




# International developments in cannabis policy for recreational use

## Summary

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EUROPE



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# Summary

The Controlled Cannabis Supply Chain Experiment was launched in the Netherlands in 2024. This experiment examines the feasibility and possible effects of regulating a closed quality-controlled cannabis supply chain in ten Dutch municipalities. The idea is that the results of the experiment will help determine the future of cannabis policy in the Netherlands. With the start of this experiment, a new chapter seems to have been added to Dutch cannabis policy. For decades, the Netherlands had a unique position internationally because of its 'tolerance policy' that made the sale and use of cannabis possible under certain conditions. However, at present, several countries have legalised cannabis and more countries are planning on doing so.

Although the Netherlands still has a unique position in Europe with its coffeeshops and tolerance policy, it does not operate in a vacuum. Experiences abroad with law and policy changes regarding cannabis can provide relevant and interesting insights and points of interest for the Netherlands. This study seeks to highlight these.

In the first part of this study, we aimed to obtain a clear overview of all international cannabis policy developments since 2010. We focused on (planned or implemented) changes in cannabis laws of jurisdictions that have or are about to change policies around recreational cannabis, including lifting the ban on cultivation, sale and use of cannabis, or legalisation of the recreational cannabis

market. This involved desk research and seven interviews with international experts from academia and international organisations which are involved in cannabis policy. This study excluded developments regarding cannabis for medical use.

In the second part of the study, we conducted an in-depth analysis of cannabis policies in the following selected countries or sub-national jurisdictions: Vermont (United States, US), California (US), Quebec (Canada), Uruguay, Germany and Switzerland. Special attention was paid to: 1) the explicit or implicit goals of the policy changes; 2) the legal and policy frameworks of cannabis policy; 3) the actors involved in cannabis policy and their cooperation; 4) the enforcement and monitoring of cannabis policy; and 5) the effects of cannabis policy on public order, crime, public health and possible side effects. Document analysis and interviews with twenty stakeholders and experts were used for this case study research. Systematic searches of the scientific literature were conducted for the analysis of effects of cannabis policy changes.

Finally, we identified insights from cannabis policy changes in other countries which may be relevant for current and future cannabis policy in the Netherlands.

Below, we answer the research questions for this study. In doing so, we use the insights gained from the collection of international developments (Part I), the in-depth case studies (Part II) and translate these into relevant insights for the Netherlands (Part III).



## **PART I: What relevant international developments in cannabis policy for recreational use have occurred since 2010?**

Since 2010, there have been several policy developments related to the supply of cannabis for recreational use in Uruguay, Canada, Australia, Germany, Luxembourg, Malta and the US.

### **a. What did the relevant jurisdiction's cannabis policy look like before and after the 'relevant development'?**

Although there have been previous international policy changes regarding medicinal cannabis and decriminalised cannabis possession, Colorado and Washington in the US were the first jurisdictions to legalise the cultivation and distribution of cannabis for non-medicinal purposes in 2012. Several other US states followed, implementing cannabis legalisation in the years after. Uruguay was the first country to legalise cannabis at the national level in 2013. Canada followed in 2018 with legislation at the federal level, giving provinces and other territories considerable autonomy in the formulation of cannabis policy, resulting in considerable variation between provinces (e.g. in terms of minimum age to purchase cannabis, permitted purchase quantities and supply models).

There have also been developments outside the Americas. In 2021, Malta became the first European Union Member State to legalise limited cultivation and distribution of cannabis. Maltese legislation legalised home cultivation and non-profit cannabis clubs. Luxembourg followed in 2023, also legalising home cultivation, while they announced future plans for cannabis clubs. In Germany, a new cannabis law was implemented in 2024, allowing adults to possess and grow cannabis for personal use, and non-commercial

associations (cannabis clubs). Commercial sale of cannabis remains prohibited in these European countries.

Besides federal, national, provincial or statewide policy changes and developments, there are also examples of local legislation at the district level. On 31 January 2020, new rules in the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) came into force that allowed personal use, possession, and home cultivation of cannabis in the district of the capital Canberra.

### **b. Which links in the supply chain were regulated or legalised and under what framework conditions did this happen?**

In this study, we focused on cannabis policy concerning the supply side (production, distribution and sales) of the cannabis market. Changes decriminalising possession or consumption were excluded.

Several supply models have been introduced to date. So far, the models introduced in Europe (Germany, Malta and Luxembourg) allow small-scale cultivation at home or in cannabis clubs, vertically integrating the steps of production and distribution in the logistics chain. Home cultivation is subject to restrictions on the number of (adult) plants per adult or per household. Almost all jurisdictions stipulate that home-grown cannabis is for personal use only, meaning it is not allowed to subsequently share, distribute or sell the homegrown cannabis products. Home cultivation is also legalised in Uruguay, South Africa, most Canadian provinces and territories and the vast majority of US states. Cannabis clubs are also subject to restrictions, for example, on the maximum number of members or sales volumes.

Some jurisdictions also allow the sale of cannabis to consumers. This separates the vertical links of production, distribution and sales in the logistics chain. Pharmacies in Uruguay, for example, are exploited by private

entrepreneurs but operate in a highly regulated environment. Most Canadian provinces and US states have a model where private companies, such as growers and retail outlets (shops), can pursue profits. In Canada, a few provinces and territories have adopted a government monopoly model to limit the commercial dynamics of the sector. The Canadian province of Quebec, for example, has a regulatory model, where the *Société Québécoise du Cannabis* (SQDC) is the only authorised cannabis distributor and seller. Retail sales of cannabis are also subject to certain restrictions, including on age, Tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) levels, sales volumes and advertising.

Most jurisdictions regulate more than one supply model. Uruguay combines home cultivation, cannabis clubs and dispensary sales, for example. Most Canadian provinces and US states allow both home cultivation and retail sales.

### **c. What were the main reasons explicitly stated in the legislation for adapting cannabis policy?**

The objectives of these policies are not always explicitly stated in the legal texts. When they are, we see that the European countries, as well as Canada and Uruguay, mainly focus on reducing societal harm and health risks. In addition, in Uruguay for example, cannabis legislation explicitly aimed to protect residents from the risks and dangers associated with illicit trafficking and drug smuggling.

In the absence of federal legislation, the described objectives of cannabis policy changes in US states are characterised by great heterogeneity. Given the significant historical impact of cannabis-related crime there, relieving the burden of law enforcement and the penal system has been a key driver for change. Increasing individual freedoms is also mentioned in several states. Finally, the

possibility of generating state revenue through taxation is stated as an explicit objective.

### **d. Are analyses assessing the relationship of the relevant cannabis policy adjustment to international treaties, available?**

We found some legal analyses assessing the relationship between cannabis policy adjustments and United Nations (UN) treaties. In general, such adjustments are considered incompatible with these treaties. Authors argue that amending the international treaties is the only option to completely avoid conflicting policies. The only possibility within current international treaties, according to the authors, is to present cannabis legalisation as a means to protect or enhance human rights. They argue that UN legal frameworks for human rights and drugs are part of the same legal system and that human rights should take priority over drug legislation. To our knowledge, these views have not yet been tried in cannabis policymaking. At the same time, inconsistency with international conventions regularly dominates policy discussions and is used as an argument against relaxing cannabis legislation.

### **e. What statements has the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) made on the adjustment of cannabis policy?**

The INCB enforces the international drug conventions of the UN. The developments in international cannabis policy described above have not gone unnoticed by them. Since 2012, annual INCB-reports mention the following countries which were also identified in the first phase of our research: Australia, Canada, Luxembourg, Malta, Switzerland, Uruguay and the US. The INCB stresses in their reports that allowing cannabis for non-medical purposes is not in line with legal obligations.

Despite its mandate, the INCB appears to deploy official missions on rare occasions. So far, this has happened twice in the context of

non-medical cannabis: to Uruguay in 2015 and to Canada in 2016. In general, the INCB seems to opt for dialogue, exchanging information on specific legislations and the potential consequences. These dialogues are not public, and therefore, we have no information on their content.

#### **f. Does the INCB get informed about the effects of the cannabis policy adjustment? If so, how?**

Countries are required to submit certain information to the INCB, such as relevant legislative and regulatory texts and significant trends in the use and trafficking of illicit drugs. However, there are no obligations in the conventions to provide specific analyses of the effects of drug policy adjustment. We have not found to what extent countries share such information.

#### **g. To what extent were/are the (side) effects of cannabis policy on public order, crime and public health monitored and evaluated? And to what extent is evaluation and monitoring anchored in legislation?**

A relatively large amount of research has been conducted on the effects of legalisation in North and Latin America, with the majority coming from the US. No evidence has been found that evaluations are legally required. The same applies to Luxembourg, Uruguay, and Malta.

In Canada and Germany, on the other hand, evaluation is indeed embedded in federal legislation. A Canadian "*Cannabis Act legislative review*" was published in 2024 and focused specifically on public health impacts, consumption patterns and the effect on indigenous communities. German legislation requires several evaluations: one specifically focused on the impact on young people after one year of the policy adjustment;

an interim evaluation after two years; and a comprehensive evaluation after four years.

## **PART II: What insights do cannabis policies in a selection of countries relevant to the Netherlands offer?**

In part II of the study, we discuss the findings from six case studies that were selected because of their relevance to the Netherlands: Vermont (US), California (US), Quebec (Canada), Germany and Switzerland. In the summary we only highlight the insights that these case studies generated for the Netherlands. In the full report, a full description of each case study can be found.

#### **a. What were/are the main reasons for adjusting the cannabis policy?**

There is considerable variation in both the principles of standing policy and the motivations behind recent policy changes. For example, California listed twenty-seven explicit targets, while Uruguay has three targets set by law.

#### **Formal objectives tend to focus on health and safety**

All the analysed jurisdictions have included public health and safety objectives. Protecting consumers and youth or young adults drives cannabis legalisation in several jurisdictions. For instance, governments in Uruguay, Quebec and Germany are trying to get a better grip on access to cannabis by offering a legal and quality-controlled alternative, while also limiting quantities, minimum age, THC levels and the commercialisation of the market. In addition, jurisdictions explicitly focus on enhancing public safety and reducing illegal drug markets by offering cannabis consumers an alternative to illegal providers.

### **Implicit objectives usually follow from the national or regional context**

We found a range of implicit objectives in the case studies, many of which depend on the national or sub-national context. In US states where cannabis has been legalised through a *ballot initiative* - a type of referendum - for example. This was mostly driven by the industry, consumer representatives and civil rights organisations. In California, legitimising the local context of an already existing medical cannabis industry was a key underlying goal of the law. In addition, reducing the disproportionate impact of the criminalisation and law enforcement within certain communities was a priority in both Vermont and California. Opportunities for revenue generation through taxation have also motivated support for cannabis legalisation.

### **The importance of a measured cannabis policy that takes into account different target groups**

We found that objectives sometimes conflicted with each other. The case studies, therefore, highlight the need for a balanced cannabis policy. When both reducing the illegal market and protecting (public) health are paramount, a balance must be found regarding the appeal of the legal market, which aims to attract consumers from illegal market, while also preventing risky use by new groups. Adding restrictions after implementation appeared to be more difficult than slowly relaxing restrictions in this context.

The case studies show that when shaping future cannabis policy, it is useful to keep different target groups in mind, on both the supply and demand sides. On the supply side, the supply model plays an important role in determining what type of actors will be involved in the cannabis market. Policymakers in Quebec, for example, limited commercial influences of the cannabis industry by

implementing a government monopoly on cannabis sales. In Vermont, the regulated market is deliberately kept accessible in order to involve small scale growers in the legal market, also with the goal to limit the role of large commercial industry.

On the demand side, the case studies show that the different models of cannabis regulation are used to target certain user groups, as home cultivation or cannabis clubs serve different types of cannabis consumers than a retail model. In Uruguay, for example, different consumer profiles are served through regulating different supply models (home cultivation, cannabis clubs and sales in dispensaries). In Switzerland, experiments with different supply models aimed at different user profiles are performed to determine what models work best for whom.

### **b. How are the policy changes established in legal and policy frameworks?**

#### **The benefits of a phased introduction of regulated cannabis**

The pace in which cannabis policies came about can vary. Many of the US states where cannabis has been legalised have done so through a ballot initiative. Legislators in such processes are then faced with a *fait accompli*, leaving limited time and opportunity for thorough preparation of the policy, compared to other legislative processes. Several case studies show that a phased introduction and implementation of a regulated cannabis model can be beneficial. This way, a full comprehensive model can be built up gradually, while adjusting aspects of the policy as the implementation evolves. In Vermont, for example, home cultivation was first allowed in 2018, before retail was also regulated in 2020. Canada gradually allowed more cannabis products after the initial legalisation of cannabis. European countries as Germany,

Luxembourg and Malta chose to initially allow only home cultivation and cannabis clubs, with the clubs being introduced gradually. This can provide more time to put systems of control into place, for example.

### Cannabis regulation and international treaties

Legalising the cannabis market is considered incompatible with international treaties by the INCB. In some case studies, policymakers have considered how to relate to these treaties. For example, by including reasons in policies that can justify the changed cannabis policy and by informing bodies that monitor the treaties (e.g. the INCB). On the other hand, Switzerland, like the Netherlands, uses the space offered by the treaties with regard to scientific research. Switzerland opts for a long-term path with small-scale scientific experiments, the results of which will be used to shape cannabis policy over time.

### The importance of a tailored approach at the local level

The case studies show that cannabis policy is not only a national issue, but that much of the implementation and responsibility ends up with local governments such as provinces, cities and municipalities. By providing room for tailored approaches, compromises can be made with local governments, who can then set their own accents in policy implementation. In the Netherlands, a tailored approach at the local level regarding coffeeshop policy is already present. While this helps local implementation and increases the support base, there are also risks that differences between municipalities become too large and lead to displacement effects, enforcement problems or legal inequality.

### c. Which parties were involved in the introduction, implementation and execution of the policy change and how was the cooperation between involved parties designed?

In Canada, Uruguay and the European countries, the government has taken an important directing role in both the preliminary process and the implementation and execution of policy changes. In Quebec, the main legislative role lay with the federal government that initiated the legalisation, while the provincial government and the Ministry of Health in particular had the main executive role in implementation. In Uruguay, the Minister of Defence played a central role, seeing cannabis legalisation as a tool in the fight against organised crime. In Germany, cannabis legalisation resulted from coalition negotiations between three political parties forming the government. The Ministry of Health was then given the responsibility to draft the bill.

### Stakeholder consultation and compromise

The case studies show that there has been effort to bring different parties and stakeholders together to form the policy and supply models. In Uruguay, the government was initially not in favour of implementing home cultivation and cannabis clubs. Yet, eventually agreed to do so, as a pragmatic compromise meeting various social movements and activists, who in turn agreed to user registration. In Switzerland, opposing parties agreed on the notion that more evidence needed to be collected to draw conclusions about which approach to the cannabis market would protect public health and minimise social harm. This gave room to explore different models before making final decisions.

It is clear that consultation and political or publicly organised discussions contribute to a supported policy in which compromises and (partial) consensus can be reached with different objectives. The case studies show



examples of compromises and why it is important to include parties early in the policy-making process. This can be about policy goals, but also about supply models or other conditions that can be included in a new law.

### Several jurisdictions have consolidated responsibilities at a central “cannabis agency”

Although a variety of actors are involved in the implementation of cannabis policy in the case studies, all six jurisdictions have established or planned agencies with whom key responsibilities for implementation, oversight or execution are centrally consolidated. These include the *Cannabis Control Board* (CCB) in Vermont, the *Department of Cannabis Control* (DCC) in California, the *Instituto de Regulación y Control del Cannabis* (IRCCA) in Uruguay and the *Société Québécoise Du Cannabis* (SQDC) in Quebec. In Switzerland, it is the Ministry of Health’s *Office Fédéral de la Santé Publique* (FOPH) that oversees the approval and roll-out of experiments, with implementation resting with the initiators of the local experiment. These bodies specialise in cannabis policy and consolidate various policy, monitoring and enforcement domains that in many other cases are vested in different agencies.

#### d. Which parties are responsible for enforcement and monitoring and how is this organised?

The central government agencies mentioned above also have an important enforcement and monitoring role in most cases. Where private parties, such as growers and retail businesses, are licensed to operate in the cannabis market, these cannabis agencies, such as California’s DCC or Uruguay’s IRCCA, have the responsibility of monitoring and enforcing these licences. The DCC regulates the growing, producing, transporting, tracing, selling, packaging and labelling of non-medical

and medical cannabis in California. In Vermont, several enforcement aspects are delegated by the CCB to specialised agencies. For example, the *Department of Financial Regulations* is involved in enforcement of financial matters at cannabis businesses and the *Vermont Department of Liquor and Lottery* monitors possible criminal activities of these businesses. In Quebec, the SQDC, a government organisation with the monopoly for cultivation, distribution and sale of cannabis, is controlled by the Ministry of Health and Social Services (*Santé et Services Sociaux*). Laws for illegal trafficking, possession and consumption by citizens are usually enforced by the police. For example, the provincial police in Quebec enforces cannabis possession and street trafficking, while the *Royal Canadian Mounted Police* enforces large-scale export, border control and organised crime.

#### e. What is known from scientific studies of sufficient quality about possible (side) effects on public order, crime and public health and other relevant outcomes?

For each of the case studies reviewed, the available scientific literature on the effects and possible side effects of the policy changes was collected. As legislation has only been introduced very recently in **Germany** and **Switzerland** no studies on effects there have yet been published.

A relatively large body of scientific literature is available in **California** on the effects of cannabis legalisation. Regarding the effects on prevalence and frequency of substance use, these studies generally find that monthly prevalence of cannabis showed a statistically significant increase after legalisation among both adults and young adults. Furthermore, both alcohol use and the combined use of cannabis and alcohol by adolescents in the past 30 days increased with the increasing availability of legal cannabis in California.

Other studies saw that proximity to cannabis retail outlets was correlated with statistically significant increases in cannabis use. The introduction of a legal market for recreational cannabis was also associated with an increase in the frequency of cannabis use in California. Several studies also showed that consumers viewed cannabis as less harmful after legalisation than before. There are no known studies on the effects of changed recreational cannabis policies on crime or the illicit market.

In **Vermont**, cannabis was legalised in 2018 and a regulated retail model was introduced in 2020. Only one study analysing the effects of regulation was found, focusing on awareness of current laws among young adults. The study found that around 60% of young adults had accurate knowledge of current cannabis policy in Vermont. Young adults who used cannabis regularly or recently generally had better knowledge in this area.

In **Quebec**, the available research mainly focuses on the shift from the illegal to the legal market. Thus, as in the rest of Canada, both the proportion of cannabis consumers buying from legal sources (versus illegal sources) and the number of cannabis shops increased significantly after legalisation. In addition, Quebec's relatively strict policies on cannabis shops - such as, for instance, restrictions on available products and product types - appear to have led to fewer unwanted effects compared to other Canadian provinces. For example, research shows comparatively fewer cannabis-related intoxications among children.

In **Uruguay**, available research focuses mainly on prevalence of cannabis use among secondary school pupils and road safety. These studies found no significant effect of cannabis regulation on use, beyond a temporary increase in 2014. In terms of road safety, positive associations were found between the number of people registered as home growers and road accidents, although

no causal mechanisms could be identified to explain this finding. Research also showed that cannabis consumers were gradually moving to the legal market, although illegal and 'grey' sources of cannabis (produced legally but distributed illegally) were still present.

#### **f. What are the similarities and differences with regard to Dutch cannabis policy?**

As the context, history and situation in the countries in question is incomparable to the Netherlands, we have not conducted a systematic comparison between the case studies and the Netherlands. Instead, we have considered which elements from the case studies provide insights that may be relevant for Dutch cannabis policy. The points of interest for the Netherlands are summarised below.

### **PART III: What possible recommendations does answering the previous questions yield for current and future Dutch cannabis policy?**

In Part III, we have formulated 25 recommendations for current or future cannabis policy in the Netherlands. These recommendations emerged from the insights gathered in Part II and from two validation workshops held with thirteen academic experts and policymakers and representatives of public agencies involved in cannabis policy in the Netherlands. During these sessions, the insights from the case studies were discussed in light of the Dutch context, with a focus on assessing the transferability of these insights.

The insights and points of interest we formulate for Dutch cannabis policy in this report require some clarifying comments. We do not make any recommendations on which direction the Dutch cannabis policy should

move, for instance, on *whether* the Netherlands should introduce a stricter or more lenient cannabis policy. Based on this study, we do make recommendations to policymakers on *how to* arrive at a policy - informed by science - by weighing important points of

concern. Because our search into international developments in cannabis law and policy since 2010 only yielded policy changes that legalised cannabis cultivation, distribution and sales, our findings and insights are mainly aimed at how to legally regulate cannabis.

**Table 0.2. Insights and recommendations**

Policy theory, objectives and target groups	
1	<p>Develop a coherent and research-informed policy theory with objectives, measures and intended outcomes:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• With at least goals aimed at public health (such as reducing harm from cannabis use) and public safety (such as cannabis-related crime);</li> <li>• Formulate activities (inputs), processes, results and outcomes;</li> <li>• Develop performance indicators;</li> <li>• Make a balanced consideration of different goals that may conflict with each other.</li> </ul>
2	<p>Formulate goals focused on the specific context of the Netherlands, for example regarding what to do with:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The already existing coffeeshops and the unregulated backdoor with illegal growers;</li> <li>• Organised crime and their role in the international cannabis market;</li> <li>• Wishes, needs and characteristics of current cannabis consumers (including target groups that do not buy their cannabis in coffeeshops);</li> <li>• Criminalised home cultivation (sometimes tolerated, up to five plants).</li> </ul>
3	<p>Make it clear how and when cannabis policy should be evaluated and for what purpose, specify for example:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The scope, purpose and (side) effects to be evaluated;</li> <li>• The type of evaluation (impact evaluation or process evaluation);</li> <li>• The evaluation criteria, such as effectiveness, relevance, coherence, efficiency, impact and sustainability;</li> </ul>
4	<p>Ensure that necessary monitoring systems are or will be equipped to measure policy indicators.</p>
5	<p>In the case studies, several specific goals emerged that are (largely) missing from the current Dutch cannabis policy framework. The following objectives could also be considered in the Netherlands when developing a possible new cannabis policy:</p> <p>social justice and the disproportionate impact of criminalisation of cannabis on vulnerable target groups;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Environmental protection in cannabis cultivation;</li> <li>• Goals regarding responsibilities of enforcement and the criminal justice system in cannabis-related offences, considering what to do with those already convicted;</li> <li>• Contain the illicit cannabis market, e.g. by competing with a regulated market through supply and pricing policies; and/or</li> <li>• The desired or undesired level of commercialisation (and its scale) of a regulated supply of cannabis, which may include consideration of non-commercial models and weighing the pros and cons of allowing other cannabis products such as <i>edibles</i>.</li> </ul>

### Legal and policy frameworks

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|---|--|
| 6 | It is important to be open about proposed policy changes towards regulatory bodies (such as the European Commission and INCB) and inform them about developments in cannabis policy.   |
| 7 | It is important to form a solid foundation for a future cannabis policy to show international parties how the Netherlands accounts for its cannabis policy. The current experiment model with the Controlled Cannabis Supply Chain Experiment and its evaluation is in line with this.                                 |
| 8 | Provide room for a tailored approach at the local level by consulting and empowering local governments to set their own emphases in cannabis policy that best fit the local context. Keep in mind the risks of having too much variation between regions, which can lead to displacement effects and legal inequality. |
| 9 | Provide adequate financial support to local governments so that they can make investments to implement new cannabis policies.  |

### Stakeholders and responsibilities

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|----|--|
| 10 | Facilitate and allow sufficient time for the decision-making process and subsequent legislative process, seeking consensus and compromise on new cannabis policies. Formulating shared goals such as protecting public health and minimising societal harm can help.                         |
| 11 | Bring together different types of stakeholders to gather as many relevant concerns for new policies as possible. In doing so, invest precisely in involving parties who are not in favour of the relevant policy changes to include their concerns (and possible implementation challenges). |
| 12 | Even after the policy has been changed, continue dialogues, monitor developments and impacts on different groups and consider adjustments or additions needed for greater support.   |
| 13 | Explore the desirability and potential for establishing a central body with whom responsibilities for coordination, licensing and enforcement can be placed.   |

### Policymaking, implementation and enforcement

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|----|--|
| 14 | Take enough time for the implementation process, thereby also giving enforcement and supervisory agencies time to analyse new regulations and get the right systems in place.  |
| 15 | Provide the opportunity to make adjustments and expansions along the way aimed at achieving the policy objectives.   |
| 16 | Consider phased implementation, where adjustments can be made based on insights from scientific research and policy evaluations.   |
| 17 | Consider restrictive regulations that can be gradually relaxed if desired or needed.   |
| 18 | Seek balance in making a regulated cannabis market accessible to vendors and producers: conditions and access requirements are desirable but must be achievable.   |
| 19 | Consider which target groups are envisaged to have a role in accessing the supply side of the cannabis market and link this to objectives. For example, allowing either large or small providers, or <i>legacy</i> growers, may affect the level of commercialisation or social justice. |



20	Examine the pros and cons of the current system with regulated <i>for-profit</i> coffeeshops and consider how it could possibly be steered in a desired direction (e.g. with regard to high-risk consumption).
21	Find a balance between a legal offer that is attractive enough to compete with the black market and one that is not too attractive to young people and vulnerable target groups.
22	Explore the possibility of funding prevention structurally.

### Evidence on effects

23	Ensure that scientific research is linked to policy goals in order to evaluate the effects of cannabis policy. Also consider a baseline measurement that maps out the situation before the policy change.
24	Consider a wide range of domains and outcome measures to capture both intended and unintended effects.
25	Encourage and facilitate international scientific research in areas that are still understudied, such as the effects of amended cannabis policies on the activities of criminal groups.