



NATO PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY

# POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

## ADOPTED IN 2024

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## STANDING WITH UKRAINE UNTIL VICTORY DECLARATION 489\*

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The Assembly,

1. **Reiterating** its unequivocal condemnation, in the strongest possible terms, of Russia's ongoing war of aggression against Ukraine as well as its missile and drone attacks against urban centres and critical infrastructure, aimed at terrorising the Ukrainian people;
2. **United** and determined to support Ukraine, its democracy, independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, within its internationally recognised borders, as well as its right to self-defence and self-determination for as long as it takes for Ukraine to win;
3. **Stressing** that Russia bears sole responsibility for triggering the most serious security crisis on the European continent since the Second World War, threatening the very foundations of the rules-based international order;
4. **Highlighting** that Russia's war against Ukraine is also a critical test of the collective resilience of democracies against the tyranny and brutality of authoritarianism and that by supporting Ukraine, Allies also protect their own security and shared democratic values;
5. **Convinced** that Russia's threat to Allies and to global security will remain for the long term and that Allies must ensure that Ukraine wins, **recognising** that Russia's aggression would not stop at Ukraine;
6. **Stressing** that the way democracies step up to respond to Russia's aggression and long-term threat will shape the future European and international order for the next generations;
7. **Stressing** that the current efforts in military assistance are not sufficient for Ukraine to win against Russian aggression and **recognising** that the amount, type and timeliness of military assistance that is provided to Ukraine has significant battlefield consequences;
8. **Recognising** that Russia can and must suffer strategic defeat in Ukraine;
9. **Commending** the initiatives taken by Allied countries to address the most urgent shortages experienced by Ukraine;
10. **Determined** that Allies must move beyond incremental, *ad hoc* steps in their support to Ukraine towards a clearly stated strategy premised on the goal that Ukraine must be provided with all that it needs, as quickly as possible and for as long as it takes for it to win;
11. **Welcoming** the European Union's agreement to use the extraordinary revenues stemming from around 200 billion euros in immobilised Russian assets to directly finance recovery and military aid to Ukraine;
12. **Highlighting** that NATO Allies account for 99% of all military aid to Ukraine and that since the start of Russia's war, the United States has provided Ukraine with over 80 billion dollars in military, financial and humanitarian aid, while other NATO Allies and partners have provided over 100 billion dollars;

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\* Adopted by the Plenary Assembly at its Spring Session in Sofia (Bulgaria) on Monday 27 May 2024.

13. **Welcoming** the clearly demonstrated solidarity of the EU member states with Ukraine, with the establishment of a 50 billion euro financial mechanism for Ukraine for a period of 2024-2027;
14. **Applauding** the substantial assistance for Ukraine in the amount of 60.8 billion dollars recently approved by the United States that demonstrates the powerful U.S. commitment to Ukraine;
15. **Recognising** that nine countries have completed bilateral security agreements with Ukraine;
16. **Stressing** that Allies together represent roughly 50% of the world's total economic and military might, that aid to Ukraine only represents a tiny fraction of their GDPs and that it is therefore a small investment compared to the strategic benefits related to Ukraine's victory;
17. **Expressing** profound respect and admiration for the remarkable bravery, resilience and resolve of the people, the democratic institutions and the armed and security forces of Ukraine;
18. **Reaffirming** that it will never recognise any of Russia's illegal and forcible attempted annexations of Ukrainian territory;
19. **Convinced** that there can be no lasting peace in Europe without Ukraine as an integral part of the European and Euro-Atlantic families;
20. **Stressing** that Allies must also continue to step up their support to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, the Republic of Moldova and other vulnerable partners, working in close synergy with the European Union;
21. **Stressing** that Allies need to actively engage third countries to convince them to condemn Russia and to limit their commercial engagements with Russia, **recognising** that Russia is conducting imperial and revanchist policies in violation of international law, including the United Nations (UN) Charter, as highlighted in UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolutions ES-11/1 and ES-11/4, and **underlining** Russia's role and intent to destroy the international rules-based order;
22. **Denouncing** the military assistance provided by the Belarusian, Iranian and North Korean regimes to Russia's war and those who provide material or other kinds of assistance to Russia;
23. **Saluting** the significant strengthening of NATO's political and practical support for Ukraine, particularly through establishing the NATO-Ukraine Council (NUC) and through the further development of the Comprehensive Assistance Package (CAP) into a multiyear assistance programme for Ukraine;
24. **Welcoming** the planned establishment of the Joint Analysis, Training and Education Centre in Bydgoszcz, Poland, allowing Ukraine to share its lessons from Russia's war and to learn and train alongside Allied armed forces;
25. **Stressing** that NATO's Washington Summit must send a clear signal that Allies will stand with Ukraine until victory and must take a concrete step forward towards Ukraine's NATO membership;
26. **Reaffirming** its readiness and determination to support Ukraine's further democratic consolidation and reform agenda on the now irreversible path to NATO membership, including through the special fund to support Ukraine's democracy;
27. **Recalling** [Declarations 474](#) and [482](#) and other Assembly Resolutions in support of Ukraine;

28. **URGES** the governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:
- a. to clearly affirm that their strategic goal is Ukraine's victory and to urgently step up and speed up the delivery of the military assistance which Ukraine needs to win;
  - b. to set assistance to Ukraine on a sustainable footing and to agree that all Allies must dedicate the necessary resources for the long term;
  - c. to use all available opportunities to provide Ukraine with the required number of air defence systems, primarily Patriot, to protect civilian objects;
  - d. to support Ukraine in its international right to defend itself by lifting some restrictions on the use of weapons provided by NATO Allies to strike legitimate targets in Russia;
  - e. to continue to ensure the fair sharing of the burden among all Allies across all types of assistance to Ukraine - military, humanitarian, financial and material;
  - f. to continue to use the NUC format, to the fullest extent, as a regular platform of consultation for discussing issues of common security and to continue to expand the format;
  - g. to establish a NATO mission for Ukraine in order to enhance NATO's role in coordinating Allied efforts in support of Ukraine, particularly in the Ukraine Defence Contact Group (the Ramstein process), the Security Assistance Group-Ukraine (SAG-U) and the International Donor Coordination Centre in Wiesbaden;
  - h. to agree on an interoperability roadmap to guide Ukraine's transition to full interoperability with NATO;
  - i. to ramp up Allied defence production for the Alliance's needs as well as to support Ukraine, to work with Allied defence industries and with like-minded partners to prioritise aid to Ukraine over orders from other third countries and to support the urgent development of Ukraine's defence industrial capacity through direct investments into Ukraine's military production;
  - j. to support the prompt establishment of the Joint Analysis, Training and Education Centre in Bydgoszcz, Poland, and encourage Allies to take a decision on the structure and funding at the Washington Summit in July;
  - k. to recognise that Ukraine has made significant progress towards an invitation to join NATO;
  - l. to redouble efforts to help Ukraine achieve full membership as soon as possible by accelerating its integration into NATO and make significant and tangible progress on it at NATO's Washington Summit;
  - m. to fully support Ukraine's path of democratic reform, including by establishing a Centre for Democratic Resilience at NATO's Headquarters to serve as a platform for sharing resources and exchanging best practices;
  - n. to encourage more Allies to sign bilateral security agreements with Ukraine;
  - o. to provide ambitious, sustainable, equitable and predictable funding for the multi-year CAP assistance programme;
  - p. to support the ongoing strengthening of the NATO Representation to Ukraine;

- q. to recognise the Assembly's essential complementary role in supporting Ukraine's democratic institutions and reform process on its path towards membership;
  - r. to allow for engagements between the NUC and the NATO Parliamentary Assembly on the parliamentary dimension of the NATO-Ukraine relationship;
  - s. to designate a liaison officer in the expanded NATO Representation to Ukraine to work with the NATO Parliamentary Assembly to support capacity-building efforts for the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine;
  - t. to continue to support the establishment of a special tribunal for prosecuting Russia's crime of aggression and all efforts to ensure accountability for all of Russia's crimes;
  - u. to back the ramping up and effective enforcement of sanctions against Russia and its accomplices;
  - v. to prepare a long-term strategy and proactive measures of modern containment of Russia in order to counter the Russian threat in all its dimensions, actively defend democracy and the rules-based international order, and boost Allied and Alliance resilience to and contest Russia's aggressive political, military and hybrid destabilising activities, affecting the Alliance and Allies' security;
  - w. to support Ukraine's efforts to promote President Zelenskyy's Peace Formula for a comprehensive, just and sustainable peace;
  - x. to step up support for Ukraine's reconstruction and urgently develop legal frameworks to allow for the use of frozen Russian assets;
  - y. to advocate among partner and affiliated countries, as well as, more broadly, among countries of the "Global South" the need to support Ukraine, and to condemn Russia, in line with relevant resolutions of the UNGA.
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## SHAPING NATO FOR THE NEXT GENERATIONS AT THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT

### DECLARATION 490\*

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The Assembly,

1. **Convinced** that NATO is and remains the cornerstone and indispensable guarantor of Europe and North America's security;
2. **Underlining** that NATO has succeeded throughout all shifts in the security environment because it is defined not by what it stands against but by what it stands for – the defence of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law;
3. **Stressing** that, for 75 years, the unique commitment to collective defence enshrined in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty has prevented an armed attack from any state actors against the Alliance;
4. **Recalling** that Allies only invoked Article 5 once, following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks against the United States;
5. **Certain** that Allies today face a new era of strategic competition and their greatest test for collective security and defence in a generation;
6. **Stressing** therefore the need to contain Russia across all domains;
7. **Underscoring** that Russia currently represents the most significant and direct threat to Allied security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area; terrorism in all its forms and manifestations remains the most direct asymmetric threat to the Alliance and is increasingly supported by the Russian and Iranian regimes; and the stated ambitions and coercive policies of the People's Republic of China pose multiple and systemic challenges to Euro-Atlantic interests, security and values;
8. **Saluting** the profound transformation at 360 degrees of the NATO Alliance initiated at the Madrid Summit and accelerated at the Vilnius Summit;
9. **Expressing** deep concern about ongoing Russian hybrid activities on Allied territory, including sabotage, acts of violence, cyber and electronic interference, disinformation campaigns and other hybrid operations;
10. **Stressing** that the Washington Summit must shape NATO for the next generations and demonstrate continued rock-solid unity and determination as well as a clear commitment by all Allies to take on a fair share of the responsibility for Allied security;
11. **Welcoming** Sweden's accession; reaffirming its full support for Ukraine, Georgia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina's aspiration to join NATO; underlining its consistent support to NATO's Open Door Policy; and fully convinced of the value NATO's partnerships add to Allied security;
12. **Firmly committed** to supporting Georgia's democracy, independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, and European and Euro-Atlantic aspirations, but **deeply concerned** about the law on the so-called "transparency of foreign influence", which is a step backwards for the country's

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\* Adopted by the Plenary Assembly at its Spring Session in Sofia (Bulgaria) on Monday 27 May 2024.

democratic consolidation and runs counter to its NATO as well as EU aspirations, and **urging** the Georgian authorities to withdraw the law before it further damages Georgian democracy;

13. **Recalling** the 30<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the establishment of the Mediterranean Dialogue and the 20<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the establishment of the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative;

14. **Determined** to continue to play its part to strengthen NATO and the unique transatlantic bond;

15. **URGES** the Heads of State and Government of the North Atlantic Alliance at their Summit meeting in Washington:

- a. to make clear that NATO is prepared and will defend every inch of Allied territory at all times under Article 5;
- b. to take further measures to implement the renewed Defence Investment Pledge agreed at the Vilnius Summit with all its elements, including:
  - i. Deliver without delay on the enduring commitment and concrete plans to reach at least 2% of GDP annually on defence spending, invest at least 20% of defence budgets on major equipment and recognise that, in certain cases, substantially higher spending will be necessary to satisfy Article 3 of the Washington Treaty;
  - ii. Ensure investment in R&D is appropriately funded.
- c. to take concrete steps to reduce and eliminate obstacles to defence trade and investment among Allies;
- d. to reaffirm the commitment to collective defence at 360 degrees against threats from all directions; to NATO's three core tasks – deterrence and defence, crisis prevention and management as well as cooperative security; and to increasing national and collective resilience;
- e. to fully recognise the threat that autocracies pose to democracies, as laid out in NATO's 2022 Strategic Concept, and operationalise NATO's commitment to defending shared democratic values by establishing a Centre for Democratic Resilience at NATO Headquarters;
- f. to urgently step up and speed up the delivery of the military assistance which Ukraine needs to win and to ensure Russia's defeat in Ukraine;
- g. to develop a strategy regarding NATO support for Ukraine against aggression by the Russian Federation at the tactical, operational and strategic levels and to help hasten Ukraine's victory against Russia's invasion forces;
- h. to send a clear signal that Allies will stand with Ukraine until victory and take concrete steps forward on its now irreversible path to NATO membership, in line with the Assembly's recommendations in Declaration 033 SC 24 E rev.2;
- i. to reaffirm the fact that NATO's role in the fight against terrorism contributes to all three core tasks of the Alliance and is integral to the Alliance's 360-degree approach to deterrence and defence, and by taking into account the Vilnius Summit decisions, to agree on additional taskings in this regard;
- j. to make concrete, long-term commitments for military assistance to Ukraine until it reaches victory and beyond;

- k. to prepare a long-term strategy and proactive measures of modern containment of Russia in order to counter the Russian threat in all its dimensions, actively defend democracy and the rules-based international order, and boost Allied and Alliance resilience to and contest Russia's aggressive political, military and hybrid destabilising activities, affecting the Alliance and Allies' security;
  - l. to promptly complete the full implementation of the new baseline for NATO's enhanced deterrence and defence posture, including by resourcing NATO's new defence plans and making these plans fully executable by all criteria;
  - m. to ensure sustainable implementation of the rotational air defence model on the Eastern Flank;
  - n. to make full use of the Defence Production Action Plan and other NATO instruments, including for joint procurement, to urgently strengthen Allied defence industries;
  - o. to agree on a pledge that all Allies must fairly share the burden and responsibility for the Alliance's shared security;
  - p. to take the unique and essential partnership with the European Union to the next level with a view to reinforcing its complementarity with NATO;
  - q. to strengthen relations with strategic partners in NATO's southern neighbourhood, beginning with those belonging to the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, building on the report by the Secretary General's independent Group of Experts, and to step up cooperation with partners at risk and like-minded partners across the globe, in particular in the Indo-Pacific region, as well as agree on a relevant roadmap;
  - r. to recognise, in the Summit communiqué, the Assembly's indispensable role and contribution as a link between the parliaments and people of the Alliance and NATO.
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## BREAKING THE SILENCE AND FIGHTING FOR DIGNITY: COMBATting CONFLICT-RELATED SEXUAL VIOLENCE\*

### RESOLUTION 491\*

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The Assembly,

1. **Deploing** the persistence of widespread and systematic sexual violence in armed conflicts around the world and the impunity from which most perpetrators continue to benefit;
2. **Strongly condemning** the deliberate use of sexual violence in armed conflict, by some state and non-state actors, as a tactic and a weapon of war against civilian populations and military personnel;
3. **Recalling** that women and girls are disproportionately targeted by conflict-related sexual violence, while **acknowledging** that men and boys are also affected by such violence;
4. **Underscoring** that sexual violence in the context of conflict is prohibited under international law and that it can, under certain conditions, amount to a crime against humanity, a war crime, and a constituent act of genocide; and **considering** that conflict-related sexual violence in all its forms is a blatant violation of the principles upon which NATO and Allied societies are founded;
5. **Emphasising** that conflict-related sexual violence is deeply rooted in harmful gender norms and structural inequalities between men and women and, therefore, **highlighting** the necessity of progressing towards gender equality;
6. **Stressing** the importance of prioritising the needs of victims and survivors, who often endure profound physical and psychological scars, as well as societal stigmatisation and ostracism;
7. **Reiterating** that all parties involved in armed conflicts must cease and prevent all forms of sexual violence and take specific measures to protect against such violence;
8. **Emphasising** that conflict-related sexual violence, by undermining social stability, fuelling hostilities, and hampering post-war recovery and peacebuilding efforts, undermines Allied and international security;
9. **Reaffirming** the importance of fully implementing UNSC resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (WPS), as well as the nine subsequent UNSC resolutions on WPS, particularly 1820 and 1888, which all recognise the need to combat conflict-related sexual violence;
10. **Recognising** that the empowerment of women and girls is a core principle of the WPS agenda and a key component in the realisation of durable peace and security;
11. **Saluting** the adoption in recent years by NATO and the Allies of policies and measures to combat conflict-related sexual violence and to advance gender equality more broadly, including the WPS Policy approved at the Washington Summit;
12. **Recognising** the urgent need for concerted efforts in bilateral and multilateral formats, including in NATO, to combat conflict-related sexual violence;

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\* Presented by the Committee on Democracy and Security and adopted by the Plenary Assembly at the 70<sup>th</sup> Annual Session of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly held in Montréal, Canada, on Monday 25 November 2024

13. **URGES** member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance and, where appropriate, NATO bodies:
- a. to implement in an integrated and systemic manner national and collective policies addressing conflict-related sexual violence;
  - b. to provide appropriate and long-term financial support for these efforts;
  - c. to intensify their efforts to combat structural gender inequalities that contribute to conflict-related sexual violence;
  - d. to ensure that national armed forces are adequately equipped and trained to recognise and prevent conflict-related sexual violence, protect civilians from such violence and assist victims and survivors;
  - e. to continue raising awareness and denouncing the use of sexual violence as a weapon of war and a driver of conflict, particularly in key multilateral fora;
  - f. to use their diplomatic influence to impress upon armed actors their moral and legal obligations to refrain from committing sexual violence and protect civilians from such violence;
  - g. to ensure justice and uphold accountability by providing national and international judicial institutions with sufficient political, financial and technical means to investigate and prosecute conflict-related sexual violence cases, and to advocate for compensation to victims and survivors for the harm suffered;
  - h. to adopt targeted sanctions against those found responsible for carrying out, ordering or enabling conflict-related sexual violence;
  - i. to invest in the collection of accurate, reliable and disaggregated data on conflict-related sexual violence, as well as in broader research efforts, and develop specific monitoring and evaluation mechanisms of Allied efforts to counter conflict-related sexual violence in order to maximise their impact, accountability and transparency;
  - j. to contribute to the prevention of sexual violence in conflict and post-conflict settings by designing and implementing community education and awareness campaigns and early warning and intervention systems, as well as addressing systemic inequalities;
  - k. to increase the representation of women as well as victims and survivors in security, peacekeeping, law enforcement, and military roles to foster trust in institutions, empower survivors and victims as agents of change, and contribute to durable peace;
  - l. to provide rapid, effective and comprehensive responses that meet the needs of victims and survivors, ensuring access to protection, justice as well as support services and reintegration programmes, and to systematically include victims and survivors in the design and implementation of such efforts;
  - m. to increase financial, technical and political support for international and civil society organisations combatting conflict-related sexual violence and helping victims and survivors;
  - n. to maintain and deepen support for Ukraine in its fight against Russia's use of sexual violence in its war of aggression against Ukraine and to assist victims and survivors and Ukrainian courts in seeking redress for these atrocities;
  - o. to cooperate more closely, in accordance with relevant NATO policies and procedures, with partner countries, relevant international institutions and civil society organisations active in the fight against conflict-related sexual violence and the implementation of the WPS Agenda;

- p. to establish a Centre for Democratic Resilience within NATO to serve as a platform for sharing resources and exchanging best practices among Allies and their partners in defending democracy and the rules-based international order, including the prohibition of conflict-related sexual violence.
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## STRENGTHENING NATO'S INTEGRATED AIR AND MISSILE DEFENCE\* RESOLUTION 492\*

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The Assembly,

1. **Recognising** that Russia's illegal, unprovoked and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine, which constituted the expansion of Russia's armed aggression that has been ongoing since February of 2014, has fundamentally changed Euro-Atlantic security and forced NATO Allies to adjust to a more dangerous security environment and acquire the capabilities necessary to defend their populations and territory;
2. **Alarmed** by Russia's rapid missile arsenal modernisation and expansion, including new dual-capable ballistic, cruise and aeroballistic missiles designed specifically to hold NATO populations and territories at risk, and the growth of its production capacity to sustain its reckless, brutal and illegal air campaigns against Ukrainian cities, civilian populations, and armed forces;
3. **Very concerned** about significant advancements and investments by Russia, China, and North Korea in their nuclear arsenals and capabilities, including a Russian nuclear weapon in development designed to target space infrastructure, which, coupled with its reckless nuclear rhetoric and announced nuclear missile deployments to its ally, Belarus, represents a clear effort to shift the global balance of strategic power;
4. **Recognising** that Russia's use of nuclear rhetoric and manipulation through threats and escalation tactics aims to destabilise Allied unity, and **reaffirming** that such actions must not deter the Alliance from providing sustained and robust support to Ukraine;
5. **Clear-eyed** about the growing forms of opportunistic military cooperation among autocratic regimes in Moscow, Beijing, Tehran, and Pyongyang, which are particularly focused on the exchange of missile and drone capabilities and know-how, and **alarmed** these forms of cooperation are extending to non-state actors, further escalating existing conflicts and conventional and nuclear risks across the globe;
6. **Alert** to the central role advanced missiles and drones already play in a growing number of conflicts in the Alliance's near neighbourhood, particularly in Russia's massive and cruel war of aggression against Ukraine, involving weapons from Iran and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and North Korean troops, and now using a strategic ballistic missile that could be a carrier of weapons of mass destruction;
7. **Vigilant** to the reality this growing complexity of air threats presents a clear and pressing challenge to NATO Allies' existing air and missile defence systems and forces partners to use their air defence forces to shoot down Russian military targets over their territory;
8. **Troubled** by Russia's repeated violation of arms control frameworks and counter-proliferation initiatives, such as the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and **understanding** that the continued erosion of arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation frameworks and norms undermines strategic stability;
9. **Commending** Ukraine for its heroic territorial defence against Russia's air campaign despite its significant disadvantages in troops and materiel;

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\* Presented by the Defence and Security Committee and adopted by the Plenary Assembly at the 70<sup>th</sup> Annual Session of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly held in Montréal, Canada, on Monday 25 November 2024

10. **Urging** Allies to learn from Ukraine's capable defence against Russia's complex air war, especially the dispersal and manoeuvrability of its air defences and innovative use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and as direct-attack munitions;
11. **Recalling** that Integrated Air and Missile Defence (IAMD) is fundamental to the Alliance's core task of deterrence and defence and, therefore, vital to collective defence, in order to avoid losing NATO's competitive edge to actors who seek to create international instability and challenge the rules-based international order;
12. **Noting** that underinvestment in Allied air and missile defence capabilities after the end of the Cold War has undermined Allied security in the current, unstable and unpredictable security environment;
13. **Acknowledging** that Allies must now make significant investments in NATO IAMD in order to meet the new baseline for defence and deterrence agreed upon at the Madrid and Vilnius Summits;
14. **Welcoming** the operationalisation of the missile defence base in Redzikowo, Poland, as a significant milestone in strengthening NATO's IAMD capabilities and enhancing the Alliance's deterrence and defence posture on its eastern flank;
15. **Welcoming** multilateral initiatives to strengthen and modernise Allied IAMD, notably the European Sky Shield Initiative, as well as the development and acquisitions of air and missile defence systems by individual Allies;
16. **Also welcoming** Allies' stated intention at the Washington Summit to update NATO's IAMD policy, based on a 360-degree approach to increase readiness, responsiveness, and integration through new initiatives, such as the IAMD Rotational Model across the Euro-Atlantic area with an initial focus on the eastern flank;
17. **Stressing** that all air and missile defence initiatives should meet capability targets specified by the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP) and that new assets should be interoperable with other NATO systems;
18. **Encouraging** Allies to invest in and become early adopters of advanced missile defence technologies, including directed energy weapons, space-based sensors, and more effective interceptors;
19. **Emphasising** that a stronger and more capable NATO IAMD architecture means not only more launchers, interceptors, radars and sensors, but also a more integrated NATO command and control (C2) network to link national assets into a coherent Alliance-wide system;
20. **Affirming** that a modernised, 360-degree NATO IAMD is a strategic imperative given the deterioration of the Alliance's security environment;
21. **Understanding** fully that missile defence can complement the role of nuclear weapons in deterrence; it cannot substitute them;
22. **Underscoring** that NATO must remain united in its response to Russia's aggression and continue to support Ukraine while demonstrating that manipulation, threats, and coercion will not deter the Alliance from upholding international law and defending democratic values;

23. **URGES** member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:
- a. to eliminate, either through individual investment or cooperative initiatives, all single points of failure across the Alliance's eastern flank, where many layers of air defences are either ageing, incompatible, legacy Soviet equipment, or non-existent;
  - b. to upgrade their air defences to NATO standards and ensure they are interoperable and integrated within a wider IAMD architecture that is tailored to address all air and missile threats emanating from all strategic directions from state and non-state actors;
  - c. to build on the commitments made in Madrid to implement NATO's air and missile defence as a crucial prerequisite to meeting the standards of performance outlined at the Vilnius Summit, and to maintain the balance of defensive and offensive systems that underpin NATO's deterrence and defence posture;
  - d. to increase defence spending to 2% of GDP as a baseline, with at least 20% allocated to investments and new equipment purchases, to increase Allies' capabilities and meet the deterrence and defence standards to which they have pledged, and to recognise that, in certain cases, substantially higher spending will be necessary to satisfy Article 3 of the Washington Treaty;
  - e. to stimulate production across Allies' industrial bases by sending consistent demand signals, making necessary investments, and lowering barriers to defence cooperation between Allies;
  - f. to adapt the Alliance's air and missile defence architecture to the state and non-state threats it faces, particularly to the clear and present challenge of Russia;
  - g. to consider whether the Alliance's ballistic missile mission should be adapted to handle the realities of the current security environment;
  - h. to ensure that Allies have lower-tier capabilities to address a range of non-strategic air and missile threats;
  - i. to learn from Ukraine's heroic self-defence, particularly the critical role of dispersed and mobile air defence systems, and incorporate these lessons into Allied missile defence practice;
  - j. to advance innovation in UAVs as both battlefield managers, direct attack munitions, and in offensive and defensive roles;
  - k. to hone their ability to exercise IAMD missions, increase their participation in relevant NATO IAMD entities, including the NATO IAMD Centre of Excellence in Crete, and ensure these missions' seamless integration into the Alliance's broader deterrence and defence posture.
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## GALVANISING TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCE TO SUPPORT ALLIED PROSPERITY AND SECURITY\*

### RESOLUTION 493\*

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The Assembly,

1. **Stressing** that maintaining NATO and Allied technological superiority is paramount in a security environment characterised by renewed strategic competition between democratic Allies and autocratic powers;
2. **Recognising** that both Allied and competitor country military systems increasingly rely on commercially developed technologies;
3. **Determined** to step up support for technological innovation and adoption across the Alliance, while redoubling efforts to secure supply chains and limit competitor countries' access to the most militarily sensitive technologies without resorting to blanket protectionism;
4. **Concerned** that China's growing economic and technological capabilities coupled with its capacity to acquire sensitive Western technologies with military applications through legal and illegal means pose a serious strategic challenge to Allies and partners;
5. **Noting** China's stated ambition to achieve a dominant position in key technology markets, many of which have military applications, including semiconductors, artificial intelligence (AI), aerospace, biotech, information technology, smart manufacturing, maritime engineering, advanced rail, electric vehicles, and other electrical equipment;
6. **Understanding** that AI is a force multiplier that will strongly condition future markets and battlefields, and that it too has become a source of mounting trade and geostrategic tension;
7. **Welcoming** the determination of Allied countries and partners to fully leverage the positive potential of AI while developing regulations and standards to address the potential dangers posed by AI and to thwart those intent on deploying AI as a weapon against the democratic world;
8. **Supporting** the establishment of tough and comprehensive sanctions regimes, including technology access restrictions, aiming to undermine Russia's capacity to sustain its war of aggression against Ukraine;
9. **Applauding** the significant investments that North America, Europe, and partner countries like Japan and the Republic of Korea have made in semiconductor manufacturing to ensure that critical commercial and defence industries will have assured access to these essential industrial components into the future;
10. **Recognising** that at least 92% of the world's most advanced (below ten nanometers) semiconductor manufacturing capacity is currently located in Taiwan;
11. **Endorsing** western commercial and government efforts to strengthen defences against intellectual property theft;
12. **Recognising** that the evolving nature of military equipment development demands new, technically and politically challenging export control strategies;

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\* Presented by the Economics and Security Committee and adopted by the Plenary Assembly at the 70<sup>th</sup> Annual Session of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly held in Montréal, Canada, on Monday 25 November 2024

13. **Condemning** Russia's evasion of export controls and sanctions to acquire restricted western technologies that it incorporates into weapons systems used in its illegal and unjustified war in Ukraine and similar efforts carried out by Iran and North Korea;
14. **Acknowledging** that the resale of restricted technologies to countries where technology restrictions do not apply or are not rigorously enforced facilitates the diversion of these technologies to strategic competitors;
15. **Concerned**, moreover, that western governments have under-resourced export controls and sanction enforcement efforts, which effectively lowers the risks and costs to those engaged in circumventing those restrictions;
16. **Cognisant** that effective technology export control regimes require coalitions among Allies and partners collectively working to ensure comprehensive restrictions that restrict rivals' access to militarily sensitive technologies;
17. **Welcoming** the AUKUS partnership engaging Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, which represents an important advance in technology sharing and defence industrial cooperation among two key NATO Allies and an Indo-Pacific partner, and which could become a model for expanded technological collaboration among democracies in the future, as well as the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP) between Japan, Italy and the United Kingdom, which similarly engages two NATO members and an Indo-Pacific partner and is open for other countries to join;
18. **Observing** that NATO Allies must maintain well-funded innovation programmes in partnership with the private sector and universities to better exploit the commercial and strategic advantages of technology;
19. **Encouraged** that NATO recognises shared technology development as a critical force multiplier which enhances interoperability and efficiency while fostering critical defence industrial links among Allies;
20. **Endorsing** NATO's recognition of the challenge that strategic competitors pose in this domain and particularly their shared efforts to thwart Allied technology export restrictions;
21. **Supporting** efforts like the NATO-Ukraine Innovation Cooperation Roadmap, which defines shared objectives to guide NATO's technology cooperation with that important partner and outlines key workstreams under four delivery areas: innovation policy enablers, innovation ecosystem engagement, pilot activities and lessons learned;
22. **Recognising** that a continuous dialogue between national defence ministries, agencies and scientific and defence industrial communities can facilitate efforts to integrate emerging technologies into national force structures;
23. **Applauding** the launch and ongoing build-up of NATO's DIANA programme which underscores the Alliance's commitment to technology innovation;
24. **Convinced** that NATO Allies require a comprehensive framework for securing supply chains and regulating trade in sensitive technologies with competitor nations and should coordinate their approaches in this domain;

25. **URGES** the governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:
- a. to dedicate more political attention and resources to counter the risks of technology leakages through trade, targeted investments in western firms undertaken by strategic competitors, smuggling, and espionage;
  - b. to recognise the full scope of China's technological and strategic ambitions and its tendency to engage in technology theft to achieve these and to invest substantial resources towards these ends in collaborating with other strategic competitors;
  - c. to collaborate more closely with partners in the Indo-Pacific in research and development, academic exchanges, and efforts to secure supply chains for the critical inputs needed to expand production of key technologies;
  - d. to enforce existing and secondary sanctions and export restrictions relating to military technology and increase cooperation relating to the development of appropriate measures to increase the economic resiliency of the Alliance in the face of strategic competition from such countries as Russia and China;
  - e. to coordinate export controls on emerging dual-use technologies and strategic intellectual property, including through relevant international forums, so that strategic competitors are prevented from accessing critical technology that could be used to threaten the security of Allies and partners;
  - f. to strike workable balances between security considerations and open trading principles, particularly among like-minded states, that avoid overly stringent controls and outright protectionism that would hinder innovation, undermine competitiveness, and unduly raise prices;
  - g. to bolster transparency about the nature of technology-driven security threats so that companies are better placed to factor in national security considerations when making trade and investment decisions;
  - h. to ensure that proper rules and enforcement measures are in place so that inward and outward investments are not leading to the proliferation of sensitive technologies;
  - i. to strengthen public-private-university partnerships to drive technology development;
  - j. to support Ukrainian efforts to develop and access key technologies it can use to defend its sovereignty and protect its people;
  - k. to support NATO efforts to work with public and private sector partners, academic and civil society, in accordance with relevant NATO policies and procedures, to develop and adopt new technologies, establish international principles of responsible use, and maintain NATO's technological edge through innovation;
  - l. to allocate public funding needed to underwrite technological advances with military applications, in line with the renewed commitment to defence and investment spending adopted at the 2023 Vilnius Summit and reiterated at the 2024 Washington Summit.
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## NATO AFTER THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT: FUTURE-PROOFING THE ALLIANCE AND SUPPORTING UKRAINE UNTIL VICTORY\*

### RESOLUTION 494\*

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The Assembly,

1. **Recognising** NATO's unparalleled role over the past 75 years as the guarantor of Europe and North America's security and the cornerstone of peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic region, its ability to evolve and adapt in response to changing security challenges, and **reaffirming** its unwavering commitment to shared democratic values, including individual liberty, human rights, and the rule of law, which form the foundation of the Alliance's mission, while **acknowledging** that the defence of these values is integral to NATO's role in safeguarding security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area;
2. **Applauding** the unity, resolve, and ironclad commitment to uphold the unique transatlantic bond and the ironclad commitment to collective defence enshrined in Article 5 demonstrated by Allies at the 2024 Washington Summit in addressing the most significant security challenges since the Cold War;
3. **Welcoming** the transformative decisions taken at the recent Summits to radically enhance NATO's defence and deterrence posture, including bolstering forward defences, adopting new defence plans, reinvigorating the defence industry and streamlining NATO's command and control arrangements;
4. **Acknowledging** the increased defence spending by Allies, with 23 nations meeting or exceeding the 2% of GDP target by 2024, while **stressing** that the security environment requires all Allies to step up for the long term;
5. **Condemning** in the strongest terms Russia's ongoing illegal, unprovoked and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine, continued illegal temporary occupation of Ukrainian territory, its war crimes, and its reckless nuclear sabre-rattling, which pose a direct threat to Euro-Atlantic stability;
6. **Reaffirming** unwavering support for Ukraine's sovereignty, territorial integrity within internationally recognised borders, and its irreversible path toward full NATO membership, and **saluting** the Washington Summit decisions to make the support of Ukraine more predictable, coherent and institutionalised, including by establishing the NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU), taking forward the establishment of the NATO-Ukraine Joint Analysis, Training, and Education Centre (JATEC), and announcing a Pledge of Long-Term Security Assistance for Ukraine with the intention of a minimum baseline funding of EUR 40 billion within the next year;
7. **Strongly condemning** the abuse by the Russian Federation of its membership in international organisations, in particular Interpol, to persecute political opponents as well as Ukrainian military personnel, politicians and public figures;
8. **Stressing** that Russia remains the most significant and direct threat to Allied security, that this threat will persist into the long term, and **welcoming** the Allies' decision at the Washington Summit to develop recommendations on NATO's strategic approach to Russia;

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\* Presented by the Political Committee and adopted by the Plenary Assembly at the 70<sup>th</sup> Annual Session of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly held in Montréal, Canada, on Monday 25 November 2024

9. **Reiterating** that terrorism, in all its forms and manifestations, remains the most direct asymmetric threat to Euro-Atlantic and global security;
10. **Clear-eyed** about the multiple and systemic challenges the People's Republic of China (PRC) poses to Euro-Atlantic security, interests and values as well as to the rules-based international order; and **deploring** the PRC's role as decisive enabler of Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine as well as the growing collusion between autocratic regimes in Russia, China, Iran, North Korea and Belarus;
11. **Condemning** in the strongest possible terms the increasing military support to Russia by North Korea, whose deployment of troops against Ukraine and supply of missiles and munitions pose a serious threat to the peace of Europe and the Indo-Pacific area, and constitute a further violation of international law;
12. **Reaffirming** the importance of NATO's 360-degree approach to security, which addresses challenges from all directions, including the southern flank, where instability, trafficking, terrorism and militant groups continue to pose threats to Allied interests; and **welcoming** the adoption, at the Washington Summit, of an action plan for NATO's stronger, more strategic and result-oriented approach toward the southern neighbourhood;
13. **Highlighting** the value of NATO's partnerships, including growing cooperation with like-minded partners in the Indo-Pacific region to uphold the rules-based international order;
14. **Underlining** its consistent support for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia and the Republic of Moldova and for the Euro-Atlantic integration of Georgia and Bosnia and Herzegovina;
15. **Recognising** the importance of NATO's strategic partnership with the European Union, **welcoming** for the first time the nomination of a Commissioner-Designate for Defence and Space, and **calling** for reinforced collaboration, particularly in areas such as military mobility, resilience, and countering hybrid threats, while ensuring full involvement of non-EU Allies in EU defence initiatives;
16. **Recognising** that emerging threats and challenges, including disinformation, cyberattacks, disruptive technologies and the militarisation of space, require NATO to adapt its strategic capabilities and maintain its technological edge;
17. **Acknowledging** the security implications of climate change and the importance of ensuring NATO remains committed to becoming the leading international organisation for understanding and adapting to the impacts of climate change and extreme weather on security, while also **welcoming** the recent establishment of the NATO Climate Change and Security Centre of Excellence, which seeks to foster civilian and military cooperation on these issues;
18. **URGES** member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:
  - a. to demonstrate their ironclad commitment to NATO's collective defence by ensuring the full implementation of decisions taken at the Washington Summit and previous Summits to strengthen the Alliance's deterrence posture and enhance readiness, including the ability to deter by denial through further strengthening our forward defences and investing in a robust, layered air defence shield across the Alliance's eastern flank;
  - b. to develop, by the next Summit in the Netherlands, a common strategic approach to Russia, focusing on fully preparing the Alliance to contain and counter Russia's hostile actions across the board, whether conventional, hybrid or nuclear, while supporting efforts to degrade Moscow's ability to conduct aggressive wars, including by ensuring the full implementation of sanctions by all Allies as well as by recognising Ukraine's right

- to strike legitimate military objects on the territory of the aggressor, in line with the self-defence principle of Article 51 of the UN Charter;
- c. to ensure that all Allies meet at least the 2% GDP defence spending target without delay and to consider further raising the target in order to ensure full implementation of NATO's new defence plans, while delivering on the NATO Industrial Capacity Expansion Pledge and encouraging joint procurement initiatives;
  - d. to sustain and increase military, financial, and humanitarian support for Ukraine, ensuring the timely delivery of munitions and advanced weapon systems, including air defence systems, long-range precision weapons, and multi-role fighter aircraft, while delivering on the Pledge of Long-Term Security Assistance for Ukraine and exploiting the full potential of NSATU, the NATO-Ukraine Council, the Comprehensive Assistance Package (CAP), the NATO-Ukraine Joint Analysis, Training and Education Centre, the NATO Representation in Ukraine, and other instruments of support, and to maintain this support to Ukraine for as long as it faces the Russian aggression or the threat thereof in the future;
  - e. to support Ukraine's efforts, as expressed in Ukraine's Peace Formula and Victory Plan, to achieve a just and lasting peace for Ukraine, and to remain faithful to the principle of "nothing about Ukraine without Ukraine";
  - f. to step up political and practical efforts to help Ukraine receive an invitation and become the 33<sup>rd</sup> member of NATO as soon as possible;
  - g. to strengthen the sanctions framework against the Russian Federation and the DPRK in order to increase the price for their cooperation in the aggression against Ukraine, and provide Ukraine with all the means, including medium-range missiles, to defend itself and deter further aggression;
  - h. to continue supporting national and international initiatives to hold Russian forces and officials accountable for violations of human rights, war crimes, the crime of aggression and other breaches of international law;
  - i. to operationalise Allies' commitment to democracy, freedom, and the rule of law, including by establishing without delay a Centre for Democratic Resilience at NATO Headquarters;
  - j. to continue efforts to counter, deter, defend and respond to threats posed by terrorist groups, including by fully implementing the Action Plan on Enhancing NATO's Role in the International Community's Fight Against Terrorism, updated at the Washington Summit, and supporting the work of the NATO Secretary General's Special Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism;
  - k. to use political and economic leverages to deter China from supporting Russia's war effort and to continue boosting Allied resilience to China's systemic challenge to Euro-Atlantic security, including by reducing strategic dependencies, investing in cyber defences and working with partners of the Alliance, particularly the EU and like-minded Indo-Pacific partners, while continuing to seek opportunities for constructive dialogue with Beijing;
  - l. to expand NATO's engagement with southern partners, building on the action plan adopted at the Washington Summit, including shoring up Allied security on southern borders while seeking mutually beneficial cooperation and exploring synergies with southern neighbours and other relevant actors, including the European Union, as well as enhancing the role of the recently appointed NATO Secretary General's Special Representative for the southern neighbourhood to make NATO's contribution to regional stability more effective and making better use of the Strategic Direction-South HUB in Naples;

- m. to remain committed to security and stability in the Western Balkans, to support reforms and reconciliation across the region, and to enhance assistance to regional partners in countering malign influences of authoritarian countries;
  - n. to continue reassuring Allies and partners in the Black Sea region by strengthening relevant multi-national battlegroups, preserving freedom of navigation, and supporting Georgia's and the Republic of Moldova's efforts to push back against Russian malign activities;
  - o. to advance NATO's technological edge and deliver on NATO's recent defence innovation initiatives, capitalising on the strengths of free societies in advancing innovation, while ensuring integration of innovative technologies across NATO's defence architecture;
  - p. to ensure that NATO addresses climate-related risks as a core element of its defence planning, including by stimulating innovation to reduce the reliance on fossil fuels and critical raw materials and enhance our autonomy in this regard, while enhancing Allies' resilience to climate-related disasters and supporting global efforts to mitigate climate instability;
  - q. to continue integrating NATO's Women, Peace and Security (WPS) and Human Security agendas across all core tasks, including by delivering on the updated WPS Policy.
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## HARNESSING OPPORTUNITIES OF THE RESPONSIBLE USE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN THE MILITARY DOMAIN\*

### RESOLUTION 495\*

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The Assembly,

1. **Recognising** that Artificial Intelligence (AI) will transform the ways wars are fought and that leadership in AI is crucial for maintaining NATO's technological edge and ensuring the responsible use of AI in the military domain;
2. **Acknowledging** that the integration of AI into military systems will revolutionise warfare through, for example, advancements in decision-making support, the deployment of autonomous systems and the augmentation and adaptation of soldiers' roles;
3. **Reaffirming** the need to adopt an international convention governing the use of AI in lethal autonomous weapons systems;
4. **Recognising** the plethora of technical, operational, legal and ethical challenges that the implementation of AI may bring to future armed conflicts and the potential for AI in warfare to create concerns and mistrust among the wider public;
5. **Observing** that the pace of innovation and demand for rapid adaptation of AI by armed forces pose challenges for civilian oversight and regulatory processes, and that most international regulatory and government efforts do not apply to national defence and the military domain;
6. **Welcoming** the Alliance's revised AI Strategy and **reaffirming** the Principles of Responsible Use of Artificial Intelligence in Defence;
7. **Applauding** NATO's efforts to foster an innovative AI ecosystem through the NATO Innovation Fund, its investments in promising start-ups, and the DIANA accelerator program, which emphasises AI as a cross-cutting enabling technology;
8. **Strongly supporting** the efforts and work of other NATO bodies, such as the NATO Data and AI Review Board, the NATO Science and Technology Organization, and the NATO Communications and Information Agency, in ensuring that the Alliance can reap the rewards whilst avoiding the pitfalls associated with AI;
9. **Welcoming** key efforts by national governments and international organisations to regulate and govern the development and use of AI, all aimed at creating frameworks for the ethical and democratic use of AI;
10. **Cautioning** that external actors, such as the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation, are ramping up efforts in this technological area to strengthen their armed forces with fewer democratic and ethical constraints than Allies;

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\* Presented by the Science and Technology Committee and adopted by the Plenary Assembly at the 70<sup>th</sup> Annual Session of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly held in Montréal, Canada, on Monday 25 November 2024

11. **Observing** that the People's Republic of China and Russia may not abide by internationally launched initiatives towards the ethical and responsible use of AI in the military domain, reflected in the fact that the People's Republic of China has not endorsed the Responsible AI in the Military Domain (REAIM) Blueprint for Action despite attending the Summit in Seoul, Republic of South Korea;
12. **Affirming** the need to maintain human control over the decision to use nuclear weapons, a core component of NATO's deterrence and defence capabilities;
13. **URGES** member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance:
- a. to advance joint efforts on AI in the civilian and military domains to ensure that NATO maintains its technological edge and its armed forces can leverage the technology's benefits whilst being cognisant of the operational, ethical, and legal challenges associated with the adoption of AI;
  - b. to continue developing and enforcing joint operational and tactical standards to strengthen collective defence and address future interoperability challenges, including misaligned data, data sovereignty issues, and system integration gaps;
  - c. to invest in fostering an innovative AI ecosystem that enables NATO to leverage commercial advancements for Allied forces and implement cross-functional risk assessments to apply civilian dual-use solutions in the military;
  - d. to actively raise public awareness of AI's role in the armed forces to build trust and legitimacy, and prevent mistrust and negative impacts on democracy and human rights by ensuring ethical use that upholds NATO's democratic values;
  - e. to work towards a proactive and coherent strategic framework and activities across NATO bodies and member countries, enabling governance to keep pace with technical developments and innovation and ensuring that ethical and legal guidelines are effectively implemented on the ground;
  - f. to ensure that all Allies build a minimum level of AI adaptation for future conflicts and consider how smaller Allies could contribute to standardisation and integration;
  - g. to build on existing approaches to regulate AI in the military domain and strive for a balance between military considerations and political priorities in the incorporation of AI in the armed forces enabling NATO to enhance its operational effectiveness while upholding democratic principles;
  - h. to foster ethical oversight by involving military, civilian, and regulatory representatives in integrating dual-use solutions, leveraging private sector expertise to minimise biases, promote workforce diversity, and prioritise funding for start-ups that align with NATO's ethical and legal principles;
  - i. to ensure that cooperation with the EU and other partners in this field includes a structured dialogue, so that the key AI documents of both institutions remain aligned, particularly regarding ethical standards;
  - j. to continue to strongly support the development of inclusive and universal norms and standards for the ethical, legal, and responsible use of AI in the military domain.