

AS (23) D E

# VANCOUVER DECLARATION

# AND

## **RESOLUTIONS**

### ADOPTED BY THE OSCE PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY

### AT THE THIRTIETH ANNUAL SESSION

VANCOUVER, 30 JUNE - 4 JULY 2023

#### **Table of contents**

	Page
Preamble	1
Chapter I: Political Affairs and Security	1
Chapter II: Economic Affairs, Science, Technology and Environment	7
Chapter III: Democracy, Human Rights and Humanitarian Questions	14
Chapter IV: The OSCE and its Institutional Sustainability	21
Resolution on OSCE and OSCE Parliamentary Assembly Credibility in the Face of Continued Russian Aggression against Ukraine	23
Resolution on Rising Anti-Semitism in the OSCE Region	26
Resolution on the Gendered Consequences of Armed Conflicts	28
Resolution on the Wagner Group's Terroristic Nature and Actions	31
Resolution on Clarifying the Consequences of the Russian Federation's Aggression against Ukraine in Terms of Adherence to OSCE Principles	34
Resolution on Future Generations	
Resolution on the Republic of Moldova	41
Resolution on Greater Exploitation of the Potential of Science Diplomacy for International Co-operation and Active Peace Policy	43
Resolution on a Structured Set of Rules for a Regular Performance Audit of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly	46
Resolution on Microplastic and Nanoplastic Pollution	48
Resolution on Adopting Effective Mechanisms to Safeguard Ukrainian Women and Children from Abuse, Exploitation and Human Trafficking	52
Resolution on Condemnation of the Desecration of Polish Graves in Belarus	55
Resolution on Support for a Democratic Belarus	57
Resolution on the Consequences of the Russian Federation's Aggression against Ukraine with Regard to Women and Children	60
Resolution on Penalizing the Deportation of Ukrainian Children, Ensuring their Return, and Prosecuting the Perpetrators	63
Resolution on the Role of National Parliaments in Enhancing Participation of Civil Society in Parliamentary and Decision-making Processes	67

#### PREAMBLE

We, Parliamentarians of the OSCE participating States, have met in annual session in Vancouver from 30 June to 4 July 2023 as the Parliamentary dimension of the OSCE to assess developments and challenges relating to security and co-operation, with a view to strengthening regional security by fostering democratic and inclusive societies, and we offer the following views to the OSCE Ministers.

We wish every success to the next OSCE Ministerial Council and bring to its attention the following declaration and recommendations.

#### CHAPTER I POLITICAL AFFAIRS AND SECURITY

- 1. <u>Strenuously reiterating</u> its firm condemnation of the large-scale military invasion and war of aggression by the Russian Federation, with the shameful accomplice role of Belarus as co-aggressor, against Ukraine, launched in the context of the Russian Federation's longstanding violation of the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Ukraine since 2014,
- 2. <u>Recalling</u> that the Russian Federation's war of aggression against Ukraine constitutes a clear, gross and uncorrected violation of Helsinki principles, as well as a complete transgression of the Charter of Paris for a New Europe and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and <u>expressing unwavering support</u> for Ukraine's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as its inherent right to defend itself from external aggression, in line with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations,
- 3. <u>Recalling</u> UN General Assembly resolution 68/262 of 27 March 2014 "Territorial integrity of Ukraine", UN General Assembly resolution ES-11/1 "Aggression against Ukraine", as well as all other UN General Assembly resolutions in this regard, and <u>supporting</u> them fully,
- 4. <u>Recalling</u> all previous OSCE parliamentary resolutions in support of Ukraine resisting the Russian Federation's aggression,
- 5. <u>Underlining</u> the importance of strengthening the international isolation of the Russian Federation and in this context <u>recalling</u> the decision of the OSCE PA, adopted at its 29th Annual Session in Birmingham (July 2022), to establish respective procedures within the OSCE PA Rules of Procedure,
- 6. <u>Condemning</u> in the strongest possible terms deliberate attacks by the Russian Federation against Ukraine's residential areas and critical infrastructure, including heating and electricity networks, schools, hospitals, churches, and other religious objects, as well as intentionally targeting civilians, torturing, raping and killing thousands of people, including children, deporting them by force to the Russian Federation,
- 7. <u>Extremely concerned</u> by the destruction of the Nova Kakhovka Dam by the Russian occupying forces, <u>alarmed</u> by the implications of this heinous criminal act for people's livelihoods, the natural environment and the economy of the region, and <u>convinced</u> that the Russian Federation should be held accountable and all perpetrators punished,

- 8. <u>Underlining</u> that many of these illegal actions by the Russian Federation can be considered war crimes and crimes against humanity, and fit multiple definitions of genocide under the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948),
- 9. <u>Recalling</u> reports of the missions of experts under the OSCE Moscow Mechanism, which confirmed clear patterns of serious violations of international humanitarian law attributable mostly to the Russian armed forces, as well as the report on the forcible transfer and/or deportation of Ukrainian children to the Russian Federation, which concludes, among others, that "the practice of the forcible transfer and/or deportation of Ukrainian children to the territories and to the territory of the Russian Federation may amount to a crime against humanity",
- 10. <u>Recalling</u> the report by the United Nations Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine of 16 March 2023, which concludes that Russian authorities have violated a wide range of provisions of international human rights law and international humanitarian law in various regions of Ukraine,
- 11. <u>Welcoming</u> the International Criminal Court's investigation of possible war crimes related to the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, including the arrest warrants for President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, and Commissioner for Children's Rights, Maria Lvova-Belova,
- 12. <u>Welcoming</u> the agreement signed between Ukraine and the International Criminal Court on the establishment of a national office in Ukraine,
- 13. <u>Supporting</u> all efforts to establish a special international tribunal to bring all those responsible for the crime of aggression against Ukraine to account,
- 14. <u>Supporting</u> President Volodymyr Zelenskyy's 10-point Peace Plan and <u>underlining</u> that any peaceful solution to end this war will have to be in full compliance with international law, Principles of the Helsinki Final Act, and the provisions of the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, notably with respect to Ukraine's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders, as well as Ukraine's right to choose its own security arrangements,
- 15. <u>Expressing support</u> for the Joint Statement adopted by the participants of the First Parliamentary Summit of the International Crimea Platform, held on 25 October 2022 in Zagreb, Croatia, and <u>underlining</u> the need to further strengthen international co-operation through the International Crimea Platform,
- 16. <u>Expressing deep concern</u> about the irresponsible behaviour by the Russian Federation to attack various nuclear power plants in Ukraine, including the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant the largest nuclear power plant in Europe to bring its military equipment to its territory and to use Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant as a shield for its attacks against various Ukrainian settlements, resulting in extensive kinetic activities in and around Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, and creating an unprecedented risk of a nuclear disaster,
- 17. <u>Extremely alarmed</u> by the Russian Federation's withdrawal from the New START nuclear arms Treaty and the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, along

with its increasing threatening rhetoric of potential nuclear attacks and the announcement regarding the deployment of Russian nuclear weapons to Belarus, which should serve as a reminder to the international community of the vital need for further commitment and progress towards global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament,

- 18. <u>Concerned</u> about the steps backward in the matter of international military transparency, and <u>urging</u> all OSCE participating States to proceed with the exchange of information on military activities foreseen in the Vienna Document, which plays an important role in confidence- and security-building and increasing openness and transparency regarding military activities in the OSCE region,
- 19. <u>Recognizing</u> the important role of parliamentarians in fostering and facilitating inclusive political processes in relation to accountable security sector institutions in line with their responsibilities arising from the OSCE commitments and principles,
- 20. <u>Recalling</u> the significant contributions of the OSCE Forum for Security Co-operation to implementing comprehensive security agreements and tools in the OSCE area, such as the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security, the Principles Governing Conventional Arms Transfers and Non-Proliferation and the Framework for Arms Control, now blatantly violated by the Russian Federation and its accomplice Belarus,
- 21. <u>Recognizing</u> the added value of close co-operation between the OSCE PA, the OSCE Secretariat, OSCE institutions and field operations on regional and thematic issues, including emerging and ongoing crisis/conflict situations and the OSCE's conflict cycle toolbox, and <u>encouraging</u> continuous and proactive collaboration in relation to conflict prevention and resolution, in particular through the OSCE Early Warning Focal Point Network,
- 22. <u>Deeply concerned</u> by the inability of pre-existing mechanisms to sufficiently deter or punish the Russian Federation's clear, gross and uncorrected violations of its obligations under the Helsinki Principles and the Charter of the United Nations, particularly in the case of Ukraine but also beyond,
- 23. <u>Seriously concerned</u> about the Russian Federation's attempts to destabilize the situation in the Transdniestrian region of Moldova,
- 24. <u>Expressing deep concern</u> over the Russian Federation's formal occupation of Georgian territory since 2008, and <u>underscoring</u> the necessity of full implementation by the Russian Federation of the EU-mediated 12 August 2008 Ceasefire Agreement, safe and dignified return of internally displaced persons and refugees to their homes and constructive engagement in the Geneva International Discussions, as well as the decisions by the European Court of Human Rights of January 2021 and the International Criminal Court,
- 25. <u>Reiterating</u> its call to Armenia and Azerbaijan to reconvene and make progress towards a comprehensive and sustainable peace agreement based on the recognition of each other's territorial integrity to establish good-neighbour relations and security in the South Caucasus region, and <u>echoing</u> the President of the European Council in encouraging Azerbaijan to engage in developing a positive agenda with the aim of guaranteeing the rights and security of the Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh in close co-operation with the international community,

- 26. <u>Welcoming</u> diplomatic efforts aiming to facilitate dialogue and build confidence and trust between Armenia and Azerbaijan, including recent negotiations between the foreign ministers of both countries in the United States of America and the leaders of both countries in Brussels, and <u>expressing hope</u> that dialogue will also result in an improved situation on the ground, including through withdrawal of Azerbaijani military forces from the sovereign territory of Armenia and facilitation of the safe and transparent movement of people and commerce along the Lachin Corridor,
- 27. <u>Alarmed</u> by the incessant development of intolerable restrictions imposed on women in Afghanistan, depriving them of all forms of freedom and opportunity to participate in public and political life, as well as all forms of sexual and gender-based violence perpetrated by terrorist groups, including abductions, trafficking in persons, rape, forced marriage, enslavement and all other forms of violence suffered by women and children in Afghanistan,
- 28. <u>Expressing deep concern</u> that the increase in stocks of uranium enriched at rates of 20 per cent to 85 per cent in the Islamic Republic of Iran, as observed by the International Atomic Energy Agency, in total violation of the Vienna Agreement, constitutes a further step towards the development of a nuclear weapon in Iran and would, given the nature of the Iranian regime and the provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, constitute an imminent, serious and irreversible threat to the equilibrium, stability and security of the Middle East and well beyond,
- 29. <u>Recognizing</u> the increase in hybrid warfare and cyberattacks on critical infrastructure, including public institutions, which increasingly convert cyberspace into a battlefield for global conflict and negatively affect security infrastructures and democratic institutions,
- 30. <u>Concerned</u> about the continued practice by Belarus of instrumentalizing illegal migration as a hybrid tool against neighbouring countries,

- 31. <u>Opposes and condemns</u> in the strongest possible terms the Russian Federation's unprovoked, illegal and unjustified full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine and <u>demands</u> that the Russian Federation immediately and unconditionally ceases its aggression and withdraws all its troops from the entire territory of Ukraine, including the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol;
- 32. <u>Demands</u> that Belarus immediately stops its facilitation of and support for the Russian Federation's war of aggression against Ukraine;
- 33. <u>Calls on</u> the Parliaments of OSCE participating States to ensure continued political, financial, humanitarian and military support to Ukraine in order to defend itself from the Russian Federation's aggression;
- 34. <u>Calls on</u> the Parliaments of OSCE participating States to support the establishment of a special international tribunal to bring all those responsible for the Russian Federation's war of aggression against Ukraine to account, as well as to support all other mechanisms of accountability for war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by the Russian Federation in Ukraine;

- 35. <u>Condemns</u> the destruction of the Nova Kakhovka dam on the Dnieper river, which has destroyed its precious natural environment, has led to a drop in the level of the reservoir used to supply cooling water for reactors at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant and thus constitutes a serious threat to the safety and security of the population of Ukraine, neighbouring States and the international community, <u>denounces</u> this act as a crime of ecocide and <u>calls on</u> the parliaments of OSCE participating States to enshrine this concept in national and international law;
- 36. <u>Welcomes</u> the establishment of the OSCE Support Programme for Ukraine, officially launched in November 2022 following the closure of the Office of the OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine, and <u>recognizes</u> the considerable responsiveness and flexibility demonstrated by the OSCE and donors;
- 37. <u>Supports</u> the North Macedonia OSCE Chairpersonship's focus on putting an end to the war in Ukraine as the top priority for the whole OSCE network and prioritizing the people as the first beneficiaries of all OSCE actions;
- 38. <u>Calls on</u> OSCE participating States and executive structures to define a strategy on how to overcome challenges posed by the destructive behaviour of aggressor States, which will guide the OSCE and its activities in the future, and to conduct a critical assessment of the OSCE conflict cycle toolbox and propose concrete suggestions for its strengthening in order to ensure effective prevention of wars of aggression and other conflicts;
- 39. <u>Calls for</u> an immediate end to escalation of the nuclear threat fuelled by the Russian Federation's war against Ukraine, and <u>encourages</u> all OSCE participating States to redouble international efforts to achieve the global elimination of nuclear weapons within a timebound framework, including by negotiating a comprehensive nuclear weapons convention or framework of agreements, as recommended in the final document of the eighth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, or by signing and ratifying the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons;
- 40. <u>Urges</u> OSCE participating States to put an immediate end to all forms of cyberaggression undermining national sovereignty, including denial-of-service attacks, hacker attacks, dissemination of disinformation and State-sponsored propaganda, and to further develop cybercapabilities through regional cybersecurity co-operation embedded in the multistakeholder approach promoted by OSCE Confidence-Building Measure 14 and the Informal Working Group established by the Permanent Council Decision No. 1039;
- 41. <u>Calls on</u> OSCE executive structures to increase their engagement in addressing various hybrid threats, including the threats of disinformation and foreign information manipulation;
- 42. <u>Urges</u> OSCE participating States to create coordinated responses to address transnational repression, including that perpetuated through the operation of illicit foreign coercion campaigns by the People's Republic of China, which target current and former Chinese citizens residing in OSCE participating States, particularly dissidents and diaspora groups such as those from Hong Kong, Uyghurs, Tibetans and other ethnic minorities;

- 43. <u>Calls on</u> OSCE executive structures to pay greater attention to the continued practice by Belarus of instrumentalizing illegal migration as a hybrid tool against neighbouring countries;
- 44. <u>Welcomes</u> the efforts to promote the Women, Peace and Security agenda, in line with UN Security Council Resolution 1325, and <u>calls on</u> all OSCE participating States and the OSCE network to ensure the full, equal and meaningful participation of women in all phases of the conflict cycle through national action plans and the inclusion of a gender perspective in the response to conflicts, including the Russian Federation's war of aggression against Ukraine;
- 45. <u>Commends and strongly supports</u> further development of the OSCE PA Gender Network, which represents a fundamental space to increase women's political participation and empowerment not only in the OSCE PA but also in the OSCE region as a whole;
- 46. <u>Urges</u> OSCE participating States to advance in implementation of the Youth, Peace and Security agenda and adoption of national action plans in line with UN Security Council Resolution 2250, and <u>reiterates</u> its call to adopt the OSCE Youth Strategy and Action Plan;
- 47. <u>Welcomes</u> with hope the signing of the Abraham Agreements between Israel and four Arab countries, which represents a significant step towards peace in the Middle East, and <u>encourages</u> all parties to intensify their efforts to extend those agreements to new signatory countries;
- 48. <u>Emphasizes</u> the importance of the challenges for border security in the Central Asian region prompted by developments in Afghanistan in recent years and the resulting transnational threats, including illicit trafficking in arms and narcotics, requiring enhanced communication and intelligence-sharing among neighbouring States and with the international community;
- 49. <u>Urges</u> the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Russian military forces from the occupied Georgian regions of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia in line with the European Union-mediated ceasefire agreement of 12 August 2008 and <u>stresses</u> the need to continue active engagement in peaceful resolution of the Russian Federation–Georgia conflict, in full respect of Georgia's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders;
- 50. <u>Welcomes</u> the efforts of the OSCE PA Ad Hoc Committee on Countering Terrorism to provide a distinct parliamentary contribution on preventing and combating terrorism and violent extremism;
- 51. <u>Congratulates</u> the OSCE PA on its election as Chair of the first Co-ordination Mechanism among Parliamentary Assemblies on Counter-Terrorism, which provides an incredible opportunity to co-ordinate efforts on counter-terrorism work among parliamentary assemblies around the world, thus expanding the Ad Hoc Committee on Countering Terrorism's scope of action far beyond the OSCE region.

#### CHAPTER II ECONOMIC AFFAIRS, SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND ENVIRONMENT

- 52. <u>Recalling</u> the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, in which OSCE participating States recognized that "efforts to develop co-operation in the fields of trade, industry, science and technology, the environment and other areas of economic activity contribute to the reinforcement of peace and security in Europe and in the world as a whole",
- 53. <u>Reaffirming</u> that, as stated in the Helsinki Final Act, "co-operation in these fields would promote economic and social progress and the improvement of the conditions of life",
- 54. <u>Emphasizing</u> the unique role of national parliaments in adopting legislation, mobilizing resources, promoting public participation and creating cross-regional responses to advance economic and environmental security, promote sustainable development and implement relevant international commitments in the OSCE region,
- 55. <u>Categorically condemning</u> the Russian Federation's unprovoked and unjustified military invasion of Ukraine, which has caused great suffering to the civilian population, and <u>drawing attention</u> to the disastrous humanitarian, socio-economic and environmental consequences of war,
- 56. <u>Appalled by</u> the deliberate destruction of the dam of the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant and <u>deploring</u> its devastating ecological and humanitarian effects, which also threatens the safety of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant,
- 57. <u>Condemning</u> in particular the use of hunger and deprivation by the Russian military against the civilian populations of Ukraine and many other countries,
- 58. <u>Supporting</u> all international efforts to permanently secure food deliveries from Ukraine to the rest of the world, and <u>commending</u> the Initiative on the Safe Transportation of Grain and Foodstuffs from Ukrainian Ports that allows for temporary exports of food and fertilizers from three Ukrainian ports,
- 59. <u>Concerned</u> that the Russian Federation's war against Ukraine has significantly weakened connectivity and prosperity across the OSCE region, with a particularly devastating impact on the environment, especially in Ukraine,
- 60. <u>Alarmed</u> that the OSCE region is being strongly impacted by multiple crises, including climate change, the war in Ukraine, and the COVID-19 pandemic, leading to increased costs of living, energy insecurity and economic downturns,
- 61. <u>Recognizing</u> the negative effect of these crises, especially on young people who are becoming increasingly frustrated and distressed, and <u>welcoming</u> all efforts intended to better integrate the needs and concerns of younger generations in policy efforts,
- 62. <u>Recognizing</u> the need to ensure women's full participation in society to build more stable, sustainable and prosperous societies,
- 63. <u>Stressing</u> that gender equality and the empowerment of all women are essential to overcoming current and future crises and to laying solid foundations for a fairer, more inclusive and more resilient society,

- 64. <u>Noting</u> with concern that the Arctic region is becoming an area of growing geopolitical tensions, and <u>underscoring</u> the need to promote peaceful economic development for all interested OSCE participating States, while duly protecting its fragile environment,
- 65. <u>Recognizing</u> the importance of economic security and the role of innovation, human capital, good governance and interconnectivity, as well as the potential of the digital economy, in driving competitiveness and fostering inclusive green growth,
- 66. <u>Welcoming</u> the adoption of the resolution on "Code of Conduct for Members of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly" at the 29th Annual Session of the OSCE PA held in Birmingham in July 2022, and <u>stressing</u> the need to lead by example in preventing and fighting corruption including by adopting a binding Code of Conduct for Members of the OSCE PA,
- 67. <u>Recognizing</u> the importance of enhancing international connectivity through transport and trade facilitation, and <u>welcoming</u> the OSCE PA Conference on "The Role of National Parliaments in Promoting Security and Stability through Green Economy, Connectivity and Sustainable Development in the OSCE Region" held in May 2023 in Baku, Azerbaijan,
- 68. <u>Committing</u> to responsible and sustainable economic development, founded on moderation in the use of energy and resources and access to clean and affordable energy for all, in order to prevent the spread of poverty and build more prosperous, secure and resilient societies,
- 69. <u>Convinced</u> that economic development and environmental protection must be complementary and mutually reinforcing goals, and that technology and science play a critical role in achieving both,
- 70. <u>Increasingly concerned</u> by the reliance of many OSCE participating States on fossil fuels, which leads to energy dependence, geopolitical tensions and environmental problems,
- 71. <u>Acknowledging</u> that diversifying energy supplies towards clean energy sources is vital for achieving carbon neutrality, mitigating climate change, reducing energy dependence and increasing accessibility, affordability and resilience of energy, the latter referring to ensuring a stable and reliable supply of energy,
- 72. <u>Underscoring</u> that unhindered access to and affordability of energy is a prerequisite for the socio-economic development, social justice and well-being of our societies, and <u>concerned</u> that several areas within the OSCE region still have limited access to electricity,
- 73. <u>Alarmed</u> by the detrimental impact of higher energy prices on prosperity, security and equality for OSCE citizens, as energy constitutes the largest expenditure of households and drives inflation throughout the region,
- 74. <u>Concerned</u> in particular by the negative impact of prolonged high inflation on the socioeconomic stability of societies, as well as on OSCE's ability to resolutely address the unprecedented security challenges affecting the region, as requested by OSCE participating States,

- 75. <u>Also concerned</u> about possible competitive disadvantages for the economy of the OSCE region due to the comparatively high energy costs experienced by many O<u>SCE</u> participating States,
- 76. <u>Emphasizing</u> the need to become and remain independent of energy provided by the Russian Federation, which is weaponized against receiving countries and used as blackmail to destabilize the region,
- 77. <u>Stressing</u> the need to better protect critical energy infrastructure in the OSCE region and upgrade current energy networks to address possible fluctuations in energy production and thereby prevent dangerous blackouts,
- 78. <u>Decrying</u> the Russian Federation's ongoing, irresponsible attacks on Ukraine's civilian infrastructure, including its nuclear power plants, and the widespread use of mines, both of which not only constitute war crimes but also threaten the well-being of the population and risk intergenerational environmental damage,
- 79. <u>Considering</u> all options for green mobility, including, but not limited to, electric vehicles, and <u>committing</u> to research alternatives to fossil fuels such as synthetic fuels and hydrogen,
- 80. <u>Encouraging</u> co-operation for the development and use of small modular reactors to achieve energy independence and diversification,
- 81. <u>Determined</u> to co-operatively and coherently address the security challenges posed by climate change, in line with the Parliamentary Plea for Resolute Climate Action adopted in 2021, focusing *inter alia* on the negative impact of land degradation and soil erosion on local communities' livelihoods, which affect ecosystem services, food security and human well-being,
- 82. <u>Underscoring</u> the importance of fostering science-based responses to climate change, and <u>highlighting</u> the progress already made in that context,
- 83. <u>Hailing</u> the historic resolution (48/13) adopted by the United Nations Human Rights Council recognizing a clean, healthy, and sustainable environment as a fundamental human right, and <u>recognizing</u> the United Nations General Assembly resolution requesting an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on States' obligations in respect of climate change as a key milestone for climate justice,
- 84. <u>Committing</u> to cross-border co-operation on transboundary environmental issues, such as waste management, water management and protection from pollution and hazardous substances,
- 85. <u>Alarmed</u> by the number of microplastic and nanoplastic particles found in ecosystems throughout the planet and in human organs, which are mainly the result of the intentional addition of microplastics to products such as fertilizers, cosmetics, industrial products, paints, detergents and plant protection products, and <u>committing</u> to research the phenomenon and its effects on health,
- 86. <u>Welcoming</u> the compromise reached at the second session of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee on Plastic Pollution which brought together representatives from 175 countries in Paris on 3 June 2023, also <u>welcoming</u> the leadership role of the High

Ambition Coalition to End Plastic Pollution, and <u>supporting</u> the drafting, by the end of 2024, of a legally binding agreement to end plastic pollution,

- 87. <u>Welcoming</u> digitalization as a key process to boost transparency and inclusivity within societies, and <u>concerned</u> by cyber threats stemming from an increasingly digitized world,
- 88. <u>Underlining</u> the need to ensure that digitalization will leave no one behind and to ensure citizens' inclusion in political, social and cultural life by providing equal access for all by digital as well as non-digital means,
- 89. <u>Reiterating its concern</u> about the demographic decline experienced by many OSCE participating States, which undermines economic prosperity and the future performance of social security systems,
- 90. <u>Stressing</u> the need to analyse and compare the effectiveness of different measures implemented by OSCE participating States to mitigate the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, with a view to preventing and better addressing similar future health crises,
- 91. <u>Reiterating</u> the support of the OSCE PA for the work of the OSCE Chairmanship in building consensus around pressing second dimension security concerns at this critical juncture, of the Office of the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities in aiding OSCE participating States to implement economic and environmental commitments in the OSCE region, and of OSCE Field Operations in promoting sustainable development, environmental protection, and economic growth across the region,
- 92. <u>Gravely concerned</u> by the growing politicization within the OSCE debates related to economic and environmental security, which has led to, *inter alia*, an unprecedented lack of consensus on the agenda, theme and modalities of the 31st Economic and Environmental Forum,
- 93. <u>Welcoming</u> the session on "Promoting Economic and Environmental Security amid the Current Crisis" at the 20th Autumn Meeting of the OSCE PA on November 2022 and a special debate on "Affordable, secure, clean and sustainable energy in the OSCE region: prospects and challenges" at the 22nd OSCE PA Winter Meeting on February 2023 as excellent opportunities to share relevant parliamentary experience and promote greater policy convergence around critical issues on the agenda of the General Committee on Economic Affairs, Science, Technology and Environment, as well as all internal coordination efforts, including with relevant special representatives, to further the reach and impact of the Committee's work,

- 94. <u>Encourages</u> national parliaments to foster a culture of reflection and self-examination, remembrance and history education to prevent the repetition of past crimes, such as totalitarianism, war crimes or genocide;
- 95. <u>Calls on governments to redouble co-ordinated efforts to implement the 2030 Agenda for</u> Sustainable Development and relevant OSCE commitments, duly reconciling global economic progress with social justice and the preservation of the environment;

- 96. <u>Encourages</u> its Members to lead by example in preventing and fighting corruption, promoting a culture of transparency and enhancing accountability;
- 97. <u>Urges</u> OSCE participating States to build defences against authoritarian corruption emanating from the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China intended to undermine democratic systems from within;
- 98. <u>Urges</u> OSCE participating States to promote sustainable economic recovery across the region, duly leveraging new technologies;
- 99. <u>Exhorts</u> OSCE participating States to develop ambitious strategies for the clean energy transition, while keeping in mind the competitiveness of their economies, the needs of less privileged people and other local circumstances in order to ensure a more equitable, inclusive, effective and affordable transition to cleaner energy sources, which is key to mitigating climate change and protecting our planet;
- 100. <u>Urges</u> OSCE participating States to establish energy efficiency plans for administrations, businesses, local authorities and bodies responsible for buildings, transport, industry, agriculture and sport, to encourage a sustainable change in habits leading to lower energy consumption;
- 101. <u>Calls on</u> governments to enhance social and labour protection for women and motherhood, and to guarantee women's full and equal access to the labour market and the economy;
- 102. <u>Calls on</u> OSCE participating States to facilitate the official recognition of foreign professional qualifications and academic degrees, which is necessary to enable people in many professions to access the labour market;
- 103. <u>Calls on</u> OSCE participating States to promote effective, sustainable and human rightscompliant migration governance, ensure comprehensive border security and increase international co-operation to address the socio-economic and environmental drivers of migration and displacement, and especially war and climate change;
- 104. <u>Encourages</u> OSCE participating States to significantly reduce their greenhouse gas emissions according to the Paris Agreement and the COP26 Glasgow Conclusions, including committing to more ambitious emission reduction targets via realistic nationally determined contributions aimed at capping temperature increases at 1.5°C;
- 105. <u>Urges</u> OSCE participating States to maintain focus on the Arctic and to recognize the impact that the climate crisis has on Arctic communities and the planet;
- 106. <u>Urges</u> OSCE participating States to implement the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework, adopted at the 15th Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity, which recognizes that biodiversity is declining at an unprecedented rate mainly due to changes in land and sea use, direct exploitation of organisms, as well as climate change and pollution, and which sets a target of ensuring the conservation and management of at least 30 per cent of the world's terrestrial, inland water, and coastal and marine areas by 2030;
- 107. <u>Calls on</u> OSCE participating States to look into options for building more sustainable cities, to save energy and reduce consumption by tackling technical deficiencies in

existing buildings and planning new variants with limited environmental impact, as well as introducing process simplifications and lowering bureaucratic obstacles to renovation efforts;

- 108. <u>Urges</u> OSCE participating States to facilitate, within their respective societies, open and fact-based debates on climate change with a view to promoting community engagement, avoiding climate anxiety, and highlighting meaningful progress, where achieved;
- 109. <u>Encourages</u> OSCE participating States to join forces in securing and protecting water as a strategic natural resource for maintaining and promoting security and to strengthen water diplomacy on issues such as water protection, pollution and wastewater treatment;
- 110. <u>Urges</u> OSCE participating States to do their utmost to bring to a successful conclusion the negotiations under way, under the aegis of the United Nations, for the adoption of a legally binding international treaty against plastic pollution;
- 111. <u>Calls on</u> governments to engage in cross-border dialogue and establish working groups to deal with transboundary pollution and hazardous waste;
- 112. <u>Urges</u> OSCE participating States to adopt policies and legislation that will prevent the misuse of technology for human trafficking purposes, and to upgrade relevant policies to effectively fight traffickers and protect the victims;
- 113. <u>Calls on</u> national parliaments to establish the civil and criminal liability of online platforms for complicity in human trafficking, create legal frameworks to implement consent verification mechanisms for individuals depicted in sexually explicit content and to develop accessible mechanisms for users to report cases of exploitation and human trafficking and establish an obligation for companies to report human trafficking cases to law enforcement authorities;
- 114. <u>Encourages</u> multidisciplinary efforts to evaluate the impact of ChatGPT and similar new technologies on democracy, education and privacy, as well as possible risks to cybersecurity, and develop the appropriate regulatory frameworks;
- 115. <u>Calls on</u> governments to collaborate to tackle the challenges stemming from a very fast and ubiquitous digitization process, not only in terms of technical support required for the implementation of digital transformations but also in view of exchanging knowledge and best practices, as well as to develop adequate data strategies for the benefit of the people;
- 116. <u>Calls on</u> national parliaments to establish dedicated working groups and committees to study and respond to the challenges posed by the demographic developments in many OSCE participating States, and more specifically, consider ways to strengthen intergenerational relations, enhance the quality of life for elderly people and develop family supportive measures;
- 117. <u>Encourages</u> governments to focus on the long-term efficiency of their health and social systems, improving accessibility of professional health care and diversifying the supply of medications to ensure universal health coverage within the OSCE region;
- 118. <u>Urges</u> OSCE participating States to assess and exchange notes on the effectiveness of their measures to counter the COVID-19 pandemic with a view to codifying important

lessons learned and setting up a framework to better respond to similar future health crises;

- 119. <u>Urges</u> OSCE participating States to reconsider the use of "gain-of-function" virology, and tighten security standards;
- 120. <u>Invites</u> the General Committee on Economic Affairs, Science, Technology and Environment of the OSCE PA to continue raising awareness and providing an open platform to share experiences, engage with the scientific world and foster policy convergence around key economic and environmental security challenges in the OSCE region, including through dedicated initiatives in partnership with the OSCE executive structures and other relevant actors;
- 121. <u>Requests</u> the Secretary General to make proposals on how to overcome the current financial challenges also triggered by persistent inflation with the aim of enabling the OSCE PA to fulfil the expectations of its membership in addressing the multiple unprecedented challenges, and to implement adequate staff retention measures by gradually aligning employment conditions to those of the OSCE and of other similar international organizations;
- 122. <u>Encourages</u> the OSCE PA International Secretariat to continue engaging in goal-oriented co-operation with the OSCE executive structures in Vienna and throughout the region, as well as with other international organizations, to promote economic and environmental security in line with relevant OSCE PA resolutions.

#### CHAPTER III DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN QUESTIONS

- 123. <u>Reaffirming</u> all previous human rights commitments undertaken by OSCE participating States within the OSCE process, including respect for the freedoms of opinion and expression, freedom of peaceful assembly, freedom of association, and freedom of conscience and religion,
- 124. <u>Concerned</u> that respect for the full and equal enjoyment of fundamental freedoms and human rights remains an aspiration rather than a reality for many people across the OSCE region,
- 125. <u>Condemning</u> in the strongest terms the Russian Federation's war of aggression against Ukraine and other flagrant violations of international law, including international humanitarian and human rights law, and <u>calling on</u> the Russian Federation to immediately and unconditionally cease its aggression and withdraw all its forces from Ukraine,
- 126. <u>Deeply disturbed</u> by the continued human suffering caused by the Russian Federation's war against Ukraine, aided and abetted by Alexander Lukashenko and his illegitimate regime in Belarus,
- 127. <u>Recognizing</u> the need for democratic and political processes that are responsive to the needs and expectations of our populations, and in keeping with the principles of the rule of law,
- 128. <u>Concerned</u> that many minority populations and vulnerable groups lack protections that would contribute to their well-being and to long-term stability within the OSCE region,
- 129. <u>Recognizing</u> the expanding impact of digital technologies on our enjoyment of human rights,
- 130. <u>Appreciating the active and positive contribution that civil society can make to the OSCE</u> process, as demonstrated in the Civic Solidarity Platform's 2022 Łódź Declaration,

The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly:

#### Easing the Suffering of Those Impacted by War

- 131. <u>Stresses</u> that the Russian Federation's withdrawal of its forces and proxies from all areas of Ukraine which it currently occupies and the subsequent restoration of Ukraine's sovereignty to its 1991 borders is the only long-term solution to ending the current physical and psychological suffering of the people of Ukraine;
- 132. <u>Deplores</u> the massive human casualty toll and physical and psychological suffering resulting from the Russian Federation's unprovoked war against Ukraine, as well as the devastating impact that the Russian Federation's attacks against civilian infrastructure such as energy, water and heating have on the lives of Ukrainians;
- 133. <u>Recognizes</u> the disproportionate impact of the war on women and children, especially unaccompanied and separated children, as well as on persons with disabilities, the elderly and marginalized groups such as the Roma, and therefore <u>calls for</u> increased attention to

the protection needs of these especially vulnerable categories of displaced persons and the provision of support services to them – both within Ukraine and in refugee-hosting countries;

- 134. <u>Urges</u> OSCE participating States hosting refugees and forcibly displaced persons to adopt policies to prevent gender- and identity-based discrimination, and to ensure that these refugees and displaced persons have access to a full range of accessible and affordable sexual and reproductive health rights and services;
- 135. <u>Expresses alarm</u> at testimonies of increasing sexual and gender-based violence linked to conflict used as weapons of war against Ukrainian women on the front line, as well as among displaced populations;
- 136. <u>Encourages</u> OSCE participating States to strengthen their support, including financial and technical support, to non-governmental and governmental organizations supporting sexual violence survivors in Ukraine and in the OSCE area, to ensure that they have the capacity and resources to provide the full range of sexual and reproductive health services through a survivor-centred approach;
- 137. <u>Calls for</u> increased attention to the mental health impacts of the war and the effect they will have on recovery in the post-war period and on the process of rebuilding a strong and free Ukraine;
- 138. <u>Commends</u> OSCE participating States that have welcomed and continue to host and support refugees from Ukraine and elsewhere around the globe, recognizing the critical role they play in addressing concerns that some Ukrainian refugees, including those of African descent, are being mistreated and not being accorded full rights under international law;
- 139. <u>Condemns</u> the widespread abuse and ill-treatment of Ukrainian detainees and the torture of prisoners of war committed by the Russian Federation's armed forces and their mercenaries as war crimes and as further evidence of the Russian Federation's authorities' disregard for the norms and principles of international humanitarian law;
- 140. <u>Applauds</u> those within the Russian Federation and Belarus who have taken a public stance against the Russian Federation's war against Ukraine and <u>considers</u> imprisoned anti-war protesters and independent journalists reporting on the war to be prisoners of conscience;
- 141. <u>Demands</u> that the Russian Federation and Belarus immediately release and rehabilitate all political prisoners;
- 142. <u>Calls on</u> OSCE participating States to support political activists, human rights defenders, independent journalists and representatives of the opposition in the Russian Federation and Belarus in their fight against the autocratic regime both from within and from exile;
- 143. <u>Considers</u> senior leaders in the Russian Federation's Government to be guilty of the crime of aggression, as well as other war crimes, and <u>calls for</u> all OSCE participating States to work towards holding them accountable through domestic or international court proceedings;

- 144. <u>Resolutely condemns</u> the abduction of Ukrainians, including children, and their forcible removal to Russian Federation-occupied or Russian Federation territory, which is an act of genocide as defined in Article II(e) of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, and <u>calls for</u> all OSCE participating States to place the best interests of the child at the centre of their policies, including children's right to preserve their identity, and to work for their safe return to their families, as well as the accountability of the Russian officials responsible for this odious crime, as well as those of the Belarusian regime who are involved in these practices;
- 145. <u>Notes</u> the contributions of the OSCE Moscow Mechanism reports of 13 April 2022 and 14 July 2022 that documented evidence of war crimes committed by the Russian Federation against Ukraine since 24 February 2022, as well as the OSCE Moscow Mechanism report of 3 May 2023 on the illegal deportation of Ukrainian children to the Russian Federation;
- 146. <u>Recognizes</u> that the imprisonment of individual war criminals, while necessary and important, is insufficient accountability for the many victims of war, and <u>calls for</u> the OSCE to convene a conference dedicated to installing an accountability system that puts victims of conflicts at the centre of its focus;
- 147. <u>Expresses</u> the conviction that OSCE participating States must work together in international initiatives to further stress the Russian Federation's obligation to pay for the damage caused by its war of aggression;
- 148. <u>Recognizes</u> that the fight against impunity is at the heart of this new system of accountability and <u>calls on</u> all OSCE participating States firstly to adapt their national legislation so that arrest warrants issued by the International Criminal Court can be enforced on their territory and secondly to join the Rome Statute that founded the International Criminal Court;
- 149. <u>Calls on</u> all OSCE participating States to put the physical and mental well-being of individuals at the centre of their refugee policy process, ensuring that they can continue their lives in a dignified and safe manner, and work towards return to their homes, if they wish to do so;
- 150. <u>Recommends</u> a thorough review of migration-related policies, to ensure that co-operation with authorities in countries of origin and transit and the outsourcing of asylum procedures to third countries do not result in further harm to those seeking protection;
- 151. <u>Urges</u> increased exchanges of best practice among OSCE participating States, including through the OSCE, with regard to support for refugees, in the interests of enhanced solidarity and improved burden-sharing among OSCE participating States;
- 152. <u>Condemns</u> the deterioration in the humanitarian and human rights situation in Georgia's regions of Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia occupied by the Russian Federation, as a result of violations of fundamental freedoms and human rights of people living therein, various forms of discrimination against ethnic Georgians, as well as the obliteration and alteration of Georgian features from Georgian cultural heritage monuments in both regions, as a direct consequence of the Russian Federation's ongoing occupation and "Russification" policy;

- 153. <u>Urges</u> increased efforts to address the challenges faced by victims of war in other parts of the OSCE, including in particular Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, and <u>notes</u> the long-lasting impacts that conflict and occupation have had on large parts of these populations;
- 154. <u>Calls for</u> a full and speedy resolution of all outstanding humanitarian issues in the Armenia–Azerbaijan peace process, including ensuring the free flow of people and commerce through the Lachin Corridor in accordance with the Order of the International Court of Justice of 22 February 2023; the release of all detainees; the clarification of the fate of all persons who went missing or were victims of enforced disappearances during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict; the implementation of a UNESCO mission aimed at protecting the region's cultural heritage; and humanitarian demining efforts;

#### Addressing Weakening Faith in Political and Democratic Processes

- 155. <u>Stresses</u> the importance of ensuring that political systems are responsive to the needs and will of our populations and are in line with our fundamental principles and the rule of law;
- 156. <u>Condemns</u> violence against women politicians as a significant barrier to increasing women's political participation, and <u>calls on</u> all OSCE participating States to prioritize this as a challenge to representative democracy, and to involve men and boys in the discourse about gender equality, stereotypes, and the toxic masculinity which fuels violence;
- 157. <u>Calls on</u> national parliaments, as well as domestic political parties, to conduct gender audits of their structures, work and processes, on the basis of OSCE PA–OSCE/Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) guidelines and in close consultation with the OSCE/ODIHR;
- 158. <u>Calls on</u> national parliaments to create an environment for the reconciliation of professional and family lives of women politicians, so that all segments of society can be fairly represented;
- 159. <u>Considers</u> a robust and independent civil society with minimal State intervention as necessary for a healthy democratic process;
- 160. <u>Regrets</u> the steps taken in a number of OSCE participating States that restrict the space for civil society to function, particularly through the imposition of burdensome administrative processes and efforts to vilify organizations through labels such as "foreign agents" or "undesirable organizations";
- 161. <u>Urges</u> OSCE participating States to ensure that Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) mechanisms are not used as tools of transnational repression to stifle dissent or target human rights defenders, anti-corruption campaigners, exiled dissidents and diaspora communities, taking into account the potential unintended consequences of prevention-focused AML/CFT regulations and their side effects, including the potential for increased financial exclusion and further malicious exploitation of strict AML/CFT and related provisions, and further <u>urges</u> them to reflect in relevant regulations the use of crypto-assets, such as bitcoin and stablecoins, to defend human rights and to provide humanitarian aid;

- 162. <u>Expresses concern</u> about the democratic backsliding and violations of core OSCE human dimension commitments taking place in certain OSCE participating States, including restrictions on freedom of expression and freedom of media, elections that did not meet OSCE standards, and the undermining of judicial independence;
- 163. <u>Calls on</u> all national parliaments to re-examine their procedures, in close consultation with the OSCE/ODIHR, with a view to ensuring broad possibilities for civil society experts' input on draft legislation at all relevant stages;
- 164. <u>Calls on</u> all national parliaments to take necessary steps to ensure greater transparency of parliamentary work, including through making better use of new information technologies and improving access and working conditions for journalists in parliaments;
- 165. <u>Notes</u> the dangers posed by populist movements that tend to downplay the importance of long-held principles in favour of short-term electoral victories, and <u>further notes</u> their general inability to deliver real results;
- 166. <u>Further stresses</u> the importance of ensuring that electoral processes are adapted to modern lives and are as accessible and convenient as possible to all voters, particularly in rural and remote areas;
- 167. <u>Calls for</u> national parliaments, with the support of the OSCE/ODIHR and in broad consultation with experts from civil society and academia, to undertake reviews of existing national electoral processes to ensure they are both in line with OSCE commitments and also convenient for populations and modern lifestyles;
- 168. <u>Notes</u> the need for careful consideration, within the modern context, of electoral processes such as timing and locations of voting, timing and regulation of electoral campaigns and appropriateness of campaign silence periods, and regulation of social media during campaigns;
- 169. <u>Stresses</u> the importance of prompt follow-up to post-election recommendations proposed by the OSCE/ODIHR and <u>supports</u> enhanced co-operation between the OSCE PA, national parliaments, and the OSCE/ODIHR in this regard;
- 170. <u>Urges</u> OSCE participating States to increase their engagement with the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism, an initiative that brings together members from the G7 community, including the European Union, to build knowledge and capacity to better respond to foreign threats to democracy, in particular disinformation and State activity targeting democratic institutions, the media and information environment and the exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms;

#### Standing Up for the Rights of Minorities and Vulnerable Groups

- 171. <u>Reiterates</u> previous OSCE commitments to protect and promote the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity of national minorities;
- 172. <u>Recognizes</u> that nations must continue to move towards a future in which racially, ethnically and otherwise diverse populations within their borders are celebrated, guaranteed fundamental rights, welcomed and included in political and economic processes, and given the tools needed to support their families, rather than excluded, ostracized and stereotyped;

- 173. <u>Calls for</u> OSCE participating States to expand such protections beyond those legally recognized as traditional minorities, to include other minorities, whether based on ethnicity, linguistic traditions, religion or sexual orientation;
- 174. <u>Deplores</u> the increasing persecution including through legalistic means in some OSCE participating States of minority populations, most notably of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex people, and <u>calls for</u> greater protections for them under both domestic and international law;
- 175. <u>Further calls for</u> sustained support for refugees and forcibly displaced persons, who are all too often placed in vulnerable situations when on the move and particularly vulnerable to being trafficked or to falling victim to serious crimes and human rights violations, and <u>urges</u> all OSCE participating States to put the well-being of such individuals at the centre of refugee-related policies;
- 176. <u>Considers</u> trafficking in human beings to be a grave violation of human rights requiring legal and political attention of the highest order to eliminate this practice which preys on innocent victims;
- 177. <u>Calls on</u> OSCE participating States to enact processes in national institutions working on human trafficking ensuring that they learn from the experiences of survivors of human trafficking and exploitation to more effectively support victims and survivors;
- 178. <u>Further calls on</u> national parliaments, in consultation with the OSCE/ODIHR, to revise their policies in order to actively promote the political participation of persons with disabilities, who remain under-represented in governing structures and decision-making positions across the OSCE region;

#### Impact of Technology and Digitalization on People's Rights

- 179. <u>Welcomes</u> the empowerment of individuals' freedom of expression that has occurred as a result of digitalization and the internet;
- 180. <u>Urges</u> OSCE participating States to ensure that the internet remains an open and public forum for freedom of opinion and expression, as enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and <u>acknowledges</u> that freedom of expression extends not only to ideas and information generally regarded as inoffensive but even to those that might offend, shock or disturb;
- 181. <u>Notes</u> that information technologies and computer coding are having an ever-increasing impact on our daily lives and are influencing our populations' thinking, including on issues such as political polarization, tolerance toward others and perception of violence, often with little or no democratic oversight by parliaments;
- 182. <u>Calls on</u> national parliaments to examine ways to promote the inclusion of respect for fundamental freedoms and human rights within information technology coding processes, with close involvement of civil society experts and oversight by appropriate parliamentary bodies;
- 183. <u>Calls for</u> national parliaments to offer all parliamentarians training related to information technology coding and artificial intelligence, to ensure that members of parliament are adequately equipped to provide democratic oversight of modern communication systems;

- 184. <u>Recognizes</u> that, with the increased role that social media are playing as a reference source for our populations, increased attention, and potentially regulation, is needed to ensure that accurate and reliable information is promoted and that social media platforms can contribute to a well-informed population;
- 185. <u>Expresses concern</u> about efforts to justify censorship on the basis of misinformation and disinformation, and <u>reiterates</u> previous calls upon all OSCE participating States to act in accordance with the General Principles outlined in the March 2017 Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression and "Fake News", Disinformation and Propaganda of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression, the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, the Organization of American States Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and Access to Information;
- 186. <u>Calls on</u> the Russian Federation to uphold its international and OSCE commitments regarding media freedom and the safety of journalists and to cease the spreading of disinformation and propaganda of war and hatred that the Russian Federation uses as one of the hybrid instruments in its war of aggression against Ukraine;
- 187. <u>Regrets</u> the pervasiveness of disinformation in the digital era, and <u>recommends</u> reviews of educational curricula with the aim of ensuring that they can equip coming generations with the tools needed to identify and defend themselves against disinformation.

#### CHAPTER IV THE OSCE AND ITS INSTITUTIONAL SUSTAINABILITY

- 188. <u>Recognizing</u> that the OSCE continues to be a pillar of the European security architecture, and that OSCE participating States benefit from a critical set of political commitments that contribute to European security,
- 189. <u>Recalling</u> previous OSCE PA recommendations on reforming and strengthening the OSCE, including those adopted in St. Petersburg (1999), Paris (2001), Edinburgh (2004), Kyiv (2007), Astana (2008), Vilnius (2009) and Helsinki (2015),
- 190. <u>Exhorting</u> the fundamental importance of a European security architecture that protects all the free peoples of Europe and which cannot be subverted, undermined or made inert by the Russian Federation or other would-be perpetrators of naked aggression and malign influence,
- 191. <u>Highlighting the Russian Federation's inherent inability to be both a steward of European</u> security and its most active threat, and <u>stressing</u> the urgent need for a restored and viable European security architecture that is inclusive and protects all States, especially those at greatest threat from Russian aggression,
- 192. <u>Considering</u> that the lack of regular high-level political engagement with the OSCE and its tools has diminished the capacity of the Organization to deliver on its promise,
- 193. <u>Expressing deep concern</u> about increased attempts to misuse the OSCE consensus rule to block the functionality of the Organization and the adoption of its Unified Budget, and to obstruct the work of the OSCE's institutions and force closure of field operations,
- 194. <u>Applauding</u> the tremendous work of the OSCE institutions and field operations in these difficult times which, despite all the challenges, regularly create and implement tools to turn words into actions, while being responsive to the multiple crises affecting our region,
- 195. <u>Noting</u> with great concern that agreement has not been reached on a Chairpersonship to lead the OSCE in 2024, which has the potential to leave the Organization without political leadership at an extremely vulnerable period,
- 196. <u>Further noting</u> that the mandates of all heads of OSCE executive institutions are set to expire in December 2023, potentially leaving the OSCE's individual institutions without leadership,
- 197. <u>Expressing deep concern</u> that the OSCE is facing an existential crisis, exacerbated by the politicized withholding of financial resources and a systematic misuse of the consensus rule, and <u>stressing</u> that this requires urgent high-level political engagement,

The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly:

198. <u>Calls for</u> all OSCE participating States to join consensus and support full funding of the OSCE, including its institutions and field operations, and to reverse policies such as zero-nominal growth that have diminished the capacity of the Organization and inhibit long-term planning of activities and partnerships;

- 199. <u>Calls upon</u> the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office, if agreement has not been reached by 5 July 2023, to immediately convene an emergency meeting of the OSCE Ministerial Council with the exclusive intention to consider and address the following three issues:
  - a. the adoption of a unified budget;
  - b. the agreement on a Chair-in-Office for 2024;
  - c. the (re)-appointment of the OSCE Secretary General, the High Commissioner on National Minorities, the Director of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights and the Representative on Freedom of the Media;
- 200. <u>Deplores</u> steps taken to weaken and limit the mandates of OSCE field operations, and <u>calls for</u> the extension in good faith of all OSCE field operations, including the OSCE Mission to Moldova, for not less than one year in line with OSCE Ministerial Council Decision No. 18/06 on Further Strengthening the Effectiveness of OSCE Executive Structures;
- 201. <u>Demands</u> that the Russian Federation immediately and unconditionally release all OSCE staff members detained by its forces and proxies in the occupied areas of Ukraine;
- 202. <u>Recognizes</u> the value, particularly at a time of geopolitical instability, of reinforcing and making full use of the OSCE Court of Conciliation and Arbitration;
- 203. <u>Reiterates</u> the OSCE PA's commitment to the OSCE as a valuable and cost-effective security organization and <u>recommits</u> to contributing to the development of the institutional structures of the OSCE.

#### OSCE AND OSCE PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY CREDIBILITY IN THE FACE OF CONTINUED RUSSIAN AGGRESSION AGAINST UKRAINE

- 1. <u>Reiterating</u> the OSCE PA's consistent condemnation of the Russian Federation's aggression against Ukraine, commenced in 2014 and expanded to a full-scale military aggression and invasion in 2022,
- 2. <u>Applauding</u> the bravery and wisdom of the Ukrainian people and leadership in defending their territory, in full accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the OSCE core principles, against this illegal, unjustified and unprovoked war of aggression by the Russian Federation,
- 3. <u>Considering</u> the devastating impact of the Russian Federation's military aggression on millions of innocent civilians, especially children and women, as well as the shocking damage to Ukraine's infrastructure and the irresponsible triggering of global food and energy crises,
- 4. <u>Bearing in mind</u> that the obvious breach by the Russian Federation of the basic principles of the Helsinki Final Act, its demonstrated disrespect for human dignity, the severe atrocities and brutality cynically shown in the course of the Russian Federation's unprovoked and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine, as well as the persistent denial by Russian authorities of the existence of the Ukrainian nation itself and the spread of the Kremlin's speculative and misleading narratives of Russian State ideology (ruscism) on the shared historical roots of fraternal peoples, clearly demonstrate the genocidal criminal intent of the Russian authorities,
- 5. <u>Noting</u> with deep concern and strong condemnation that the Russian Federation's continued war of aggression is a clear signal that the Russian Federation aims to destroy Ukraine and exterminate its people and is not at all interested in a genuine dialogue aimed at a comprehensive, just and lasting resolution, which must be based on full respect for Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders,
- 6. <u>Further noting</u> that Russian parliamentarians' unanimous support for the war and the aggressive policies of the Kremlin effectively disqualifies the present Russian parliament as a responsible partner for dialogue and makes sanctions against these parliamentarians a legitimate and appropriate policy towards them as accomplices,
- 7. <u>Appalled</u> by the fact that the Russian Federation misuses the OSCE and OSCE PA platforms to justify its aggression against Ukraine, as well as to whitewash numerous crimes committed against the Ukrainian people, and <u>acknowledging</u> that such misuse attempts to undermine the integrity of the OSCE PA and will compromise the clear and steadfast position that the OSCE PA has so far demonstrated with regard to the Russian aggression since 2014,
- 8. <u>Recalling</u> that the OSCE PA, in its numerous declarations and resolutions adopted since 2014, has concluded that the Russian Federation has breached every principle of the Helsinki Final Act's decalogue in the course of its aggression against Ukraine and the Ukrainian people,

- 9. <u>Concerned</u> that the Russian Federation has been blocking consensus in the OSCE to prevent the Organization from taking action to respond to urgent security threats and challenges in the OSCE region, as well as to promote implementation of core OSCE principles including democracy, human rights, and the rule of law,
- 10. <u>Stressing</u> that in the face of such an assault on the OSCE and the regional security order, the OSCE PA's functioning and political engagement remain more important than ever, and <u>emphasizing</u> that the OSCE PA must work to maintain its effectiveness and credibility, guided by OSCE principles,
- 11. <u>Underlining</u> that the only feasible solution to preserve the integrity of the OSCE PA, which is standing guard over OSCE principles and commitments, is to ensure implementation of the relevant provisions of the OSCE PA resolution on "The Russian Federation's War of Aggression Against Ukraine and Its People, and Its Threat to Security Across the OSCE Region" of July 2022 on adopting the amendments to the OSCE PA's Rules of Procedure regarding temporary suspension of the mandate of the national parliamentary delegation of a State in cases where it violates the sovereignty and territorial integrity of another State,
- 12. <u>Condemning</u> Russian disinformation campaigns aimed at vilifying individuals and groups, exacerbating social divisions, sowing discord, polarizing societies, spreading Russian State ideology (ruscism), hatred, racism, xenophobia, negative stereotyping and stigmatization, and inciting violence, discrimination, hostility and war (from UN Human Rights Council resolution A/HRC/RES/49/21 "Role of States in countering the negative impact of disinformation on the enjoyment and realization of human rights"),

- 13. <u>Calls on</u> the OSCE Ministerial Council to recognize the Russian Federation as having committed clear, gross and uncorrected violations of relevant OSCE principles and commitments and, on that basis, to disregard any dissent by the Russian Federation related to decisions with regard to Ukraine, in accordance with the 1992 OSCE Prague Document;
- 14. <u>Reiterates</u> the need to adopt amendments to the OSCE PA's Rules of Procedure regarding the temporary suspension of the mandate of the national parliamentary delegation of a State in cases where it violates the sovereignty and territorial integrity of another State, as prescribed by the OSCE PA Resolution "The Russian Federation's War of Aggression Against Ukraine and Its People, and Its Threat to Security Across the OSCE Region" of July 2022, and <u>welcomes</u> the efforts of the Sub-Committee on the Rules of Procedure and Working Practices in this regard;
- 15. <u>Calls on</u> the President and Standing Committee of the OSCE PA to enforce the following measures until such time as the OSCE PA determines that an effective cessation of military operations has been agreed and implemented:
  - a. only convene statutory meetings the locations of which are not already prescribed, in countries that will uphold widely adopted visa bans on Russian parliamentarians;

- b. not appoint any Russian parliamentarians who support the war to OSCE PA election observations, special representative positions, membership of ad hoc committees, or any other positions of responsibility in the OSCE PA;
- 16. <u>Encourages</u> national parliaments from OSCE participating States that deny entry to Russian Federation parliamentarians to contribute to OSCE PA work by hosting major statutory events, and <u>authorizes</u> the OSCE PA International Secretariat to engage in discussions regarding future meetings with these parliaments;
- 17. <u>Calls on</u> the OSCE PA International Secretariat to bring this resolution to the attention of hosts of all future meetings, and <u>calls for</u> invitations to be issued in line with this resolution;
- 18. <u>Urges</u> the President of the OSCE PA to establish an Ad Hoc Committee on Ukraine to support the parliament of Ukraine and serve as a contact point for consultations among parliamentarians on the range of issues related to the Russian Federation's full-scale invasion of Ukraine and to assisting the people of Ukraine;
- 19. <u>Calls on</u> the OSCE and OSCE PA and OSCE participating States to support the establishment of a special tribunal for the crime of aggression against Ukraine in order to bring to account Russian officials responsible for the crime of aggression that, in turn, has led to heinous war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by the Russian Federation in Ukraine and to condemn Russian State ideology (ruscism).

#### **RISING ANTI-SEMITISM IN THE OSCE REGION**

- 1. <u>Alarmed</u> by the rise in anti-Semitic attacks and rhetoric, as well as Holocaust denial and distortion, across the OSCE region, including in civil society reports that anti-Semitic incidents increased by as much as 36 per cent in some areas in 2022,
- 2. <u>Concerned</u> about the spread of anti-Semitic tropes by popular entertainers and public figures to their followers on social media or through public statements, as well as the dissemination of anti-Semitic disinformation, conspiracy theories and hate speech globally through the use of modern digital technology, all of which can also incite extremism and violent attacks,
- 3. <u>Alarmed</u> that the spread of anti-Semitic disinformation and conspiracy theories threatens to undermine democratic institutions, including by undermining the veracity of government and mainstream media,
- 4. <u>Also recognizing</u> that anti-Semitism is often connected to intolerance directed against members of other ethnic and religious minority groups, racial groups or other vulnerable populations,
- 5. <u>Disturbed</u> that President Vladimir Putin tried to justify the Russian Federation's brutal, full-scale attack on Ukraine through perversely anti-Semitic statements which claimed that the invasion was an effort to "de-Nazify" the country,
- 6. <u>Recalling</u> that this year is the 20th anniversary of the first OSCE conference on anti-Semitism, which was held in Vienna, Austria, in 2003, followed by the 2004 OSCE Conference on Anti-Semitism held in Berlin, Germany,
- 7. <u>Reaffirming</u> the support of the OSCE PA for all OSCE commitments to combat anti-Semitism, racism and discrimination, including the 2004 Sofia Ministerial endorsement of the 2002 Berlin Declaration,
- 8. <u>Recognizing</u> the work done over the past 20 years by the OSCE PA and the OSCE structures and institutions to address anti-Semitism, including the development of a hate crimes database, practical guidelines and handbooks, and educational materials,

- 9. <u>Condemns</u> without reservation all manifestations of anti-Semitism, including attacks against synagogues and other religious sites;
- 10. <u>Calls on</u> government officials and other prominent people to speak out clearly against anti-Semitism when it occurs to ensure that anti-Semitism, and any other type of prejudice or intolerance, does not become normalized;
- 11. <u>Urges</u> OSCE participating States to create, if they have not already done so, an interagency co-ordination group, special envoys or other similar structures to improve government efforts to counter anti-Semitism;

- 12. <u>Recommends</u> that OSCE participating States develop, if they have not already done so, a unified national strategy to counter anti-Semitism, including provisions to strengthen education, protect public safety, train law enforcement officers and collect data, build coalitions, and strengthen government leadership and put in place a monitoring and reporting mechanism with metrics to ensure accountability and effective implementation;
- 13. <u>Asks</u> OSCE participating States to support Jewish communities in efforts to provide security for synagogues, schools, community centres and other sites;
- 14. <u>Calls on</u> OSCE participating States to provide the OSCE with the appropriate resources, including extrabudgetary resources, to continue its work to combat anti-Semitism and to promote tolerance and non-discrimination.

#### THE GENDERED CONSEQUENCES OF ARMED CONFLICTS

- 1. <u>Reiterating</u> the commitment of OSCE participating States to upholding the principles enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act, which include the peaceful settlement of disputes, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, equal rights and self-determination of peoples, co-operation among States and the fulfilment in good faith of obligations under international law,
- <u>Recalling</u> OSCE Ministerial Council decisions No. 14/04 (Sofia) on the OSCE Action Plan for the Promotion of Gender Equality, No. 15/05 (Ljubljana) and No. 7/14 (Basel) on Preventing and Combating Violence Against Women, No. 14/05 (Ljubljana) on Women in Conflict Prevention, Crisis Management and Post-conflict Rehabilitation, and No. 4/18 (Milan) on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women,
- 3. <u>Acknowledging</u> that armed conflicts have gendered consequences, and <u>deeply concerned</u> by the situation of women in the context of the Russian Federation's war of aggression in Ukraine,
- 4. <u>Referring</u> to the OSCE PA's Birmingham Declaration and its resolutions on the Russian Federation's war of aggression against Ukraine and its people, and its threat to security across the OSCE region, and on the importance of the human dimension in the context of current threats to the security of the OSCE area stemming from the Russian aggression against Ukraine, as well as the Berlin Declaration (2018) and its resolution on preventing and combating gender-based violence,
- 5. <u>Guided</u> by the 2019 Annual Report of the OSCE PA Special Representative on Gender Issues entitled *Gender Mainstreaming and Intersectional Analysis of Key Issues Affecting the OSCE Region: Conflict, Migration and Climate Change*, the 2021 Annual Report of the OSCE PA Special Representative on Gender Issues entitled *Violence Against Women Journalists and Politicians: A Growing Crisis*, and the Report of the OSCE PA Special Representative on Human Trafficking Issues to the Standing Committee at the 29th Annual Session of the OSCE PA,
- 6. <u>Inspired</u> by the 2021 report of the OSCE Office of the Special Representative and Coordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings entitled *Applying gender-sensitive approaches in combating trafficking in human beings*,
- 7. <u>Recognizing</u> that women are disproportionately at risk of direct and indirect harm in situations of armed conflict, including sexual and gender-based violence, being the victims of trafficking and forced displacement, and facing challenges in accessing food, health care and education, and <u>noting</u> that situations of armed conflict also exacerbate existing structural gender inequalities,
- 8. <u>Stressing</u> the gendered consequences of forced displacement faced by women, including risks of sexual and gender-based violence, family separation, mental health repercussions and risks of exploitation, and <u>noting</u> the challenges faced by refugees in the host countries in the OSCE area,

- 9. <u>Underlining</u> that the increased risks of gender-related and sexual violence in conflict situations magnify the importance of access to affordable sexual and reproductive health and rights services for women, both in conflict zones and in refugee-hosting countries,
- 10. <u>Acknowledging</u> that women who serve in leadership roles, as journalists, politicians, human rights defenders and in civil society are exposed to heightened risks of human rights violations in conflict situations,
- 11. <u>Emphasizing</u> the importance of holding perpetrators of human rights violations and war crimes accountable and providing reparation to victims,
- 12. <u>Encouraged</u> by the establishment of the Dialogue Group on Accountability for Ukraine, and <u>supporting</u> the work of the Office of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine to document suspected cases of war crimes and violations of human rights,
- 13. <u>Highlighting</u> the reports of the missions of experts produced under the OSCE Moscow Mechanism, the reports of the United Nations Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine, and the reports of the United Nations Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine, and <u>closely following</u> the progress of the International Criminal Court investigation in Ukraine,
- 14. <u>Endorsing</u> UN Security Council resolution 1325 on women and peace and security, as well as subsequent resolutions that comprise the women, peace, and security agenda, which calls on United Nations Member States to ensure the full participation of women in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security,

- 15. <u>Urges</u> the OSCE and OSCE participating States to support the collection and publication of disaggregated data on the prevalence of sexual and gender-based violence in conflict situations in the OSCE region and ensure that such data, and the information they provide on the experiences of women with intersecting identity factors, informs any action taken to make certain that policies and legislation are effective, inclusive and evidence-based;
- 16. <u>Recognizes</u> that conflicts are not gender-neutral, and that humanitarian assistance provided by OSCE participating States must be sensitive to gender, age and intersectionality to be effective and reach those most in need;
- 17. <u>Calls on the OSCE and OSCE participating States to adopt a survivor-centred approach</u> in the prevention of and response to sexual violence in conflict contexts;
- 18. <u>Urges</u> OSCE participating States that are hosting refugees and persons displaced by the Russian Federation's war of aggression in Ukraine to adopt policies to prevent genderand identity-based discrimination;
- 19. <u>Calls on</u> OSCE participating States that are hosting refugees and displaced persons to ensure access to a full range of universal, accessible and affordable sexual and reproductive health and rights services;
- 20. <u>Reiterates</u> the resolution on Combating Violence against Women Journalists and Politicians included in the OSCE PA Birmingham Declaration, which called on the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media and the OSCE Office for Democratic

Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) to denounce violence against women journalists and politicians and to draw attention to cases in which women journalists and politicians are harassed, detained or imprisoned, including in conflict situations in the OSCE region;

- 21. <u>Asks</u> all OSCE participating States that have not already done so to develop and implement national action plans on women, peace and security;
- 22. <u>Encourages</u> parliamentarians of OSCE participating States to actively monitor whether their national institutions relevant to the security and defence sectors are meeting their commitments to the women, peace and security agenda;
- 23. <u>Welcomes</u> the work of ODIHR regarding gender and security, and <u>calls on</u> the governments of OSCE participating States to use the tools developed by ODIHR, including the gender and security toolkit, to guide their efforts to integrate a gender perspective and advance gender equality in their security and justice policy, programming and reform;
- 24. <u>Strongly recommends</u> that OSCE participating States provide funding to civil society organizations that support women's rights, including in Ukraine, with a focus on womenled organizations.

#### THE WAGNER GROUP'S TERRORISTIC NATURE AND ACTIONS

- 1. <u>Emphasizing</u> that terrorism constitutes one of the most serious threats to international peace and security, and unequivocally <u>condemning</u> all acts, methods and practices of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, wherever and by whomsoever committed, regardless of their motivation, as criminal and unjustifiable,
- 2. <u>Recalling</u> that States bear the primary responsibility for preventing and countering terrorism, violent extremism and radicalization that lead to terrorism, while respecting their obligations under applicable domestic and international law, including but not limited to international human rights law, international refugee law and international humanitarian law, as well as relevant UN Security Council resolutions,
- 3. <u>Stressing</u> the central role of the United Nations in countering terrorism and preventing violent extremism, and <u>recalling</u> relevant United Nations resolutions, such as UN Security Council Resolution 1566 (2004), in particular paragraph 3 on, *inter alia*, criminal acts to intimidate people or governments, and UN Security Council Resolution 2462 (2019) urging States to take into account the potential effect of counterterrorism measures on exclusively humanitarian activities,
- 4. <u>Underscoring</u> the complementarity of the counterterrorism legal framework with international humanitarian law, where relevant, and <u>recalling</u> that all acts or threats of violence against civilians with the primary purpose of spreading terror among the civilian population are prohibited according to international humanitarian law,
- 5. <u>Recalling</u> the Luxembourg Declaration, adopted by the OSCE PA at its 28th Annual Session, which referenced the obligation held by States to ensure "that PMSCs [private military and security companies] operating in or from their territory act in accordance with international humanitarian law, human rights law and customary international law",
- 6. <u>Highlighting</u> that the Wagner Group, a self-described private actor, undertakes military action and subversive operations to further the overt and covert foreign policy goals of the Government of the Russian Federation, although private military companies are technically banned under Russian law,
- 7. <u>Emphasizing</u> that the President of the Russian Federation has publicly admitted after years of Kremlin denials that the Wagner Group had been "fully funded" by the Russian State, with the Wagner Group receiving over 86 billion Russian roubles, or over US\$1 billion, from the State budget in one year, thus clearly making the Russian State responsible for the acts of the Wagner Group abroad,
- 8. <u>Noting</u> the direct ties between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Wagner Group established by Yevgeny Prigozhin, a close associate of the President of the Russian Federation, including the Wagner Group's use of Russian Federation military infrastructure, advanced Russian weapons systems, including tanks and combat aircraft, and close institutional relationships with the Russian Federation's military intelligence service, the GRU,

- 9. <u>Affirming</u> that the activities of the Wagner Group are terroristic in nature, as they are characterized by premeditated violence committed against non-combatants in the pursuit of political objectives,
- 10. <u>Denouncing</u> the deliberate, systematic and criminal atrocities and violations of human rights attributed to Wagner Group personnel while conducting operations in Ukraine in furtherance of the interests of the Government of the Russian Federation,
- 11. <u>Underlining</u> that the Wagner Group's recruitment of prisoners for its operations in Ukraine also increased its propensity for the commission of atrocities and war crimes,
- 12. <u>Emphasizing</u> that the Wagner Group and its affiliated entities have also committed, or are credibly accused of committing, predatory and terroristic activities in numerous other locations, including Mali, Sudan, the Central African Republic, Libya, the Syrian Arab Republic, Mozambique and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela,
- 13. <u>Highlighting</u> that the actions that Wagner Group operatives are credibly accused of committing include, but are not limited to, heinous acts of violence and human rights violations against civilians such as mass atrocities, summary executions, mutilations, sexual violence, destructions of homes, kidnapping, torture, human trafficking and the murder of journalists,
- 14. <u>Noting</u> European Parliament resolution of 23 November 2022, which calls on the Council of the European Union to include the Wagner Group, *inter alia*, on the European Union list of persons, groups and entities involved in terrorist acts (European Union terrorist list),
- 15. <u>Welcoming</u> ongoing efforts in various national parliaments to address the terroristic actions of the Wagner Group, including the legislatures of Ukraine, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, France, Canada, Belgium and the United States of America,
- 16. <u>Taking positive note</u> of the official visit of the OSCE PA Ad Hoc Committee on Countering Terrorism to Switzerland on 21–22 March 2023, in which, *inter alia*, the terroristic nature of the Wagner Group's operations was repeatedly pointed out,
- 17. <u>Also commending</u> the goal-oriented partnership established by the OSCE PA with the OSCE executive structures and with relevant United Nations organs and agencies, and especially the 2022/23 OSCE PA Presidency of the Coordination Mechanism among Parliamentary Assemblies on Countering Terrorism as an excellent opportunity to better coordinate relevant parliamentary actions across the globe,

- 18. <u>Determines</u> that the actions of the Wagner Group on behalf of the Russian Government can rightly be characterized as terroristic in nature and intent, and that designation of the Wagner Group as a terrorist organization by national authorities is therefore justified;
- 19. <u>Strongly condemns</u> the Belarusian Government for its support and permission for the construction of a military base on its territory by the Wagner Group, endangering the entire region of the Baltic countries;

- 20. <u>Calls on</u> OSCE participating States, in accordance with international and national legislation and without prejudice to the applicability of international humanitarian law, to take action against the Wagner Group and its affiliated and successor entities, including through its designation as a terrorist organization;
- 21. <u>Urges</u> OSCE participating States to make full use of all domestic and international instruments, including those established to counter terrorism, to thwart the malign presence of the Wagner Group (and its affiliates and successors) wherever it operates and ensure the accountability of all those responsible for the crimes they have committed;
- 22. <u>Encourages</u> OSCE participating States to reinforce international norms which clearly recognize the terroristic nature of the Wagner Group and its actions, the responsibility of the Russian Federation as the State sponsor of said terrorist organization, and the inadmissibility of employing such actors in inter-State relations;
- 23. <u>Decides</u> that the OSCE PA Ad Hoc Committee on Countering Terrorism, with the support of the OSCE PA International Secretariat, shall remain seized of this matter and support the implementation of this resolution as appropriate.

#### CLARIFYING THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION'S AGGRESSION AGAINST UKRAINE IN TERMS OF ADHERENCE TO OSCE PRINCIPLES

- 1. <u>Firmly believing</u> that the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, signed on 21 November 1990 as the concluding document of the CSCE (Paris Charter), and the Charter of the United Nations impose an obligation on OSCE participating States to refrain from any threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, as well as to respect and protect inalienable and indivisible human rights in their entirety,
- 2. <u>Noting</u> that, following the Russian Federation's aggression against Ukraine that has, since 2014, violated Ukraine's sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders and territorial waters, the Russian Federation has been engaged in a full-scale armed war of aggression against Ukraine since 24 February 2022, and has thus intentionally broken the Charter of the United Nations, the Helsinki Final Act and the Paris Charter, and shaken the rules-based international peace order to its core,
- 3. <u>Emphatically reaffirming</u> Ukraine's right of self-defence under Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations against the continuing armed assault by the Russian Federation, and <u>pointing out</u>, in this context, the legitimacy of emergency assistance measures by third parties to enable the attacked State to exercise that right of self-defence effectively against the aggressor,
- 4. <u>United and resolute in reaffirming</u> the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders, and <u>condemning</u> the attempted annexation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol carried out by the Russian Federation in 2014, before the current full-scale military invasion of Ukraine, and the further violations of Ukraine's State sovereignty and territorial integrity resulting from the military invasion and temporary occupation by the Russian Federation of certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine,
- 5. <u>United and resolute in reaffirming</u> its solidarity with the attacked Ukrainian nation and its democratically elected government,
- 6. <u>Utterly condemning</u> the crimes committed against the civilian population of Ukraine by the armed forces of the Russian Federation (in Bucha, Irpin, Mariupol and other places in Ukraine) as violations of the Russian Federation's obligations under international humanitarian law and OSCE commitments, and the military occupation, economic plundering and violent attempted annexation of parts of Ukraine as grossly violating the norms and principles of international law, and OSCE principles and commitments,
- 7. <u>Utterly condemning</u> the deliberate destruction of civil and critical infrastructure, such as power stations, hospitals, schools and administrative institutions, the repeated threats to deploy nuclear weapons expressed by members of the Government of the Russian Federation, and the systematic violations of international humanitarian law, such as the execution and torture of prisoners of war and civilians, sexual violence and the deportation of more than 19,000 Ukrainian children and adolescents to date to the

Russian Federation for the purpose of re-education and adoption by Russian nationals, as documented in the OSCE Moscow Mechanism "Report on violations and abuses of international humanitarian and human rights law, war crimes and crimes against humanity, related to the forcible transfer and/or deportation of Ukrainian children to the Russian Federation" of 4 May 2023,

- 8. <u>Expressly welcoming</u> the investigations of the International Criminal Court to secure and document evidence of violations of international humanitarian law and suspected cases of war crimes and crimes against humanity with a view to bringing those responsible to justice at a later date,
- 9. <u>Noting</u> with moral urgency that the pattern of atrocities in the Russian Federation's illegal war against Ukraine, including mass killings, deportation of children, mass sexual atrocities and the targeting of civilian infrastructure, medical facilities, schools and churches, as well as the record of statements, documentation and justification by the Russian Federation's most senior leadership, demonstrate State-level intent and implementation of actions constituting genocide as defined in Article II of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
- 10. <u>Welcoming</u> the fact that prisoners of war have been exchanged on several occasions, and <u>expressly welcoming</u> the efforts of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to stabilize the security situation around Ukraine's Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant illegally seized by the Russian Federation,
- 11. <u>Condemning</u> the Russian Federation for the unlawful imprisonment of former employees of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, and the prison sentences imposed on them without due process in the occupied regions of Donetsk and Luhansk, and <u>calling</u> for their immediate release,
- 12. <u>Welcoming</u> the efforts of the international community, especially Türkiye, to guarantee the exports of grain from Ukraine on the basis of an international agreement in spite of the ongoing armed assault by the Russian Federation, in order to stabilize the logistics chains for global food supplies and combat the exacerbation of the food crisis in the countries of the global south,
- 13. <u>Condemning</u> the far-reaching support of the Russian Federation's aggression against Ukraine on the part of Belarus, particularly in respect of military logistics to secure supply lines and the provision of locations on the territory of Belarus for the Russian armed forces to launch missiles and muster troops, and <u>expressing its profound concern</u> that Belarus is thereby moving ever closer to the status of an active war party,
- 14. <u>Underscoring</u> the violently imperial and colonial nature of the State of the Russian Federation, which is on fullest display in its unprovoked and illegal war against Ukraine and violations of international human rights laws and the laws of sovereign nations, including through unlawful abduction, but is also expressed in its soft annexation of Belarus, occupation of Georgian territory and support for separatism in Moldova, as well as in its forceful, ongoing and deliberate subordination of indigenous and ethnic minority nations within the Russian Federation, which are denied equal rights and self-determination and subject to abuse and exploitation in violation of the Helsinki Principles and the Charter of the United Nations,

- 15. <u>Criticizing</u> the continuous worsening of the human rights situation in Belarus since the falsified presidential elections in 2020, the systematic repression of Belarusian civil society and the persecution of the political opposition by means of harsher laws on extremism and terrorism, the high number of at least 1,500 political prisoners and the expansion of the list of crimes subject to the death penalty,
- 16. <u>Welcoming</u> the generous willingness of Moldova to admit over 100,000 refugees from Ukraine on humanitarian grounds and provide them with consolidated protection status under residence law, as well as the measures taken to enable the refugees to access preschool and school education, basic medical care and social welfare assistance,
- 17. <u>Criticizing</u> the Russian Federation for its use of energy supply as leverage and <u>condemning</u> the fomenting of domestic tensions and nationality-specific differences by the Russian Federation as illegitimate attempts to interfere with the domestic affairs of Moldova with the aim of destabilizing the political order and overthrowing the democratically elected government,

- 18. <u>Solemnly declares</u> and <u>emphatically reaffirms</u> that the goals and obligations of the Paris Charter remain in place and that the values and principles of the OSCE must determine the precepts guiding the political action of all OSCE participating States;
- 19. <u>Calls on</u> OSCE participating States to respect and protect, as such and in their entirety, universal and inalienable human rights as enshrined both in the Paris Charter and in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and particularly to fully guarantee the principle of the rule of law in domestic and external affairs in order to take a stand against tyranny, for the principle of equality before the law and for democracy;
- 20. <u>Calls on</u> OSCE participating States to strictly adhere to OSCE principles, especially in cases of domestic or international conflict, in order to settle conflicts exclusively by peaceful means and in accordance with the norms of international law, especially territorial integrity, the inviolability of internationally recognized borders, and the sovereignty of States involved in conflict;
- 21. <u>Emphatically urges</u> the Russian Federation, in light of the above-mentioned principles, to halt its unjustified armed assault on Ukraine without delay and completely withdraw the Russian Federation's armed forces and paramilitary forces from Ukraine and to fully re-establish the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine within the borders recognized by the international community;
- 22. <u>Urges</u> OSCE participating States to strictly refrain from diplomatic recognition of the areas of Ukraine that have been annexed in violation of international law by the Russian Federation since 2014 and to work towards a safe means of return for internally displaced people and war refugees;
- 23. <u>Calls on</u> OSCE participating States to actively stand by Ukraine as, attacked without justification by the Russian Federation, it exercises its right of self-defence and to comprehensively support it with humanitarian, financial and economic assistance to care for the civilian population of Ukraine who are in need and deal with the vast war damages;

- 24. <u>Urges</u> the Russian Federation to support the IAEA initiative to establish a nuclear safety and security protection zone around the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, grant the IAEA inspectors unhindered access to the reactor facility and end the military occupation of the nuclear power plant;
- 25. <u>Urges</u> the Russian Federation to release the children and minor adolescents abducted from Ukraine into the care of the Ukrainian authorities without delay so that they can return to their parents and families or legal guardians, to exchange all Ukrainian nationals being held as Russian prisoners of war for all Russian nationals being held as Ukrainian prisoners of war, in accordance with the established "all for all" principle, and to release the unlawfully imprisoned OSCE employees without delay;
- 26. <u>Calls on</u> OSCE participating States to actively support the work of the International Criminal Court to secure and document evidence of suspected crimes against humanity and war crimes and, as necessary, to launch criminal investigations within OSCE participating States in accordance with the principle of universal jurisdiction;
- 27. <u>Appeals</u> to the international community to make every diplomatic effort to facilitate the extension of the grain deal and durably stabilize the logistics chains for global food supplies;
- 28. <u>Urges</u> the Government of Belarus to halt its support of the military warfare of the Russian Federation without delay, end the domestic repression of Belarusian civil society and the political opposition, release all political prisoners, strictly uphold the prohibition against torture and other forms of cruel, degrading and inhuman treatment, and abolish the death penalty;
- 29. <u>Calls on</u> OSCE participating States to generously support Moldova in providing humanitarian assistance to the large number of refugees, and advocate for open borders for people in need, humane refugee policy grounded in solidarity that strictly upholds the rule of law and human rights standards, and the re-establishment and expansion of the right to asylum in OSCE participating States;
- 30. <u>Proposes</u>, in view of the increased significance of the global food security issue, to establish a separate committee for that topic within the OSCE PA or at least to treat it as a topic of equal status in the General Committee on Economic Affairs, Science, Technology and Environment;
- 31. <u>Recommends</u> considering the introduction into the Rules of Procedure of the OSCE PA of suitable sanctions below the level of full suspension, such as withdrawal of the right to vote and stand for election, to be imposed on delegations from OSCE participating States which violate the common values and principles of the OSCE in a serious and sustained manner, in order to give the obligations to uphold the provisions of the Paris Charter greater force and a more binding effect in practice.

# **FUTURE GENERATIONS**

- 1. <u>Taking note</u> of the United Nations Secretary-General's report "Our Common Agenda", which proposes to renew our social contract and adapt to the challenges of this century, with a new commitment to young people and future generations, and <u>welcoming</u> the Secretary-General's proposal to adopt a Declaration on Future Generations to define and make concrete our duties to the generations to come after us,
- 2. <u>Recalling</u> the Charter of the United Nations, which made a commitment to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, and UN General Assembly resolution 70/1 "Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development", which contains a comprehensive, far-reaching and people-oriented set of universal and transformative Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), providing a blueprint for meeting the needs of present generations without compromising the future,
- 3. <u>Welcoming and fully supporting</u> the proposal to organize the Summit of the Future in 2024 as an opportunity to agree on multilateral solutions for a better tomorrow and to strengthen global governance for both present and future generations,
- 4. <u>Applauding</u> the work carried out by the Permanent Representatives of Fiji, Jamaica and the Netherlands to the United Nations as co-facilitators of the intergovernmental process on the Declaration on Future Generations initiated by the United Nations General Assembly,
- 5. <u>Recognizing</u> future generations as all those generations that are yet to be born, without discrimination or distinction of any kind, such as according to race, gender, religion, sexual orientation, political opinion, age or any other grounds, and who will inherit the planet,
- 6. <u>Expressing concern</u> over the growing number of violent conflicts that can endanger the planet's and humanity's long-term development,
- 7. <u>Alarmed</u> by the recent increase in aggressive rhetoric on the use of nuclear weapons, and <u>recalling</u> that nuclear war still represents an existential threat to the planet and humanity,
- 8. <u>Alarmed</u> by the unpredictable risks and threats coming from the inadequate stewardship of emerging technologies, artificial intelligence, and the militarization of science and technology, as well as by increased reports of cyberinterference and cyberattacks on critical infrastructure and the disruptive use of digital technologies,
- 9. <u>Expressing concern</u> over the well-being of the planet in the face of the global challenges caused by climate change, food and energy shortages, increasing poverty, unsustainable consumption and production, and biodiversity loss, as well as global shocks that in the twenty-first century have taken on new, more complex and worrying characteristics and impacts,
- 10. <u>Expressing concern</u> over global trends of backsliding on human rights and democracy, continuing inequalities, lack of trust in political institutions and meaningful engagement of citizens with governments, as well as heightened geopolitical competition and weakening of international co-operation and multilateralism,

- 11. <u>Stressing</u> that the achievement of gender equality is one of the major preconditions for ensuring a prosperous life and respect for the human rights of future generations,
- 12. <u>Recognizing</u> the role that youth activism has played in bringing inter-generational justice to the political agenda,
- 13. <u>Noting</u> that, while young people may have interconnected interests with future generations, they should not be left to take full responsibility and bear the burden of advocating for future generations by themselves, but should rather be given a role in making decisions about the future,
- 14. <u>Noting</u> that constructive engagement between policymakers and civil society and academia is necessary in framing knowledge and policies that can safeguard the interests of future generations,
- 15. <u>Noting</u> that many current global and regional crises are interlinked with long-term drivers and that decisions made today have consequences in the future and might negatively affect future generations, whose well-being or existence might be compromised,
- 16. <u>Recognizing</u> the duty of current generations to protect future generations from the negative impacts caused by decisions made today,
- 17. <u>Emphasizing</u> that there is no trade-off between well-being in the future and needs in the present, and <u>noting</u> that effective and durable solutions to current challenges and problems can be found only by taking into account the long-term perspective,
- 18. <u>Stressing</u> the need to implement long-term sustainable approaches to address both present and future challenges, and <u>highlighting</u> the importance of the SDGs for securing the interests of present generations and for building the foundations to enhance the interests of future generations,

- 19. <u>Calls on</u> OSCE participating States to recognize the rights of future generations who have no voice in current decision-making processes, define their relationship to the present, and commit to their interests;
- 20. <u>Urges</u> OSCE participating States to intensify their efforts to achieve the SDGs and to initiate discussions regarding the sustainability agenda beyond 2030 with respect to the interests of future generations, while preserving the vital link to the ongoing needs of present generations;
- 21. <u>Urges</u> OSCE participating States to prioritize the assessment of threats and the development of a response to existential risks and global shocks;
- 22. <u>Encourages</u> OSCE participating States to support the adoption of the Declaration on Future Generations;
- 23. <u>Calls on</u> OSCE participating States to introduce institutional legal, oversight and advisory mechanisms such as commissioners or ombudspersons for future generations within their government systems to advocate for, or act on behalf of, future generations,

and to design, monitor and audit policies sensitive to the rights and interests of future generations;

- 24. <u>Encourages</u> the OSCE executive structures, in co-operation with the OSCE PA, to build expertise and engage in awareness-raising and capacity-building activities on the application of parliamentary foresight and future checks in the design, implementation and evaluation of policies and programmes;
- 25. <u>Calls on</u> the parliaments of OSCE participating States to follow the examples of Finland, Iceland, Lithuania and the United Kingdom and establish parliamentary committees and "groups on the future" with the aim of assessing the impact of legislation and policies, taking into account the long-term perspective;
- 26. <u>Calls on</u> OSCE participating States and international organizations to build a strong, integrated evidence base on future impact, effectively linking science to policymaking, and to develop the practice of systematic reviews of the future impact of key policies and programmes;
- 27. <u>Calls on</u> parliaments and governments of OSCE participating States to apply strategic foresight in policymaking and to systematically and comprehensively analyse the expected trajectory towards the future;
- 28. <u>Suggests</u> that the OSCE PA should organize a parliamentary conference in preparation for the 2024 Summit of the Future to discuss the role of parliamentarians in strengthening co-ordination and regional governance for the future of present and coming generations;
- 29. <u>Suggests</u> that the OSCE PA should establish a platform to increase legislators' awareness of and learning about multilateral systems for long-term thinking and foresight in policymaking.

# THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA

- 1. <u>Recalling</u> the previous resolutions on the Republic of Moldova and the Transdniestrian conflict settlement process adopted during earlier annual sessions of the OSCE PA,
- 2. <u>Recognizing</u> that the Republic of Moldova is one of the countries most affected by the consequences of the unprovoked war of aggression waged by the Russian Federation against Ukraine, which constitutes a gross violation of the norms and principles of international law, including a severe breach of the OSCE's commitments and the Charter of the United Nations,
- 3. <u>Commending</u> the Republic of Moldova's solidarity with Ukraine and its people amid the Russian Federation's illegal war there, including by welcoming hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian citizens who have transited through or sought refuge in the Republic of Moldova, despite the latter's limited material resources and the ongoing security and economic threats posed by the Russian Federation,
- 4. <u>Appreciating</u> the commitment of the Republic of Moldova to pursuing comprehensive, far-reaching reforms, notably to strengthen the rule of law, combat corruption and build strong and efficient institutions, and <u>thanking</u> the OSCE institutions for developing tailor-made support in such challenging times,
- 5. <u>Welcoming</u> the granting, by the June 2022 Council of the European Union, of European Union candidate status to the Republic of Moldova, which is a milestone for the future of the country,
- 6. <u>Convinced</u> that continued democratic reforms supporting the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the fight against corruption can contribute to achieving this aim,
- 7. <u>Recognizing</u> that the conflict in the Transdniestrian region of the Republic of Moldova continues to pose a serious threat to security and stability in the OSCE area, and <u>reaffirming</u> OSCE participating States' commitment to attaining a peaceful, comprehensive and sustainable solution to this protracted conflict, with full respect for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova within its internationally recognized borders,
- 8. <u>Emphasizing</u> the importance of economic development and the positive aspects resulting from the implementation of the free trade agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Moldova, including the Transdniestrian region, that has been in effect since 1 January 2016,
- 9. <u>Underlining</u> the importance of the positive example, in terms of socio-economic development and cohesion, by the Autonomous Territorial Unit of Gagauzia,

The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly:

10. <u>Emphasizes</u> the importance of inter-parliamentary dialogue and parliamentary contributions to addressing protracted conflicts in the OSCE region;

- 11. <u>Underlines</u> that the main goal of the Transdniestrian conflict settlement process is to attain a comprehensive, peaceful and sustainable resolution based on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova within its internationally recognized borders, with a special status for the Transdniestrian region while ensuring the viability of the reintegrated State;
- 12. <u>Fully supports</u> the outstanding work done by the OSCE Mission to Moldova in accordance with its mandate, especially in the current geopolitical context, with the monitoring activities by the Mission in the Security Zone and beyond, in particular, being of the utmost importance;
- 13. <u>Notes</u> that the 5+2 talks are on hold as a result of the Russian Federation's war of aggression against Ukraine and, in this context, <u>appreciates</u> the efforts of the OSCE Mission to Moldova aimed at facilitating, in particular, the dialogue in the 1+1 format, both at the level of chief negotiators and within the framework of sectoral working groups, with the aim of solving emerging issues in the interests of people living on both banks of the Dniester/Nistru River;
- 14. <u>Urges</u> the Russian Federation to resume the withdrawal of its military troops and ammunition stockpiles from the territory of the Republic of Moldova, in accordance with its constitutional provisions of neutrality and in line with the relevant 1999 OSCE Istanbul Summit decisions, as well as UN General Assembly resolution 72/282;
- 15. <u>Welcomes</u> the readiness of the OSCE Mission to Moldova to contribute to ensuring transparency of the removal and destruction of Russian ammunition, weapons and military equipment stored in the Transdniestrian region of the Republic of Moldova;
- 16. <u>Invites</u> all relevant actors to initiate political discussions with the aim of transforming the current peacekeeping operation in the Transdniestrian region into a multilateral civilian mission under an appropriate international mandate that would reflect the real needs on the ground.

# GREATER EXPLOITATION OF THE POTENTIAL OF SCIENCE DIPLOMACY FOR INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION AND ACTIVE PEACE POLICY

- 1. <u>Believing</u> that the urgent global issues facing humanity cannot be resolved without scientific education and research, political diplomacy and sustainable economic, environmental and social innovations,
- 2. <u>Recognizing</u> that overcoming global challenges like climate change, natural disasters, pandemics, poverty-induced diseases and armed conflicts will require collaboration within the international community,
- 3. <u>Recognizing</u> the complex links between climate change and armed conflict, and that climate change generates or exacerbates competition for access to natural resources, requiring the promotion of systematic and comprehensive scientific exchange on climate security issues,
- 4. <u>Committed</u> to implementing the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and to combating hunger and poverty in the countries of the global south with particular urgency,
- 5. <u>Having solemnly pledged</u> to take the Charter of the United Nations and the Charter of Paris for a new Europe as touchstones for the political action of OSCE participating States in order to safeguard a rules-based international order for long-term peace, and to strictly refrain from all threats or use of violence against the territorial integrity or political independence of a State,
- 6. <u>Recalling</u> the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the Paris Charter, in particular on co-operation among OSCE participating States in the economic, scientific, technological and environmental fields, which should contribute to the creation of favourable conditions for economic development for the benefit of citizens in the OSCE area,
- 7. <u>Aware</u> of the importance of evidence-based scientific findings in explaining political decisions and communicating them to the public when pursuing those goals in practice,
- 8. <u>Expressing particular appreciation</u> for the fact that numerous OSCE participating States already engage in internationally effective, proactive science diplomacy, which during the COVID-19 pandemic helped facilitate worldwide scientific dialogue about the disease and the rapid development of effective vaccines,
- 9. <u>Highlighting</u> the significant opportunities and potential which science diplomacy offers in important forward-looking fields such as medical technology, hydrogen technology, climate-neutral energy provision, nanotechnology and artificial intelligence, to support businesses' innovations for social welfare and prosperity,
- 10. <u>Underlining</u> the necessity of effectively protecting property rights when it comes to developing research into marketable innovations, and of engaging in knowledge transfer on an equal footing with the countries of the global south,
- 11. <u>Recognizing</u> in particular the significant role played by science diplomacy in intercultural understanding, conflict research, crisis prevention, peace processes, rehabilitation in

post-conflict societies, development co-operation, and communication between States in the absence or interruption of diplomatic relations,

- 12. <u>Expressing particular appreciation</u> of the contribution that science diplomacy can make to gender and intergenerational justice, as well as to a diverse and inclusive society,
- 13. <u>Firmly resolved</u> to put a stop to the processes shrinking the spaces in which the scientific community and civil society can operate freely in some OSCE participating States,
- 14. <u>Emphatically reaffirming</u> that, ever since the adoption of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975, inalienable and indivisible human rights have been part of the immovable common values and principles of the OSCE, which OSCE participating States have pledged to uphold,

- 15. <u>Solemnly and emphatically declares</u> that the goals and commitments of the Paris Charter are to be pursued more intensively, not least using the tools of science diplomacy;
- 16. <u>Appeals</u> for science diplomacy to be aligned with the SDGs to make a substantial contribution to the achievement of those Goals;
- 17. <u>Recommends</u>, to this end, that coherent and interministerial strategies be developed in OSCE participating States for internationally effective science diplomacy, with clear funding structures and generous research funding for staff, in-kind resources and research visits abroad, which are scientifically evaluated at regular intervals to monitor transparency, accountability and effectiveness;
- 18. <u>Proposes</u> to establish the post of Science Diplomacy Officer in the executive staff of national governments in OSCE participating States, reporting directly to the President or the Head of Government;
- 19. <u>Proposes</u> to launch new collaborative initiatives in OSCE participating States, modelled on the European Union Science Diplomacy Alliance, with the aim of implementing and further developing joint research projects, policy advice, capacity-building and training activities on science diplomacy;
- 20. <u>Recommends</u> systematically expanding the scientific collaborations and university partnerships between OSCE participating States and their partner countries, and significantly adding to the international scholarship and exchange programmes for students and junior academics, as well as reintegration programmes for researchers, who have spent a long time abroad, within existing science diplomacy co-operation arrangements;
- 21. <u>Recommends</u> establishing improved opportunities, in future science diplomacy programme streams, for international research funding to deal with the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic and combat future pandemics, in order to make healthcare systems in OSCE participating States and their partner countries more resilient and facilitate the transfer of knowledge and innovation;
- 22. <u>Recommends</u> promoting integration and building international networks among players in science, politics and civil society to help advance capacity-building in partner countries through education and research;

- 23. <u>Calls for</u> existing barriers to mobility, which obstruct science in OSCE participating States, to be dismantled by visa facilitation agreements, and for advisory services to be created to help universities and research institutions to address status and residence issues;
- 24. <u>Recommends</u> improving funding opportunities for high-level scientific research and developing attractive co-operation formats for international clusters of excellence for science diplomacy, as well as supporting innovation-effective spin-offs from higher education and science while safeguarding copyrights;
- 25. <u>Calls for</u> funding for international research into security, conflict and peace to be markedly increased in the interests of science diplomacy, also <u>calls for</u> political decision-makers to take the expertise of peace research into account and conduct regular exchanges between scientists and policymakers, and further <u>calls for</u> scientists to be offered public platforms as a means of dismantling opposing perceptions of conflicts and contributing to civilian conflict management globally and particularly in context of domestic and international conflicts ongoing in the OSCE area;
- 26. <u>Recommends</u> that future programme streams for science diplomacy, as a priority, establish support for women in all degree courses, access to professional positions in research and university administration, and research funding projects;
- 27. <u>Calls for</u> the full guarantee of academic freedom, in light of growing threats to that freedom, and appropriate safeguards to be provided for persecuted scholars such as increased funding for academic scholarship and mentoring programmes, and facilitated humanitarian admission of refugee scholars;
- 28. <u>Appeals</u> for effective counter-strategies to be developed in OSCE participating States to combat hybrid attacks on public order, such as anti-science disinformation campaigns, the manipulative spreading of misinformation and targeted cyberattacks on critical infrastructure by private individuals or State actors intended to destroy democratic societies from within.

#### A STRUCTURED SET OF RULES FOR A REGULAR PERFORMANCE AUDIT OF THE OSCE PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY

- 1. <u>Recognizing</u> that the OSCE PA has pledged to combat corruption and promote transparency, accountability and integrity on several occasions, including through the Helsinki Declaration, Tbilisi Declaration, Minsk Declaration, Berlin Declaration, Luxembourg Declaration and Birmingham Declaration,
- 2. <u>Observing how other international organizations and parliamentary assemblies have clear</u> sets of rules for the process of performance audit and the areas it should cover,
- 3. <u>Recognizing</u> the need to expand the scope of the independent audit of the OSCE PA to include a performance audit in addition to the current financial audit,
- 4. <u>Recognizing</u> that a financial audit alone is not sufficient to establish whether the Organization's budget is used in the most efficient manner,
- 5. <u>Noting</u> that a specific system of rules dictating how a performance audit should be conducted is a significant step towards enhancing the institutional framework that supports transparency, accountability and integrity, and consolidates the role of the OSCE PA in promoting these goals,
- 6. <u>Acknowledging</u> that performance auditing is an independent, objective and reliable examination of whether organizations are operating in accordance with the principles of economy, efficiency and effectiveness and whether there is room for improvement,
- 7. <u>Underlining</u> the need for creating rules of accountability in the budgetary planning of the organization and the method of allocation of its resources,
- 8. <u>Emphasizing</u> that transparency within the OSCE PA also concerns issues pertaining to staff recruitment,

- 9. <u>Calls on</u> its Standing Committee to adopt a set of rules concerning OSCE PA audits, taking the following elements into consideration:
  - a. specify that performance audits shall be conducted by an external partner that shall be given the relevant mandate which shall encompass, inter alia, the budget, the work of the secretariat and the recruitment of staff in key positions;
  - b. add a clause to the OSCE PA's Financial Regulations stating that a performance audit shall be performed every year together with the financial audit or at any other regular interval that the Standing Committee wishes to establish;
  - c. establish the requirement that a representative of the auditors takes part in a meeting of the Standing Committee once a year, if so requested, to report on their findings and recommendations;

- d. establish the obligation that the external auditors follow up and monitor the implementation of recommendations if so instructed by the Standing Committee;
- e. establish a clear set of disciplinary actions for failing to implement recommended changes or for other misconduct that has been found as a result of an audit.

## MICROPLASTIC AND NANOPLASTIC POLLUTION

- 1. <u>Reaffirming</u> OSCE commitments related to environmental protection enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act, the 2003 OSCE Strategy Document for the Economic and Environmental Dimension (Maastricht Strategy), the 2007 Madrid Declaration on Environment and Security, and other relevant OSCE documents and decisions,
- 2. <u>Noting</u> that microplastics enter marine and atmospheric environments through several channels, namely as primary microplastics, designed and manufactured to be very small, and as secondary microplastics that result from the degradation of larger plastic items,
- 3. <u>Drawing attention</u> to the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), to which all OSCE participating States have agreed, especially SDG 14, which calls on countries to prevent and reduce marine litter, including plastic litter and microplastics from both land and sea-based sources,
- 4. <u>Recalling</u> United Nations Environment Assembly resolutions 1/6, 2/11, 3/7 and 4/6 on marine plastic litter and microplastics, and <u>welcoming</u> United Nations Environment Assembly resolution 5/14, adopted in March 2022, on the establishment of an international legally binding treaty to control and reduce plastic pollution and waste, which includes microplastics in the definition of plastics,
- 5. <u>Welcoming</u> the Ocean Plastics Charter, which is endorsed by several OSCE participating States, and in particular its provisions relating to the research, development and use of technologies to prevent plastics and microplastics from entering the marine environment, among other commitments,
- 6. <u>Welcoming</u> the compromise reached at the second session of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee on Plastic Pollution, which brought together representatives of 175 countries in Paris on 3 June 2023; also <u>welcoming</u> the leadership role of the High Ambition Coalition to End Plastic Pollution; and <u>supporting</u> the drafting by the end of 2024 of a legally binding instrument to end plastic pollution,
- 7. <u>Emphasizing</u> the need for collaborative and transnational efforts to address the issue of microplastic and nanoplastic pollution, given the transboundary nature of such pollution, and <u>calling on</u> all OSCE participating States to actively contribute to global efforts to combat microplastic and nanoplastic pollution,
- 8. <u>Alarmed</u> by the 2019 special report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change on the ocean and cryosphere in a changing climate, which indicates that microplastics have become a major concern owing to their persistence and accumulation in many marine environments,
- 9. <u>Highlighting</u> the growing body of knowledge regarding the presence, sources and environmental and human health impacts of microplastics and nanoplastics, and <u>recalling</u> the United Nations' Second World Ocean Assessment, which recognizes that marine contamination with microplastics is of emerging concern, not only because of the potential ecological impacts but also because of the potential threats it poses to food safety, food security and human health,

- 10. <u>Underlining</u> that humans inhale and ingest microplastics and nanoplastics, including through the consumption of seafood or drinking water, and that the accumulation of microplastics and nanoplastics in human bodies is raising concern in the scientific community,
- 11. <u>Reiterating</u> the OSCE PA Birmingham Declaration (2022), which calls on national authorities to strengthen efforts to better understand how environmental degradation affects different aspects of public health and to propose viable solutions to protect citizens' health, especially in the context of microplastic and nanoplastic pollution,
- 12. <u>Noting</u> that microplastics and nanoplastics can transport endocrine-disrupting chemicals and other harmful compounds, and <u>encouraging</u> scientific research into the leaching of endocrine-disrupting chemicals from microplastics and nanoplastics, their pathways of exposure, and their potential health impacts, including pertaining to the hormonal systems of humans and animals,
- 13. <u>Promoting</u> the importance of international scientific co-operation on microplastic and nanoplastic pollution, and <u>encouraging</u> the development of standardized methodologies for monitoring and assessing microplastic and nanoplastic pollution in different environments, to allow for the comparison of data between regions and over time,
- 14. <u>Noting</u> with concern the presence of microplastics and nanoplastics in the Arctic, and even in areas with no apparent human activity, such as the deep sea,
- 15. <u>Underscoring</u> that the COVID-19 pandemic has resulted in a significant increase in the number of single-use plastic items used and disposed of worldwide, and that these items will likely degrade into smaller microplastics,
- 16. <u>Recognizing</u> the vital role that technological advancements and innovation play in the mitigation and control of microplastic and nanoplastic pollution, such as the development of plastic waste management systems and methods for removing microplastics from water bodies,
- 17. <u>Insisting</u> on the need for better waste management systems, including wastewater and sewage systems, both on land and at sea, to prevent the dispersion of plastic waste into the environment and its subsequent fragmentation into microplastics,
- 18. <u>Welcoming</u> the development and implementation of circular economy models and principles that aim to reduce, reuse and recycle plastic materials, thereby minimizing the generation of plastic waste, which is a significant source of microplastic pollution,
- 19. <u>Stressing</u> the need to improve product design standards to reduce the fragmentation of plastic items into microplastics, and to ensure the production of biodegradable and more durable, reusable and recyclable plastic items,
- 20. <u>Applauding</u> the commitment of the private sector in reducing plastic pollution through corporate responsibility initiatives, such as reducing the use of single-use plastics and developing eco-friendly materials,
- 21. <u>Recognizing</u> the role of legislation, regulations and policies in reducing the production and consumption of plastic products, promoting the recycling and responsible disposal of

plastic waste, and encouraging the development of plastic items free of harmful chemicals,

- 22. <u>Acknowledging</u> the significant contribution of car tyre abrasion to microplastic pollution, as tyres wear down and release microplastic particles into the environment, with these particles often ending up in water bodies,
- 23. <u>Stressing</u> the need to reduce the release of microplastics from tyre abrasion, including by supporting research and development into more environmentally friendly tyre materials and technologies, and encouraging automotive manufacturers and related industries to innovate and adopt sustainable practices, including the production of longer-lasting tyres and the recycling of worn tyres,
- 24. <u>Encouraging</u> the development of initiatives that aim to capture and degrade microplastics released from tyre abrasion before they enter water bodies, including initiatives that aim to capture and treat stormwater runoff, which often contains microplastics from tyre wear, and the development of infrastructure, such as permeable pavements and green spaces, which can help to trap and degrade microplastics from tyre abrasion,
- 25. <u>Highlighting</u> the role of government regulations in setting higher standards for tyre durability and wear resistance, which can significantly reduce the quantity of microplastics released from tyre abrasion,
- 26. <u>Recalling</u> the adoption of Directive (EU) 2019/904 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2019 on the reduction of the impact of certain plastic products on the environment, and its transposition into the domestic legislation of Member States,
- 27. <u>Stressing</u> the importance of public education campaigns to raise awareness about microplastic pollution, including from car tyre wear, and to promote understanding of the sources and impacts of, and solutions to, microplastic and nanoplastic pollution, in order to empower individuals and communities to take action,

- 28. <u>Recognizes</u> the disproportionate current and potential negative impacts of plastic pollution on marginalized communities and coastal communities, as well as the particular consequences for indigenous peoples, who may rely on traditional practices of hunting and fishing in areas where the land, water and wildlife are polluted;
- 29. <u>Understands</u> that barriers in addressing microplastic pollution may be related to unsustainable patterns of consumption and production, and that a reduction in plastic consumption would lead to a reduction in plastic waste generation;
- 30. <u>Highlights</u> the role of OSCE parliamentarians in raising awareness of the harms of plastic and microplastic pollution and in engaging with civil society organizations, young people and indigenous peoples to develop innovative prevention and mitigation measures aligned with their concerns and priorities;
- 31. <u>Welcomes</u> the increasing number of OSCE participating States that have taken measures to address primary microplastic pollution, such as prohibiting the use of microbeads in personal care and cosmetic products and <u>calls on</u> States to take further action to combat

the addition of microplastics to products such as tyres, fertilizers, paints, detergents and plant protection products;

- 32. <u>Encourages</u> OSCE participating States to align their ambitions with those of the European Union as expressed in Directive (EU) 2019/904 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the reduction of the impact of certain plastic products on the environment, by committing to the prohibitions set out in the Directive, as well as adding the prohibition of single-use plastic bags, which are environmentally unjustifiable;
- 33. <u>Invites</u> OSCE participating States to identify, at the national and regional levels, the most significant sources of microplastics and nanoplastics, and take all necessary measures for reducing them at source and preventing them from entering the air and oceans;
- 34. <u>Urges</u> OSCE participating States to do their utmost to bring to a successful conclusion the negotiations on a legally binding international treaty against plastic pollution, under the aegis of the United Nations;
- 35. <u>Calls on</u> OSCE participating States to fund science-based research projects on microplastic pollution, nationally or through international organizations, to reduce knowledge gaps regarding the presence, concentration, fragmentation and degradation of microplastics, as well as their potential risks to the environment and to human health, including those caused by their possible leaching of endocrine-disrupting chemicals and their potential bioaccumulation in human and animal bodies;
- 36. <u>Encourages</u> OSCE participating States to take steps to enable the scientific community to fill knowledge gaps regarding the presence, concentration and behaviour of nanoplastics, which are difficult to detect and measure;
- 37. <u>Recognizes</u> the significant role of car tyre abrasion in microplastic pollution and encourages OSCE participating States to promote innovation, research and development to reduce and prevent the release of microplastics from tyre abrasion into the environment, including relating to the development of new tyre material and better recycling practices, and the capture and degradation of microplastics by improved wastewater and sewage water management or other infrastructure;
- 38. <u>Calls on</u> OSCE participating States to consider legislation that encourages the development and use of tyre technologies that reduce tyre abrasion, such as requirements for tyre manufacturers to disclose information about the expected life and environmental impact of their products;
- 39. <u>Encourages</u> the International Secretariat of the OSCE PA to organize regular opportunities for parliamentarians, representatives of relevant international organizations and members of civil society to share best practices to address microplastic pollution.

# ADOPTING EFFECTIVE MECHANISMS TO SAFEGUARD UKRAINIAN WOMEN AND CHILDREN FROM ABUSE, EXPLOITATION AND HUMAN TRAFFICKING

- 1. <u>Concerned</u> that women and children have been disproportionally affected and displaced by the Russian Federation's unjustified, brutal, and genocidal war on Ukraine, that 90 per cent of the more than 8 million Ukrainian refugees are women and children, and that the majority of the more than 5 million persons displaced inside Ukraine are women and children,
- 2. <u>Alarmed</u> that Ukrainian women and children fleeing the war are particularly vulnerable to human trafficking, both when crossing borders and when seeking housing and work as refugees, as well as by reports of disturbing trafficking risks and incidents at border crossings and by an observed and documented lack of 24-hour anti-trafficking police, registration and counselling personnel at major border crossings,
- 3. <u>Concerned</u> that a survey conducted by the OSCE Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights on the Safety and Security of Women Refugees from Ukraine found that almost half had not received information on the risks of human trafficking, that many had already been targeted with proposals to work in the sex industry or had been subjected to sexual harassment and/or sexual violence, and that some 40 per cent had not found employment,
- 4. <u>Alarmed</u> that the United Nations Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine found that Russian forces were committing war crimes against civilians, including rape of girls and women, as well as of boys and men, and that the United Nations Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict, Pramila Patten, has described the Russian Federation as using rape as a "military strategy" in Ukraine,
- 5. <u>Greatly concerned</u> that the children of Ukraine are suffering serious injury and trauma due to Russian aggression, including physical injury, death, psychological trauma, sexual abuse, exploitation and hunger, as well as disruption of their education,
- 6. <u>Alarmed</u> that the Russian Federation has been forcibly transferring Ukrainian children to the Russian Federation and Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine as part of a Russian government policy of forced assimilation and russification of Ukrainian children apparently aimed at destroying their ethnic identity,
- 7. <u>Recognizing</u> that forcibly transferring children of one group to another group is a violation of article II(e) of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide and the Geneva Convention (IV), including articles 24, 25, 50, 78 and 82, and that the International Criminal Court has indicted President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin and Commissioner for Children's Rights Maria Lvova-Belova for the war crimes of unlawful deportation of population (children) and unlawful transfer of population (children) from occupied areas of Ukraine to the Russian Federation under articles 8(2)(a)(vii) and 8(2)(b)(viii) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,
- 8. <u>Concerned</u> that in May 2022, President Putin signed a decree simplifying the procedure for adopting Ukrainian children purportedly without parental care and granting them

Russian citizenship and that Russian authorities change the names, dates of birth and other identifying information when Ukrainian children are adopted, thereby making them difficult to trace,

- 9. <u>Appalled</u> that Russian government-controlled media have blatantly misused coverage of the arrival in the Russian Federation of Ukrainian children for Russian government propaganda purposes,
- 10. <u>Alarmed</u> by the findings of the 28 April 2023 Moscow Mechanism *Report on Violations* and Abuses of International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law, War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, Related to the Forcible Transfer and/or Deportation of Ukrainian Children to the Russian Federation, which concluded that "non-consensual evacuations, transfers and prolonged displacement of Ukrainian children constitute violations of IHL [international humanitarian law], and in certain cases amount to grave breaches of GCIV [the Geneva Convention (IV)] and war crimes," that "non-justified prolonged stay or unfounded logistical hurdles violate the obligation to facilitate reunification and contravene the principles embodied within the GCIV that family unity is to be protected and respected" and that "facilitating re-education and permanent integration into Russian families serves to confirm that the displaced Ukrainian children are indeed the victims of deportation in the sense of Article 49 of the GCIV",

- 11. <u>Urges</u> OSCE participating States, the OSCE PA and the OSCE to support the creation of a unified central emergency call centre hub linked to law enforcement in Ukraine and in other countries to enable reporting on and interventions on behalf of missing children originally from Ukraine, as well as suspected cases of human trafficking and sexual exploitation, including online, of persons originally from Ukraine;
- 12. <u>Calls on</u> OSCE participating States to support the creation of an international mechanism to facilitate vetting by government authorities or law enforcement of volunteers and other non-governmental front-line responders working with refugees or with victims of other major crises or natural disasters;
- 13. <u>Calls on</u> OSCE participating States to ensure 24-hour anti-trafficking and Ukrainianlanguage trained law enforcement and assistance present at the entrance and exit points of major border crossings to prevent and/or respond to potential human trafficking, particularly during refugee crises;
- 14. <u>Calls on</u> OSCE participating States to run unannounced "stress-tested" simulated trafficking operations to evaluate whether there are effective anti-trafficking and refugee assistance measures at major border crossings;
- 15. <u>Urges</u> OSCE participating States to support the development of a unified system for tracking Ukrainian child refugees and unaccompanied or separated minors, including registering them at border crossings, encompassing the Schengen zone as well as other countries in the region that have received or are receiving refugees from Ukraine;
- 16. <u>Urges</u> OSCE participating States to develop and implement, if they have not already done so, national referral mechanisms specific to children that take a trauma-informed and age-

appropriate approach to identification of and assistance to child victims of human trafficking;

- 17. <u>Calls on</u> OSCE participating States to support the development of robust child protection mechanisms for vulnerable Ukrainian children, both in Ukraine and in countries that have received Ukrainian refugees, which include social assistance and protection to help prevent human trafficking and sexual abuse of Ukrainian children;
- 18. <u>Recognizes</u> that the forcible transfer of Ukrainian children to the Russian Federation and Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine, as part of a Russian government policy of forced assimilation and russification of Ukrainian children, can be considered an act of genocide under the 1948 Genocide Convention;
- 19. <u>Urges</u> OSCE participating States, the OSCE PA, the OSCE and other relevant international organizations to press the Russian Federation to provide information on the names and whereabouts of all Ukrainian children in its custody, Ukrainian children who have been given Russian citizenship, adoption records since 2014 of children originally from Ukraine regardless of their current citizenship, as well as any records of children originally from Ukraine placed with Russian foster families since 2014;
- 20. <u>Calls on</u> OSCE participating States, the OSCE PA, the OSCE and other relevant international organizations to develop or support, as appropriate, efforts to ensure that international monitors have access to sites where Ukrainian children are being held and that children from Ukraine in Russian custody are able to contact family members, guardians or an international organization;
- 21. <u>Calls on</u> OSCE participating States to support, in co-operation with Ukrainian authorities, the development of a unified and consolidated searchable registry of missing children that includes provision for a searchable database including, if available and provided, DNA from family members and/or children in order to facilitate identification of children and reunification of families;
- 22. <u>Urges</u> OSCE participating States to designate for sanctions those responsible for the forced transfer of Ukrainian children to the Russian Federation and/or Russian-controlled areas of Ukraine and/or for their forced assimilation, adoption or placement in a foster home;
- 23. <u>Urges</u> OSCE participating States to support or, as appropriate, develop programmes specifically for trauma treatment and healing, rehabilitation and where necessary prostheses, for Ukrainian children affected by the war, in co-operation with the Government of Ukraine and with relevant regional and international organizations working on the ground, including the OSCE;
- 24. <u>Recommends</u> that OSCE participating States support programmes to assist Ukraine in rebuilding its education system and, as appropriate, to support education for Ukrainian child refugees;
- 25. <u>Recommends</u> that OSCE participating States and the OSCE support and assist Ukraine in implementing its legislation and policies concerning the protection of children in the digital environment, for example by providing training and technical support for law enforcement, judges and prosecutors.

### CONDEMNATION OF THE DESECRATION OF POLISH GRAVES IN BELARUS

- 1. <u>Considering</u> the Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between OSCE participating States in the Helsinki Final Act:
  - a. "the participating States will respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief",
  - b. "The participating States in whose territory national minorities exist will respect the right of persons belonging to such minorities to equality before the law, will afford them the full opportunity for the actual enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms and will, in this manner, protect their legitimate interests in this sphere",
- 2. <u>Underscoring</u> the 2014 Baku Declaration's Resolution on Protection of Cultural Property in the OSCE Area, in which the OSCE PA:
  - a. "mindful that cultural heritage is an important component of the cultural identity of communities, groups and individuals and of social cohesion, and its intentional destruction may therefore have adverse consequences for human dignity and human rights",
  - b. "emphasizes the importance of preserving the status of monuments and sites related to history and culture, wherever they are located, which constitutes an integral part of the overall efforts within the CSCE for the preservation and protection of the common cultural heritage (paragraph 31 of 1991 Document of the Cracow Symposium on the Cultural Heritage of the CSCE Participating States)",
- 3. <u>Emphasizing</u> the Kyiv Ministerial Council decision 3/13 on freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief, which calls on OSCE participating States "to adopt policies to promote respect and protection for places of worship and religious sites, religious monuments, cemeteries, and shrines against vandalism and destruction",
- 4. <u>Acknowledging</u> that the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict provides that "damage to cultural property, belonging to any peoplewhatsoever, means damage to the cultural heritage of all mankind, since each people makes its contribution to the culture of the world",
- 5. <u>Reiterating</u> the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights:
  - a. "Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled to realization, through national effort and international co-operation and in accordance with the organization and resources of each State, of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality",
  - b. "Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits",
- 6. <u>Aware</u> that cultural sites, such as graves and monuments, are of great importance to the identity of peoples, groups and communities as well as their social cohesion,

7. <u>Noting</u> that the increase in destruction and desecration of cultural sites such as graves often serves as a tool to serve political goals in areas where peoples with ties to the sites are unable to venture,

- 8. <u>Emphasizes</u> the urgent need to protect Polish graves in Belarus from further desecration and vandalism, as well as to prevent future desecration of a similar nature;
- 9. <u>Stresses</u> the importance of these graves for Polish peoples and their cultural identity, but also for the world as a reminder of the horrors of war and genocide;
- 10. <u>Understands</u> that intentional destruction of cultural sites may amount to acts of racial, religious or cultural hatred and may cause degradation of relations between cultural groups, as well as violation of the fundamental principles of human rights law;
- 11. <u>Reaffirms</u> its commitment to the Resolution on Protection of Cultural Property in the OSCE Area;
- 12. <u>Requests</u> that the desecration of these graves stops immediately and that Belarusian authorities condemn these acts, restore all destroyed sites, as well as investigate the deeds.

#### SUPPORT FOR A DEMOCRATIC BELARUS

- 1. <u>Having</u> regard to:
  - a. its previous resolutions on Belarus,
  - b. the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and all human rights treaties to which Belarus is a party,
  - c. the awarding of the 2022 Nobel Peace Prize to human rights advocate Ales Bialiatski from Belarus,
  - d. the European Parliament resolution of 24 November 2022 on the continuing repression of the democratic opposition and civil society in Belarus,
  - e. the report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights of 4 March 2022 on the situation of human rights in Belarus in the run-up to the 2020 presidential election and in its aftermath,
  - f. the report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Belarus, Anaïs Marin, to the United Nations General Assembly of 20 July 2022,
  - g. the unlawful sentencing of all those facing political persecution, including Svitlana Tsikhanouskaya, Pavel Latushka, 2022 Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Ales Bialiatski, human rights defenders Valiantsin Stefanovich and Uladzimir Labkovich, representative of the Polish national minority Andrzej Poczobut, and blogger Ihar Losik, in addition to the politically motivated detention of almost 1,500 people,
  - h. the deterioration of prison conditions, proven by recent facts including the brutal beating of former presidential candidate Viktar Babaryka in a penal colony and the death of democratic activist Mikalai Klimovich, which is at least the fourth death of a political prisoner in detention,
  - i. the systemic practice of exerting psychological pressure on democratic activists by deliberately arresting and sentencing their relatives,
  - j. the 2020 report under the OSCE Moscow Mechanism of the human dimension on alleged human rights violations related to the presidential elections of 9 August 2020 in Belarus, as well as the recent report under the OSCE Moscow Mechanism of 11 May 2023 entitled *Report on the serious threat to the OSCE human dimension in Belarus since 5 November 2020*,
- 2. <u>Deeply concerned</u> about the deteriorating human rights situation in Belarus and the authorities' brutal crackdown on civil liberties, freedom of association and independent media, as well as the continued repression of political opposition, civil society, trade unions and legal defenders, in violation of OSCE commitments and international obligations,

- 3. <u>Strongly condemning</u> the unprecedented scale and increasing number of arrests and cases of detention in reaction to peaceful protests and the beating and torturing of people in jail, which leads to the destruction of their health and may cause death,
- 4. <u>Noting</u> the legal developments in Belarus and the lack of an independent judicial system, which includes sham trials, the lack of fair court proceedings, and the bill of 7 December 2022 approved by Belarusian lawmakers, opening the way for more extensive use of the death penalty,
- 5. <u>Concerned</u> about the relatives of political prisoners being pursued, convicted and detained as hostages by Belarusian authorities,
- 6. <u>Concerned</u> about the situation for Belarusians who have fled the country, many of whom lack identity papers,
- 7. <u>Regarding</u> the 9 August 2020 presidential elections in Belarus as fraudulent in that these elections stripped Belarusians of the opportunity to freely choose their own future,
- 8. <u>Standing firm</u> and <u>continuing to stand in solidarity with</u> the people of Belarus, as well as with forces that demand and work for a democratic, independent, sovereign, prosperous and stable Belarus,

- 9. <u>Calls on</u> the Belarusian regime to:
  - a. immediately and unconditionally release all political prisoners in Belarus;
  - b. guarantee proper medical supervision of the health of political prisoners and the possibility of independent international medical commissions having access to them;
  - c. have an independent investigation carried out into and an expert report compiled on the death of Mikalai Klimovich;
  - d. cease all punishment of the families of political prisoners;
  - e. abolish the sentences of all those facing political persecution, including Svitlana Tsikanouskaya, Pavel Latushka, 2022 Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Ales Bialiatski, Valiantsin Stefanovich, Uladzimir Labkovich, Andrzej Poczobut and Ihar Losik;
  - f. stop the ongoing and all future sham trials which represent a flagrant abuse of the justice system;
  - g. ensure that the country's legislation is in full compliance with international human rights commitments;
  - h. reconsider the imposition of the death penalty for "high treason" committed by government officials and military personnel;
  - i. reconsider the restrictions on peaceful mass events and freedom of the media, and engage in real negotiations with the democratic opposition on free elections;

- j. allow the holding of free and fair elections with observers from the OSCE;
- 10. <u>Calls on parliaments in the OSCE region to:</u>
  - a. call for more systematic co-operation between OSCE PA Members and representatives of Belarusian democratic forces, for instance by setting up friendship groups with the democratic opposition of Belarus;
  - b. engage parliaments and governments in providing technical assistance to the democratic opposition in every area of running a State bureaucracy and democratic parliament;
  - c. support political prisoners through NGOs such as Viasna, work for their release, and promote support schemes that protect prisoners' families, property and health;
  - d. urge fellow parliamentarians to work for a universal periodic review of Belarus in the United Nations Human Rights Council;
  - e. support further European Union individual and economic sanctions on the Belarusian regime, and call on parliamentarians to work for the strengthening and implementation of those sanctions;
  - f. support the aspirations of Belarusian society to preserve its cultural and linguistic identity, including by strengthening the potential of the independent Belarusian informational, educational, and cultural space;
  - g. encourage parliaments and governments to support independent news outlets targeted at a Belarusian audience such as Nexta, Malanka, Radyjo Svaboda, Radyjo Racyja, Belsat TV, European Radio for Belarus;
  - h. prevent discrimination against Belarusian refugees, support their civil selforganization and educational activities;
  - i. continue to condemn the Lukashenko government's involvement in the Russian Federation's war against Ukraine and explore options for how it can be held accountable.

# THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION'S AGGRESSION AGAINST UKRAINE WITH REGARD TO WOMEN AND CHILDREN

- 1. <u>Reaffirming</u> its strong commitment to the sovereignty, political independence, territorial integrity and unity of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders,
- 2. <u>Reiterating</u> the urgent need for the Russian Federation to immediately cease its aggression against Ukraine and to withdraw its troops,
- 3. <u>Expressing solidarity</u> with the Ukrainian people who are defending not only their sovereign State but also the principles and values of the OSCE,
- 4. <u>Expressing grave concern</u> about the ongoing human rights and humanitarian crisis in Ukraine, particularly with regard to the reports of gross violations and abuses of human rights and violations of international humanitarian law by the Russian Federation,
- 5. <u>Recalling</u> the findings and recommendations of the recent reports by OSCE Moscow Mechanism experts on violations of international humanitarian and human rights law, war crimes, and crimes against humanity,
- 6. <u>Deeply concerned</u> by the disproportionate effect that the Russian Federation's aggression on Ukraine has on women and children, and the persistent and widespread use of violence against them, including conflict-related sexual violence, and <u>underscoring</u> the need to hold perpetrators accountable,
- 7. <u>Condemning</u> in the strongest possible terms the cases of sexual violence used by Russian soldiers as a tactic of war and as a deliberate way to dehumanize victims,
- 8. <u>Expressing deep concern</u> about the large number of Ukrainian children who since 24 February 2022 and even prior to this date, have been abducted and forcibly displaced from the territory of Ukraine to the temporarily occupied territories and to the territory of the Russian Federation,
- 9. <u>Strongly condemning</u> the deliberate and systematic policy of the Russian authorities of forcibly transferring and indoctrinating Ukrainian children, and of carrying out forced adoptions and fostering,
- 10. <u>Firmly condemning</u> the support of the Russian Federation's aggression against Ukraine by Belarus, particularly in respect of the involvement of the Belarusian regime in the illegal transfer of Ukrainian children from the Russian-occupied territories of Ukraine to Belarus, including through the Union State of Belarus and Russia,
- 11. <u>Noting</u> the recent decision of the International Criminal Court to issue arrest warrants for the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, and the Commissioner for Children's Rights, Maria Lvova-Belova, in connection with alleged war crimes of unlawful deportation and transfer of children in the context of the situation in Ukraine,
- 12. <u>Recalling</u> UN Security Council resolution 1325 on women and peace and security and its subsequent resolutions, which call for an effective response to all forms of sexual

violence related to conflicts and support women's full, equal and meaningful participation at all stages of peace and security processes,

- 13. <u>Concerned</u> about the growing number of civilian casualties caused by the Russian Federation's aggression against Ukraine, and <u>strongly condemning</u> attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure,
- 14. <u>Deploring</u> the large-scale violations of the human rights and fundamental freedoms of women and children of Ukraine,

- 15. <u>Condemns</u> in the strongest possible terms the human rights violations and abuses and violations of international humanitarian law resulting from the aggression against Ukraine by the Russian Federation;
- 16. <u>Underlines</u> that the Russian Federation's full-scale aggression against Ukraine has placed millions of civilians in existential danger and forced many to flee their homes and seek refuge in neighbouring countries;
- 17. <u>Stresses</u> the need to redouble efforts to fight all forms of conflict-related sexual violence and to address the issue of the impunity of the perpetrators of such crimes, as well as to enhance efforts to support victims;
- 18. <u>Acknowledges</u> that the conflict driven by the Russian Federation's unprovoked aggression hits the most vulnerable the hardest: children, women, older people and people with disabilities;
- 19. <u>Stresses</u> that the Russian Federation bears full responsibility under international human rights law and international humanitarian law for all actions taken by its armed forces, as well as by separatist forces under its control, during the occupation of Ukrainian territories;
- 20. <u>Urges</u> the OSCE and OSCE participating States to provide greater support for women and children who are subjected to forced displacement due to instability and conflict and who are at increased risk of violence and discrimination;
- 21. <u>Also strongly recommends</u> strengthening international support and protection for women refugees and displaced women in conflict settings;
- 22. <u>Calls on</u> the Russian Federation to immediately stop its human rights violations and abuses and violations of international humanitarian law in Ukraine and to cease the practices of forcible transfer and deportation of children from Ukraine to the temporarily occupied territories and the Russian Federation;
- 23. <u>Calls on</u> OSCE participating States to provide all necessary assistance, including logistical and financial support and know-how, to Ukraine to support its multi-agency efforts to collect and duly verify data on all children who have been forcibly transferred or deported from Ukraine to the temporarily occupied territories and the Russian Federation, as well as to support Ukraine's efforts to locate the children;

- 24. <u>Calls for</u> the immediate cessation of all forms of sexual violence against women and children, and <u>calls for</u> the effective prosecution of the perpetrators in compliance with international law;
- 25. <u>Calls on</u> the international community to ensure there is no impunity for all the international crimes committed in and against Ukraine, including for war crimes and the crime of aggression, and that perpetrators are prosecuted before the appropriate court;
- 26. <u>Calls on</u> the OSCE and OSCE participating States to substantially progress implementation of the Women, Peace and Security agenda, in particular by providing protection for forcibly displaced and refugee women and children and combating trafficking in human beings, as well as preventing and addressing conflict-related sexual violence.

# PENALIZING THE DEPORTATION OF UKRAINIAN CHILDREN, ENSURING THEIR RETURN, AND PROSECUTING THE PERPETRATORS

- 1. <u>Referring to</u> the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris for a New Europe (Paris Charter), particularly the commitment on the part of the signatory States to co-operate in defending democratic institutions against activities that violate the independence, sovereign equality or territorial integrity of the O<u>SCE</u> participating States,
- 2. <u>Recognizing</u> that the signatory States to the Helsinki Final Act and the Paris Charter, the concluding documents of the CSCE, pledged to respect and protect inalienable and indivisible human rights in their entirety,
- 3. <u>Aware</u> that the signatory States to the Charter for European Security (Istanbul Document) have committed to protecting the rights and interests of children in armed conflict and post-conflict situations, including refugees and internally displaced children,
- 4. <u>Noting</u> that the Russian Federation has been conducting a war of aggression against Ukraine since 24 February 2022, whereby the Russian Federation is grossly violating the Charter of the United Nations and the Paris Charter and failing to meet its obligations to uphold the international peace order that are concomitant with its status as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, a founding member of the CSCE, and an OSCE participating State,
- 5. <u>Utterly condemning</u> the numerous Russian war crimes, crimes against the civilian population (in Bucha, Irpin, Mariupol, etc.), attacks on energy supplies and other civil infrastructure, systematic violations of the Geneva Conventions, such as the execution and torture of prisoners of war and civilians, and sexual violence perpetrated by the Russian army and paramilitary groups commissioned by the Russian State,
- 6. <u>Profoundly concerned</u> about the deportation of an estimated 19,500 Ukrainian children to the Russian Federation for the purposes of re-education and forced adoption by Russian parents,
- 7. <u>Condemning</u> the far-reaching de facto support of the Russian Federation's aggression against Ukraine on the part of Belarus, particularly reports that some of the abductions of Ukrainian children have taken place through the territory of Belarus,
- 8. <u>Recognizing</u> that, in response to pressure from the international community and the tireless work of Ukrainian civil society, some children have been brought back to Ukraine and reunited with their families,
- 9. <u>Welcoming</u> the fact that the International Criminal Court, with the support of the international community, has launched investigations to secure and document evidence of violations of international humanitarian law as well as suspected cases of war crimes and crimes against humanity, with a view to condemning these crimes and bringing those responsible to justice,
- 10. <u>Expressly welcoming</u> the issue of arrest warrants against the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, and the Commissioner for Children's Rights, Maria Lvova-

Belova, who is considered chiefly responsible for carrying out the deportations and forced adoptions,

- 11. <u>Taking note</u> of the "Report on Violations and Abuses of International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law, War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, Related to the Forcible Transfer and/or Deportation of Ukrainian Children to the Russian Federation" produced within the framework of the OSCE Moscow Mechanism, the evidence of crimes against international humanitarian law on the part of the Russian Federation set out therein, and the recommendations for action to be taken by the Russian Federation, Ukraine and the international community,
- 12. <u>Recognizing</u> that the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine deployed by the United Nations Human Rights Council concluded that the deportation of children within Ukraine or to the Russian Federation violates international humanitarian law and constitutes a war crime,
- 13. <u>Aware</u> that the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe concluded in its Resolution 2495 (2023) that the deportation and forcible transfer of Ukrainian children to the Russian Federation or territories temporarily under Russian occupation, and the fact that the deported children are subjected to a "russification" process by means of re-education in Russian language, culture and history, corresponds to the international definition of genocide,
- 14. <u>Noting</u> that the Council of Europe summit in Reykjavik decided to establish a damage register for Ukraine as part of the international compensation mechanism for victims of Russian aggression,
- 15. <u>Mindful</u> that the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide specifies the forcible transfer of children as a defining criterion,
- 16. <u>Recognizing</u> that deporting Ukrainian children, forcing them to assume Russian citizenship and forcibly placing them in the families of citizens of the Russian Federation to be brought up constitutes a violation of the abducted Ukrainian children's right to preserve their identities as enshrined in Article 8 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child,

- 17. <u>Urges</u> the Russian Federation to stop the unprovoked illegal war of aggression against Ukraine without delay, withdraw the Russian armed forces and the paramilitary groups active in Ukraine from Ukrainian territory and re-establish the territorial integrity of Ukraine within the internationally recognized borders, respect the sovereignty of Ukraine and return all prisoners of war to the care of the Ukrainian authorities without delay;
- 18. <u>Calls on</u> Belarus not to support the Russian Federation's war of aggression against Ukraine and not to make its territory and infrastructure available to the Russian army and paramilitary groups acting on behalf of the Russian State;
- 19. <u>Calls on</u> the Russian Federation to stop the deportation of Ukrainian children from the occupied territories without delay and, in cases where unaccompanied children and adolescents need to be brought to a place of safety for justified reasons, to maintain

constant contact with their families and ensure that the evacuation occurs with their consent and that accommodating the children in Ukraine or in a safe place of their choice is always pursued as the preferred option;

- 20. <u>Calls on</u> the Russian Federation to guarantee the safe return of deported children to Ukraine without delay and hand over all abducted children to the safe care of the Ukrainian authorities so that they can return to their families as quickly as possible;
- 21. <u>Urges</u> the Russian Federation to stop immediately the adoption procedures currently under way in respect of Ukrainian children or children and adolescents who until recently had Ukrainian citizenship, and to provide the Ukrainian authorities, as well as the competent international humanitarian actors such as the international Red Cross and United Nations organizations, with lists of children already adopted, including their whereabouts, and to transparently communicate any changes of their names;
- 22. <u>Calls on</u> OSCE participating States to support Ukraine in creating specific mechanisms and solutions to advance the children's reunification with their families by, for example, identifying and registering children from Ukraine who are unaccompanied or have been separated from their parents, and facilitating the search for family members and family reunification;
- 23. <u>Recommends</u>, to that end, creating a mechanism under the leadership of the OSCE to support the NGOs and families working to return children from the Russian Federation to Ukraine, particularly by securing their safe and unbureaucratic entry into and departure from the Russian Federation to fetch the children;
- 24. <u>Calls on</u> the Russian Federation to stop immediately the current practice of accelerated granting of Russian citizenship to Ukrainians, particularly to children;
- 25. <u>Calls on</u> the Russian Federation to end the so-called "patriotic education" of children forcibly transferred or deported from Ukraine to the temporarily occupied territories and to the Russian Federation, and to respect those children's rights, including their right to speak Ukrainian, practise their own religion, and develop their own identities, in line with their true and genuine personal, legal and family roots;
- 26. <u>Calls on</u> the Government of Belarus to prohibit the abduction of Ukrainian children through Belarusian territory and to return all Ukrainian children currently in Belarus to the Ukrainian authorities without delay;
- 27. <u>Calls on OSCE participating States to resolutely and consistently denounce these crimes</u> by the Russian Federation;
- 28. <u>Recommends</u> that the OSCE participating States that are Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court take all conceivable steps to fulfil their obligations and execute the arrest warrants already issued by the International Criminal Court and support the criminal prosecution and conviction of all other responsible parties;
- 29. <u>Calls on</u> OSCE participating States to actively support the work of the International Criminal Court to document evidence of suspected crimes against humanity, war crimes and violations of international humanitarian law;

30. <u>Emphatically underlines</u> that the goals and obligations of the Paris Charter remain in place and that the values and principles set forth in the Charter and international human rights treaties must guide the political action of all OSCE participating States.

# THE ROLE OF NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS IN ENHANCING PARTICIPATION OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN PARLIAMENTARY AND DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES

- 1. <u>Acknowledging</u> the contribution of civil society in promoting peace, democracy and, ultimately, security at the national, regional and global levels,
- 2. <u>Reaffirming</u> the vital role that civil society organizations play in promoting the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms, including civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, and representative governance that practises meaningful inclusion and gender equality,
- 3. <u>Aware of the need to further strengthen trust in and credibility of democratic institutions, and recognizing that widening the opportunities for civil society participation in decision-making processes is necessary to achieve that aim,</u>
- 4. <u>Noting</u> that national parliaments of OSCE participating States must strive to promote participatory democracy, including by promoting open, transparent, representative, inclusive and gender-sensitive decision-making processes,
- 5. <u>Underlining</u> that national parliaments of OSCE participating States have a critical role in guaranteeing, protecting and promoting the participation of civil society in parliamentary and decision-making processes, particularly through their legislative, oversight and representation powers,
- 6. <u>Recognizing</u> that effective civil society participation in decision-making processes improves the quality, gender sensitivity and overall inclusiveness of policy and legislative decisions and enhances the potential for their successful implementation,
- 7. <u>Noting</u> that the term "civil society" covers a wide range of independent stakeholders, including non-governmental organizations, human rights and environmental defenders and academia, working to improve and advance different matters of public interest,
- 8. <u>Recognizing</u> that civil society plays a central role in ensuring that the interests and needs of historically under-represented groups, including, but not limited to, women, persons with disabilities, young people and national minorities, are represented in decision-making processes, especially in cases where national parliaments are not fully representative of the diversity of society,
- 9. <u>Emphasizing</u> that civil society can engage in parliamentary and other political decisionmaking processes by advocating for legal reforms, including by initiating or sending petitions to relevant legislative or executive bodies, by appearing before such bodies to provide information and evidence, by participating directly in the legislative drafting process, by submitting input during public consultations, etc.,
- 10. <u>Recalling</u> that OSCE participating States have committed to the aim of "strengthening modalities for contacts and exchanges of views between NGOs and relevant national authorities and governmental institutions" (Document of the Moscow Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE, 1991, para. 43.1), and that legislation will be adopted "as the result of an open process reflecting the will of the people, either

directly or through their elected representatives" and "at the end of a public procedure" (Document of the Meeting, 1991, para. 18.1 and Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE, 1990, para. 5.8),

- 11. <u>Recalling</u> that OSCE participating States have also specifically committed to "secure environments and institutions for peaceful debate and expression of interests by all individuals and groups of society" (OSCE Strategy to Address Threats to Security and Stability in the Twenty-first Century, Maastricht, 2003, para. 36) and to ensure equal opportunities for the effective participation in political and public life of women (2004 OSCE Action Plan for the Promotion of Gender Equality, Annex, para. 44(d)), persons belonging to national minorities (Report of the CSCE Meeting of Experts on National Minorities, Geneva, 1991), Roma and Sinti, especially Roma and Sinti women (OSCE Strategy, Maastricht, 2003, para. 88, and OSCE Ministerial Council Decision No. 4/13, para. 4.2) and persons with disabilities (Document of the Moscow Meeting, 1991, para. 41),
- 12. <u>Having regard</u> for the Joint OSCE/ODIHR and Venice Commission Guidelines on Freedom of Association (2014), the OSCE/ODIHR Guidelines on the Protection of Human Rights Defenders (2014) and the forthcoming OSCE/ODIHR Guidelines on Democratic Law-making and Better Laws,
- 13. <u>Noting</u> the distinct role that the OSCE PA also has in supporting civil society,
- 14. <u>Also noting</u> that the right to participation in parliamentary and decision-making processes implies the right to express criticism and submit proposals to improve legislation and must include critical voices and dissenting views,
- 15. <u>Highlighting</u> that minority, disadvantaged, vulnerable or marginalized persons or groups and those with specific needs also have the right to participate in parliamentary and decision-making processes on an equal basis,
- 16. <u>Underlining</u> that civil society representatives can be included not only in the law-making (development and review of legislation) process but also in the monitoring, evaluation and oversight processes in national parliaments,
- 17. <u>Condemning</u> the establishment of administrative and legal obstructions and the realization of attacks against or harassment or smearing of civil society organizations or their members, as factors that are contributing to the shrinking of civic space in OSCE participating States,

- 18. <u>Recommends</u> that national parliaments commit to making genuine efforts to create and maintain a truly enabling environment for civil society by establishing a supportive legislative framework for public participation by:
  - a. guaranteeing in legislation and in practice freedom of association, freedom of peaceful assembly, freedom of expression and freedom of information, as well as the freedom, independence and pluralism of the media;

- b. guaranteeing to individuals and civil society organizations the right of access to information, including a general right to request and receive information, in line with international standards;
- c. guaranteeing access to information except in the case of information that is classified for reasons clearly specified by law or where access is restricted for reasons of data protection in line with relevant international obligations;
- d. guaranteeing that requirements concerning the registration or legal status of civil society organizations are in line with relevant international standards and not overly restrictive;
- e. guaranteeing that access by civil society to financial resources, including foreign and international resources is subject only to limitations that are in accordance with relevant international standards, and that the receipt of foreign or international funding alone is not grounds for additional scrutiny of civil society;
- f. guaranteeing access to draft legislation and related background information in a timely manner, and encouraging public participation mechanisms and meetings to include open and online consultation processes and online access to related information and documents;
- g. ensuring a clear and reasonable minimum timeline for public participation and consultation that will involve civil society representatives as early as possible in the process and provide them with sufficient time to prepare, discuss and submit recommendations on draft legislative acts;
- h. ensuring that any limitations or restrictions of civil society participation in the lawmaking process are clearly defined and in line with relevant international standards;
- i. guaranteeing access by all associations and individuals to regional and international human rights mechanisms, and the ability to freely co-operate and communicate with such mechanisms without fear of reprisals;
- j. introducing civic education in formal education systems that will specifically address issues related to participation in public affairs;
- k. ensuring that civil society organizations have access to trials in order to monitor public interest-related cases;
- 19. <u>Further recommends</u> that national parliaments commit to creating and promoting a truly enabling environment for civil society engagement, including contributions to public debates, in national parliaments' legislative and oversight functions by:
  - a. ensuring involvement of civil society in processes of consultation on draft policies or draft legislation;
  - b. recognizing and respecting the vital role of civil society by actively encouraging participation in parliamentary processes, including hearings, consultations and committee meetings;

- c. promoting open communication and engagement in constructive dialogue between parliaments and civil society;
- d. ensuring that civil society input and feedback are taken into account and responding to their requests for engagement and participation;
- e. respecting the autonomy and independence of civil society organizations and protecting their rights;
- f. empowering and supporting civil society in its efforts to meaningfully contribute to policymaking and lawmaking processes, beginning at the earliest stages, including by providing the necessary tools, technical assistance and resources;
- g. ensuring that the views and concerns of civil society are taken into account in policymaking and lawmaking, while reporting back to civil society on the outcomes of engagement and taking action to address any concerns;
- h. committing to make parliamentary engagement with civil society inclusive, including by actively seeking the input of marginalized and under-represented groups;
- i. ensuring that everyone, regardless of background or circumstance, can access the necessary information and resources to engage with parliament;
- j. taking steps to ensure that civil society can hold parliamentarians and the parliament itself accountable, including by establishing independent oversight mechanisms and enabling civil society to participate in monitoring and review processes;
- k. ensuring that organizers of public consultations are impartial in choosing participating civil society representatives and that public decision-making processes are also opened to smaller civil society groups;
- 1. ensuring that, where expert working groups are formed, publicly known selection criteria and requirements in terms of competence and expertise are applied to civil society representatives;
- m. ensuring that a perceived lack of capacity of civil society organizations is not used as an excuse for not opening public decision-making or consultation processes to them and, in the case of disabled persons' organizations, that all necessary arrangements will be made so as to ensure their participation on an equal basis with others;
- n. overseeing the responsiveness of executive authorities to requests made by civil society for additional information relevant to their work;
- o. ensuring that executive authorities have timely feedback mechanisms on the outcome of public consultations with civil society, particularly information giving reasons for any decisions finally taken;
- p. establishing a system of monitoring and reporting on compliance with binding standards on public participation in decision-making processes by designated independent bodies (such as national human rights institutions, information commissioners and relevant parliamentary committees) with the participation of civil society organizations;

- q. ensuring that all comments received from civil society representatives in parliamentary law-making or oversight processes are made public and that sufficient opportunities for feedback are provided;
- r. actively scrutinizing allegations by civil society representatives of attacks, harassment, smears and intimidation, and the measures taken by competent authorities to counter such incidents;
- s. actively scrutinizing possible harassment in the form of legal action or a threat of such action against civil society representatives;
- t. requesting the OSCE Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) to carry out a review of the legal framework for public participation in their respective countries in order to assess its compliance with OSCE human dimension commitments, or of the legislative process more generally, and also covering aspects related to civil society participation in lawmaking in order to provide concrete recommendations for improvements;
- 20. <u>Recommends</u> that the OSCE PA in partnership with ODIHR, considers evaluating the participation of civil society in parliamentary and other political decision-making processes in national parliaments and continues to monitor implementation of assumed commitments;
- 21. <u>Recommends</u> that OSCE participating States share and promote good practices in involving civil society in general in parliamentary and other political decision-making processes;
- 22. <u>Pledges</u> that the OSCE PA should in principle maintain an open, transparent, inclusive and meaningful regular dialogue with civil society and invite representatives of civil society as speakers in statutory meetings;
- 23. <u>Encourages</u> rapporteurs of OSCE PA general committees to discuss their draft reports and resolutions with civil society representatives before presenting them to their Members;
- 24. <u>Recommends</u> that national parliaments should continue to draw on ODIHR's support in promoting gender equality in politics and advancing the representation of historically under-represented groups, including, but not limited to, persons with disabilities, youth and national minorities, with the view to informing the work of the parliament around its three core functions;
- 25. <u>Asks</u> the OSCE PA Special Representative on Civil Society Engagement to co-operate with ODIHR to prepare a set of guidelines to assist national parliaments in engaging civil society in parliamentary work.