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VERSLAG VAN HET SYMPOSIUM «NATO AT 60 – THE FUTURE AHEAD»

Friday 23 October 2009 Senate of the Netherlands

Chair: Mr. Fred de Graaf

1. Official opening

OPENING ADDRESS BY MR. FRED DE GRAAF

Chairman of the standing committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Development Cooperation of the Senate

Mr. de Graaf: Good morning everybody! Ladies and gentlemen, it is a great pleasure for me to welcome you on behalf of the standing committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Development Cooperation to the Senate of the States General and to this symposium on NATO's future.

Let me start with a few housekeeping announcements. First, please turn off any mobile devices and secondly, I would like to remind you that this is a public symposium. A verbatim transcript of this event will be produced and may be made publicly available.

Ladies and gentlemen, NATO's 60th anniversary is an occasion to take stock of its past and reflect on its future. As an organisation with 28 members and no shortage of candidates to join, NATO does not appear to have lost much of the appeal or vitality that helped it come into existence in 1949.

But aging is a process that inevitably sparks existential questions and NATO is not immune to them. For nearly twenty years now, since the end of the cold war, the Alliance has been struggling to re-define itself.

The question of what NATO's mission is, how it is changing and how its members should respond is related to but goes beyond the operational issues facing NATO forces in the field. In other words, new headlines about the counter strategy in Afghanistan or NATO's expanding member-

ship towards the East ultimately boil down to fundamental questions of strategy and direction.

These are contained in the NATO Strategic Concept. As you are of course aware, the process of review of this document has started this year. It is due to be presented by Secretary-General Rasmussen early next year. As Julian Lindley-French will further elaborate on, the new strategic concept must account of the way in which security challenges have evolved, such as the new emphasis on proliferation, failed states, piracy, energy supplies, terrorism and climate change. In other words, the central question is to what extent NATO as an organisation should focus on comprehensive security, directing its attention more towards non-traditional security areas like non-proliferation, energy security and cyber defence or, taking a step back and re-aligning itself with a more traditional interpretation of collective defence.

The new strategic concept will also need to give specific guidance to NATO governments on how they need to further transform their own national defence structures and capabilities in order to be successful in meeting NATO's core tasks in the 21st century. As an alliance of member states the ultimate success of NATO requires a convergence in national threat perceptions and foreign policies. Now that national defence budgets may likely dwindle as a result of the global financial crisis, such unity of purpose has become all the more pressing. Hugo Klijn will address this interaction between NATO and its members, focussing on The Netherlands in particular.

Ladies and gentlemen, relations with Russia are of course pivotal to NATO's strategic orientation, irrespective of the vision one may hold about the scope of the Alliance mission. On a practical level, cooperation between NATO and Russia on strategically important issues such as Afghanistan and Iran offers mutual benefits to both parties. On the level of pan-European security architecture Russian, European and Atlantic interests need to be articulated, discussed and reconciled. We are honoured to welcome Konstantin Kosachev to share his views on this relationship.

Today's speakers, at least to some extent, represent different strategic cultures in wider Europe. I am grateful for their efforts to share their perspectives with us today. Public participation to the discussion leading up to the renewed strategic concept is paramount to its long term credibility and success. I am very pleased to see so many familiar faces here, of people who have for long been following NATO and the wider international security architecture, be it as politicians, civil servants, analysts or members of various social and religious organisations. I trust that your varying views on the future of the transatlantic alliance will make a living and sound discussion, much like the debate we value in this House.

I am particularly pleased to introduce our first speaker of today, Mr. Konstantin Kosachev. He will share a Russian perspective on NATO's development and future. Mr. Kosachev currently serves as chairman of the Duma committee on International Affairs. He is also a member of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe since 2004. Before being elected to the State Duma in 1999, Mr. Kosachev had a successful career as a diplomat, serving in various Russian diplomatic missions abroad. May I invite you, Mr. Kosachev?

KEY NOTE ADDRESS BY MR. KONSTANTIN KOSACHEV

Chairman of the standing committee on International Relations of the Russian Duma

Mr. **Kosachev**: Dear ladies and gentlemen. First of all, I would like to thank Mr. de Graaf for arranging this conference and inviting me as one of the key note speakers though Russia does not belong to NATO. But as you absolutely correctly pointed out the relations between NATO and Russia are definitely of significant importance for both sides of this cooperation. I believe that my contribution may also be of some importance in terms of discussions, which are ongoing right now about the new strategic concept of NATO. I would also like to thank my friend Mr. Tiny Kox for initiating my participation in this conference. We are not just friends by also neighbours, sitting together in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. I would also like to thank Mr. René van der Linden, the newly elected president of the Senate. He is now absent but he wrote me a very warm letter and I believe that we will have many other occasions to meet, here in The Hague or elsewhere in the world.

I am going to speak about «NATO at 60 – the future ahead» in three dimensions. I will speak about NATO as an outsider with you, insiders, I will speak about Russia as an insider with you, outsiders and I will speak about our common Europe, where we all are insiders but where the problem is the number of outsiders, which is much larger and much more than we could have had.

My first remark is about NATO at 60. If you would analyse these 60 years I would like to put four benchmarks with 20 years' steps. The first one is quite natural, in 1949 when the Washington Treaty was signed. At that moment the enemy was quite clear and obvious: the Soviet Union. The strategy at that moment in 1949 was based on two concepts: deterrence and defence. I believe that this strategy has proved to be successful, at least for NATO. Five years later – maybe some people here do not remember that – the Soviet Union immediately after the death of Joseph Stalin asked for membership in NATO but was refused, rejected. Again, one year later the Warsaw Pact was established and the war re-started as the Cold War between the two blocks and not just the two systems.

The second benchmark is 20 years later, 1969, when NATO approved a new strategy, and adding a third concept of détente to the first two concepts of deterrence and defence. At that moment, the word was not famous but I believe it was a very important strategic decision by NATO, not just opposing the countries of the opposite block but trying to involve some of these countries in a dialogue, countries which were placed somewhere between NATO and the Soviet Union. I believe that this second strategy from 1969 also was a success story, at least for NATO but also for other parts of Europe. In some years' time different developments started and they later on developed into something like Perestroika, the end of the Iron Curtain-area.

Then we come to the third bench mark which is exactly 20 years later, in 1989. All of us now celebrate the 20 years of the end of that era. We all bear in mind the period of two years later, 1991, when another strategy of NATO was approved. But at that moment, 1989, 1990 and 1991 NATO faced several options and maybe for the first time.

One of these options already at that moment was to push the so-called reset button, to start over, just like starting over the way John Lennon put it 10 years before at the time. But that option was denied by NATO and

this is the first unsuccessful decision by NATO. The choice was done in favour of continuity. «NATO forever», though there was no enemy any longer.

This experience is really less successful because the years after showed all of us that maybe NATO succeeded to win at least some Eastern Europe countries. Today, Defence ministers of NATO have the privilege of having their meetings in Bratislava, in a new member state of NATO. But at the same time I believe that these years NATO was losing Russia.

Now the fourth bench mark, again 20 years later. This is now, 2009, when we have the discussions on the New Strategic concept, which will be approved in Lisbon next year. I believe that the reasons of having this new discussion in NATO are quite serious. It is not just about celebrating another ten or twenty years of development of the organisation. The major reasons to my mind are two.

The first is the new situation within NATO with 28 members and probably more members ahead. The question that NATO needs to answer is whether NATO in future should become a global actor or more or less stay the way it is now as a regional actor with ability and/or ambition to act globally. We will see how Mrs. Albright and Mr. van der Veer will respond to that question.

The second reason for reconsidering the strategy of NATO to my mind is the new threat assessment outwards. It is clear that threats have changed their character. It is clear and obvious for everyone that threats do not come from states but from non-state actors. This is a completely new situation, which needs further analysis, not just within NATO but everywhere, including Russia. In the context of this meeting the discussion about the new threat assessment should also be somehow concentrated on a very simple and a very natural question, which is whether Russia is a threat, towards NATO or anybody else in Europe. You know perfectly well that some member states of NATO, mostly the so-called newcomers, definitely believe that Russia is a threat, that Russia does not differ from the former Soviet Union and should be treated the same way NATO treated the Soviet Union in 1949.

Now I come to the second item of my report, which is about Russia. I will not dwell on what is going on in Russia in general. If there are any questions I will be ready to answer them. I will rather speak about what is happening in Russia's attitude towards NATO. I will confess immediately that compared with the benchmarks of 1949, 1969 and 1989 not much has changed in Russia's attitude towards NATO. On the level of experts, yes, definitely there are clear changes. By «experts» I mean politicians, diplomats and military experts. They are definitely more open, more cooperative and more flexible. More «friendly» would not be a proper word. But the problem is the state of public opinion in Russia. Public opinion in Russia is more or less the same towards NATO and NATO is broadly considered as an enemy towards Russia, whether you like it or not. I just know this is true. This is the major problem in our relations, because this current state of public opinion in Russia creates limits for experts to proceed, to make progress in cooperation with NATO, the way it does not do on the NATO side. On NATO side experts work more or less in harmony with the state of public opinion in your countries, but in our case the gap is still rather large and obvious. The reasons for that are both objective and subjective. Objective are the mistakes of NATO in previous years like Yugoslavia and Kosovo, which is considered as a major mistake in Russia or in the recent history about membership of Ukraine in NATO or – last but not least, of course – the recent history with Georgia being

invited to NATO and interpreting as an approval of becoming more assertive. Again, in the Southern Caucasus.

Subjective reasons are also quite obvious. Russian politicians, mostly coming from the so-called patriotic opposition exploit this NATO-fobia, which exists in the Russian society with great pleasure. When they have this type of discussion in the Russian State Duma, for me as a person who would rather belong to the experts than to the regular public opinion in Russia it is sometimes difficult to oppose this argumentation, because I lack arguments to show people: Look now, NATO is not an enemy, NATO is a friend because this and that has happened. These types of arguments in my view are quite few yet.

So, the conclusion here would be that it is not enough to work on an expert level, I mean to work in relations between NATO and Russia, which is the case right now. We need – and I mean we need it together – to change minds in Russia, in the newcomer states like Poland or Lithuania – you know why I specifically mention these two – and maybe here in The Netherlands as well. It is up to you to accept or to deny this option.

On the minimum level these tasks should mean to have more positive projects, like our ongoing cooperation in Afghanistan, which is a positive project but I believe this is the only positive project, as a maximum, and that is my naive dream. In the new strategy of NATO, maybe not this time but maybe in 20 years' time ahead, but sooner or later I believe there should be a phrase about something like «Russia is also welcome to the club if Russia wants to». This is again a very ambitious idea but I believe that in case our predecessors in 1954 had been more flexible, maybe this situation could have been completely different now.

My third message would be about Europe, about a united Europe. In your perspective, in the perspective of people living here in The Netherlands and other NATO-countries, Europe after the Second World War has survived as a democratic and free area, space for the reason it has become transatlantic. This is true and I believe that this transatlantic project has played a very important role, not just for Western Europe but also for Eastern Europe, for Russia, for the whole of Europe by contributing to our own reforms in my country as well. But being right once – I speak now in terms of geo-politics and not in terms of ideologies – does not necessarily mean being always right. I am absolutely sure that it is an illusion to believe that further NATO-expansion is the answer. Expansion of a military block does have its natural limits. Without enemies a military block dies as a military block. A military block needs enemies and it searches for enemies.

So, my conclusion again would be staying Transatlantic is of course still fashionable and it is still good – at least for you – but it is not enough anymore. My humble answer to the question on what could be the complement to being Transatlantic, again complement and not option or replacement, would be that Europe should also simultaneously – again simultaneously – become Transpacific.

The problems we face now jointly are somewhere in the middle, so to say, between the Atlantic and the Pacific. It is all about Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan – another explosion just two hours ago – North Korea and so on and so forth. Allies are everywhere around, including traditional countries – I would mention Japan and South Korea as traditional partners of NATO – but they can now also be other countries like China and, of course, like Russia. But to make ends meet again one needs Russia. NATO needs

Russia and Europe needs Russia, the same way Russia needs Europe. Russia needs a good cooperation with NATO.

What about Russia in this sense? The Russians are not coming, be calm. The Russians are making proposals and the most relevant one in this context is of course the initiative delivered by our president in summer last year on the Treaty on European Security. This idea was at the beginning denied by most European countries without going into details. I know the reasons for countries which are inside some security structures like NATO. Nothing needs to be changed. It is rather comfortable to be the way it is now and if you would change something then you need to be convinced that this change is for the better, that it will improve your current situation. But discussion is going on and I believe that this idea gets more and more support in Europe right now, including inside NATO. The new Secretary-General Mr. Rasmussen has explicitly expressed his wish and readiness to start a formal discussion with Russia on that initiative.

The idea of the Treaty to my mind is quite transparent and clear. One, we need everyone who would be inside this Treaty would take on legally binding commitments – legally binding commitments – and two, this new structure should be comprehensive, universal with each and everybody interested involved. In the text of that Treaty, according to our view, we should first confirm one by one all the principles of our cooperation in Europe and secondly, we should commit to refuse to use military force the way NATO-countries have done so towards each other, inside NATO, to make it on a broader basis. Thirdly, to introduce the concept of equal security, because NATO – it is quite natural – is something what in economic organisations would be called «protectionism», when you solve some problems of your own inside and you do not care what is going on outside. For a military block to be a protectionist structure is much more natural but again, in terms of global security this military protectionism is also something belonging rather to the past than to the future. So, we speak about equal security when any security arrangement does not damage security conditions of other countries and participants. The fourth idea there is that no country and no organisation – Russia included, of course – would have exceptional or exclusive rights on our common security. It should really be common. The fifth idea are arrangements about a reasonable military infrastructure in terms of the whole Treaty and last but not least, again the common threat assessments, speaking about the new threats in the first hand, because for NATO right now combating international terrorism, combating drugs, combating proliferation is not the most natural thing to deal with.

Chances to get support for this idea, again, are increasing. We believe that it will be the case for the simple reason that we know that NATO is not the answer, with all due respect to that organisation. Now that we have Mr. Obama as President of the United States I believe that the chances of this new security arrangement in Europe are becoming even better. I was very happy to learn that Mr. Obama was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. At first, everybody was surprised and it was a rather unexpected decision, but I believe that this is just a clear support, a mandate for Mr. Obama to proceed with his new foreign policy. Let's hope and believe that he will use this mandate.

Let's hope and believe NATO will use this new situation and ongoing discussions on the new strategy while building up this new infrastructure in Europe. Let's hope and believe Russia will not be pushed aside and out by further mistakes by the United States or NATO, which just happened in

the past. Let's hope and believe Russia will avoid its own mistakes it made so many times in the past.

Thank you for your attention!
(Applause)

Mr. **Chairman**: Thank you very much, Mr. Kosachev, for your interesting speech!

May I now introduce Professor Lindley-French. Mr. Lindley-French is Eisenhower Professor of Defence Strategy at the Netherlands Defence Academy and senior associate fellow at the United Kingdom Defence Academy. Throughout his career he has applied academic research to defence policy and military doctrine, co-authoring for example the joint doctrine of the British Armed Forces. Mr. Lindley-French has published extensively on NATO, Transatlantic security and European security and Defence.

I am pleased to give Mr. Lindley-French the floor to speak on NATO's future strategic challenges.

KEY NOTE ADDRESS BY MR. JULIAN LINDLEY-FRENCH

Professor of Military Art and Science at the Royal Military Academy of the Netherlands

Mr. **Lindley-French**: Thank you, Mr. de Graaf! It is a very distinct honour for this humble Englishman to be addressing this meeting here at the Dutch Senate ever since you lost to us the four Anglo-Dutch wars. My old naval family has been trying to seek some revenge but there was a spot of rust developed by the Royal Navy at Chatham! I am encouraged because of Admiraal De Ruyter, whose painting I saw outside. I might say «now is my chance» and I fully intend to seize it! My subject this morning is the NATO strategic concept and I hope to be topical, concise and indeed a little bit provocative in keeping with my Yorkshire roots. I am not going to focus on the overarching security architecture so eloquently covered by Mr. Kosachev, though I agree with much that he had to say about new initiatives in Europe and beyond. But I am tempted to say that watching NATO undergo yet another strategic concept one is reminded of Oscar Wilde's famous dictum about second marriages «The triumph of hope over experience». What I must say from the outset is that I am relieved that good Dutch pragmatic common sense is at the core of the process; with Mr. Jeroen van der Veer acting as vice chair of the Expert Group. Make no mistake; this is also an important moment in the development of the Atlantic Alliance. One must understand that this strategic concept is indeed a metaphor for the wider Atlantic Alliance. There is, I regret to say, still an uncomfortable reality at the core of all this, which many find very hard to accept. Legitimate military power will still be relevant and still be required in the security and stability of future global governance. I can say that looking at the modernisation of the Russian military that Moscow clearly has a similar view.

The job of this Expert Group will not be easy. First, this is any old strategic concept. Before 1991 strategic concepts, which are in effect the what, the why, the where, the when and to some extent the how of Alliance action, were reasonably straight forward affairs concerning by and large the organisation of the defence of Western Europe against a possible attack by the Red Army and its Warsaw Pact surrogates. That is how we saw it and that is what the concept was designed to organise and thereupon that is what it did. They were short – the 1967 concept – and fairly sparing with

words. Even the 1991 and 1999 strategic concepts, notwithstanding the tragic wars of the Yugoslav succession, by and large concerned the keeping of the Cold War promise to create a Europe that was whole and free. Therefore, the emphasis – the focus, if you like – having been on a defensive Europe during the Cold War was at that time on the security of Europe, the organisation thereof.

This strategic concept is most decidedly not about the creation of a global NATO. Heaven forbid! The organisation is not ready for it nor is I suspect the world. But it is about NATO in the world. That is what makes this effort so different from previous efforts. More specifically, what Europeans are prepared to do to support America's global security role and whether they offer enough to keep America engaged in European security.

Now why is that? Because for all the talk of European defence – and I have been involved in this process working for the EU for several years – we Europeans, we non-Russian Europeans are not prepared to spend the money required to create a wholly European security and defence effort. We are simply not. And like it or not, if we are not we are going to rely for the security of many of our fundamental interests upon the Americas. It is time that we Europeans are honest about that. Either we put up or we shut up and to some extent the strategic concept will indeed be about that.

So, let me first try to answer the pivotal question of the heart of this strategic concept, which particularly for younger generations who did not grow up in the Cold War as I did is a question that we have to address: what is NATO for today? Mr. Kosachev touched on this issue. What indeed is NATO for? It is a question that we should answer.

Essentially, the Alliance is about anything that we, the allies, believe is big enough and dangerous enough that requires a major military-led effort over time and distance. I am not going to move around this basic issue; it is ultimately about the aggregation, the organisation and the application of military-based security power in pursuit of stability but in pursuit of our common interests and values. And we have common interests and values. We have fundamental interest. We are nation states. We have legitimate interests, be they expressed through the Alliance, through the Union, through the United Nations.

But there is a broader issue here that one sees in Afghanistan. The security architecture that we the West created, particularly the United Nations, designed to ensure that extreme state behaviour did not lead to the kind of chaos we saw twice in this continent in the last century is not repeated elsewhere. Credible military power still has a fundamental role in the credibility of security and stability, underpinning institutional effect. That is the vital legitimacy. You cannot be effective in this environment without legitimacy. But you also cannot be effective in this environment without credible power and that must be at the heart of this strategic concept.

Now of course, there is Afghanistan. It is difficult for us to talk about multiple NATO futures whilst Afghanistan is entering the most critical eighteen months of the campaign. I spend much of my life in Washington these days heading up a project for the Atlantic Council on the Strategic Advisors Group on the NATO strategic concept. Much of my work is on Afghanistan with the British. It is difficult, as I have said, for us to make that progress without unity of purpose and unity of ambition over the key eighteen months that we are now entering. Unless we understand that reality that this next eighteen months' period will make or break this

mission I fear we are in for a very rocky road in trying to design and construct a strategic concept.

Solidarity is at the heart of this process. I know how sensitive Washington, London and The Hague understandably are on this issue because ultimately an Alliance must stand the solidarity test. Only for so long can a few members do most of the dying at the sharp end of a NATO-operation. I am sorry again to be so blunt but that is the reality. We must understand that this is part of this debate over the NATO strategic concept.

One must understand that the issue of solidarity, the issue of the new NATO shopping list will be intrinsically shaped by what happens in Afghanistan. I suppose if I was being devil's advocate I would ask «is this the right time to be asking big strategic questions when we have Afghanistan to, as it were, make progress in?» Well, it will certainly shape our thinking as much of our resources are engaged therein.

But there is a flipside to this and there is a real paradox that governments face, European and North American governments. There is a genuine problem of what to plan for. I hear a lot of people talking about threats, WMD proliferation, catastrophic terrorism, a resurgent Russia, more stabilisation and reconstruction, et cetera. In fact, by historic standards these so-called threats are in fact risks and therein lies the problem. Any one or combination of these risks could in time become threats. But we don't know which ones are indeed likely to become threats. There are many different views on where the centre of gravity of future global insecurity is going to be. The problem is, if we make hard choices now and particularly about what military forces we need – because what decisions we make now will only bear fruit in ten or fifteen years' time – and we find in ten or fifteen years' time in fact the world is not as we had envisaged it, then we will try to make do with what we got in circumstances which are entirely different. To some extent you see that with the American forces today; they brought all the hallmarks of the 1990's in which you needed ever leaner, ever smaller forces to be ever more projectable and ever more technological. But what you need in Afghanistan right now is boots, large numbers of boots to cover space to bring stability. There is a genuine dilemma at the heart of the NATO strategic concept process because it must lead to guidance about what in future forces that we will need thereafter.

And indeed, what forces do we need as part of a broad security policy? I always find it bizarre the idea that we can plan some military forces without understanding their component role within the broader national civilian effort. What security establishments do we need in our countries? What civilian security establishments are vital to stability? After all, we are strategic stabilisers. The purpose of the Atlantic Alliance today is as the cornerstone of global stability. Much of the world today is dependent on the Atlantic Alliance maintaining that credible role.

But that is first and foremost a civilian role. It is a diplomatic role, it is an economic role, it is aid and development. Only when one has made strategic judgments about that effort can one then decide what kind of military forces we need. I wonder whether, again, the strategic concept will address fundamental planning issues, which indeed it should.

So, with the best will in the world and given that we are engaged in Afghanistan, given that the strategic landscape is divers, complicated but unclear I would suggest to you that the strategic concept will be a holding concept. Concepts these days tend to last about ten years. They have a shelf-life of ten years. We had 1991, then 1999, we will have 2010 and we

will almost certainly have 2020. They are in a sense decennial planning documents designed to offer overarching political guidance to that effort. So again, in ten years' time it might be that we have a more clear strategic landscape that we do not have today.

Then there is the Alliance itself. I was at a Luxembourg meeting last week with the Expert Group. What struck me was how everybody has a shopping list. Everybody seems to add things on to NATO but no one ever takes anything away. I had a rather naive intervention there when I pointed out that many of us are really broke. In 2020, what I would like to know, is what will NATO be doing, what will its core purpose be but above all what will NATO no longer be doing? It is a core question because NATO cannot simply keep adding on, bits here, bits there, to keep every member satisfied and every constituency satisfied. One ends up with a little bit of everything but not much of anything in the military realm. What does that mean? That is not a theoretical discussion. I spent two days with the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps as the political advisor to the commander. I have spoken to Richard Shear, the general in charge, over dinner and he made the very point to me that when these questions are not addressed it simply transfers risks down the command chain to his people in the field end up trying to make bad strategy work with not enough resources and not enough interoperability and interaction. The Alliance must address these fundamental responsibilities. I say to many of you in this room as senior politicians that ultimately it is your responsibility that you do so. This concept process is not merely theoretical.

I am pleased the Expert Group has been formed although the original idea were to have a kind of small Harmel-wise person group of real experts, looking at the future of the Alliance. At one stage, I feared there might be 28 Harmels, which would not only have been unworkable – with due respect to a certain country of the south of the Netherlands – but the idea of 28 Belgians deciding the future of NATO might not quite have generated the big picture that we need right now. And it is the big picture we do indeed need right now.

Thankfully, there are only 14 but can they fashion a working consensus? There is one additional problem here that we Europeans need to be fundamentally aware of. We all tend to think the problem is finding a European consensus. It is a very Eurocentric problem; we have become so self-obsessed, particularly in Western Europe, over the last 50–60 years that we find it very hard to look beyond our own inner workings. The more time I spend in Washington as part of the Strategic Advisors Group the more it convinces me that we need to work on the Americans. We cannot take the United States' support for NATO for granted. Increasingly, the centre of gravity of their military effort is CENTCOM, Central Command. There are many officers in the Pentagon in CENTCOM who have no experience of the Alliance, little respect for it and even less understanding of Europeans. This will probably become very much to the fore in the next eighteen months in Afghanistan. We still need to convince them and must not take them for granted. Moreover, the new Secretary-General has spent a lot of critical capital on driving this process of preparation of the strategic concept out of the private office. That is a big risk. My sense is that if by the Lisbon summit of November next year he has not delivered a substantive strategic concept and progress on Afghanistan his own position will be under pressure as the North Atlantic Council tries to take back the process out of the private office. This is a genuine tension inside the Alliance, which capitals need to be aware of.

So let me, Mr. de Graaf, if I can begin the process of concluding. You will note the long winded way in which we British tend to wind up by telling

you what I think NATO needs to be good at by 2020. That is what this concept is ultimately about: what NATO needs to be good at by 2020. As I said, its basic mission would be to focus on big aspects of our military security, which is not the European Union. It is ultimately a military alliance, which requires American partnership. To some extent it will be about ensuring the Americans remain strong in world hotspots, like ensuring at the very minimum that we Europeans are credible in and around Europe. The Americans are overstretched. I was in Beijing and New Delhi recently; despite the headlines they are happy for a strong United States in East Asia because if the Americans weaken the arms' race currently underway it would get out of control. That is the role the Americans play. In essence, our mission is to keep them strong elsewhere by getting strong and credible here, working with partners like Russia to ensure that Europe, which by the way for the first 500 years in its history is neither the centre of world power nor the source of conflict. In some ways, we are a strategic backwater, which I think we find quite hard to understand but indeed, we are. Keeping America strong is one central mission, vital to our own security.

Specifically, NATO will have to be credible in the following areas. Some of this will be necessarily provocative for the sake of debate.

1. Whilst we need to continue to remember the Treaty language of Article 5 that talks of armed attack, the precedent established on 12th September 2001 probably means that Article 5 will now be interpreted as any major event with grave consequences. It is ultimately a political decision. The automaticity is not as it was. But make no mistake; there are clear red lines. Any country needs to understand this, that we will defend all our members, whoever they are and where they are, in the event of armed attack. What does that mean? Does that mean that cyber defence is part of that process? I don't know. Catastrophic terrorism? Missile attack? We have a genuine problem of old technology now. A nuclear, chemical, biological missile delivery? These are all 60–70 years old. Show me in a globalised market where old technology does not proliferate. It is not just an issue of intent, it is an issue of access. The very genuine reality of small organised rich terrorist groups, funded by massive flows of illicit criminal capital, gaining access to destructive technology is a very real one. That affects all our states.
2. Whilst we need to do all we can to strengthen arms' control in general and the Non-Proliferation Treaty in particular I do not see president Obama's call for general nuclear disarmament as in the short term realistic. Indeed, we can well see several first generation nuclear armed forces around the Euro-Atlantic community by 2020 and NATO will need a credible deterrent policy. Nuclear deterrence is coming back into the work of the Alliance.
3. There may be occasions when we need to intervene with conventional forces to pre-empt the use of weapons of mass destruction, of course under UN mandate and that will mean the generation of sufficient and credible numbers of specialist deployable forces. We will need those specialised forces who can go in quickly in such circumstances.
4. It is easy to say that there will be no more Afghanistans but fail states are a fundamental security interest. We cannot just simply pretend that it is no longer our business. We do have values. Part of the genuine dilemma that we in the West face today is that we do confuse our interest and our values and quite rightly so! There is not just things that we need to do, there is a way in which we need to do it, if we are

to uphold the international system that we created, the international system of institutional governance, based on values of which we were the articles. That means that we will need to be able to act as effective stabilisers and constructors. I very much hope that in the language of the concept much of the work of the Dutch, and particularly the three Ds, is clearly apparent, because so much expertise, civil and military, will be central to the effect and the credibility of the Alliance in the future. Much of the work I am doing with the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps is about plugging in to civilian partners effectively, getting civilians early in the campaign planning cycle, which will be pivotal to effect in the future and ultimately, this is where the NATO-EU relationship has to have meaning.

I sometimes have problems with some of my compatriots in London about this, by no means all. If the ESDP will matter it will matter to NATO. Why? Because the flag one puts on an operation in complex environments is almost as important as the force that one deploys. The political identity that one communicates, who you are when you go to do something in somebody else's backyard is vital to the mission and state that one is trying to achieve. There are clearly places where a NATO flag – or dare I say an American flag – would be inappropriate but an EU-flag would be a more efficient way of bringing stability and security. I am sure my Russian colleague would agree with that. There are places where an EU-flag would be more acceptable than a NATO-flag.

5. Effective interoperability between NATO militaries and those that wish to join us. There are many who wish to join us. When I travel the world and speak to various governments and if you would have been in Afghanistan alongside the coalition I get the same message. None of them want to join NATO but they do not want to reinvent the wheel every time they go on operations with NATO forces. They do not want to have to go through the painful process of learning how NATO does things. I believe that NATO Command and Control, the whole body of knowledge built up over many decades is NATO's fundamental exportable product for the efficient generation and use of stabilisation forces. By the way, that also goes for CENTCOM. If I could call for anything right now it would be a NATO CENTCOM meeting, so that CENTCOM understands they are simply producing an American plan. A big four star American headquarters and trying to fit all other countries in a coalition into the American way of doing military business is not an efficient way of going about. That is what NATO is for and should be used as such.
6. Above all, NATO must remain the place where North Americans and Europeans grip reality and not avoid it. I hope that we have the political courage with this concept to grip change and reality. Mr. Kosachev is right, the world is moving on. The Cold War is well over. There is much change going on in which we are partners and must be partners. But I would like to see the political courage in that document that says that we have gripped that. The Alliance must remain the Transatlantic security forum and the focal point of collective knowledge and understanding of the very complex and potentially dangerous environment into which we are moving. Because sadly, as a historian I am convinced the world will be more dangerous in 2020 than it is today.

Before I make my closing statement let me confront the issue of Russia head on. It has been a great honour to share the platform with Mr. Kosachev and I said I agree with much that he had said. The Cold War is,

as I have said, over. But the next ten years or so will be the test to the NATO-Russian relationship. If too much of your public are seeing NATO as «the enemy», which we find bizarre, too many of our own people find Russia's behaviour inconsistent. We find too often a gap between that declared policy and reality. If we are to build that partnership, which I believe and many believe fundamental to the stability of Europe and beyond the next ten years we are going to have to work hard at better understanding each other. Last year's events in Georgia made that sell harder, make no mistake of that! We are essential partners. As an Englishman I have always found it hard to understand why Russians do not recognise that the one stable border Russians have is with their partners to the West. Or I look around Russia's borders, to the South and the East, I see a sea of instability. I recognise Russia's support over Afghanistan for which we are deeply grateful. I recognise Russia's support over a host of other issues, increasingly over Iran and the issue of Iranian nuclear policy but I do believe we have to put the past behind us, the clichés that we trade backwards and forwards: Russians believing that somehow the West sold Russia out in the 1990s – we did not – and somehow the West believing that Russia is hell-bent on becoming a resurgent Soviet-style state. It is not. So, that dialogue will be fundamental.

The triumph of hope over experience? Well, not quite. Ultimately, a strategic concept is about three constituencies. First, politicians, i.e. you, second, practitioners and third publics.

First, a good strategic contract renews the contract between the political class and security practitioners, demonstrating to the practitioners that the politicians have gripped reality and will not even require to be credible in dealing with that reality and that the latter can demonstrate to their political masters that they understand how to organise effectively to cope with it within the financial and economic constraints, which are reality. That is the first mission of a strategic concept.

Second, a good strategic concept conveys to nervous publics that politicians and practitioners are capable of good leaderships in this area. Recently, I have heard much about twittering and blogging and sending messages out to the 25-years old and anything else. Yes, that is important. I am worried that so many of the people involved in this business are like me over 50: we need our younger generation to engage. I am very happy to see several members of the younger generation involved here. But ultimately, we cannot escape the fundamental reality that security is an elite-led process. It is up to the elite to get it right first. It is called leadership. It is not right for elite to say «we can't do this» or «we can't do that because of public opinion.» It is time to lead.

Finally, it must enshrine and reinforce the contract at the heart of the Atlantic Alliance, which was first mooted on the decks of HMS Prince of Wales in 1941. I hasten to add that sadly six months later HMS Prince of Wales sunk. It is perhaps not the most auspicious start but Roosevelt and Churchill, when they sat down back in 1941 understood this: the essential contract for the post-World War to Europe was that the weaker would be afforded the security of the stronger in return to the equitable sharing of responsibilities. That is ultimately what an Alliance is about. It is about solidarity. We cannot again avoid that over time because it will simply suck the credibility out of the entire process. By the way, if the Alliance does see that solidarity in action in Afghanistan I find it very hard believe that ESDP will survive in a meaningful form either. It is the fundamental issue of alliance.

Yet, a 2010 strategic concept passes those tests that it be worthy of the men of vision who founded this alliance sixty years ago. So the question I have for you is simple: are you up to it?

Thank you very much!
(Applause)

Mr. **de Graaf**: Thank you, professor, for your very interesting contribution to this symposium. I understand that you have to leave us earlier.

Mr. **Lindley-French**: Regrettably so. I have to go to Latvia.

Mr. **de Graaf**: Thank you again! We will have a short coffee break now.

Coffee break

Mr. **de Graaf**: Ladies and gentlemen, welcome back. Before I give the floor to the third speaker today you might ask where the audience fits in into the discussion till now. After the third speaker I will give the floor to the three discussants to my right side and I suggest that from that moment interruptions are possible and that you can ask questions, either to the discussants or to Mr. Kosachev and Mr. Klijn. Professor French has already left.

Let me now introduce the third speaker to this symposium, Mr. Hugo Klijn, who will illuminate the Netherlands' relationship with NATO, providing both a brief historical account as well as the Dutch perspective on NATO's future development. He is particularly well-placed to do so, serving as a diplomat with the Dutch ministry of Foreign Affairs since 1990 with postings to Moscow, Belgrade and the Permanent Representation to NATO. Mr. Klijn was intimately involved with the creation of the 1999 security strategy and has just published a policy brief on NATO's new strategic concept with the Clingendael Institute this month. He is presently seconded to Clingendael and will speak in that capacity and not as an official of the ministry.

KEY NOTE ADDRESS BY MR. HUGO KLIJN

Senior Researcher, Clingendael Security and Conflict Programme

Mr. **Klijn**: Thank you very much for your introduction and thank you for inviting me to this distinguished audience and the Symposium NATO at 60 – the future ahead.

Most people at 60 start thinking about retirement, maybe not necessarily now in the Netherlands with the looming debate on pushing the retirement age a little bit further but certain as military alliances go 60 it is a very respectable age.

Not NATO. NATO is not thinking about retirement but for the third time after the end of the Cold War it is trying to rejuvenate and that will take place in a process that should lead to the adoption of a new strategic concept at a summit, which will take place at the end of next year, presumably in the city of Lisbon. So, there is another Lisbon strategy coming, to add to the confusion.

As Mr. de Graaf said, I will dwell a little bit on history, the Netherlands and NATO and then touch on a couple of issues that are relevant to the Netherlands when it comes to NATO's future and indeed, not giving a formal

position but rather as an educated guess at what the Netherlands' position may be.

Looking back into history, obviously World War 2 abruptly ended a sustained period of aloofness from international politics and the status of neutrality that served the Netherlands quite well for a long period of time. The war was a wake-up call for the Netherlands to the real world and to a large extent a wake-up call to its Hinterland, whereas traditionally the outlook of the Netherlands, previously being a sea-born maritime commercial empire, has been Atlantic and – if you will – Anglo-Saxon rather than dealing with its Hinterland. That was not possible anymore after the German invasion and soon after the war the thinking came about some collective defence mechanism, particularly important for a smaller country like the Netherlands.

There was something before NATO. In 1948 five countries – the Benelux countries, France and the United Kingdom – signed a Brussels treaty in March, 1948. The treaty can be read as a kind of letter of intent to establish a collective defence mechanism. It contained an article 4, which even proved to be stricter than the subsequent Article 5 of the NATO Treaty. Article 5 of the NATO Treaty says that any ally in case of an armed attack against one of them should take the action it deems necessary. There is still an escape route if you think it is not necessary to do anything at all. Not so in the Brussels Treaty: you have to act to your abilities. In September, 1948 a defence organisation was established with Field Marshall Montgomery as a kind of SACEUR *avant la lettre*. The development in Eastern Europe prompted this getting together of five countries. The next year, 1949, obviously this Brussels mechanism was overtaken by the Washington Treaty and that was signed the five countries of the Brussels Treaty, the US and Canada. Subsequently Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway and Portugal joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.

The European debate on collective defence was not over yet and there was a serious effort to create a European defence community that would include Western Germany. Churchill was one of the initiators of this, so there was a debate going on after the establishment of NATO. As you may remember, this project came to an end when the French Assemblée Nationale, allegedly whilst singing the Marseillaise, refused to ratify this document. But still, thereafter there have been efforts in Europe to take care of security. The Brussels Treaty later on merged into the Western European Union and at a later stage, 1997, the Western European Union – Europe's famous sleeping beauty – merged into ESDP, the European Security and Defence Policy, where it sits now.

In this debate on European security the Netherlands has always been cautious. Whenever there was an effort to define a more operational role for the Western European Union it met with resistance from the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and from a greater distance from the United States as well.

What was NATO for the Netherlands? Obviously, it served as a counterweight to the Soviet Union as from 1955 the Warsaw Pact. It provided a security umbrella under which European reconciliation and ultimately integration could take place, which also was an important feature of the Alliance for the Netherlands. So, the purpose was two-fold: no EU without NATO. But then again, the outlook of the Netherlands, security wise, remained staunchly Transatlantic and I would say this still holds true. When it comes to security, especially hard security, the Netherlands despite being an enthusiast of further developing the European security and defence policy remains a truly Transatlantic partner. Our security is

something that should include the United States rather than something to be left to European countries.

What was NATO to the Netherlands after the end of the Cold War? In the general sense, obviously for smaller countries like the Netherlands, multi-lateral fora are important as channels for expressing themselves diplomatically and politically. Therefore, NATO and the EU remain important for the Netherlands. Furthermore, NATO for the Netherlands always has been and still is an important vehicle for moulding its bilateral relationship with the United States. The Netherlands and the United States have strong historic ties and commercial interests. For the traditional maritime and maybe even Anglo-Saxon outlook of the Netherlands this Transatlantic forum, including the United States always has been and still is important for the Netherlands. That is why the Netherlands in the post-Cold War era of NATO, actually when NATO finally started doing things operationally, has always been an active participant, first in the Balkans and later on, until today, in Afghanistan but also in other US-led coalitions, like involvement in Iraq and also participation at times in the US Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. So, the Netherlands is constantly punching above its weight within NATO to get the occasional US pat on the back. I think that still holds true as well.

Next to that, NATO became the organisation of choice for peace-keeping operations. Everybody will vividly remember the disastrous UN mission in Bosnia, when the Netherlands were heavily involved in the Srebrenica-tragedy. After that, the argument ran «no more fuzzy command lines». It is better to be operationally involved in NATO's framework where you do not suffer from political and military ambiguity.

My next comment is about the future of NATO. NATO at 60 now preparing itself to discuss another, new strategy, an updated strategy that should have a validity for the next ten years. I will dwell upon some of the issues that will stir debate during the process of the strategic concept and I will try and inform you about a position the Netherlands is likely to take in this respect.

I think it is fair to say that the Netherlands was not the initiator of a new strategic concept. With now 28 member states discussing your purposes and tasks may indeed be a very cumbersome process. You may open a Pandora's box and all the issues on which the allies are divided will come to the surface. NATO had a similar period after the US invasion of Iraq. The effort by some European countries to establish autonomous military headquarters and the debate of that period, especially between the US on the one side and France on the other side, is still very alive in the minds of many people. It is bad for NATO's solidarity if you tackle all these issues. But then again, finally it was decided it may be even better to contain all this divisiveness amongst the allies within a managed process of writing a new strategic concept. The Russian-Georgian war in August 2008 played its role, where obviously allies reacted very differently to what was going on and to what NATO might or might not do. There was a debate going on between NATO's founding members and NATO's newcomers and then common sense prevailed to try and contain all these different views in writing a new concept to at least be able to manage the process from within and to not have the discussion raised by the media.

What will the Netherlands do when it comes to this new strategic concept? The Netherlands will like to stress the political role of NATO. NATO is a politico-military alliance; politicians, the privacy, although it is often regarded as a military alliance but given the fact that the Netherlands attach great importance to NATO as the primary Transatlantic forum

where European and North American allies sit together I think the Netherlands will like to stress maybe an even more political role of NATO, the North Atlantic Council as a forum to discuss issues even if there is no likelihood of operational involvement. You may want to discuss Iran in the North Atlantic Council even if nobody contemplates any operational involvement of NATO and also displaying NATO as a solidarity and values-based community of now 28 democracies that look at the world and discuss issues. Furthermore, there is a debate going on between the 28 allies of NATO about whether NATO is primarily still a collective self-defence organisation or more a collective security organisation. It is actually a false debate because collective self-defence and collective security are part and parcel of the same complex. It has come to the fore by the new entries into NATO who primarily joined the Alliance because of its Article 5 mutual assistance clause, whereas some of the older NATO members rather see NATO developing into a more collective security organisation that is not primarily focused on preparing for Article 5 situations but rather on projecting stability outside its own territory. Actually «Non-Article 5 operations» – the operations NATO mostly does – is a misleading term because there is only one Article 5 operation that NATO is doing right now and it is a largely unknown maritime operation in the Mediterranean «Active Endeavour». So, in the process of writing a new strategic concept NATO should maybe be also more imaginative in naming and branding its operations. If you keep saying «non-Article 5» it presumes that Article 5 is standard and non-Article 5 is the exception. It is rather the other way around.

The Netherlands is clearly on the side of collective security rather than collective defence. I think its geographical location has to do with that. The Netherlands is not terribly bothered by Article 5 situations. Though only recently it has been evoked for the very first time in the history of the Alliance it was largely a symbolical gesture, not even proposed by the Americans themselves. In practice, it did not amount to much. A few Awacs planes and that was about it. It was rather expressing solidarity with the United States than anything else.

The Netherlands would like to stress the non-Article 5 activities of NATO. For the time being let's call it the non-Article 5 activities. These are preventive operations outside of area but also other export products by NATO, like Security Sector Reforms (SSRs), capacity building, logistical support, pretty much what NATO has been doing for the African Union in its operation in Sudan. With those products you are projecting your knowledge and your skills and you are helping other organisations. Again, collective security may be seen as a kind a forward-collect defence. So, the debate is pretty false but still it is very vivid and countries take strong opinions on this.

That does not say that Article 5 is not important. Obviously, it is the foundation on which the Alliance is built. You have a commitment towards each other and on the basis of that you can be a collective security organisation. So, you should maintain your Article 5. I do not think it is any use to re-write the article because ultimately, like one of the previous speakers said, it is always a political decision. In 2001 the attack was deemed to be illegible for Article 5, though it was not a classical armed attack in the sense the writers of the 1949 Treaty had in mind.

You may want to have a look at Article 6, which still geographically limits Article 5 to the area North of the Tropic of Cancer. That is a little bit odd; just imagine that the NATO Response Force, when they held a large exercise on the Cape Verde Islands, during which they got their operational capability label had been attacked: technically, NATO would not have been able to invoke Article 5. The Article 6 geographical limitation is pretty much instated just after the Second World War, so you may want to have

a look at that. Otherwise, do not touch on Article 5.

This whole debate about the proponents of collective defence versus collective security obviously has to do with the perception of Russia. Arguably, this is the biggest fault line currently within the Alliance. In this debate, the Netherlands is clearly on the partnership side of the equation and in that sense, I guess the Netherlands has been heartened by the first public speech by the Secretary General, who really wants to be serious about a true strategic partnership with Russia. It is not on top of every Secretary-General's agenda but Rasmussen coming out in his first public speech so fervently in favour of further elaborating this relationship is something the Netherlands likes to hear.

That also has to do with the fact that the Netherlands does not in any sense feel threatened by the Russian Federation and the general policy line is that it is better to tie Russia in than antagonise it. Therefore, I think the Netherlands is quite favourable to discussing the security architecture proposals by president Medvedev, although at this stage maybe not very mature yet but they merit debate. It remains to be seen whether the OECE is the appropriate forum to raise this debate but anyhow, it is an important debate, a discussion that should be held at the same time the Netherlands will stress the further elaboration of the NATO-Russia Council, which has great potential but which has not been tapped yet. In that sense also the NATO-Russia Council should be a security table at which no subjects for debate are off-limit. If the Medvedev-proposals show anything it is the need by Russia to have a seat at security tables that matter. I think the NATO-Russia Council has the potential of becoming one such relevant security table.

It is a small step to the discussion about enlargement because in my view moulding it through strategic partnership with the Russian Federation does not sit well together with having Georgia and Ukraine joining the Alliance. These are two policy goals, which are mutually exclusive. Of course, we all have to live – including the Netherlands – with the declaration of the Bucharest summit, the April 2008 summit, where the North Atlantic Council at the level of the heads of state and government agreed that these two countries, being Georgia and the Ukraine, will become members of NATO. Actually, an unprecedented decision by NATO because in the same paragraph it says that these countries do not qualify yet for the Membership Action Plan. Apparently they do qualify for ultimate membership and I think that the North Atlantic Council slightly overstepped its mandate. NATO cannot decide that countries will become members. It can invite countries to become members, because you still have domestic procedures. Ukraine has always announced that there would be a referendum on that issue and furthermore, you will have 28 parliamentary ratification procedures in the allied capitals themselves. But apparently, the heads of state and government that kicked diplomats out of the room and started drafting this paragraph 23 and got a little bit carried away with their diplomatic work and came forward with this ill-formulated compromise. Then obviously, it is for the diplomats very difficult to say that it is totally impossible what they have just written down.

There are good arguments to not make haste with implementing this decision. The Netherlands has really become a criteria-based country when it comes to enlargement, be it EU or NATO. Article 10 of the Washington Treaty says that any enlargement should contribute to security in the North Atlantic area. In my view, it is obvious that a speedy membership of Georgia and Ukraine will not contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area. I would say this is not about granting NATO decision making powers to Moscow but this is about preserving the Alliance and the foundation of your Alliance, your Article 5 mutual assistance clause. Are you going to die for Tsinvali, the capital of South Ossetia, or are you not? That is actually the question it all boils down to.

On enlargement other than with Georgia and Ukraine the Netherlands also seems to be a very cautious partner these days. Even the application for the Membership Action Plan by Montenegro and Bosnia Herzegovina is controversial in the Netherlands because these applications in the Netherlands are largely seen through the prism of EU-enlargement. The argument runs that you first knock on NATO's door and then it is very difficult to not open the EU-door after, since the Euro-Atlantic institutions are usually seen as one complex. Apparently, in parliament this attitude is being applauded. Personally, I do not think it is a very strategic position when you really want to stabilise and finish your business in the Western Balkans. NATO membership of ultimately all these countries, which is not as controversial as Georgia and Ukraine, is something you should grant. When you think strategically you should not be too difficult about the applications of these smaller countries.

NATO has a host of partnerships and I think that the Netherlands is among those countries who want to take a closer look at the current patchwork of partnerships, apart from the privileged partnerships with Russia, Ukraine and Georgia now. There are an awful lot of other fora, a Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the political umbrella for the Partnership for Peace. Nobody at NATO is really able today to explain what added value the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council has, where Sweden and Switzerland sit next to Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. I think they would like to have a look at trying to streamline the partnerships that NATO has. Furthermore, my guess is that the Netherlands would like to urge NATO to be more generous towards other organisations with a security dimension. Over the last years, there have been repeated efforts by the Collective Security Treaty Organisation to intensify the relationship with NATO. This has been met with resistance, primarily from the United States but also from some other countries. The Netherlands would rather like to open more the discussion towards the CSTO but also to the Shanghai Corporation Organisation. You may not agree on every single issue but given the fact that NATO is now so heavily involved in Afghanistan, its self proclaimed key priority of the moment, and you have all these countries surrounding this theatre willing to talk security, it is in your own interest to be more generous and improve your relationship with both organisations that have such a strong regional impact in that part of the world. When it comes to other inter-organisational relationships the Netherlands obviously wants to improve NATO-EU. With 21 overlapping memberships it is very difficult to explain why this relationship is still so thorny. They meet everywhere, they meet in the Balkans, they meet in Afghanistan but it still is a very difficult relationship. Obviously, NATO or the Netherlands is not going to solve the political deadlock over Turkey and Cyprus, but in the meantime we should work as hard as possible to have these two organisations better work together. If the international community is serious about a comprehensive approach to crisis management then especially NATO and the EU have to work together. I stress it is something of the international community; it is not a «NATO-thing». NATO is part of a comprehensive approach or 3D or sometimes misnamed the famous «Dutch approach». It is not really Dutch, it is Canadian in origin. But also the US is more receptive to work harder on this approach. It is an approach by the international community that if you want to make it work it is especially NATO and the EU that have to work together, not in a competitive sense but to focus on those things they are good at. So, NATO should not start developing civilian capabilities nor should the EU – and certainly not at this stage – aspire to play a strategic military role. They should look for where the two closely fit together and work better together.

Once again, when it comes to harder security the Netherlands will keep betting on NATO when it comes to ESDP and enlargement despite being an EU-enthusiast.

Another looming debate is NATO's nuclear policy. Obviously, after the Prague speech last April by president Obama where he pleaded in favour of reducing the role of nuclear weapons with the final goal of abolishing them altogether, this has sparked a lot of debate, also domestically. I do not think NATO's strategic concept will dramatically change. Besides, NATO is not in the driver seat. At the end of this year the US will come forward with a nuclear review and next spring there will be the Non-Proliferation Treaty review conference. But at least, the Netherlands will want to make sure that the impetus to the debate on disarmament is translated into the strategic concept. Obviously, the Netherlands being involved in Afghanistan is all in favour of more deployable forces, common funding mechanisms and what have you. Finally, I think the Netherlands is also in favour of keeping the new strategic concept realistic and, to a certain extent, modest. Much of what is written about the current strategy still holds true. NATO is not going to be a leading agent when it comes to climate change and demographic trends, etc. So, stick to what you are good at.

As a final remark, NATO will remain the quintessential security forum and the quintessential transatlantic body for the Netherlands for the foreseeable future. As Robert Kaplan recently said: «Decline is an overrated concept». The world is changing but may be not as fast as some of us like to believe. So, stick to what you have and don't throw away your old shoes before you buy new ones. By and large, that will be the main attitude of the Netherlands when it comes to NATO's immediate future. Thank you very much!

(applause)

Mr. de Graaf: Thank you very much for your contribution to this symposium.

Ladies and gentlemen, we will now have three discussants briefly commenting the speeches of the three key note speakers. The first will be the former Major General Frank van Kappen. He is a liberal senator. He served the Royal Marines in the UK, the US and the Caribbean. He was a military advisor for the former UN Secretary General and he is an advisor to NATO since 2003.

The second is Dr. Arjan Vliegenthart, senator for the socialist party and the principal organiser of this symposium. He is working at the socialist party scientific bureau. He published extensively on foreign policy issues and he is a member of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly.

Last but not least our colleague, Henk Jan Ormel. He is member of the House of Representatives and chairman of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives. He is also Vice President of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly.

Ladies and gentlemen. From this moment on you can interrupt and ask questions to the discussants or the principal speakers if you wish. When you do, please use the microphone and state your name.

Let me invite Mr. van Kappen for a short reaction to the three key note speakers.

COMMENTS BY THE DISCUSSANTS:

FRANK VAN KAPPEN, Major-General (ret), Senator, Advisor to NATO and consultant to The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies

Mr. van Kappen: Mr. Chairman. You emphasised «short», so I have to cut some corners here. I would like to compliment the three speakers on their intelligent and insightful speeches. There are many things to discuss, so I have to do some cherry-picking.

Let me start with the presentation of Mr. Kosachev. He emphasised the fact that the Cold War is over. However, in the perception of the people of the NATO-nations and Russia, the Cold War is still lingering. I think the Secretary-General of NATO, Mr. Rasmussen, put it right, he said: «Basically, after the fall of the Soviet Union we had unrealistic perceptions of each other.» That, I think, is very true. Is Russia a threat to NATO? Is NATO a threat to Russia? That is the big question. Do we really trust each other?

Let me put it this way. I believe that Russia will always be a factor in the complex security equation of Europe. Russia is just too big to ignore.

The other thing is that from a European perception, the most dangerous threat to Europe would be a long-term weakness of Russia. A weak Russia would impose a security threat from Vladivostok to Murmansk, this is just too big to handle. *That* is the biggest security threat if you look at Russia, a long-term weakness of Russia. A strong Russia, but an authoritarian ruled Russia, is only slightly better. It would impose a threat of a different nature, but it is only slightly better.

The best thing we can hope for is a strong, prosperous and democratic Russia with all the checks and balances in place. That is our best bet.

What is in the future? Only the Russians are in charge of their future. But I strongly believe that it is in the Russian and in the European interest to face the challenges of the future together. For the time being, I believe we should deal with each other in a very pragmatic way. Let's start with those issues that we share. Let's start with those threats or risks that are mutual and let's try to work it from there. That is the best way to build trust.

That brings me to the speech of Julian Lindley-French. I agree with most of what he said. However, I am far more pessimistic than he is. He believes that legitimate and credible military power will be relevant, also in the future. I agree with him. However, if you look at the big picture it does not make me very happy. I worked on the Multiple Futures project for NATO ACT and I also worked on the Future Policy Options Survey for the Netherlands. If you look in the future and try to be honest about it, it is a rather diffuse and unpredictable future that we face. We will have to face a comprehensive threat, a very difficult intertwined mix of defence and security threats. We have to be prepared for war on the geopolitical seams again; interstate wars. We thought that would be over, but that is not true. If you look at the future, you will see that on the geopolitical seams, with new powers like China and India, multiple stress zones might emerge where the chance of interstate war is highly likely.

At the same time, we have to be prepared not only to face states, but also non-state actors, organisations like the Taliban or Al-Qaeda. That creates a very complex mix; we have to be prepared to fight symmetric and asymmetric wars. At the same time, it is far more difficult to explain to our public what the real threat is. It is far more diffuse.

I agree with the fact that you can only counter this composite threat by a comprehensive approach. I therefore really would like to emphasise the fact that in a new strategic concept for NATO we should also embrace the European Union. These organisations are two natural strategic partners and they should really link arms. You need all elements of state power to face the composite threat in the future.

I believe that so far we have failed to adapt NATO to the ever increasing and changing security environment. The reason we failed so far, despite all the efforts of a lot of good people, is that we are dealing with different

perceptions of what NATO should be. If we do not overcome that problem NATO will become irrelevant; I think it is already five minutes to twelve. We really have to show some political guts and adapt NATO, so it can deal with the security challenges of the future.

Mr. Hugo Klijn emphasised the fact how the Netherlands tries to sail between Scylla and Charibdus and how we make our policy choices. He described the fact that we were disappointed in the UN. He did not say this in so many words, but it was very clear what he meant. I was the military advisor to the UN when we had all the problems in Bosnia and I know how the Netherlands reacted to after Srebrenica; we basically did not want to do UN operations anymore with confused command structures, etc. The proof of the pudding is in eating and therefore NATO is our partner of choice if we talk about security operations.

He also emphasised the fact that for the time being NATO will be a very important corner stone of our security policy. I agree with that view. However, I believe NATO really needs a fundamental overhaul. I further strongly believe that the Transatlantic Link with the United States is still extremely important. Mr. Kosachev also emphasised that. The new meaning of the cross-Atlantic or transatlantic relationship between Europe and the United States is that only together we have sufficient critical mass to face the challenges of the future. I would like to add, that it would be my dream – like Mr. Kosachev's – to include Russia in this security equation. I think this is also a necessity. I still believe that the dream of an overarching European security structure, where Russia, Europe and the transatlantic link are all integrated, is still far away. But let's start working on it and let's start working in a very pragmatic way, not by trying to find the differences between Russia and Europe or Russia and the NATO Alliance, but in trying to find what we share, trying to find the mutual threats that we both have to face. There are many such threats, threats to Russia that are a threat to us as well. Together we will have even more critical mass to survive the challenges of the future.

Thank you!
(Applause)

Arjan Vliedhart, Senator, member of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly

Mr. **Vliedhart**: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will also try to be brief. Two years ago former NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer called for a public debate on the new strategic concept. Developments worldwide at the beginning of the century have been such that the old strategic concept of the 1990s has, according to the judgment of the former Secretary-General, been overtaken. I think this point has been raised by all three speakers. The Cold War is over and we need to fundamentally rethink what NATO is about. Indeed, for my generation, as Julian Lindley-French pointed out, the idea that NATO is to keep the Americans in, the Russians out and the Germans down is something we have from textbooks and not as a lived, experienced reality.

How does that then relate to the strategic concept? I will try to get across a couple of things I have heard from the speakers. The basic question is: do we want to move beyond Afghanistan as the litmus test for the Alliance's right to exist, including all kinds of issues that we raised, like burden sharing, the notion of Triple D and the strategic concept or the strategic approaches to that? Do we want to move beyond it? Or do we want to have a new strategic concept that is basically experience-oriented, based on the current experience?

It would be a wasted opportunity if we would not move beyond it. We will have a strategic concept for two or three years, maybe five but within ten years we would need a new one. If you want to have a strategic concept with a more future-oriented view we at least need to address two different questions that have also been addressed by the subsequent speakers.

The first question is how NATO ought to engage in a global security architecture. How does it need to relate with the United Nations, with other international organisations and important countries such as Russia, China, India and Australia? In this debate should also figure the question to what extent NATO as the principal owner of military force can reconcile its interests with the interests of other states. If we want to have a discussion on that only then we will be able to get to a strategic concept that can hold at least somewhat longer than a decade.

I have no doubt there are different views about that. We heard different views from the three speakers. We heard about the difference between Western and Eastern Europe on collective security versus collective defence. We also heard the discussion on whether NATO needs the US or whether the US more principally need NATO. These questions need to be addressed if you want to have a fruitful and lasting strategic concept.

Finally, I think the debate on the future of NATO demands greater importance from the broad public and the political representatives. That is something that we as politicians need to do. It is precisely in a situation of rapid change that it has become evident that the future of NATO is very unstable and there I share the points made by Frank van Kappen. Along that, the future of the global architecture of security might very well be very unstable.

If we do not join this debate today and tomorrow we might face a strategic concept where the Dutch and the Dutch political scene have nothing to say. That would be a tragedy and an enormous waste of time.

Thank you!
(Applause)

Henk Jan Ormel, Chairman of the standing committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, Vice-President of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly

Mr. **Ormel**: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Coming from the House of Representatives it is an honour to stand here in the Senate for the first time. Thank you for giving me this opportunity. As we talk in the House of Representatives about working above the age of 65 I really appreciate we are talking about NATO functioning above the age of 60. I would also like to thank my partners, senators from the socialist party for making this possible.

I would like to make a few small remarks. First of all, NATO is an organisation defending the values of individual freedom, of freedom of speech, of freedom to live your life in security. In a way, democracy in itself is a security provider but as Professor Lindley-French stated, we need military security. And NATO is giving us military security. We have to think about how to organise ourselves and thereto we talk about the strategic concept. Not only a few wise men but we are also talking intensively about the strategic concept in the NATO Assembly. Members of parliament of all member states are involved in talking about this strategic concept. As we are controlling our governments the discussion in the NATO Assembly is important for the strategic concept.

There is too much to say about these discussions but in brief we can say we are talking about threats, though we had better talk about risks, as Professor Lindley-French pointed out. Those risks are the asymmetric threats, for example the threat of worldwide terror. There is also the feeling of security that is not monolithic anymore in the member states of NATO. And of course, we are talking about relations with a self-assured Russia. I am deeply honoured that my colleague from the State Duma is here, that I could listen to him and that I can have some discussions with him. Thank you, Mr. Kosachev.

As Mr. van Kappen already pointed out, a strong, prosperous and democratic Russia as a partner is what we wish. NATO is no threat to Russia and you know it. Maybe the values for sustaining democracies at the borders of Russia are a threat to some in the Russian Federation but according to Article 10, all European countries can become member of NATO. Russia is a European country, so if you ask for a special sentence in the new strategic concept, it is already in the Treaty. That means that this Article 10 – all European countries can become member of NATO – is for every sovereign European country. These relations do not have to go over Moscow. I think nobody wants a new Yalta!

The relations with the Russian Federation are too valuable to stock in dispute. I think we all have to work on this. I am ready, as one of the Vice Chairmen of NATO, to go together with you to the Russian media and explain why NATO is not an enemy. On the other hand, it is necessary that you go to some European countries. A fortnight ago I was in the city of Lviv in Western Ukraine. During the last century this city changed five times from state. I met young people, students. When they think about the way they are living today they say they are living in freedom because they are not occupied anymore. They were occupied until 1989. I think it is very important, not only for you but for the whole of Europe, that there will be some reconciliation process about what happened in the past century.

For the next century I am sure we will have a good relationship. I am not that pessimistic as Mr. van Kappen when he reacted to the words of Professor Lindley-French. Of course, there will be a lot of risks. We all know them. We know the risk of terrorism, of climate change and we know the risk of not having enough food. But we share those risks. If we see that and if we see that a strong NATO is needed to fight those risks or threats, then we will have a bright future ahead.

Thank you!
(Applause)

DISCUSSION

Mr. **de Graaf**: Ladies and gentlemen. The floor is open to discussion. If you have a question to the two keynote speakers or the three discussants, feel free to raise it. Again, please state your name and your background.

Mrs. **Bano** (Gender Concerns International): We are a Dutch-based organisation in The Hague. It is a privilege to be invited on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of NATO. We are also a partner of the Dutch government with 25 Dutch national action plans. We talk about the position of women in conflict areas, such as Afghanistan and Pakistan. Recently, with the Dutch ministry of Foreign Affairs we were able to have a regional conference in Kabul, where we invited women from the triangle of Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan and also from Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and India, because there is growing interest for a station among the women from the region to post the threats we talked about here. We ended the conference with

the Kabul Declaration, which was also a sort of response to the 31st March conference in the Hague about Afghanistan and the declaration prepared there.

On 7th July the Kabul Declaration was passed and all representatives from the international community were there, including European like Norwegian and Danish but also US representatives. We discussed the need between NATO and the women of the region to see what is happening at the level of the peacekeeping operations. There is concern about the way this operation goes on. It has implications for the need to address NATO from a gender perspective from two levels, first what is happening to the women being part of the peacekeeping forces – I will not elaborate on that – and secondly, the shopping list Professor Lindley-French talked about. My question is where gender is on that shopping list. It is time to include the consent of women, especially in Afghanistan. Thank you!

Mr. Ormel: Thank you for your question! Of course, gender is very important. As I stated, NATO is defending values and one of the most essential values is that of women to live their life and to feel secure. Two weeks ago I was in Afghanistan and there you see that women are involved in ISAF and are part of American troops and they are doing the same as their male colleagues. Also in sessions of the NATO Assembly we have a special session every six months about the role of women in the forces. This is partly initiated by a Dutch member of parliament, Angeline Eijssink from the labour party. Every assembly we are talking about the role of women in the forces. As far as it is about the position of women in Afghanistan I think one of the main reasons why NATO is there is because the Afghan people want us to be there. Half of the Afghan people are women and they do not want to go back to the era of the Taliban, where they are not allowed to leave their houses and cannot go to school. Besides fighting worldwide terror the position of women is well thought about.

Mr. Korteweg (The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies): Thank you for organising this very timely conference. I have a question to the referents as well as to Mr. Kosachev. Last year, in late 2008, our institute organised an online survey, an online discussion with approximately 300 policy-makers from North America and Europe, including Russia, regarding what are the primary challenges facing NATO in light of the upcoming strategic concept discussion. The debate today has already mentioned some of the items that also came up during these deliberations. We distilled from these deliberations eight primarily strategic dilemmas that read as a short list of the fundamental issues that NATO must confront in the new strategic concept. Obviously, the relationship with Russia is among them. So much for the shameless plugging of our research. You can find it on our website.

One of the questions I have on this is a topic that has not been mentioned today and that relates to energy security. Energy security has been identified by the participants and again, these are policy makers and officials from the NATO countries and beyond as one of the fundamental issues that NATO must address. If you look at the current mandate for energy security related operations it is a small by-sentence in the current strategic concept. How does the panel consider the role of energy security in a new strategic concept? What place should it have? Should it be part of a new interpretation of Article 5? Perhaps considerations should be made as to sharing energy solidarity, the supply of security among NATO nations? Also specifically to Mr. Kosachev: regarding a treaty on new European security and also given concerns of Eastern European nations regarding

the security policy of the Russian Federation, how do you see energy security to be an integral part of the proposals by Medvedev regarding a new contract on European security?

Mr. Kosachev: Thank you very much for this question. I will give you my general comment on energy security issues. I do believe that this is one of the principal questions of confidence, trust and prosperity in Europe. We need to build this infrastructure of our cooperation as soon as possible, because we do not have it now. A so-called energy charter, which is very popular in the European Union – not mentioning NATO – is not enough in our opinion, for the simple reason that we Russians we do not feel comfortable about this energy charter. Whether you like it or not, we need to have a construction where each and every participant will feel comfortable. That is not the case now, because the energy charter efficiently protects the consumers of energy but still has shortcomings for the producers of energy, like Russia. They hope that we will have a further debate on that and they believe that the energy security chapter will be on the future coming treaty and the European Union, because they believe it mostly belongs there, to our relations with the European Union rather than to our relations with NATO. This is my first comment.

Secondly, speaking about the treaty I believe that the initiative by Mr. Medvedev is foremost about the «hard» security, about issues like military cooperation and things like that. Again, if we would be able to communicate and to make agreements on this «hard» security area, yes, a further step maybe about energy security issues but not as the first step. The first step would still be the «hard» security.

Mr. van Kappen: Thank you, Mr. Korteweg, for your question. I am familiar with the project, so I know what you are talking about. Energy security is one of the most important issues that we have to face, although I have to say that water in the future will be even a bigger problem. In 30 years' time 70% of the world population will not have access to drinkable water if we do not don't act. Anyway, energy security is an important issue but it is a multidimensional issue. Part of the solution has to be found by technology. We have to find alternate sources of energy. That is not a job that NATO does; I think it is more in the realm of the European Union. We should concentrate our efforts in finding alternate sources of energy. But for the time being, we will be depending on mineral oils for a long, long time to come. For Europe, the dichotomy is that we are to a large extent depending on Russia for energy – about 40% nowadays – and we are depending on the US for protecting energy supplies coming from the greater Middle East. As Europe, we are not in an enviable position. I think we should take that problem much more serious but I do not think it is a NATO issue. A NATO issue is probably protection of sea lines of communication, tankers coming from the greater Middle East, around Africa, etc. That is the military side of it. But I think far more important is that you also need a diplomatic effort. The area where most of our energy resources are coming from, apart from Russia, is the greater Middle East. That is a highly unstable area. We have the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that has not been finished, we have Iraq and it is not finished. Iran is a big question mark, Afghanistan is not finished, we have Pakistan destabilising. In that area we see a whole bunch of countries that are not stable at all. There are a lot of analysts who believe that in Saudi Arabia the house of Saud might have seen its longest day. If Saudi Arabia destabilises we will have a major, major crises on our hands. The fact of the matter is that the military side is only one part of the equation. The other side is that we need far more diplomatic and political action to stabilise the region. You cannot stabilise the region only with military force.

You need military force, you need credible and legitimate military force, but you also need proper and consorted political action.

In addition we have to look at our relationship with Russia. As I said before, also the Netherlands is rather «double» in this. On the one hand we say «yes, as Europe we are too much depending on Russia for energy supplies» but on the other hand we struck a deal with the Russians that the Netherlands would become the big hub for the distribution of gas coming from Russia.

So, do we really trust Russia? Do we really trust Russia not to use energy as a weapon against us when we do something that they don't like? Will they cut the supply? That is the big fear on the background. Of course, the Russians say they will never do that. However, is that true? That is a big question mark. Here we have two areas, energy and security, for both we are depending on two large outside powers. We cannot protect the energy supplies coming from the greater Middle East without the military power of the US. The Europeans just do not have the military might to do that. On the other side we are depending to a large extent on Russia for our energy supply. Do we really trust Russia? I will leave it at that.

Mr. **de Graaf**: Some questions cannot be answered in this Symposium!

Mr. **Kosachev**: We have answers but that will take too much time! Next time.

Mr. **Eigeman** (PvdA, Eerste Kamer der Staten-Generaal): Thank you, Mr. Chairman and thank you also for the organisation of this wonderful conference. I have one question. Our starting point in the discussion is that we need military based security and that is why we need NATO. That is one starting point. The second starting point is that we are all the time talking about treaties between the nation states. All kinds of threats we are talking about are not coming from nation states but are coming from other powers. When we talk about energy supply, food, terror but also when we talk about big crime in the world, it is not nation state controlled. So, why do we need an organisation like NATO to give an answer to these questions in the coming years? The most interesting answer came from Mr. Kosachev, when he talked about a worldwide discussion about assessment on threats and risks. I think that is a very good thing but in the end there is still the question why do we need an organisation like NATO based on military security and based on nation states. My question is for all these gentlemen?

Mr. **Klijn**: We do not need NATO to address all these problems because NATO is ill-fitted to do anything food scarcity, climate change and demographic trends. Referring to the last question about the energy security I even feel the denomination of Mr. van der Veer as the former CEO of Royal Dutch Shell, the vice chair of the group of experts that will initiate the strategic concept process. He may have conveyed the wrong message that energy security is at the core of NATO's business. It is not. It is about protecting vital infrastructure for which you need military forces. But that can be any infrastructure, including energy infrastructure in times of crisis. Sometimes I get the feeling that the term «security» is taken as «hard security». Energy security is to secure supply of energy. When it comes to Russia there is an interest from our side to secure supply but there is an equal interest from the side of Russia to secure demand. Gazprom is primarily making money in Europe, so it is not a zero-sum game. It is much more that it binds us instead of divides us when it comes to the energy issue. That is why I plea for some realism and modesty when it comes to drafting a new concept. NATO should not be a global

player and should not be an instrument to address all misery, gloom and disaster in the world because it is ill-fitted to do that. It has difficulty in getting a few transport helicopters to Afghanistan, let alone it should tackle the food crisis.

Mr. Vliegthart: I think that is a very relevant question, especially because there seems to be a tendency like «if you have a hammer everything in the world looks like a nail and you can hammer on it». In that respect to militarise all these issues and to put the military component first is a somewhat dangerous development. Apart from a discussion on what NATO ought to do we need to have a broader discussion on what international organisations can do to provide these security arrangements where there is no military necessary. Most of the issues that were raised like famine and even to a large extent – as Frank van Kappen mentioned – energy are not primarily a military issue and a military question. I think we should avoid making them a military question by overloading a new strategic concept with all kinds of issues that need to be addressed within NATO. In that respect, we need a lean concept that actually addresses what needs to be addressed militarily.

Mr. Ormel: I do not think we need NATO for many of the worldwide problems. We have the UN, the FAO, the WHO, etc. These are organised by nations but are worldwide organisations. But as Professor Lindley-French stated security and military security are at the basis. If you are talking about soldiers then nations want to have their sovereignty about what happens to their soldiers. We want to discuss in this room and in the House of Representatives where our soldiers are going to. That is necessary and besides that it is also necessary to show the organisation you belong to that you have that solidarity, that you want to send your soldiers and do not want so many caveats and that you want to pay money for your defence budget. I think there is a national responsibility to us politicians to show that maybe we are going down too much in our defence budgets and we have to do more to secure ourselves.

Mr. van Kappen: It is a very relevant question. NATO itself as an organisation is the first to recognise that they are not the answer to all the problems in the world. In the future we have to face a composite threat to our vital interests. Some of it is military and some of it is not military at all. If you look at the sovereign wealth funds in this world; if a nation like Dubai release all the money they have in such a fund it could immediately destabilise our economic security. The Dow Jones would go down, the AEX would go down. China also has a sovereign wealth fund, as well as Norway. These are non-military threats to our economic security. So, there are many threats to our vital interests and NATO is not the hammer to use for every nail. NATO provides a very basic thing: military security, politically based, legitimate and credible military security. The other threats to our vital interests should be accounted by other means. Other organisations are much better suited to do that. For us, as Europeans, the first step should be to recognise that the European Union, contrary to NATO has access to other elements of alliance power than military power alone. It is the ideal strategic partner for NATO, that could take care of all those non-military aspects. The EU has a mechanism to have access to the other elements of state power. NATO has no mechanism to have access to the other elements of state power. NATO has only access to military power and political power to a certain extent. For me, it is the most important thing to break down the brick wall between the European Union and NATO. These are strategic partners. Let me tell you one more thing. I know I am on the edge here, but it is still something that is stuck in my mind. I have seen papers when I was working for NATO that said «releasable to PFP-nations and Russia but not to the European Union».

Are we crazy? The European Union is the natural strategic partner to take care of all those other threats we have to face that are non-military in nature. That is my plea: break down the brick wall between the European Union and NATO. If you do that first, there are other organisations too, that we could build strategic partnerships with. But the EU is the first one.

Mr. de Graaf: A lot of organisations are passing the scene. The only one I did not hear was OPEC!

Mr. Kosachev: Yes, NATO does have the future as long as member states of NATO need this organisation. No doubt about that. But as I already expressed it in my key note speech, I do not believe that NATO is the answer to the future challenges and threats. We may have different opinions on what are the major threats but if I would try to answer the question what is the real threat right now, it is the possibility of fundamentalist radical forces in Pakistan to come into possession of nuclear weapons there. This is the number one threat to me and it is of course very much dependent on the situation in Afghanistan. Is NATO capable to respond to this threat number one? My answer is «no». The major deficit of the operation in Afghanistan is that this is a NATO operation. I do not criticise NATO for what NATO is doing in Afghanistan. We support it by our heart, but the limits of this operation is that it is a NATO operation which excludes countries like Russia, China and many others who may contribute but it still is a NATO operation. It experiences huge problems and nobody knows how it will end.

So, yes, NATO may continue to develop and NATO may continue to speak about very important issues like relations with the European Union, like taking or not taking inside countries like Ukraine or Georgia. This is also important but these are not the important things. Again, either we will be able to develop something complementary, something additional which will be really universal and comprehensive or we will continue to address these challenges and threats in a very limited format. Then I am afraid this is not the most efficient format.

Mr. van Kappen: With all respect to Mr. Kosachev but I have to correct something that you said. The operation in Afghanistan is not a NATO operation; it is a UN operation that is executed and led by NATO under Chapter 8. I agree with you that so few non-NATO nations are participating in the operation. Therefore, the perception is, that this is an American, a Western or a NATO adventure, but it is not. It is a Security Council mandated operation, only the UN could not do it because they do not have the necessary military structure; the level of violence is just too high, so they asked, under Chapter 8, NATO to lead the operation.

I agree with you that the most dangerous conflict we are facing today is Afghanistan. Not because of Afghanistan but because of Pakistan. If Pakistan destabilises the Indians are not going to wait. The Iranians in Baluchistan are also waiting for their share. The Iranian influence also spreads into Iraq. So there is a «belt» of fundamental instability from Afghanistan, Pakistan through Iran and even to Iraq. If you are in Iraq you are very near the border of Europe, at least the border of NATO, because Turkey is there. This is the most dangerous conflict that we face. It is also dangerous for Russia. The reason that Russia is not participating in the field in this NATO-led operation is a historical one. I am not sure, but I feel Russia is participating because Russia is supporting the NATO-operation by opening Russian airspace for logistics. But you are absolutely right, the perception is that this is a Western, a NATO adventure. It is not; it is a UN operation led by NATO. But the perception is that it is Western because so

few other nations participate. And it is the most dangerous conflict that we face at the moment.

Mr. **Kox** (SP fractie Eerste Kamer der Staten-Generaal): Thank you for this debate, though I get a bit pessimistic whenever I hear Frank. Nevertheless, it is a good debate. You remind us of the fact that we are living in dangerous times. It is not a time to relax and wait and see; we have to do something. I am a member of the Parliamentary Assembly of NATO and I wanted to share my experience there with you to show that things are quickly changing.

In 2004, I was in Bratislava with the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. Two days before a bomb was detected and fortunately they removed it. The Slovakian army was protecting us, parliamentarians both from Russia as well as from the NATO countries. The atmosphere was very bad. An American senator told us shortly after the conflict in Iraq: let's be clear, you don't want us and we don't need you. That was the situation in NATO at that time.

Four years later we had a meeting in Oslo and there we had an opposite situation. It looked as if the differences between Europe and America had been solved and Russia was there because of the war between Georgia and Russia. Very fierce statements were made against Russia and the Russian Council was dismissed.

Now we have our Parliamentary Assembly of NATO in three weeks in Edinburgh and once again, the situation is totally different. We now have a president in the United States who knows that isolationism and unilateralism are not of use anymore. We also have a president in the Russian Federation who also realises that this era should be behind us. He offers proposals to how to combine things.

Because things change so quickly I would like to ask both Mr. Kosachev and Mr. Klijn how long this window of opportunity will remain of having a president in the United States and a president in the Russian Federation who both realise we have to do some other business than looking for confrontation. If president Obama fails there is still a chance of a fall-back to the other position in the United States. The same goes for the Russian Federation. There still is a possibility to look eastward instead of westward. How much time do we have to really improve things before they get worse again?

Mr. **Kosachev**: I totally agree with Tini Kox that we have clear time limits. This window of opportunity is not forever and I think that Mr. Obama is now under hard pressure and his popularity is declining. He needs to produce some good news for the American audience. We have already good news for the Russian audience, like the cancellation of the anti missile systems project in Poland and the Czech Republic. I believe that a very important benchmark is the future agreement on strategic armament between Russia and the United States, which expires on 5th December. As far as I know, the progress is rather good, so people on both sides are still rather optimistic. Maybe the difficult parts of it are still ahead but optimism is still there.

Of course, the second is Afghanistan. Definitely, Afghanistan. Russia made a very good move by supporting this operation by NATO and we hope it will also give some good results in the nearest future.

The third is Iran. As you can see, the communications between Russia, the United States and other participating states in this group are much better

right now. This makes Iran also to move ahead. I do not know the results of the discussions today, whether Iran has accepted the proposals made by the G6. But yes, we are on the right track and I hope we will not miss this window of opportunity.

Mr. **Klijn**: Indeed, I agree there is another window of opportunity, the famous reset button and the decision about the anti missile system. But there have been windows of opportunity before in the post Cold War era. Under the first term of Jeltsin there was a very pro-Western policy emanating from Moscow, which in Moscow's perception was met with persistent NATO enlargement. Another window of opportunity appeared just after 9/11, when president Putin was the first to pick up the phone and express his sympathy and offer support to the US led invasion with the facilities in Central Asia. Again, the perception in Moscow was that this generosity was not heeded by the West, mainly the US. Let us not be too pessimistic. It is important that Russia and the US come to terms on a new nuclear disarmament treaty, the one that should succeed the current treaty that expires on 5th December this year, when we all celebrate Pakjesavond in the Netherlands.

I get the feeling, but correct me if I am wrong, that at least in Russian intellectual circles Obama is perceived as a kind of Gorbachev-figure, widely popular abroad but heavily criticised domestically; maybe someone who will oversee the decline of US influence. If that idea spreads into Russian policy circles they may take an attitude of wait and see: how long will Obama last, despite being awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. It will not bring him a lot of domestic support for that matter. So indeed, there is a window of opportunity but there are a couple of threats hanging over this new era.

Closing

Mr. **de Graaf**: Thank you very much. It is half past one and we are getting to the end of this symposium. I want to say words of thanks first to the speakers Mr. Kosachev, Mr. Klijn en Professor Lindley-French, who has already left the symposium. In times of financial crisis I have small presents for the two remaining speakers. I would like to thank you again for your contribution.