing and investment requirements for adaptation, reduction of losses and damages, general infrastructure, regulatory environment and capacity building, and climate-responsive social protection further exacerbate the magnitude of the challenges for developing countries to attract financing (*high confidence*). {3.2, 14.4, 15.1, 15.2, 15.3, 15.4, 15.5}

**FOOTNOTE 77:** In modelled pathways, regional investments are projected to occur when and where they are most cost-effective to limit global warming. The model quantifications help to identify high-priority areas for cost-effective investments, but do not provide any indication on who would finance the regional investments.

**E.5.2** There is sufficient global capital and liquidity to close global investment gaps, given the size of the global financial system, but there are barriers to redirect capital to climate action both within and outside the global financial sector, and in the macroeconomic headwinds facing developing regions. Barriers to the deployment of commercial finance from within the financial sector as well as macroeconomic considerations include: inadequate assessment of climate-related risks and investment opportunities, regional mismatch between available capital and investment needs, home bias factors, country indebtedness levels, economic vulnerability, and limited institutional capacities (*high confidence*). Challenges from outside the financial sector include: limited local capital markets; unattractive risk-return profiles, in particular due to missing or weak regulatory environments consistent with ambition levels; limited institutional capacity to ensure safeguards; standardization, aggregation,

scalability and replicability of investment opportunities and financing models; and, a pipeline ready for commercial investments. (*high confidence*) {15.2, 15.3, 15.5, 15.6}

**E.5.3** Accelerated financial support for developing countries from developed countries and other sources is a critical enabler to enhance mitigation action and address inequities in access to finance, including its costs, terms and conditions and economic vulnerability to climate change for developing countries (*high confidence*). Scaled-up public grants for mitigation and adaptation funding for vulnerable regions, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, would be cost-effective and have high social returns in terms of access to basic energy (*high confidence*). Options for scaling up mitigation in developing regions include: increased levels of public finance and publicly mobilised private finance flows from developed to developing countries in the context of the USD100 billion-a-year goal; increase the use of public guarantees to reduce risks and leverage private flows at lower cost; local capital markets development; and building greater trust in international cooperation processes (*high confidence*). A coordinated effort to make the post-pandemic recovery sustainable and increased flows of financing over the next decade can accelerate climate action, including in developing regions and countries facing high debt costs, debt distress and macro-economic uncertainty (*high confidence*). {15.2, 15.3, 15.4, 15.5, 15.6, Box 15.6}

**E.5.4** Clear signalling by governments and the international community, including a stronger alignment of public sector finance and policy, and higher levels of public sector climate finance, reduces uncertainty and transition risks for the private sector. Depending on national contexts, investors and financial intermediaries, central banks, and financial regulators can support climate action and can shift the systemic underpricing of climate-related risk by increasing awareness, transparency and consideration of climate-related risk, and investment opportunities. Financial flows can also be aligned with funding needs through: greater support for technology development; a continued role for multilateral and national climate funds and development banks; lowering financing costs for underserved groups through entities such as green banks existing in some countries, funds and risk-sharing mechanisms; economic instruments which consider economic and social equity and distributional impacts; gender-responsive and women-empowerment programs as well as enhanced access to finance for local communities and Indigenous Peoples and small landowners; and greater public-private cooperation. (*high confidence*) {15.2, 15.5, 15.6}

**E.6 International cooperation is a critical enabler for achieving ambitious climate change mitigation goals. The UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol, and Paris Agreement are supporting rising levels of national ambition and encouraging development and implementation of climate policies, although gaps remain. Partnerships, agreements, institutions and initiatives operating at the sub-global and sectoral levels and engaging multiple actors are emerging, with mixed levels of effectiveness. (*high confidence*) {8.5, 14.2, 14.3, 14.5, 14.6, 15.6, 16.5}**

**E.6.1** Internationally agreed processes and goals, such as those in the UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol, and Paris Agreement, including transparency requirements for national reporting on emissions, actions and support, and tracking progress towards the achievement of nationally determined contributions, are enhancing international cooperation, national ambition and policy development. International financial, technology and capacity building support to developing countries will enable greater implementation and encourage ambitious nationally determined contributions over time. (*medium confidence*) {14.3}

**E.6.2** International cooperation on technology development and transfer accompanied by capacity building, knowledge sharing, and technical and financial support can accelerate the global diffusion of mitigation technologies, practices and policies at national and sub-national levels, and align these with

other development objectives (*high confidence*). Challenges in and opportunities to enhance innovation cooperation exist, including in the implementation of elements of the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement as per the literature assessed, such as in relation to technology development and transfer, and finance (*high confidence*). International cooperation on innovation works best when tailored to specific institutional and capability contexts, when it benefits local value chains, when partners collaborate equitably and on voluntary and mutually agreed terms, when all relevant voices are heard, and when capacity building is an integral part of the effort (*medium confidence*). Support to strengthen technological innovation systems and innovation capabilities, including through financial support in developing countries would enhance engagement in and improve international cooperation on innovation (*high confidence*). {4.4, 14.2, 14.4, 16.3, 16.5, 16.6}

**E.6.3** Transnational partnerships can stimulate policy development, low-emissions technology diffusion and emission reductions by linking sub-national and other actors, including cities, regions, non-governmental organisations and private sector entities, and by enhancing interactions between state and non-state actors. While this potential of transnational partnerships is evident, uncertainties remain over their costs, feasibility, and effectiveness. Transnational networks of city governments are leading to enhanced ambition and policy development and a growing exchange of experience and best practices (*medium confidence*). {8.5, 11.6, 14.5, 16.5, Cross-Chapter Box 12 in Chapter 16}

**E.6.4** International environmental and sectoral agreements, institutions, and initiatives are helping, and in some cases may help, to stimulate low GHG emissions investment and reduce emissions. Agreements addressing ozone depletion and transboundary air pollution are contributing to mitigation, and in other areas, such as atmospheric emissions of mercury, may contribute to mitigation (*high confidence*). Trade rules have the potential to stimulate international adoption of mitigation technologies and policies, but may also limit countries' ability to adopt trade-related climate policies (*medium confidence*). Current sectoral levels of ambition vary, with emission reduction aspirations in international aviation and shipping lower than in many other sectors (*medium confidence*). {14.5, 14.6}